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Abstract
This thesis makes a critical examination of the concept ‘environmental security’. It 
explores in depth, and in a manner consistent with critical theory, what has and has 
not been considered under the rubric of environmental security. In so doing, this 
thesis develops an account of environmental security informed by concerns for 
human security and positive peace. The implications of this for politics, policy, 
and governance are also considered.
A critical examination of environmental security is timely. The concept has 
become increasingly popular since the end of the cold war, but the exact meaning 
of the term is by no means clear. Despite this ambiguity, environmental security is / 
now being used to inform policy. It is also gaining prominence as an alternative to 
existing concepts, such as sustainable development, which assist in the 
comprehension and resolution of environmental problems. The concept of 
environmental security is contested between political Realist/nation-centred 
approaches and human and ecologically-centred approaches. This thesis’ critical 
examination finds that there are considerable limitations in the political 
Realist/nation-centred approaches, and it’s reformulation of the concept draws on 
the human security approach and is informed by ecological principles. This 
reformulation offers a more robust environmental security concept which can 
better contest the meaning and practice of environmental security, and which 
provides a new perspective on environmental problems and policy.
This thesis begins with a discussion of environmental insecurity. It then 
outlines the particular critical and Green perspective which is used as the basis for 
subsequent analysis. Next it provides a macro-historical explanation of the causes 
of environmental insecurity. Having established these preliminary understandings 
necessary for a critical examination of environmental security, the thesis then 
examines the meaning of security and the political Realist approach which 
dominates. Next it examines attempts to redefine security, as it was from these that 
the concept of environmental security emerged. It then makes a detailed and 
critical examination of the popular idea that environmental degradation will lead 
to violent conflict. Following this, there is a critical examination of recent U.S. 
environmental security pronouncements and initiatives. The thesis then discusses 
the linkages between military activity and environmental degradation, and the
concept of ecological security is examined. The thesis argues that Realist, nation- 
centred and militarised approaches to environmental security serve the interests of 
a minority and undermine the needs of the majority of people. It argues that these 
approaches legitimate state inaction and obscure the need for fundamental social 
reform. On the basis of these limitations the thesis then reformulates the concept 
of environmental security to serve the interests of the environment, peace, and 
human security. Some implications of this reformulated concept for politics, 
policy, and governance are then considered.
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This thesis makes a critical examination of the concept ‘environmental security’. It 
explores in depth, and in a manner consistent with critical theory, what has and has 
not been considered under the rubric of environmental security. In so doing, this 
thesis develops an account of environmental security which is informed by 
normative concerns for human security and positive peace. The policy relevance 
of such an account is also considered.
A critical examination of environmental security is timely. The concept has 
become increasingly popular since the end of the cold war, but the exact meaning 
of the term is by no means clear. The literature has evolved in an ad hoc manner 
with a variety of interpretations vying for credibility. This cacophony of discrepant 
interpretations has not prevented an environmental security policy discourse from 
emerging, although this discourse too, is far from clear about the meaning of 
environmental security. That environmental security is now informing policy 
makes the need for an examination of the concept all the more important. In 
addition, environmental security is gaining prominence as an alternative to 
existing concepts, such as sustainable development, which assist in the 
comprehension and resolution of environmental problems. That these existing 
approaches, regardless of how theoretically coherent and well intended, have 
failed (thus far) to lead to a resolution of environmental problems makes the 
development of an alternative concept potentially useful. At present there is little 
in the concept of environmental security to suggest much of a contribution in this 
respect. However, a critical examination leading to a more consistent formulation, 
such as this thesis intends, may well assist in the production of an environmental 
security concept that is better able to comprehend environmental problems and 
inform policy.
This thesis is motivated by the widely shared perception that environmental 
degradation poses fundamental problems for humanity. It is also motivated by an 
arguably no less widespread perception that throughout society there are 
unacceptable injustices or violences (insecurities) that degrade the lives of large 
numbers of human beings. These environmental and social problems are
2interrelated, and this thesis locates itself at this intersection. The problems of 
environmental degradation and environmental insecurity are explicated in the 
following section o f this chapter.
Understood in another way, the meta-problem of concern for this thesis is 
that of insecurity, particularly its environmental dimensions. Environmental 
security as others have understood it, and as this thesis understands it, is a 
manifestation of contemporary concerns (however varied) for degradation o f the 
‘environment’ combined with a concern for ‘security’ (however understood). In 
one fundamental, and ultimately inescapable sense, environmental security 
involves various interpretations o f the conjunction of the words ‘environment’ and 
‘security’. In another sense, environmental security is part o f the ongoing struggle 
to conceptualise, in a politically and policy relevant way, responses to 
environmental degradation. From yet another perspective, environmental security 
represents the attempt by certain theoreticians and practitioners of International 
Relations, the purveyors o f ‘security’ par excellence, to come terms with 
environmental issues.1 2 In this respect a study of environmental security is a study 
of global environmental politics. However, this thesis is not a study of 
International Relations as such, it draws on and synthesises a range of ideas from a 
range of disciplines, of which International Relations is but one (see chapter 2).
This thesis is located at the broad juncture where studies of environmental 
degradation intersect with peace studies. It is therefore very large in scope. There 
are two dimensions to this; laterally, this thesis seeks to cover all the existing 
literature from which present approaches to environmental security can be 
discerned and potential reformulations developed; vertically, this study delves into 
a wide range o f issues which are intimately related to environmental degradation 
and peace. This latter depth is necessary as any meaningful conceptualisation of 
environmental security requires some appreciation of the entirety o f the modem 
world. As Falk has observed, there is an:
(I)nterconnectedness of the threats to human existence, not only in the banal
sense that everything is connected to everything else, but in the fundamental
1 When this thesis refers to ‘International Relations’ it is referring to the mainstream of the 
discipline. A reference to ‘global politics’ should be read as a reference to an emergent 
perspective which has a critical and more spatially unrestrained understanding of politics.
2 Australian National University PhD dissertation guidelines stipulate that a thesis may not 
exceed 100,000 words. Unfortunately this has meant that certain related and interesting 
dimensions, particularly to Part I of this study, have been either relegated to footnotes or to 
appendices. The reader is not required to read these (of course), and the thesis should work 
in their absence. However, the reader is encouraged to peruse the footnotes and appendices 
if these seem of interest.
3respect that these issues cannot be successfully treated as separate and
separable (Falk 1971: 98).
This is not by any means to say that this thesis comprehensively addresses the full 
gamut of problems in this late modem era, but it is to say that it is aware of these 
and it situates itself in this broader context.
This thesis differs from many theses in that it focuses on theories, 
discourses and concepts of environmental security rather than adopting a case 
study approach. This entails taking risks, for “without risk-taking, the capacity for 
reflection and shared communication would lie dormant and the only rationality 
would be the bad economics, poor human relations and rotten morality” that seems 
to characterise so much of the modem world (Rees 1995: 285-6). Although this 
thesis does not study environmental security by way o f case studies as many do, 
there is a small case study o f Australian defence and environmental issues in 
chapter 8, and one of nuclear power in chapter 9. The preparation o f this thesis did 
not involve conducting interviews, nor is there much analysis of public documents 
(other than in chapter 7). Instead this thesis seeks to assess the concept of 
environmental security itself, by exploring its historical antecedents, and by 
critically examining the literature. Such a comprehensive critical study has never 
been conducted, and is long overdue.* 4 Indeed it might be argued that those 
empirical studies of environmental security rest on shaky conceptual foundations 
given that there is as yet no paradigmatic coherence to environmental security and, 
as this thesis will argue, most existing approaches to environmental security are 
undertheorised. This thesis therefore seeks to provide a coherent and consistent 
account of environmental security as a basis for further research and action.
In pursuing its goal, this thesis therefore does two things. It provides a 
sustained critical appraisal and reformulation of the concept o f environmental 
security. In the course of this critical appraisal it offers insights into the 
interrelated concerns o f peace and environmental degradation, as de Wilde notes: 
“it is politically correct to read an environmental security o f the world”. The 
concept of environmental security is therefore not only a specific concern but also
J Recent PhD theses by Edwards (South Pacific), Magno (Spratley Islands) and Stoett
(regimes for atomic energy, whaling and river management) each use case studies of
environmental security. The findings of these are available in Edwards (1996), Magno 
(1997), and Stoett (1995).
4 Dalby’s work, however, makes a considerable inroad (see various references in the 
bibliography)
4a vehicle for reflection on these broader concerns for peace and the environment. 
The structure o f this thesis’ inquiry is outlined in section 1.3 of this chapter.
1.2 The Problem(s): Environmental Degradation and Environmental 
Insecurity
Before proceeding it is necessary to talk a little about the problem that 
environmental security seeks to address and to establish certain terms and 
processes which underpin later analysis and discussion (this is also the function o f 
Part I of this thesis). As shall be established in the introduction to Part II, exactly 
what is the problem is by no means clear, as Brock wryly observes,
“environmental security .. is an answer. And what was the question?” (1996: 5).5 
It is therefore necessary to establish an understanding of the particular problem 
that this thesis considers to be the purview of environmental security. Although 
this runs the risk of imposing an a priori beginning to the critical examination aim 
of this thesis, there is little option but to establish this such that some notion o f the 
substantive problem is established. In any event, because this thesis ultimately 
proposes it’s own approach to environmental security, establishing the problem 
that concerns it - even if this is not the concern o f other approaches - is warranted.
The problem is understood by this thesis to be that of environmental
insecurity, itself a function of the more general problem of environmental
degradation. This may seem axiomatic, but environmental insecurity frequently
goes without mention in much of the literature. A couple of observations help set
the context for discussing environmental degradation and the more specific
problem of environmental insecurity:
Humanity is approaching a crisis point with respect to the interlocking
issues of population, environment, and development.... As human numbers
increase, the potential for irreversible changes o f far reaching magnitude 
also increases. Indicators o f severe environmental stress include the growing 
loss of biodiversity, increasing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing 
deforestation worldwide, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid rain, loss of 
topsoil, and shortages o f water, food, and fuel-wood in many parts of the 
world (Population Summit o f the W orld’s Scientific Academies 1993: 13 
and 5).
The world has become more polarised, and the gulf between the poor and 
rich o f the world has widened even further..... The poorest 20% of the
5 This absence of a problem statement says much about the difficulties of a critical 
examination of environmental security.
5world’s people saw their share of global income decline from 2.3% to 1.4%
in the past 30 y ea rs .... The assets o f the world’s 358 billionaires exceed the
combined annual incomes of countries with 45% of the world’s population
.....The gap in per capita income between the industrial and developing
worlds tripled, from US$5,700 in 1960 to US$15,400 in 1993 (UNDP 1996:
2).
The ‘environment’ itself is a confusing term. Its basic meaning is “the total 
of the external conditions that surround an organism, community or object” 
(Goodall 1987: 155). Harvey notes that the environment “necessarily means such 
different things to different people, that in aggregate it encompasses quite literally 
everything there is ... the uses to which a word like environment is put prove 
instructive” (1996: 117). What is “instructive” about the use of the word 
‘environment’ is the way in which this “fundamentally incoherent” concept is 
deployed to serve certain interests (Harvey 1996: 117). It is the commonality and 
universality of such a word that makes its capture desirable for particular interests. 
This ambiguity o f meaning necessitates an explication o f what this thesis means 
by ‘environment’.
In this thesis ‘environment’ is understood as a common label for what is 
more accurately called ‘the biosphere’, defined as: “that part of the Earth’s surface 
which includes living organisms, the remains of living organisms and the physical 
and chemical components of the total system necessary for, or involved in the 
process of life” and “which were in existence before human culture appeared on 
Earth” (Boyden et al 1990: 314 and 290).
There is an abundance o f empirical data that points to increased 
environmental degradation and insecurity.6 When regarding such figures the 
notion of biological and biophysical interdependence (ecology) must always be 
kept in mind. Focussing on any single problem limits appreciation of the broader 
processes of environmental degradation. Thus the Aristotelian observation that 
‘the sum of the parts does not equal the whole’ (even assuming that we have a sum 
of parts) has is corresponding application in the understanding that “the whole of 
the insecurity domain is greater than any of its parts” (Borrow 1996: 436). The 
following observations about environmental degradation and environmental
6 As a rule all such evidence needs to be treated with caution as there is a high degree of 
knowledge uncertainty due to the more generic problems associated with the ecological 
sciences (see for example Dovers and Handmer 1992, and Peters 1991). The overwhelming 
focus in this section is on differences between nation-states. This should not be taken to 
infer that this thesis is unaware of discrepancies that occur within individual nation-states, 
or indeed of the differences between people.
6insecurity should be seen, then, not only as problems in their own right, but also as 
signs pointing to a far larger problem.
1.2.1 Environmental degradation
Environmental degradation is understood by this thesis to be the processes by 
which the life sustaining functions o f the biosphere are disturbed. So when this 
thesis refers to the problem of environmental degradation it is referring to the 
totality of a wide range of interdependent processes occurring at a range of scales 
and in different places to differing degrees: “the ecological problematique is 
complicated and multifaceted” (Falk et al 1982a: 435). These processes include, 
among others, atmospheric pollution and climate change, biodiversity loss, soil 
loss, salinisation and acidification of soils and water, fisheries depletion, depletion 
of forests and timber, marine pollution, and contamination of plants and animals 
by synthetic chemicals and radioactive substances (for a typology see Dovers 
1990).
Harvey considers that there is “a rough convention” in society which loosely 
understands environmental issues to be: “the relationship between human activity 
and well-being ... and a) the condition or health of the biome or ecosystem which 
supports human life, b) specific qualities of air, water, soil and landscapes, and c) 
the quantities and qualities of the natural resource base for human activity” (1996:
118). This points to two basic differences in understanding the problem of 
environmental degradation. First, there is what McMichael refers to as the sources 
problem (Harvey’s part ‘c’ above) which arises when the supply of natural 
resources of direct use to humans decreases, and resource scarcities occur 
(McMichael 1993: 47). This supply of materials problem is fundamental to 
Malthusian theories and was (perhaps mistakenly) the most popularly interpreted 
message of The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972). This aspect is for the 
most part economistic rather than ecological as it concerns the scarcity of natural 
capital contributions to the economy. This narrow understanding makes possible 
Julian Simon’s insistence that environmental problems are resolvable through 
market mechanisms, which is to say that an environmental problem is really an 
economic problem (Simon 1981, Simon and Kahn 1984).
There is another, more complex aspect to the problem of environmental 
degradation, which McMichael refers to as “the overloading of planetary sinks” 
(McMichael 1993: 47). This refers to the decreasing capacity of the planet’s
7natural systems to absorb wastes. O’Riordan and Rayner describe this ‘sinks’ 
aspect:
Possibly the least understood feature of global environmental change is the 
cumulative biogeochemical impact of persistent and toxic micropollutants 
which emanate from dispersed (and uncontrollable) sources via 
concentrations at or below the level of detection. These can accumulate 
unpredictably (chaotically) in air and ocean currents, in rainfall, in soil­
forming processes, and through food chains in such a way as to become 
catastrophically hazardous (O’Riordan and Rayner 1991: 98).
This is arguably the more critical environmental issue and is less easily understood
and less widely recognised, particularly outside the natural sciences. The
overloading of sinks is related to the notion of a threshold beyond which essential
life support systems are no longer able to support certain forms of life - including
our own. This is an ecological understanding of the problem of environmental
degradation. There is, however, considerable overlap between these sources and
sinks aspects.
The assertion that there is increasing environmental degradation is 
widespread and draws on a solid base of scientific understanding. The quotes from 
the Population Summit which opened this section are the consensus of fifty-eight 
national scientific academies, and so refutations of its findings are difficult to 
maintain, at least on scientific grounds. Similarly the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) incorporates a vast number of core contributors and an 
even vaster number of reviewers in the production of its findings about climate 
change, meaning that those who dispute the IPCC’s findings are a very small 
minority, however audible. In 1995 the IPCC stated that “greenhouse gas 
concentrations have continued to increase (since pre-industrial times)... climate 
has changed over the past century ... the balance of evidence suggests a discernible 
human influence on global climate ... climate is expected to change in the future .. 
[but] ... there are still many uncertainties” (IPCC 1995). To invoke the findings of 
the Population Summit and the IPCC is not to suggest that their findings are 
‘factual’, but it does suggest that in as much as scientists agree, scientists agree 
that there is a problem of environmental degradation.
It is thought that some 40% of the earth’s surface used to be covered with 
forests, whereas this figure is now 27% and falling, most of this loss has occurred 
since 1950 (Brown et al 1996). Canada, for example, is thought to be losing up to
7 The IPCC is arguably a historically unique process for science given the vast number of 
contributors and the seemingly strong degree of consensus underlying its findings.
8a million hectares of forest cover per annum, and Siberia 4 million hectares per 
annum (Brown et al 1996). Deforestation strongly implies declining biodiversity, 
although figures for this are difficult to produce as only 13% of an estimated 13 
million species have been scientifically described (UNEP 1997). Tropical 
rainforests cover only 7% of the earth’s surface yet contain an estimated 50% of 
plant and animal species, so their decline accounts for large losses of biodiversity 
(Seager 1995). Every year some 20 million hectares of tropical rainforests are 
grossly degraded or completely destroyed (UNDP 1996). It is thought that up to 
fifty plant species become extinct every day (Seager 1995), that 37% of North 
America’s inland fish species are either extinct or at risk of extinction, and that in 
Europe over 40% of freshwater fish species face possible extinction (Brown et al 
1996).8
Coastal flora is also being rapidly cleared. In Australia for example, 17% of 
Moreton Bay’s mangrove stands have been removed, and in Westernport Bay 85% 
of the area of seagrasses has been lost (Commonwealth of Australia 1996a). In 
Latin America some 50% of coastal mangroves are affected by forestry and 
aquaculture (UNEP 1997), and in Thailand aquaculture has destroyed 87% of 
mangrove stands (Seager 1995). Degradation of coastal environments is 
contributing to depletion of many of the world’s fisheries. Up to 60% of the 
world’s marine fisheries are ‘heavily exploited’ (UNEP 1997). The total marine 
fish catch throughout the world more than quadrupled between 1950 and 1990 
(WRI 1993). In excess of 3 billion people rely in some manner on coastal and 
marine habitats for food and other needs, so it is disturbing that third of the 
world’s coastal regions are at risk from degradation (UNEP 1997).
Land degradation is an important component of the overall processes of 
environmental degradation. Deforestation, agriculture and overgrazing are the 
three principal sources of land degradation. It is thought that some 20% of Asia, 
22% of Africa and 25% of central America suffers from land degradation (WRI 
1992); that 1 billion people in 110 countries are at risk from the impacts of the 
degradation of dry-lands (UNEP 1997); and that 200 million people in 
industrialising countries are severely affected by desertification (UNDP 1996). 
Land degradation contributes to decreased agricultural productivity, despite
g
The introduction of new or non-endemic species is also a significant cause of biodiversity 
loss. In Australia there are between 1,500 and 2,000 introduced plant species, and 
introduced species now account for 31% of all plant species found in Tasmania 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992a).
9increased use of fertilisers. Brown (1996) notes that overall, grain harvests are 
gradually declining, whilst population numbers continue to increase. Africa in 
1994 was producing 27% less food than in 1967 (Seager 1995), and in 1995 the 
world grain harvest was less than world consumption; reserves are thus gradually 
diminishing (Brown et al 1996). Some 95% of the world’s food is supplied by only 
thirty crops, four of which - wheat, rice, maize and potato - dominate (Seager 
1995). Worldwide the price of basic foodstuffs is increasing. More than 800 
million people do not get enough to eat and 500 million people are chronically 
malnourished (UNDP 1996). Malnourishment is most prevalent in Africa, West 
Asia and South America, and ovemourishment is most prevalent in North America 
and Europe (Seager 1995).
Atmospheric pollutants are also a significant problem. All the world’s major 
cities suffer from poor air quality (UNEP 1997). There is evidence to suggest that 
that skin cancers are increasing in southern latitudes due to depletion o f the 
stratospheric ozone layer (McMichael 1993, Seager 1995). Ozone depletion has 
increased despite considerable action to reduce the use o f ozone depleting 
substances in industrialised countries (UNEP 1997). In 1995 worldwide carbon 
emissions reached an all time high of nearly 6.1 billion tons, reflecting a 
worldwide increase in the burning of atmospherically damaging fossil fuels for 
energy (Brown et al 1996).
The most large scale atmospheric problem is that o f global warming, or 
more accurately - climate change. As discussed earlier, the evidence suggests a 
warming of climate, likely increased climatic variability, and “average sea level is 
expected to rise” (IPCC 1995). 1995 was the warmest year since records began to 
be kept 130 years ago, and the ten warmest years on record have occurred since 
1980 (Brown et al 1996). Global warming is of particular concern to 
industrialising countries as these tend to have less effective adaptive mechanisms, 
and so are less resilient to problems arising from climatic variability and rising
9 The difficulty of referring to ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries has been resolved by calling these 
‘industrialised’ and ‘industrialising’ countries. This seeks to resolve the geographic- 
discursive distanciation that transpires when the words ‘third world’ are used (is it not this 
world?), and the value assumptions made when the words ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ are 
used (greater wealth is not necessarily a positive ‘development’). Having said this, this 
thesis is aware that the use of industrialised/industrialising is not without its own 
complications and is certainly not connotation free, however the suggestion is that these 
terms are more about describing an economic state rather than implying a value judgement 
about the validity of ways of living.
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sea-levels. Between 1989 and 1995 there were 13 weather related disasters 
throughout the world which individually caused in excess of US$3 billion in 
damages, and which collectively caused US$106.4 billion in damages (Flavin 
1996). Even the adaptive mechanisms of the industrialised countries are faltering; 
insurance claims for weather related disasters increased from $16 billion between 
1980-1990, to $48 billion between 1990-1995 (Brown et al 1996). As a result, 
many insurance companies are incrementally reviewing policies that insure against 
the risk of weather related losses (Brown et al 1996).
Worldwide population numbers are increasing, as is the number of people 
living in urban areas. In 1995 the world’s population increased by 87 million 
people, most of whom were bom in industrialising countries (Brown et al 1996). 
Growing numbers of people in conjunction with environmental degradation 
contributes to a rising numbers of refugees - an important aspect of environmental 
insecurity. In 1995 the United Nations registered 4.4 million new refugees, taking 
the world total to 27.4 million. One positive aspect, however, is that the overall 
rate of population growth is slowly declining, and in many areas population has 
already stabilised or is nearing zero growth (Brown et al 1996).
There are other positive indicators. Whilst in absolute numbers the use of 
renewable energy technologies is very small, in relative terms their 
implementation is increasing rapidly. In 1995 sales of energy efficient fluorescent 
light bulbs increased by 15%, shipments of photovoltaic cells increased by 17%, 
and the installation of wind turbines increased by 33% (Brown et al 1996). The 
growth in wind generated power is likely to outstrip the growth in nuclear power 
by the turn of the century (Brown et al 1996). Particularly striking is that while 
automobile production increased only slightly in 1995 to 36 million units, bicycle 
production increased substantially to 114 million units; this augurs well for the 
future of sustainable transport. Awareness of the risks imposed by high levels of 
fertiliser use is slowly spreading, so that between 1989 and 1992 world fertiliser 
use declined by 15 million tons (Seager 1995). There are now in operation a large 
number of international treaties that seek to protect the environment. In 1992 160 
states signed the Convention on Biological Diversity, and 163 states signed the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. This represents a significant increase 
in support from twenty years ago when only 82 states signed the 1972 London 
Dumping Convention (Seager 1995). The protection of areas of environmental 
significance is increasing. The percentage of all nations’ areas under protection
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increased from 1.6% in 1972 to 4.9% in 1990 (World Bank 1992). Finally, in 
industrialised countries energy use is becoming more efficient. In 1965 166 
kilograms of oil equivalent energy were needed to produce US$100 of GDP, 
whereas in 1991 the figure was 26 Kg of oil equivalent energy (UNDP 1996).
1.2.2 Environmental insecurity
The problem of environmental insecurity is a more specific aspect of this broader 
problem of environmental degradation. Environmental insecurity is defined here 
as the vulnerability ofpeople to the effects of environmental degradation. So 
environmental insecurity is more than the physical processes of environmental 
degradation, it includes the way this degradation affects the welfare of human 
beings. Environmental insecurity is therefore understood as a social problem, both 
for the way it impacts upon human welfare, and because the meta-problem of 
environmental degradation is a product of human behaviour. At its deepest level 
this understanding of the problem is developed throughout this thesis, and the 
evolution of environmental insecurity will be considered in some detail in chapter 
3.
Environmental insecurity is very much about risk. In the first instance a risk 
to biospheric integrity is a risk to human health. Some infectious diseases, 
including traditional diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, have become more 
prevalent due to continued environmental degradation. In 1993 tuberculosis and 
malaria together accounted for 4.7 million deaths (Platt 1996). At the same time 
acute respiratory infections claimed 4.1 million lives, and diarrhoeal diseases 3 
million (mostly young) lives (Platt 1996). Further, in 1993 some 200 million 
people were thought to suffer from schistosomiasis, 4.3 million from whooping 
cough, and up to 500 million from malaria (Platt 1996). In 1995 the recorded 
number of HIV infections increased by 4.7 million, and in 1993 there were an 
estimated 700,000 HIV related deaths (Platt 1996). Whilst there is much 
speculation about the origin of AIDS, McMichael observes that, like most 
infectious diseases, it arises because “changes in human demography, culture and 
technological practice create ecological opportunities for microbes” (1993: 282, 
see also Pirages 1996). It is also suggested that throughout the world there are now 
some 20,000 pesticide related deaths per year (Brown et al 1996).
Water scarcity and poor water quality are arguably the most important 
factors in environmental insecurity. It is estimated that by the year 2000 one
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quarter o f the Earth’s land surface will face persistent water shortages, but already 
there are some 1.7 billion people, or roughly 30% of the world’s population, who 
are without a reliable supply of safe water (UNEP 1997). Water borne diseases are 
still the largest cause of human illness and death worldwide, causing some 25,000 
deaths per day (UNEP 1997). The widespread use o f fertilisers affects long term 
agricultural productivity and, through run-off, severely deteriorates water quality.
It is human behaviour that contributes to the risk that the biosphere may be 
unable to sustain some life forms and some ways of living. The United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, and Our Common Future - both of 
which express the consensus of the vast majority o f nation-states - have both 
argued that it is human insecurities such as poverty and inequality which are at the 
root o f many environmental changes (WCED 1987, UNCED 1993). Put another 
way: human vulnerability generates environmental insecurity, which in turn 
exacerbates human vulnerability. In this sense ‘insecurity’ more generally cannot 
be too stringently distinguished from environmental insecurity. So, as we shall see 
more fully in chapter 3, environmental insecurity is complex in both material and 
conceptual ways.
Conventional wisdom has it that a range o f seemingly unrelated human 
vulnerabilities cause environmental insecurity. Such vulnerabilities apply most 
fundamentally to women. Women are more vulnerable (than men) to physical, 
economic and psychological abuse in most if not all modem societies. Worldwide, 
between 85 and 114 million females have been subjected to genital mutilation, 
and surveys in ten countries have shown that between 17 and 33 percent of women 
have been physically assaulted by an intimate partner (Brown et al 1996). Nearly 
130,000 rapes are reported annually in the age group 15 - 59 in the industrialised 
world (UNDP 1996).10 Worldwide, half a million women die each year from 
causes related to childbirth, and in industrialising countries the average maternal 
mortality rate is 384 deaths per 100,000 live births (UNDP 1996). In industrialised 
countries the wage rate for women is two-thirds that for men (UNDP 1996). In the 
public sphere women are under-represented, for example throughout the world 
women hold only 12% of parliamentary seats (or equivalent), and constitute only 
6% of national cabinets (or equivalent) (UNDP 1996).
10 The rate of reportage being an underestimate of incidence due to the stigmatisation of 
sexual assault in nearly all modem societies.
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Children are no more secure than females, and female children are more 
vulnerable than male children. In India and China, for example, infant females are 
far more likely to die than infant males (suggesting that it is extremely difficult to 
disengage population reduction programs from violence) (Brown et al 1996). More 
than 12 million children under the age of five die each year - mostly due to 
malnutrition - and over a third of all children in industrialising countries are 
malnourished (UNDP 1996). More than one million children, mostly females in 
Asia, are forced into prostitution each year (UNDP 1996).
Militarisation is arguably the single biggest institutional risk to human 
beings. The effects of militarisation come not merely from warfare, but also from 
the preparation for warfare and the opportunity costs to society forsaken by 
military' expenditure (see chapter 8). Nuclear testing has been, and continues to be, 
a source of insecurity. Nuclear tests have been carried out at seven sites in the 
South Pacific, making four islands completely uninhabitable and causing above 
average cancer levels in residents of the Marshall Islands (Seager, 1995, Siwatibau 
and Williams 1982). Since the second world war the number of armed conflicts in 
the world has increased by 500%, most of these are intra-state, but no less fatal. In 
conflict zones throughout the world there are in excess of 100 million people who 
are chronically malnourished (UNDP 1996). By 1995 there were some 100 million 
landmines lying in the soils of 64 countries - an indiscriminate threat to the health 
and welfare of large numbers of people throughout the world (Brown et al 1996). 
Landmines deny people access to lands which can be used to grow food and for 
housing. In 1992 more than 20,000 women were raped in Bosnia in a deliberate 
systematic strategy of warfare (Brown et al 1996).
That militarisation continues to generate insecurity is made possible by the 
levels of expenditure on the military-industrial complex. Governments pay out 
large sums to buy ‘security’ of one kind at the expense of security of other kinds. 
An estimated US$8 trillion (US$8,000,000,000,000) has been spent on nuclear 
weapons alone since 1945 (Sivard 1996). In 1995 the world spent US$1.4 million 
dollars on weapons every minute (Sivard 1996). Lockheed Martin, the world’s 
biggest defence company, earned US$19.4 billion in 1995, a sum greater than the 
GDP of 72 of countries (The Economist 1997, and after UNDP 1996). Worldwide, 
an average of 3.2% of every nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was spent on 
defence expenditure in 1994 (UNDP 1996). There are vast discrepancies however, 
the U.S. military budget is bigger than the sum of the military budgets of the next
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thirteen biggest spenders (Sivard 1996). U.S. military spending remains in excess 
of US$250 billion per annum (SIPRI 1996), to compare; the Russian Federation 
spends US$106 billion (1994), France US$42 billion (1994), Australia US$7.2 
billion (1994), Bangladesh US$463 million (1993), Myanmar US$415 million 
(1993), and Guyana US$6 million (UNDP 1996).
The priority given to military spending can be revealed by expressing it as a 
percentage of government expenditure on health and education; for example in the 
United States (1991) military expenditure was equivalent to 46% of all 
expenditure directed towards meeting the health and education needs of U.S. 
citizens (UNDP 1996). Comparable figures are (1991): Myanmar 222%, the 
Russian Federation 132%, Bangladesh 41%, France 29%, Guyana 21%, and 
Australia 24% (UNDP 1996). For the industrialised countries military expenditure 
far exceeds official development assistance (ODA) to industrialising countries.
The United States contributes one dollar to ODA for every 28 dollars on defence, a 
ratio of 1:28; Australia contributes at a ratio of 1:7, France contributes at a ratio of 
1:5, Canada contributes at a ratio of 1:4.5, and Japan contributes at a ratio of 1:3 
(after UNDP 1996).
Certain forms of insecurity are being lessened. The world’s stockpile of 
nuclear weapons, long perceived as the single best threat to human survival, is 
gradually decreasing (Brown et al 1996). Globally, the levels of military 
expenditure have been on a downward trend since 1987 (Sivard 1996). There are 
positive signs on some health issues; smallpox has recently been completely 
eradicated, and polio has been eliminated in 145 countries (Brown et al 1996). 
Between 1960 and 1993 average life expectancy in industrialising countries 
increased from 46 to 62 years, the average infant mortality rate fell by more than 
half, the under 5 years old mortality rate fell by more than half, and now 80% of 
people in industrialising countries have access to basic health services and 70% 
have access to safe water (UNDP 1996). Females are increasingly attaining higher 
levels of education (UNDP 1996).
Consumption and redistribution are key concepts for understanding 
environmental insecurity. Consumption of energy, food and other resources is 
much higher in industrialised countries, and so a far larger amount of wastes are 
generated. Overconsumption in industrialised countries is therefore the primary 
cause of resource depletion and the overloading of planetary sinks. The average
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Canadian, for example, eats 98 kg of largely grain fed beef, whereas the average 
Indian eats less than 20kg of beef - most of which is fed by grazing (Seager 1995). 
In 1991 there was one automobile for every 2.5 Australians as opposed to one car 
for every 200 Kenyans (Seager 1995). An average person in an industrialised 
country consumes ten times as much commercial energy as an average individual 
in an industrialising country (Seager 1995). The population of the industrialising 
countries is four times greater than that of industrialised countries, yet those in 
industrialising countries produce only a quarter of global atmospheric emissions 
(UNDP 1996). Meanwhile, the principal source of energy in industrialising 
countries, firewood, is becoming more scarce. It is estimated that by the year 2000 
over 2.9 billion people will face firewood shortages, an increase of 1.2 billion 
people since 1980 (Seager 1995). A contributing factor in deforestation is paper 
consumption; in North America each person consumed an average of 302kg of 
paper in 1991, whereas in Africa the average person consumed only 6kg of paper 
in the same year (Seager 1995).
This overconsumption and lack of redistribution produces a double 
insecurity whereby long standing vulnerabilities arising from poverty are 
compounded by new vulnerabilities generated by environmental degradation. For 
example, a Bangladesh person has a life expectancy twenty one years less than a 
resident of Australia, a Bangladesh woman is ninety times more likely to die when 
giving birth than a women from Australia, and an average person from Australia 
consumes 90 times more commercial energy than a person from Bangladesh 
(UNDP 1996). There are therefore clear inequities and injustices between these 
two countries, environmental insecurities aside. However, an average Australian 
produces over one hundred times more greenhouse gases than the average person 
in Bangladesh (ie the Australian is more responsible for environmental insecurity), 
yet within 50 years up to 18% of Bangladesh could be flooded due to sea-level 
rises, whereas a much smaller amount of Australia’s surface is likely to be flooded 
(WRI 1996). Furthermore, Australia has much greater wealth as a nation 
(Australia’s Gross Domestic Product in 1993 was 12 times greater than that of 
Bangladesh), as do its residents (GDP/capita is 14 times greater), giving it the 
fiscal capacity to adapt to sea-level rise and increased climatic variability (UNDP 
1996). The difference is that for an Australian, environmental insecurity is a 
problem of adaptation, for a Bangladesh person the problem is a matter of life and 
death. The are therefore discrepancies in responsibility for environmental
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problems and vulnerability to environmental problems. The double vulnerability 
considered here underlies the idea of environmental justice.
The continued non-resolution of environmental insecurity motivates this 
thesis. Despite growing awareness of environmental changes, and long standing 
awareness of material insecurities, the problems persist. There can be little doubt 
that the world is aware of famine and malnutrition in Africa, clearfelling of 
rainforests in central America, the continued abuse of women and children, and 
the real possibility of sea-level rises. Why these problems have not been resolved 
is a vexing question. Answering this question requires (among other things), 
numerous in-depth studies on a variety of related subjects. This thesis is one such 
study. It also requires communication and exchange between these studies. 
Bearing this latter need in mind, this thesis seeks to be open, transparent and 
accessible such that this communicative requirement can be fulfilled more 
effectively.
1.3 Thesis Overview
The overarching aim of this thesis is to make a critical examination of the 
concept of environmental security. There are three broad components to the 
satisfaction of this aim, these are addressed in the three Parts that comprise this 
thesis. First, there is a need to establish some foundations for the critical 
examination to proceed in an informed, consistent, and accessible manner. This is 
the function of Part I of this thesis, which establishes the critical, normative, and 
historical foundations upon which the subsequent examination is based. Part I is 
comprised of chapters 2 and 3 (individual chapters are discussed below). Second, 
there is of course a need to subject existing accounts of environmental security to 
critical examination. This is the function of Part II of this thesis. A cursory review 
of the environmental security literature reveals seven major themes: redefining 
security; environment, conflict and instability; environmental (national) security; 
military-environment linkages; ecological security; environmental (human) 
security; and the issue of securitisation (these are displayed in the heuristic guide 
located in the introduction to Part II). Part II begins with a preliminary chapter 
which discusses the meaning of security. Then it examines attempts to redefine 
security, as it was from these attempts that the concept of environmental security 
emerged. It then critically examines in turn the themes of conflict and instability,
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environmental (national) security, military-environmental linkages, and ecological 
security. The theme of securitisation is discussed throughout Parts II and III. Part
II is comprised of chapters 4 to 9. Third, there is a need to provide an account of 
environmental security which is informed by the critique, and which is linked to 
practice. This is the function of Part III of this thesis. Part III of this thesis 
advances the theme of environmental (human) security as, it is argued, this is 
theoretically and practically the most effective way to conceptualise 
environmental security. Part III also discusses some implications of this human- 
centred environmental security concept for politics, policy, and governance. Part
III is comprised of chapters 10 and 11.
There are a number of specific requirements for a critical examination of the 
concept of environmental security, these are addressed in the first eleven chapters 
of this thesis (which are divided into the three Parts discussed above). The first of 
these is to establish the problem to which environmental security speaks. This was 
the function of the previous section of this chapter. It is important to establish the 
problem as this provides a firm basis upon which discussion can then proceed, and 
because, strangely, the problem to which environmental speaks is rarely 
explicated. To restate, the problem is environmental insecurity, understood as the 
vulnerability of people to the effects of environmental degradation. So, 
environmental security is a specific aspect of the broader problem of 
environmental degradation, defined here as the processes by which the life 
sustaining functions of the biosphere are disturbed.
In order to justifiably call itself ‘critical’ in orientation, it is important to 
outline the particular critical approach that this thesis adopts. Hence the second 
requirement to meet this thesis’ overarching aim is to outline the critical 
perspective for the subsequent examination o f environmental security. This is 
necessary to make clear the presuppositions and values that inform this thesis, it 
facilitates transparency and accessibility, it establishes some key concepts, and it 
gives a sense of the nature of the inquiry that follows. This is the function of 
chapter 2, which is the first chapter of Part I of this thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the 
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, feminist theory, poststructuralist theory 
and Green theory to elicit some features more or less common to all. These 
generally common features form the basis of this thesis’ critical Green perspective, 
they include: an open declaration of the values informing the inquiry, a dialectical 
perspective, an appreciation and regard for history, a positive view of human
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nature and an emancipatory intent, an holistic and interdisciplinary approach, and 
a concern for imagination and utopianism. Chapter 2 also discusses the normative 
concern of this thesis which is encapsulated in the notion of peace.
For a critical examination of environmental security to be both 
comprehensive and insightful it needs to have an understanding of the evolution of 
contemporary society, and an understanding of the history of the problem. Further, 
to be capable of generating effective recommendations for change, any 
conceptualisation of environmental security also requires this understanding.
Hence the third requirement to meet this thesis’ overarching aim is to understand 
the evolution o f environmental insecurity. This is the function of chapter 3 which 
offers a meta-history of insecurity. Chapter 3 discusses four phases of human 
history: the hunter-gatherer phase, the early farming phase, the early urban phase, 
and the modem high energy phase. The principal findings are that over time 
population, energy use, social disaggregation, violence (structural and direct - see 
chapter 2), and environmental degradation have all massively increased.
Because ‘security’ is a key component of environmental security, there is a 
need to understand its meaning. Thus the fourth requirement to meet this thesis’ 
overarching aim is to examine the meaning o f security. This is the function of 
chapter 4, which is the first chapter of Part II of this thesis. This chapter discusses 
the concept of security in general terms, and then it discusses and critiques the 
political Realist approach to security which has conditioned almost all existing 
accounts of environmental security. Chapter 4 argues that the Realist approach to 
security protects the security of the state and the military-security establishment at 
the expense of the vast majority of people.
Part of any successful examination of a concept or idea is the need to 
understand its beginnings, hence the fifth requirement to meet this thesis’ 
overarching aim is to examine the origins o f environmental security. This is the 
function of chapter 5. Chapter 5 discusses efforts to extend and modify the 
dominant Realist approach to security as it was from these efforts that the concept 
of environmental security emerged. This chapter argues that despite good 
intentions these efforts did not sufficiently modify the Realist approach, and the 
new security concepts that were proposed were instead coopted by Realist security 
discourse.
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Because the dominant Realist approach to security entails a concern for war, 
it is not surprising that environmental security is concerned about the ways in 
which environmental degradation may contribute to armed conflict. The most 
cursory review of the literature reveals this to be the case. This environment- 
conflict concern warrants critical examination, so the sixth requirement to meet 
this thesis’ overarching aim is to examine the idea that environmental degradation 
will induce violent conflict. This is the function of chapter 6. Chapter 6 argues that 
contemporary concerns about environmentally induced conflicts reflect the (not 
essential) Realist ontology which assumes that people will resort to violence in 
times of stress. It argues that this literature fails to grasp the difference between 
resource and environmental problems, that it leads to militarisation of 
environmental problems, and that it obscures recognition of the day-to-day 
environmental insecurities people experience.
The concept of environmental security has been deployed in policy 
discourse. Examining the policy manifestations of environmental security reveals 
more clearly the way in which nation-states interpret and deploy the concept.
Hence the seventh requirement necessary to meet this thesis’ overarching aim is to 
examine policy manifestations o f environmental security. This is the function of 
chapter 7. Chapter 7 begins by discussing environmental security as a national 
security phenomena, and then it examines the policy initiatives of the United 
States. This examination of U.S. environmental security policy finds that 
environmental security is interpreted and deployed in ways that legitimise the 
military and security establishment. It is then argued that a more robust 
environmental security concept is required to help resist military appropriation and 
to more effectively contest the meaning and practice of the concept such that 
humanitarian concerns can be heard in policy dialogue.
In addition to the issue of environmental degradation inducing conflict, the 
prevailing (Realist) war-oriented approach to security induces environmental 
security to consider the relationship between militaries and the environment. This 
warrants further examination, and so the eighth requirement to meet this thesis’ 
overarching aim is to examine the connections between the military and the 
environment. This is the function of chapter 8. Chapter 8 discusses the 
environmental effects of warfare and the way military preparation for warfare 
degrades the environment. The principal focus of chapter 8 is on the difficult 
question of whether militaries may be able to help overcome environmental
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insecurity. A tentative argument is made that militaries can make a positive 
contribution by engaging in non-core, non-coercive and domestically-oriented 
activities. The principal benefit of this, it is argued, comes from the possibility that 
it may assist in conversion of the military.
Chapters 4 to 8 focus largely on the security component of environmental 
security. Counterbalancing this, there is a need to explore the environmental, or 
ecological component, often expressed through the concept of ecological security. 
The concept of ecological security occurs simultaneously with environmental 
security, and is at times used interchangeably. The idea of ecological security 
presents a different approach to security and environment-security linkages, and so 
it warrants consideration. Thus the ninth requirement to meet this thesis’ 
overarching aim is to examine the concept o f ecological security. This is the 
function of chapter 9. Chapter 9 applies ecological theory to security, arguing that 
ecological notions of resilience and diversity can be metaphors for a more positive 
approach to security. It also discusses the difficult issue of sovereignty and 
ecology, and it suggests that rather than rethinking sovereignty, a broader project 
of rethinking the meaning and practice of politics is required. Chapter 9 also 
applies a framework for identifying ecological security problems. It is concluded 
that the concept of ecological security has many merits, but is not particularly 
effective in contesting the meaning and practice of security and its environmental 
dimensions. Ecological security does not engender a dialogue with the dominant 
Realist approach in the way that environmental security does. For this reason, this 
thesis argues that environmental security is the preferred term, but requires 
reformulation such that previously ignored ecological notions and humanitarian 
concerns are emphasised.
So, this thesis argues that a human-centred and ecologically infused 
environmental security concept can more effectively contest the meaning and 
practice of both security and environmental security. Such a reformulation of 
environmental security helps to overcome the limitations of existing approaches, 
and it may offer a genuine alternative approach to the comprehension and 
resolution of environmental problems. This is the essence of the tenth requirement 
necessary to meet this thesis’ overarching aim, which is to reformulate the concept 
of environmental security such that it overcomes the limitations o f existing 
approaches. This is the function of chapter 10, which is the first chapter of Part III 
of this thesis. Chapter 10 draws on the literature on human security to inform its
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reformulation of environmental security. This human-centred environmental 
security concept is true to the normative value of peace, and is informed by the 
notions of risk and resilience. It is argued that a human-centred environmental 
security concept must seek to enhance the security of those people most vulnerable 
to the effects of environmental degradation; people are the first and overriding 
security referent. In chapter 10 the human-centred environmental security concept 
is explained, defined, related to the concept of sustainability, and then justified by 
answering some questions posed in the literature.
The applicability of this thesis’ human-centred reformulation of 
environmental security is enhanced by a general sense of what it implies for 
politics, policy, and governance. So, the eleventh requirement necessary to meet 
this thesis’ overarching aim is to explore the implications o f the reformulated 
environmental security concept for politics, policy, and governance. This is the 
function of chapter 11. Chapter 11 does not propose detailed policy measures, 
arguing that these are available elsewhere. Instead, it addresses institutions of 
politics and governance, arguing that these are responsible for the failure to 
provide environmental security. The role of individuals as political agents is given 
considerable attention. Motives for individual action and the ways in which 
individuals may act to enhance environmental security are discussed. Next, some 
implications for national policy are explored. It is argued that national policy 
should foster dialogue between a more diverse range of interests represented in 
governance processes. It is also proposed that national governments should 
facilitate the implementation of a polycentric system of governance.
A concluding chapter seeks to cover the principal outcomes and 
contributions of this thesis, revisit its aim, and suggest some areas for further 
research (chapter 12). However, the general tenor of the critical perspective of this 
thesis makes it improper to suggest that there will be complete closure in this final 
chapter.
This structure of this thesis therefore contributes to the overarching aim to 
conduct a critical examination of environmental security. It works towards a 
critical (and comprehensive) examination of environmental security through 
careful consideration of the problem, the critical approach, and the history of the 
problem; by critiquing existing approaches; and on the basis of this proposing its 
own conceptualisation of environmental security and discussing the implications
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of this for policy, politics, and governance. There are difficulties in moving 
through these various modes of thinking, particularly from critique to policy. The 
structure of this thesis seeks to resolve some of these difficulties, nevertheless, 
shifting from a position of critique to one in which a broad policy position is 
outlined is rarely done and is problematic. This thesis makes the transition through 
a broad understanding of policy as the means to transform society, this means that 
there is no detailed discussion of specific policies.
The structure of this thesis is also designed to make clear the assumptions 
and thought processes that comprise this study such that subsequent dialogue can 
be better directed. Finally, this thesis is an explication of a particular politics; it is 
hoped that this self-understanding is never obscured.
Part I
Foundations: A Critical Green Perspective and a History
of Insecurity
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Introduction to Part I
Foundations: A Critical Green Perspective and a History of
Insecurity
Chapter 1 explained the problems that concerns this thesis, and it introduced some 
key concepts. Part I of this thesis introduces other concepts of relevance, and 
establishes the theoretical, normative, and historical foundations upon which this 
thesis’ critical examination of environmental security is based. It is necessary to 
establish these foundations so that the critical examination can proceed in an 
informed, consistent, and accessible manner.
It is important to be clear about the kind of critical perspective and value 
orientation that informs this thesis (chapter 2). This makes the critique more 
effective, and it makes the analysis of this thesis open and accessible such that 
subsequent dialogue can be based on a clear understanding of the terms, concepts 
and intent of this thesis. This communicative function is vital because the lasting 
contribution of any study is the dialogue and inter subjective learning that it 
stimulates.
Part I also establishes the meta-historical origins of environmental 
degradation and environmental insecurity (chapter 3). An historical awareness is a 
key part of any critical study, and it is essential to effectively address 
contemporary problems such as environmental degradation and environmental 
insecurity. So, an awareness of history is necessary if environmental security is to 
be a useful concept.
Part I therefore sets the scene, and establishes the preliminary 
understandings necessary for a critical examination of environmental security. 
This thesis sees itself as a beginning, not an end, to the study of environmental 
security. Part I, then, is the beginning of this beginning.
24
Chapter 2. Outline of a Critical Green Perspective
2.1 Introduction
This thesis does not have a ‘method’ in any positivist sense, nor does it sit 
comfortably within any particular academic discipline. Instead, this thesis takes a 
‘critical’ approach to the study of environmental security. The purpose of this 
chapter is to outline the particular critical approach that this thesis adopts. Bearing 
in mind Kant’s famous observation that experiences without concepts are blind, 
and concepts without experiences are empty, this chapter seeks to establish the 
main parameters of this critical perspective rather than describe in depth the 
particular analytical concepts, or apply these in any detail (the proposed 
perspective is applied to ‘experience’ in the following chapters). Ultimately this 
thesis “seeks vindication in the plausibility of the stories it tells”, so the function 
of this chapter is to establish the position from which it begins to tell these stories 
(Dryzek 1997: 9).
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the terms of relevance, and 
then discusses what it understands ‘critical theory’ generally to be. Next, it 
summarises the core features of four key critical approaches - The Critical Theory 
of the Frankfurt School, feminist theory, poststructuralist theory and Green theory 
- with a view to eliciting some common features which can inform this thesis’ own 
critical perspective. This is called a ‘critical green perspective’, suggesting that it 
seeks to be more critical than Green theory, and ‘greener’ than most critical 
theory. Green theory is generally (but not always) critical, but has arguably not 
engaged sufficiently with other critical theories (Dickens 1992). On the other 
hand, other critical approaches have not been able to fully connect with the Green 
perspective (Dickens 1992, Goldblatt 1996). This chapter is inspired by attempts 
to link the Green perspective with other critical approaches, such as those by 
Dickens (1992), Dobson (1992, 1993), Dryzek (1997), Eckersley (1992), Goldblatt 
(1996), Harvey (1996), Laferriere (1996) and Paterson (1996), all of which have 
“enlarged the ontological domain of radical social science” (Gleeson 1996: 232). 
This chapter does not claim to do more, nor indeed as much, as these previous 
efforts, but it hopes it might be able to shed some further light on this complex
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field of study. This should be seen as a secondary function of this chapter. The 
primary function of this chapter is to describe the parameters of this thesis’ critical 
green perspective, and in the process reveal its underlying normative concern.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define certain terms. This chapter and 
the thesis as a whole talks of theories, concepts and discourses. A theory is 
understood to be “any abstract general account of an area o f reality, usually 
including the use o f formulation o f general concepts” (Jary and Jary 1995: 686).1 
Theory is approached in this thesis as a critical, non-positivist way of knowing 
which is “reflective on the process o f theorising itse lf’ (Cox 1981: 128), and is 
“directed towards criticism: towards identifying, formulating, refining and 
questioning the general assumptions on which the everyday discussion .. proceeds” 
(Bull 1995: 183). There is a clear distinction between this critical approach to 
theory and that of the traditional (explanatory and predictive) positivist sciences.
A discourse is a specialist language which enables social power by 
describing the world in a particular way, and which makes possible certain claims 
to truth, hence justifying certain forms of action (Foucault 1977a). Discourses 
“operate to foreclose political possibilities and eliminate from consideration a 
multiplicity of possible worlds” (Dalby 1990a: 4). A discourse reduces 
contingency and diversity into a singular unifying framework (George 1994). A 
discourse therefore generates a particular account o f reality which “can be 
mobilised for a particular political end” (Dalby 1990a: 8).
A concept is “the idea or meaning conveyed by a term” (Jary and Jary 1995: 
111). A concept helps to explain, classify and organise thoughts. Although 
concepts have basic meanings and intuitive resonances, many concepts are 
contested. According to Jacobs, sustainable development, democracy, liberty and 
justice are examples of concepts which have competing interpretations (Jacobs 
1991).
This thesis refers to environmental security as a concept rather than as a 
discourse or a theory because it is, at present, a contested idea. The contestation of 
environmental security involves discourses and theories, but the overall picture is 
one of contest of the term, making ‘concept’ the most appropriate label. The
It is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition of ‘theory’. This definition is deemed 
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, however the question o f ‘reality’ and how it can be 
known is not accepted unproblematically.
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essential meaning of environmental security lies in the relationship between 
environmental degradation and security, but the details of this idea - the particular 
representation of the relationship - is the subject of debate. Thus it is most 
accurate to understand this thesis as an examination of the concept of 
environmental security.
A brief summary of the way philosophical categories influence theories, 
concepts and discourses is al$o necessary; this should not be read as a 
comprehensive account of philosophy. The study o f ‘first principles’ is known as 
metaphysics, understood here as a concern for concepts such as being, time, space 
and substance; it is “the ultimate science of Being and Knowing” (Little et al 
1973: 1315). Cosmology is “that part of metaphysics which deals with the idea of 
the world as a totality”; it is the particular way in which metaphysical problems 
are resolved (Little et al 1973: 433). The problem of understanding any given 
cosmology, even one’s own, is arguably intractable. Contingent upon cosmology 
is ontology, understood here as what is presumed about the nature of things which 
exist (Harrison and Livingstone 1980). A particular ontology embodies how what 
is perceived to exist is understood, as opposed to cosmology and metaphysics 
which are concerned with the existence and understanding of things beyond 
immediate perception. Ontology is thought to determine epistemology, the way in 
which knowledge is produced. Finally, depending upon the approach to the 
production of knowledge, a methodology may be employed. Methodology is 
considered by this thesis to be “the techniques and strategies employed within a 
discipline to manipulate data ... the research methods used by an investigator” 
(Jary and Jary 1995: 410).
2.2 Critical Theory
‘Critical theory’ is a term that denotes, in the least, a concern for theorising in 
ways that seek to question established orders of knowledge, and to transcend those 
established orders which impede the realisation of ‘the Good’ - however 
understood. That even this minimal understanding is problematic (particularly 
with respect to the Good) is a reflection of the difficulty of talking coherently and 
conclusively about critical theory. For, even if referring to a particular 
understanding such as the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, a clear picture 
is by no means apparent. This thesis is concerned, however, with a broader
27
conception of critical theory, which could perhaps be more accurately referred to 
as “critical social theory” (George 1994: 139), or “critical theoretical 
investigations” (Campbell 1996: 129), or even more expressively as critical 
political and social theory. The general tenor of which, for the present, is reflected 
in the opening sentence o f this paragraph, namely questioning established orders 
with a view towards achieving the Good.
When talking o f critical theory a distinction can be made between critical 
theories that explain a phenomenon in a critical way and the critical approach to 
theory. These are not mutually exclusive and the distinction should not be taken 
too literally. This chapter describes this thesis’ particular, but hopefully not overly 
inconsistent, critical approach (a ‘critical green perspective’) which draws on four 
loosely identified critical approaches which have particular relevance. These are: 
the Critical Theory o f the Frankfurt School; feminist theory; poststructuralist 
theory; and Green theory. Each of these critical approaches transcends the 
arbitrary drawing o f disciplinary boundaries. That there are differences between 
these critical approaches does not infer sovereign domains based on boundaries 
marked on a one dimensional ‘map’ of knowledge. These four critical approaches 
should be seen as general ‘types’. Each has a unique constellation o f concerns, and 
particular ways o f addressing these. There are common concerns and points of 
agreement, so these four critical approaches are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Further, as knowledge is never static it follows that each of these four approaches 
is in constant transformation, therefore a rigid demarcation is not merely 
counterproductive, but is inevitably prone to error over time. To be sure, in the 
milieu o f approaches and issues discrepancies do arise, but these should be seen, 
as Morrow (1994) and Poster (1989) would suggest, in the context o f the 
interaction and development of theory, not as evidence of entrenched difference. 
Focusing on the difference ignores the broader context and contribution which 
critical theory has made to study o f society and nature.
This chapter is based on an assumption that there is an approximate element 
of complementarity between the four critical approaches identified. The following
2 In that critical theory approaches occur in all of the humanities and social sciences there 
is a very real problem in generalising about such perspectives. For the sake of clarity it 
should be acknowledged that the critical theory literature that informs this discussion 
comes mostly from the disciplines of human geography, international relations, peace 
research, and to a lesser degree political science and sociology (however these are 
defined!). Further, in as much as it is preferable to speak of the approach of a particular 
person or scholar rather than to generalise, the reader can infer that those scholars cited 
throughout this chapter are those that have informed this chapter.
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discussion makes an extremely brief (and therefore necessarily crude) summary of 
these four critical approaches to elicit some generally common features which will 
therefore be of relevance to the critical green perspective of this thesis/ This 
discussion is not intended as a definitive account or comparison of critical theory 
types, nor will it prove or disprove the assumption of complementarity (a task 
which is arguably a PhD dissertation in its own right). Simply, this consideration 
of critical theory types seeks to keep this thesis’ critical approach consistent with 
the broad parameters of the critical tradition.
2.2.1 The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School asks questions of the prevailing 
modem social and political order by juxtaposing the values espoused by a society 
to the realities o f life within that society (the technique o f immanent critique). 
Identifying and highlighting these contradictions serves an emancipatory function; 
it assists people to see through the ideologies that dictate the social order so that 
they may then act conceitedly to counteract these to remake the social order 
(Benson 1983).
Critical Theory is normative in that it espouses the need for the ‘Good life’. 
This sense of the Good grounds Critical Theory’s analysis o f the prevailing order 
(Wellmer 1985). It is important not to infer from this that Critical Theory holds a 
master plan for society. Instead, it seeks the emancipation of all people as the 
means to bring about the condition o f freedom, therefore “the subsequent 
construction of the new society cannot be the object of theory, for it is to occur as 
the free creation of the liberated individuals” (Marcuse 1969: 135). With Critical 
Theory (as with this thesis), politics is the “realm concerned with realising the just 
life” (Devetak 1996a: 146).
Critical Theory appreciates material circumstances. It considers that the way 
in which society organises itself to provide for its material needs is imperfect - in 
as much as these needs could be supplied without repression. Materialism in this 
sense is a concern with human happiness and the conviction that necessary to its 
fulfilment is a transformation of the relations o f production (Leiss 1970). This 
concern for materialism contributes to what Morrow considers to be a
3 The discussion presented here is based on the more extensive summaries located in 
Appendix I. This has been necessary in order to keep the length of this thesis within ANU 
guidelines.
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distinguishing characteristic of the Frankfurt theorists, that is a certain 
“supradisciplinarity” and an openness to theories and methods from the social 
sciences, humanities and non-Marxist philosophies (Morrow 1994: 12). Further, 
Critical Theory adopts an holistic view of society by seeking to understand it in its 
totality, rather than as the sum of narrowly defined and separately studied parts. 
The breadth o f the critique is indicated by White: “As originally conceived, 
critical theory would have the role of giving new life to ideals of reason and 
freedom by revealing their false embodiment in scientism, capitalism, the 'culture 
industry’ and bourgeois Western political institutions” (White 1995: 4).
An important aspect of Critical Theory is its concern for self-reflection, 
understood as a concern “with its own mode o f insertion into the social world” 
(Benson 1983: 335). Critical Theory is aware o f the connection between 
knowledge and power. It is in this political understanding of knowledge and power 
that the openly (in M arcuse’s terms ‘obstinate’) normative character o f Critical 
Theory must be understood. Critical Theory understands itself as political, and 
explains its politics as a concern for emancipation - the process o f making people 
free.4
Common to all who follow the Frankfurt School tradition is a view of 
society as an historical production. Critical Theory observes that “not only is 
history a one-way street, but also that we are irremediably, presently and wholly 
constituted by that history” (Dobson 1993: 195). Although appreciating that 
society is a product of history, Critical Theory (after Marx and Hegel) assumes 
that human activity produces and reproduces the world: “through our daily 
attention and neglect we reproduce our world, for better or worse” (Forester 1983: 
246). Critical Theory therefore views human society as an ongoing social 
production, and so rejects the existence of natural laws (Linklater 1990). Thus 
society is historically shaped and socially reproduced, producing what Heydebrand 
calls the “dialectical process of transforming and self-transforming activity”, 
where ‘self transforming’ refers to the capacity o f human agents to consciously 
generate a social order that transforms the present (1983: 308). This understanding 
of the dialectical nature o f social reproduction is linked to a dialectical 
understanding o f the relationship between theory and social structure. For the 
Critical Theorists, theory itself reflects and recreates social reality (Leiss 1970).
4 Freedom is the ability of people to continually be able to create and recreate themselves 
and society. The extent to which this is possible is the extent of freedom (after Marcuse 
1969).
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This self reflexive understanding holds that in describing the possibilities for 
transformation of society, Critical Theory indeed affects some change in society 
(Leiss 1970).
Summary
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School is interdisciplinary and seeks to 
understand problems within an holistic and historical view of society. It is 
materialist at least in the minimal sense of appreciating that constraints are placed 
on individuals by relations of production. It is dialectical in that it recognises that 
social structures are socially produced and can be reproduced. Critical Theory is 
self reflective and understands itself to be manifestly political, and so is explicit 
about its conception of ‘the Good’ and ‘freedom’ to which it aspires. Critical 
Theory questions the philosophical foundations and repressive tendencies of the 
modem order and seeks to transcend these.
2.2.2 Feminist theory
Feminism can be understood as a social movement (feminism) and as a form of 
critique (feminist theory). This discussion refers primarily to feminist theory. 
Discussing feminist theory is difficult as “there is no one feminism, no single 
approach to the construction of feminist theory, but multiple variations of 
feminism which often embrace very contradictory and overlapping positions, 
discourses and practices” (True 1996: 212); thus “feminism defies premature 
attempts at closure” (Elshtain 1995: 342). However, what is common to all 
feminist theory is a (normative) concern for the oppression of women: “whatever 
else it is, feminism is at least the movement to end sexist oppression. It involves 
the elimination of any and all factors that contribute to the continued and 
systematic domination or subordination of women ... all feminists agree that sexist 
oppression exists, is wrong, and must be abolished” (Warren 1993a: 321). A 
feminist dictum is that the oppression of women is a significant - if not the original 
- axis of oppression (Carrol 1996).
Feminist theory understands those social relations by which women are 
oppressed to be patriarchal. Institutions such as household production, paid labour, 
and popular culture can be patriarchal, as can organisations such as government, 
the market and the military (Walby 1990). Conceptual frameworks are patriarchal 
when they justify and maintain the subordination of women (Warren 1993a).
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Feminist theory talks of gender as a fundamental axis of discrimination: 
“feminist theorizing is distinctive insofar as it reveals how much of social practice 
depends on manipulation of gender” (Enloe 1987: 543). Gender is not the same as 
‘sex’ (biological difference) but is “a set of culturally shaped and defined 
characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity” (Tickner 1992: 7). To 
talk of gender, then, is to question the construction and relationship between 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ based on the (false) conceptualisation of differences in 
sex as being as basic dichotomy of life. The relationship between the two is binary 
because masculinity has no meaning without a feminine ‘other’.
Based on its understanding of sex and gender, one of the broader logical 
foundations that feminist critique tackles is that of dualism: “among the many 
issues that feminism is said to address, I would place ‘dualism’ as central” 
(Glennon 1983: 260). For feminists the problem with dualisms is that they are 
deployed in oppressive conceptual frameworks to establish inferiority and to 
justify subordination and domination (Warren 1993a). An understanding of 
gendered dualisms as a basic feature of social life enables feminist theory to link 
numerous forms of oppression in insightful ways. Ecofeminists, for example, 
understand the domination of nature, rationalised through dualisms such as 
man/nature, to be linked with the domination of women (man/woman) (Merchant 
1982, Seager 1993, Shiva 1989).
A fundamental aspect of the contemporary use of dualisms is the way in 
which the latter of the pair (typically associated with femininity) is devalued or 
excluded (Marchand 1996, Tickner 1992). In understanding that “what gets left 
out is often as important as what is put in and assumed” (Elshtain 1987: 48), 
feminist theory critiques what is assumed to be normal and so “reopen(s) the 
possibilities for development which have been successfully locked off by 
conditioning” (Greer 1993: 17). Feminist theory understands that exclusion is 
integral to identity creating processes such as nationalism, colonialism and racism, 
and that gender exclusion is pivotal in making all exclusion possible (for example 
see Pettman 1995, 1996). As a means to transgress dualisms, feminist theory is 
concerned with what Glennon (1983) calls ‘synthesism’, or holism. This approach 
can be said to be dialectical in that it makes possible the idea of ‘both’ (Glennon 
1983).
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Some feminist theory is concerned with the claim to objectivity enabled by 
the object/subject dualism. The claim of objectivity (masculine, scientific and 
rational) by its binary nature devalues subjectivity (feminine, unscientific and 
irrational). In as much as it rejects the objective and embraces the subjective, 
feminist critique tends to reconfirm the Critical Theory belief that scientific 
objectivity is a falsity. Feminist research therefore recognises “that all knowledge 
is partial and is a function of the knower’s lived experience in the world”, and so it 
takes the subject positionality of the author seriously by making clear its 
assumptions, presuppositions and normative underpinnings (Tickner 1992: 17, 
Dooley 1987).
This awareness of subjectivity makes feminist critical theory self-reflective. 
Feminist critique is aware of the changes in society that can be affected by theory, 
thus “it is especially important to look at the implications of theorising as an 
activity, and not simply at the resulting theories” (Enloe 1987: 526). Like Critical 
Theory', feminist theory' seeks to use this understanding of the political nature of 
theorising to affect a change consistent with its values. Consistent with this 
dialectical understanding of theory, feminist theory assumes that institutions of 
oppression are not fixed but are ongoing processes made possible by human 
thought and action, and so a change in human thoughts and actions can effect a 
change in social relations. Thus feminist theory considers that ‘the personal is 
political’, which is to say that structures of oppression are enabled by all forms of 
oppression, so resistance to patriarchy in the private realm is equally resistance to 
patriarchy in the public realm.
Summary
Feminist theory critiques forms of logic and foundational beliefs that make 
possible the oppression of women. It appreciates that concepts such as gender, and 
the behaviours that these enable, are socially constructed and enable oppression. 
Feminist theory is self-aware and is committed to theoretical self-reflection. It is 
holistic in that it seeks to overcome fractured and dualistic conceptions of the 
world, and it is an interdisciplinary and flexible perspective that speak to all forms 
of oppression in all places, at all scales.
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2.2.3 Poststructuralist theory
In speaking of poststructuralist theory this thesis is speaking of a particular kind of 
post-positivist thinking which differs from other types of critical theory, including 
feminist theory, and which differs in some respects from post-modernism. Exactly 
what constitutes this difference is the subject of a much larger debate, but what all 
poststructuralist theories have in common is that they ask how knowledge, truth 
and meaning are determined (Gregory 1989). Because poststructuralist theory 
resists simplistic classifications, and because it resists definition, this discussion is 
cognisant that it cannot speak of ‘a poststructuralist theory’ as such. Nevertheless, 
in as much as this thesis identifies a poststructuralist perspective, some discussion 
of its core features is necessary. Ashley indicates the general concerns of 
poststructuralism:
The poststructuralist wants to know .. how modes of order are produced, 
imposed, problematized, and resisted as well as why, despite resistance, 
modes of subjectivity, objectivity and conduct are reasserted on a still wider 
scale.... She wants to understand the workings of power in the most general 
terms, and she wants to understand power’s relation to knowledge. She 
wants to examine overt and covert relations between institutions and 
thought.
The boundary itself is never simply there, poststructuralism knows. It is 
always in the process of being marked, transgressed, erased, and marked 
again (Ashley 1989: 279 and 311).
Poststructuralist thought arose in response to the failings of structuralism 
(Jary and Jary 1995, Morrow 1994). ‘Structuralism’ is generally considered to 
have made a key contribution by suggesting that reality is located in linguistic 
performances, and that societies can be understood as being in some way 
analogous with their language and linguistic characteristics (Jary and Jary 1995). 
Poststructuralist theory denies the bold assertions of explanatory power that the 
structuralists made, and rejects the idea that the study of language is wholly 
capable of explaining society. Poststructuralist theory nevertheless remains deeply 
concerned with language, speech and text. Most significantly, poststructuralists are 
concerned with meta-theories (Marxism or Enlightenment for example) which 
seem to explain the totality of social life at the expense of diversity. Therefore 
poststructuralists are dubious of the possibility that social reality can ever be 
objectively ‘known’, for “there is no ‘truth’, only competing perspectives and 
‘regimes of truth’” (Devetak 1996b: 185).
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Poststructuralists consider that language is not a neutral carrier of 
knowledge.5 For Derrida, language is comprised of definitions (signs) that are 
made possible by determining what the sign is not, hence meaning is determined 
by differentiation (Derrida 1978). Because meaning resides in difference, a stable 
understanding of meaning is never fully achieved, so language (and the world it 
describes) is always in a state of flux and redefinition. Following on from Derrida, 
poststructuralist theory seeks to ‘deconstruct’ the ‘text’ to reveal the uncertainties 
that arise when meaning resides in the relation to other (differentiating) texts 
(intertextuality).6 78 So deconstruction seeks to destabilise claims to truth by 
breaking open the linguistic performances which mediate understanding of truth. 
Attention is drawn to the use of metaphors that describe figuratively, and to the 
use of dualisms or binaries that assert meaning by simplistic differentiation o f an 
‘other’. Deconstruction frequently involves reasserting the subordinated ‘other’, 
which often takes the form of listening to those who are marginalised. Another 
way of appreciating the linguistic basis of claims to truth arises from consideration 
o f ‘discourse’ (defined earlier in this chapter).
A key insight o f poststructuralist critique is that knowledge is rooted in 
power relations. Poststructuralist theory views knowledge and power as being 
mutually constitutive (Foucault 1977a). For the poststructuralist, power is located 
not so much in structures and organisations, but in the ability to deploy the 
knowledge that shapes understanding and action. Therefore poststructuralist 
critique focuses on the linguistic acts which, as they communicate ‘a ’ knowledge, 
exclude alternative ways of knowing. Because knowledge and power are seen to 
be inseparable, those ways o f knowing that claim universality or to speak a ‘truth’ 
are infused with the power to make the world in their image, and in so doing 
oppress alternative possibilities that may be less violent.
The normative dimension of poststructuralist critique is elusive. If  literally 
interpreted in a relativist postmodern fashion, it can be argued that a concern for 
the Good life is impossible for the poststructuralist because to articulate a
5 The importance of language can be traced to Wittgenstein’s linguistic philosophy.
6 A ‘text’ is a written or symbolic representation of the world which can have its own 
existence beyond the writer (after Jary and Jary 1995).
7 Also an insight of feminist theory.
8 This comes in part from understanding knowledge in genealogical terms in which a 
contemporary way of knowing is understood as being contingent upon the filtering of 
alternative conceptions throughout history. A genealogy of an idea is a strategy to reveal 
the alternative conceptions which have been excluded in the process of determining a 
unitary understanding of an idea which serves vested interests (Foucault 1980a).
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universal requirement is to ‘will to power’ a world in the image of the theorist that 
is inevitably exclusive and repressive to some degree.9 Nevertheless, however 
amorphous it may be, most poststructuralists have a normative goal that not 
merely enables them to prioritise the problem of power as opposed to any other 
problem, but which also enables them to talk of power as a problem. Although it is 
rarely made explicit, poststructuralist theory is concerned about the way in which 
power and knowledge are used to affect privileges which degrade the lives of 
others. Gregory alludes to this when referring to all the writers in 
International/Intertextual Relations as sharing “an interest in learning how 
discourse is related to the construction and subjugation of humankind” (Gregory 
1989: xxi).
The poststructuralist approach is interdisciplinary in that it transgresses 
“arbitrary limits” and “open(s) up hitherto closed off connections” between ways 
of knowing and thinking (Ashley and Walker 1990a: 264). The insightfulness of 
poststructuralist critique makes it inevitably confluent with social movements that 
seek to critique institutions of power, including feminism, environmentalism, the 
peace movement, worker’s movements and cultural movements (Ashley and 
Walker 1990b). Poststructuralist theory’s interdisciplinarity lies to a large degree 
in its attempt to break down the arbitrary boundaries of knowledge that isolate 
confluent concerns such as these.
Poststructuralist theory’s denial of objectivity or ‘a truth’ demands an 
awareness that the author is constructing her own discourse and her own subjective 
theory. For Ashley, for example, the poststructuralist “must be persistently, 
openly, blatantly politicizing in the theory she does... she must understand that 
theoretical practice is inescapably as much a political practice as any other practice 
she might care to name” (1989: 280). Like feminist theory and Critical Theory 
then, poststructuralist critique appreciates that to do theory is to do politics.
Summary
The poststructuralist approach, as understood by this discussion, is fundamentally 
concerned with representations of the world. Language, text, discourse and 
popular culture are all seen to be responsible for creating an allegedly objective 
understanding of the way the world is, and in so doing influence behaviour such 
that the social world is constituted in the image of prevailing representations.
9 See the discussion on postmodernism in Appendix I.
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Poststructuralist theory critiques these representations by revealing the way in 
which they rely on exclusions. Poststructuralist critique has latent normative 
concerns, and it transcends disciplinary divides.
2.2.4 Green theory
The word ‘green’ refers to both a social movement (environmentalism) and a 
method of critique (Green theory), the latter being of prime concern for this 
discussion.10 The factor common to all Green perspectives is a concern for the 
degradation of parts or all o f the biosphere, hence “although deep ecologists, 
animal rights activists, ecofeminists, social ecologists, Heideggarians, pantheists, 
sociobiologists, and others find much to disagree about, they are united by a 
rejection o f the narrowly anthropogenic and utilitarian world views of industrial 
society and liberal morality” (Dryzek 1990a: 195). ‘Environmentalism’ and 
‘green’ are understood here in the original and radical way like that posed by 
O’Riordan, as the search for “the resolution of the arrogance o f a [wo]man 
orientated view of the world with the humility of accepting [wojman’s dependence 
on the offerings o f nature” (1976: vii); and as seeking “to drive at the very heart of 
western society’s hubris and optimism, and to develop a new moral order based on 
principles o f nature’s justice, thermodynamic laws and biogeochemical cycles” 
(O’Riordan 1989a: 411). This understanding is reasonably synonymous with 
‘radical ecophilosophy’ (Zimmerman 1993), ‘Green Politics’ (Patterson 1996), 
‘Green Political Thought’ (Dobson 1992), or ‘Green Radicalism’ (Dryzek 1997).
Green theory has a normative concern for excessive degradation and for a 
harmony or balance between human activity and the biosphere, most frequently 
expressed as the need to live sustainably. Not unlike ‘freedom’, the limits of 
sustainability are ambiguous and very hard to quantify, hence notions such as 
harmony and sustainability are seen as conceptual devices and as goals to strive 
for. For the environmentalist this lack of precision does not impede commitment.
Green theory exposes the fallacious assumptions of modem culture. It 
argues that growth cannot be finite, that progress need not be material, and that 
humans are but one o f millions o f species equally dependent on the biosphere. It 
understands the degradation o f the biosphere to be rooted in modernity, that is as
10 On environmentalism see O’Riordan 1976, 1989a, 1989b, and 1995. O’Riordan (1989b) 
distinguishes between environmentalism and Green theory, arguing that environmentalism 
is the broader set of values and views of the world (the components of which are frequently 
in tension), whereas being Green is a subset of environmentalism.
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being inextricably connected to the “political, social, economic and scientific 
consensus that dominates the late twentieth century” (Dobson 1992: 4). Green 
theory has much in common with Critical Theory on this point, both are wary of 
the scientism and instrumental reason that emerged with the Enlightenment. An 
appreciation of history is therefore integral to Green theory (hence chapter 3 of 
this thesis).
Green theory has a particular understanding of society which most 
resembles that of feminist theory. Society is understood more in terms of 
agglomerated individual behaviour than as a product of abstract systems. Hence, 
like feminist theory, Green theory seeks reform through individual resistance. It 
seeks “a shift in the strategies and assumptions of our lives” such that the 
institutions of modernity are reformed from the bottom up (Dobson 1993: 190). 
From this perspective, all individuals who ‘overconsume’ are seen to have a 
responsibility to lessen ecological degradation and the differential impacts this has 
on less affluent people (George 1977, Trainer 1985, Goldsmith 1988). This 
thinking underlies the popular slogan ‘think global, act local’.
The Green slogans ‘think global, act local’, and ‘everything is connected to 
everything else’ embody a sophisticated perspective on (for want of a better term) 
systemic interaction. These open up the issue of scale in unconfinable ways.
Greens would consider, for example, that just as the individual is a synergistic 
component of the social, the subatomic particle is an inextricable component of 
the biosphere. This speaks to an unlimited conception of space as well. Greens 
would consider, for example, that the stand of trees in any local park has some 
ecological function in global terms, just as the British household has some 
function in the global economy. So, Green theory understands the subatomic 
particle, the individual, the stand of trees and the global economy to be 
interconnected and interrelated. Thus Green theory embraces interdependence and 
complexity. This picture of complexity requires Green theory to be (arguably) 
more interdisciplinary and more holistic than any other type of critical theory. 
Green theory is very much attuned, then, to the problems of uncertainty and how 
to act in the face of incomplete or partial ‘truths’, it also suspicious of ‘facts’ in the 
light of this pervasive uncertainty (Paterson 1996). In as much as this renders ‘the 
boundary'’ - be it physical or conceptual - meaningless, Green theory is an 
exemplar of poststructural sensibility (Doran 1995).
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Like other critical approaches, Green theory has an awareness of the role of 
theory in revealing the impediments to realisation and subsequent action. Green 
theory seeks to empower change because “solutions can only come from the 
struggle and the personal conviction that a better collective existence is possible 
for all the world’s population, living and yet to be bom” (O’Riordan 1976: vi). 
What is arguably absent though, is the degree of self reflectiveness characteristic 
of feminist theory.11 This lack o f self reflectivity underlies the contestation of the 
‘green’ agenda that concerns'Dobson (1992) and Paterson (1996), and which is in 
turn played out in an important way in the literature on environmental security. 
The time when most environmental writings had an unambiguous agenda has long 
passed, and because the positions and presuppositions of the writer have not 
traditionally been made explicit, counter-environmental and counter-critical 
perspectives have been able to emerge under the guise o f a common concern for 
‘the environment’. So the argument presented here is that theoretical and author 
self-reflectiveness is not only ‘honest politics’ (in as much as all theorisations are 
political), but also wards against agenda capture.
Summary
Green theory is a critical, emancipatory perspective which begins from a belief 
that at present the totality of human behaviour is environmentally unsustainable 
(O’Riordan 1989a). It understands that the social practices and institutions that 
create this unsustainability are enabled by historically produced structures of 
reason and forms o f knowledge, particularly those that emerged with the 
Enlightenment. Green theory appreciates complexity, interdependence and the 
uncertainty that these create. This necessitates an holistic outlook and an 
interdisciplinary perspective.
2.3 Towards a Critical Green Perspective
Thus far this chapter has discussed four critical approaches with a view to elicit 
some points of commonality that can inform this thesis’ own critical approach. 
The ‘critical green perspective’ that is being developed here is informed by the
11 O’Riordan suggests that “critical self-awareness is very much a part of the politics of 
modem Green theory” (1989a: 400), however, I consider this to be considerably less the 
case when compared to the extent to which feminism and some forms of poststructuralism 
are self-aware.
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features more or less common to these four critical approaches, namely: the need 
to be clear about the role o f theory, the role o f the theoretician, and the 
assumptions and values that underlie the theory; a dialectical perspective; an 
appreciation and regard for history; a positive view of human nature and a concern 
for emancipation; an holistic and interdisciplinary approach; and an imaginative 
and utopian element. This section explains these general characteristics which 
form the basis o f this thesis’ ‘critical green perspective’.
2.3.1 The role of theory
According to Dalby, “critical scholarship has a role in charting the dimensions of 
our current dilemmas and crisis, exploring how we came to our present state of 
affairs and suggesting how we might act and think differently” (Dalby 1990a: ix). 
This thesis shares with the four types of critical approaches discussed the 
understanding that no knowledge is value free, and that a critical perspective that 
seeks to affect a change consistent with its underlying values is a political act as it 
does not merely describe the world but may also create the world in its image. 
Hence, because much is at stake, the onus is on the theoretician to be absolutely 
clear about what is being said, what is not being said, and what values are 
informing the theory. This is the essence of the rationale for this chapter.
2.3.2 Dialectics
A feature generally common to the four critical approaches discussed is a 
dialectical view of society. Dialectical thinking emphasises processes, relations, 
fluxes and flows, and so understands the individual in relation to the process and 
flows that influence her, and which she reflexively influences in turn (agency 
makes structure and structure makes agency) (Giddens 1984, Harvey 1996). 
Understood another way, a dialectical perspective seeks to move beyond the 
subject/object dualism. All of the four critical perspectives discussed in this 
chapter consider that society is not fixed  in time or in nature. The dialectical 
position approximately shared by all is that contemporary society is for the most 
part an historical production and so is for the most part highly mutable. This is the 
source o f optimism and hope of all dialectical theories; society can change for the 
better.12
12 Or pessimism - for the worse!
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The critical green perspective of this thesis seeks to be approximately 
continuous with this dialectical mode o f understanding. This thesis understands 
dialectics (a difficult term) as the view “that elements, things, structures and 
systems do not exist outside of or prior to the processes, flows and relations that 
create, sustain or undermine them” (Harvey 1996: 49). In the dialectical view, 
boundaries waver, the world is in flux, things move, history matters, and ‘all that 
is solid melts into air’. Thus ecosystems, societies and their institutions are not 
permanent nor discrete, but change and flow across time and space.
A danger in adopting the dialectical perspective is that it can deny the 
relevance o f ‘things’. So although the dialectical approach is given an “ontological 
priority” in this thesis (Harvey 1996: 8), in as much as it addresses environmental 
problems, the critical green perspective incorporates a substantial materialist 
element as well. The suggestion here is that there is an unavoidable extent to 
which the environment is a ‘thing’. This is not to say that the societal roots of 
environmental problems cannot be explained dialectically, nor is it to say that 
nature is not itself constantly in flux; indeed an ecological and evolutionary view 
supports the dialectical perspective. What the muted dialectical/materialist 
perspective argued for here does say is that there are some permanencies that 
matter; for example, as far as we know, people must eat and drink clean water to 
be healthy, bombs and bullets hurt, rape injures. It is a concern for these ‘solids’ 
that motivates the normative dimension of this thesis’ critical green perspective 
(see section 2.4).
2.3.3 Historicity
A concern for history is common to the four types o f critical theory considered, 
indeed such a concern is consistent with the dialectical perspective (Giddens 
1985a). More specifically, each of the four critical theories, and therefore the 
critical green perspective developed here, appreciates that what exists is the 
product o f particular and distinctive historical circumstances. According to this 
historicity perspective, that which exists - be it a society, a ‘thing’, an idea or a 
theory - cannot be understood independently of history. Green theory, for example, 
is cognisant o f the need to understand the history o f environmental degradation; 
feminist theory likewise seeks to understand the oppression of women in terms of 
the past; Foucault sought to appreciate the particular understanding through
13 Marx’s famous dictum
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genealogical deconstruction; and the Frankfurt School looked for the origins of 
instrumental reasoning. Therefore history matters, which is why the following 
chapter seeks to explore the evolution of contemporary environmental insecurities.
2.3.4 Human nature and emancipation
The critical perspective developed here understands society to be a product of 
history and processes (not as “a reified object world”), and human behaviour to be 
both a product and producer of society (Benson 1983: 345). Human nature itself is 
also understood in a dialectical way. The view here is that people are not 
essentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but there are degrees of recognition o f influence, be 
they cultural norms (like consumption), discourses, ideologies or more overt 
coercive factors (after Heydebrand 1983). The role of critical theory is to unmask 
and critique these influences and ‘powers’, beginning with those that clearly foster 
violent and repressive behaviour (and so can be understood as violences in their 
own right). Because people are seen as being both susceptible to influence and as 
having influence (agents), critical theory encourages realisation, recognition and 
contemplation of the situation of the individual in the social milieu.14 Indeed, 
according to Dryzek:
A critical social science theory is verified not by experimental test or by 
interpretive plausibility, but rather by action on the part of the audience who 
decide that, upon reflection, the theory gave a good account of the causes of 
their sufferings and effectively pointed to their relief (Dryzek 1995: 99).
This is another way of understanding the emancipatory role of critical theory.15
‘Power’ is a key theme here. As alluded to in chapter 1 (section 2), and as will be
discussed more fully in chapter 11, people in the industrialised world have more
freedom and more power to resist or recreate the broader processes and institutions
which are socially and environmentally damaging.
2.3.5 Holistic and interdisciplinary
The four critical approaches which inform this thesis’ critical green perspective 
are understood to be interdisciplinary and holistic. The Critical Theory of the 
Frankfurt School is concerned with any economic, political, cultural or 
philosophical process by which the human condition and ‘nature’ are oppressed,
14 Which is very much what this thesis does for the author.
15 At this point it needs to be acknowledged that emancipation cannot be understood 
independently of ethics. Ethics answers the question ‘how are we to live’. Such answers are 
necessary for the individual to reconcile competing demands and guide behaviour such that 
freedom for all - and hence real freedom for the individual - is advanced
42
and so looks at society as a whole. Feminist theory is similarly holistic and multi­
dimensional in the way it addresses all and any causes which degrade the lives of 
women. Poststructuralist theory’s focus on power and logic/linguistic processes is 
likewise able to speak of any number of social problems.16 Green theory has 
perhaps the strongest claim to holism and interdisciplinarity through the 
appreciation that ‘everything is linked to everything else’. Green theoreticians are 
constantly forced to link disciplines and theories in their attempt to understand the 
philosophical, social and biophysical processes involved in generating 
environmental degradation.
The dialectical view of each of these four critical approaches is holistic by 
virtue of the emphasis on wholes rather than parts, and the appreciation of 
processes, connections, and that a ‘thing’ has little meaning except in relation to 
that which produced it and surrounds it. The claim for holism can also be made for 
each of these critical theory types through the way in which each appreciates 
history' to be a constitutive foundation of society. Finally, integral to each is the 
focus on broad problems (for example unfreedom, oppression of women, power, 
and environmental degradation) which ground the critique and enable 
identification of an array o f different causes of the problem: “important problems 
are almost always interdisciplinary” (Lebow 1988: 509). This grounding in the 
problem is arguably the key to interdisciplinarity. This thesis adopts an holistic 
and interdisciplinary approach in all these respects.
There is a broader point to be made here. The claims of particular academic 
disciplines to be in some way ‘distinct’ are becoming less tenable: “society is 
being historicised, culture is being politicised, history is being anthropolgised, 
nature is being denaturalised” (Anderson 1996: 121). To identify with ‘a’ 
discipline is to restrict explanatory capacity: “the narrowness o f functionally 
specialized agencies and scholarly disciplines further blocks out large areas of 
awareness and understanding, a process reinforced by the vested interests and 
ideologies growing up around them” (Bennett and Dahlberg 1990: 78). Thus 
Toynbee writes that “this academic quarrel is foolish, perverse, and inimical to 
true knowledge and understanding” (Toynbee 1966: 89). However, a risk of 
interdisciplinary scholarship is the possibility of crudely treating the deeper
16 Witness Foucault’s writings on sexuality (1980b) and punishment (1977b), the study of 
‘critical geopolitics’ (O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998), and critiques of mainstream 
International Relations discourses (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989).
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insights arising from a singular perspective. There are other risks, which Rose 
explains:
I know when I draw on ideas from a discipline not my own I worry if Tve 
got that discipline right, if there aren’t certain assumptions it makes that I ’m 
breaking which invalidates my account, if there isn’t something really 
important I just don’t know about. In one sense that worry is quite 
groundless, of course; interdisciplinarity work is all about risk, about 
juxtaposing the unexpected, about two different discourses brushing 
unevenly against each other’s grain. On the other hand, that worry is also a 
part of the pleasurable dangers of transgression which come from saying 
something quite new and disruptive (Rose 1994: 117).
This thesis takes these risks, it does not identify with ‘a ’ discipline, nor is it
particularly concerned to identify disciplinary contributions.
2.3.6 Imaginative and utopian
The function of critical theory is to unmask the political, cultural, economic, 
ideological, and linguistic impediments to the realisation of the ‘Good’ (in this 
thesis understood as ‘peace’ - see the following section). In stipulating the need for 
the ‘Good’ critical theory, and more particularly Green theory and the Critical 
Theory o f the Frankfurt School, is utopian. However the extent to which critical 
theory seeks to specify the ‘Good’ in detail varies. Arguably it seeks to negate 
impediments more than it articulates a positive vision. An imaginative/utopian 
element is required though, because it enables talk of futures and possibilities in a 
meaningful and hopeful way. The critical green perspective being developed here 
incorporates this imaginative/utopian approach because “the human imaginary has 
to be deployed to its full force in the quest for progressive socio-ecological and 
political-economic change” (Harvey 1996: 12).
The role o f ‘imagination’ in theory is often understated. To make anything 
we first need to conceive of it. To imagine a better society is to engage in a way of 
thinking that challenges the limitations of prevailing ideologies and reason, it 
“ involves us in new concepts and principles, in new ways o f using our minds to 
grasp complexities we do not yet comprehend” (Gowin 1988: ix).17 Imagination is 
part of theorising for a different world: “what we feel, believe, think, expect or 
wish shapes not only our present behaviour but also the kinds of futures we will 
transmit and posterity will inherit” (Falk et al 1982b: 499). Imagination is needed
17 This raises a host of deeply difficult questions about the ability to think and imagine in 
ways that are totally independent of the conditioning effects of prevailing modes of thought 
and reason. Whilst no-one may be capable of imagining a (plausible or ‘sane’) world 
completely distinct from anything we know today, the collective process of trying to do so 
can pull ‘reality’ and possibility in new directions.
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to suggest the possibility of change and to resist the identification o f the present 
social order as being somehow ‘natural’ and eternal (Morrow 1994). Boulding 
talks of a ‘social imagination’ (1988) and the Frankfurt School of a ‘dialectical 
imagination’ (Jay 1973); both seek to transcend the limitations of the present to 
shift consciousness towards the possibility of a better society. Marcuse is succinct 
on the value of imagination:
Imagination denotes a considerable degree of independence from the given, 
o f freedom amid a world o f unfreedom. In surpassing what is present it can 
anticipate the future (Marcuse 1969: 154).
The imagined society is known as ‘utopia’. Utopias stand as ethical or 
theoretical possibilities which contrast with contemporary society, and which 
suggest avenues for action to transcend the present; thus they help “influence the 
immanent possibilities o f action” (Giddens 1985a: 338).18 ‘Utopia’ is frequently 
used pejoratively by ‘realists’, but according to Marcuse this denouncement 
indicates that there may indeed be a valid potentiality in the derided ‘utopia’ 
(Marcuse 1969: 143). Sayer and Storper speak o f the validity o f utopianism: “we 
should not dismiss a kind o f utopianism that attempts to think about the feasibility 
of desirable alternatives in terms o f how the recommended social processes would 
work, asking counterfactual questions, conducting thought experiments, and 
scrutinising critical standpoints” (1997: 7).
This thesis seeks to incorporate an imaginative dimension into its critical 
green perspective. Imagination enables the critical green perspective to go beyond 
pure critique to talk o f transformation in a way that helps to answer the questions: 
‘so what?’, ‘what next?’ or ‘how?’. This is problematic as critical theory, properly 
understood, does not have to answer the question because the answer - ‘eliminate 
oppression’ such that individuals are free to create the society they want - resides 
in the critique. However, in as much as we live in a society dominated by
18 To put forward a utopia is to flirt with the potential to create an hegemonic 
understanding of ‘the Good life’ which is arguably good only for the proponent. Like 
theory more generally, every image of the future contains bias, and every image of the 
future has the potential to be reified. Part of the way to avoid misappropriation and 
hegemony is to state clearly and openly the principles and values that inform the imagined 
society such that these can be assessed and debated - hence the reason for the following 
section. Nevertheless, the danger is apparent, certain visions have powerfully captured the 
popular imagination and made the world in their image, for example Falk et al (1982b) talk 
of slavery as the realisation of an ‘image’, and Harvey observes that the imagery of 
emancipation and progress underwrote the emergence of institutionalised capitalism in the 
eighteenth century (1996: 131).
45
instrumental rationality, a critically informed but nevertheless imaginative answer 
to the question ‘what next’ is necessary. It is through this imaginative function that 
the difficult intellectual shift from critical theory to public policy can perhaps take 
place such that policy can itself become an ‘instrument’ of emancipation. So an 
imaginative theory creates by proposing alternatives to the present that are 
consistent with the insights and values that underlie the critique. The following 
section seeks to explicate the values and normative position that underlies this 
thesis’ critical green perspective, these are encapsulated in the notion of peace.
2.4 Peace: A Normative Position
A normative theory is understood as a mode of theorising which incorporates the 
inescapable beliefs and values of the theorist into the theory in explicit and 
instructive ways (Morrow 1994, Jary and Jary 1995). A normative element is more 
or less present in the four critical approaches discussed earlier in this chapter, for 
example feminist theory is critical of practices and processes that oppress the 
(value) that women should be free, and Green theory is critical of practices which 
impede the realisation of (the value of) sustainability. This section seeks to make 
clear the values that underlie this thesis’ critical green perspective, where the 
primary value is that of ‘peace’.
Stating the normative position that underlies this thesis is necessary 
because “the credibility of social science research rests to an important degree on 
the explicitness with which we identify our values and how they affect what and 
how we analyse. There is simply no such thing as value-free research” (Gurtov 
1991: xiv). A clear set of values enables a normative style of critique in which the 
present can be assessed relative to a set of ideals. Morrow calls this ‘normative 
argumentation’ and points out that rather than being irrational or irregular, it 
actually occurs in everyday practice and is a very rational technique of critique and 
persuasion: “we continuously uphold normative or value propositions that are 
entirely unproblematic and without doubt rational in every sense: children should 
not play with fire; fraud is unjust” (1994: 239). Further, as the postpositivist 
critique has downgraded formal empiricist and positivist rationality it has 
upgraded the purposefulness and explanatory functions of normative critique 
(Morrow 1994). A statement of values is also necessary because it makes the 
political agenda of the research more transparent. This thesis considers that at its
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core ‘politics’ is (and should always be) the business of deliberation and 
negotiation of ‘the Good’.19 In this sense, then, the normative position being 
explicated here is not so much a self-evident universal truth, but serves instead as 
a normative starting point for this thesis, and as a starting point for ongoing debate 
which can proceed on a clear understanding of the politics of this thesis.
The normative position that underlies this thesis’ ‘critical green
perspective’ can be surmised as a concern for ‘peace’. According to Galtung’s
classic formulation, peace is “the absence of personal violence and (the) absence
of structural violence” (Galtung 1969: 183). Violence is that which impedes
people from realising their potential: “violence is present when human beings are
being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below
their potential realisations. Violence here is defined as the cause of the difference
between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is”
(Galtung 1969: 168). So violence is much more than causing physical harm (direct
violence), it is also the absence of social justice and includes the monopolisation
and manipulation of knowledge (indirect violence). Peace is therefore very much
about the melioration of power. Power too, has this direct and indirect
characteristic, as indicated by Giddens:
Power may be at its most alarming, and quite often its most horrifying, 
when applied as a sanction of force. But it is typically at its most intense and 
durable when running silently through the repetition of institutionalised 
practices (Giddens 1985a: 9).
Peace therefore has a negative and a positive dimension. Negative peace 
refers to the absence of direct violence that causes physical harm, and positive 
peace refers to the absence of structural violence manifested as the uneven 
distribution of power and resources. Negative peace is reactive in nature in that 
it seeks the cessation of actual or impending conflict in the near term. This is most 
frequently interpreted as ‘peace as the absence of war’, a view which so dominates 
contemporary understanding of peace that Enloe writes “the dichotomy
19 A view vastly at odds with the practice of governance in all countries, and equally at 
odds with the way political decisions are made in contemporary times - that is on the basis
of instrumental or economically rational criteria.
20 According to Gleditsch, the concept of structural violence became so successful in the 
1970’s that it came to include any social ill, and so eventually “self destructed” (Gleditsch 
1998: 385). But if this implies working only with uncontaminated concepts, then new 
concepts shall have to be frequently and perpetually developed. If Gleditsch was to work 
with only pure and robust concepts then he would not be able talk of ‘peace’ or ‘security’. 
Gleditsch seems to miss Derrida’s point about meanings not being fixed, and it points to the 
very nature of concepts and their contestation, including concepts such as environmental 
security. These concerns recur in Parts II and III of this thesis.
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(war/peace) has been so widely assumed as obvious, logical, and true that peace 
has gotten the short end of the theoretical discussion” (1987: 538). Peace can be 
literally interpreted as ‘anti-war’, enabling military personnel to refer to 
themselves as ‘in the business of peace’ or ‘peace planners’ (Toffler and Toffler 
1995). Positive peace, on the other hand, is proactive in nature. It seeks to remove 
the underlying structural imbalances that present risks and vulnerabilities to people 
in the short as well as long term. Galtung (1969) notes that negative and positive 
peace are contiguous with each other, at least in theory. However, the competing 
uses of the word ‘peace’ in the twentieth century have made its meaning 
ambiguous; it can be and is deployed in ways that are very much anti-peace.
Integral to a meaningful understanding of peace is an appreciation of 
justice.21 A minimum conception of justice includes the right to basic human 
needs such as clean water, healthy food and adequate shelter, hence Armengol 
expresses peace as “the absence of any form of violence that might prevent the 
satisfaction of any basic human need” (Armengol 1991: 119). In 1948 the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which still stands as an internationally sanctioned expression of 
peace and justice (United Nations General Assembly 1948). " It contains 30 
articles which sketch the dimensions of an encompassing notion of peace, 
including:
All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in 
a spirit of brotherhood (Article 1).
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status...(Article 2).
Everyone has a right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3).
No one shall be held in slavery or in servitude (Article 4).
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (Article 5).
21 Rees (1995) talks o f ‘humanity’ as a complementary but alternative notion to justice. 
Humanity involves “values o f community, of sharing and caring, of partnerships and 
interdependence”, it “implies a statement about quality of life” which recognises “an 
interdependence o f environment, society and economy”, and is “multidisciplinary, 
multicultural and multinational” (Rees 1995: 290 - 299). This seems to be an extremely 
useful conceptualisation that may help skirt some o f the more complex aspects of ‘justice’. 
However, because justice is the more common parlance, and because this thesis seeks to 
have some resonance with the notion o f ‘environmental justice’, it maintains the use of 
‘justice’.
22 At the time o f writing a case can be made that virtually every one of these rights has been 
contravened in contemporary (industrial and ‘developed’) Australia.
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Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law 
(Article 6).
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Article 9).
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion... 
(Article 18).
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression ... (Article 19)
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association 
(Article 20).
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his(her) country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives (Article 21.1)
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization ... of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his(her) dignity and the free development of his(her) 
personality (Article 22)
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment 
(Article 23.1)
Everyone, without discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work 
(Article 23.2)
Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of 
his(her) interests (Article 23.4).
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well being of him(her)self and of his(her) family including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care... (Article 25.1)
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages (Article 26.1)
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized (Article 28).
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his(her) personality is possible (Article 29.1).
(United Nations General Assembly 1948)
Likewise at a 1976 international conference of jurors, politicians, 
sociologists and economists, a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples was 
produced which “consecrates the rights of self-determination, of protection of the 
environment, of control of natural resources, and of the protection of minorities” 
(in Falk et al 1982c: 432). This declaration lists numerous basic group rights 
which indicate some further parameters o f ‘peace’, some of these include:
The right to the respect of national and cultural identity,
The right to retain peaceful possession of territory,
The right to be free from colonial or foreign domination, whether direct or 
indirect, and from any racist regime,
The exclusive right to administer natural wealth and resources,
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The right to participate in scientific and technical progress which is the 
common heritage of (wo)mankind,
The right to pursue economic development freely without foreign 
interference,
The right to speak one’s own language and to maintain one’s own culture,
The right to a group’s artistic, historical and cultural wealth,
The right to not be imposed upon by an alien culture,
The right to improvement, conservation and protection of the local 
environment,
The right to make use of the common heritage of (wo)mankind including 
the high seas, the sea-bed and outer space,
The right to the same rights as other citizens in private and public life 
without discrimination.
(The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, pp 432 - 434 in Falk et 
al 1982c)
Listing rights in this way is highly problematic as certain rights may conflict 
or be covered in numerous ways and are themselves subject to differing 
interpretations. However, the principle of positive peace is made clear enough in 
such declarations. If interpreted in a fair manner the adherence to such rights 
would bring about a far more peaceful and vastly different world than the one in 
which we live at present.
Peace should not be seen in highly iterative or quantifiable terms. It is a 
sentiment, a “commitment to action” and a goal to always strive towards; peace is 
a process that should be able “to reproduce itself’ (Dower 1995: 22). Collingwood 
encapsulates the idea:
Peace is a dynamic thing; a strenuous thing; the detection, even the 
forestalling, of occasions for quarrels; the checking of the process by which 
the non-agreements thus constantly generated harden into disagreements 
(not without the use of force) and are softened into non-agreements; and the 
dialectical labour whereby occasions of non-agreement are converted into 
agreement (Collingwood 1992: 334).
Peace as a process means the unfettered participation of people in making and 
remaking the world as they choose - a concern of the four critical approaches 
considered in this chapter. Indeed it is arguably on the subject of peace so defined 
that these approaches converge in highly complementary ways.
Important in the formulation of peace is the need for some relative certainty 
about the continued provision of basic needs, in other words there needs to be 
some degree of ‘security’ for there to be peace. Peace is therefore an object of 
security, as well as a means by which security is obtained: “the commitment to the
50
way of peace is precisely the means, or at least the most important means, to 
achieving .. security” (Dower 1995: 22). Furthermore, to threaten to do injury or 
to threaten to withdraw or interrupt basic needs is to create insecurity and so is 
violence in that it impedes a person from realising their potential.
There are a range of values that are associated with the meta-value of 
peace. Falk sees peace (or more accurately his conception of ‘world order’) as 
having four (value infused) criteria; “the minimisation of collective violence; 
maximisation of economic well-being; maximisation of social and political justice; 
and maximization of ecological quality” (1982a: 161). These serve as an 
analytically useful basis for appraising actions in the name of ‘peace’. A 
comprehensive account of values for peace comes from Gurtov, who lists 
numerous personal and institutional values that attend the core value of ‘peace’, 
including; community, compassion, co-operation, diversity, enoughness, equality, 
harmony, honesty, integrity, non-violence, responsibility, spirituality, trust, 
vulnerability7, accountability, appropriate technology, collectivity, participation, 
shared power and voluntary simplicity (Gurtov 1991: 15).
There is no absolute or rigorous conception of peace that can be asserted to 
be better than another, but there is a general sense and degree of consensus about 
what constitutes peace and this has (hopefully) been conveyed. Similarly, there 
will never be one optimal way to bring about peace, it requires a host of 
complementary concepts and strategies, one of which may be environmental 
security.
Peace has intuitive resonances with the environment, for example the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development recognised that “Peace, 
development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible” 
(Principle 25, UNCED 1993). Nevertheless, the theory and practice of explicitly 
linking environment and peace is not well developed. In this thesis the concept of 
‘environmental security’ is one attempt to further our understanding of the ways in 
which peace and environment are related. In this way this thesis understands itself 




This chapter has outlined the key elements of a critical green perspective which 
informs the remainder of this thesis, and which can be found in other, established 
critical theories. These common elements include a concern for history, a concern 
for self-reflectivity, an holistic and interdisciplinary approach, an emancipatory 
function, a dialectical outlook, an imaginative and utopian approach, and the 
presence of some underlying normative position (in this case a concern for peace).
This chapter has established the case for an historical perspective on the 
grounds that the present is the product of particular and distinctive historical 
circumstances, and so cannot be understood independent of them. An historical 
appreciation is also consistent with the dialectical perspective. The following 
chapter adopts an historical approach to the problems of environmental 
degradation and environmental insecurity.
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Chapter 3. A Trajectory of Insecurity
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has established the case for history on the grounds that the 
present is entirely a product of its antecedents, and so cannot be understood 
independent of them. Despite this, there is still a tendency towards temporal 
ignorance when addressing the problems of the present; it seems that modernity 
erases recognition of the past (Giddens 1990, Hobsbawm 1994). However, without 
an appreciation of history we approach present and impending crises without the 
principal benefit of culture - that of accumulated knowledge. History also enables 
meaningful speculation on the future: “without a long running start in history, we 
shall not have the momentum needed, in our own consciousness, to take a 
sufficiently bold leap into the future” (Mumford 1961: 11). In addition, offers a 
source of optimism, it helps us to know that the world was once different, and 
might be so again (Frank 1985).
This chapter seeks to understand the historical processes which gave rise to 
the problems of environmental degradation and environmental insecurity.1 This is 
necessary if this thesis’ aim of critically examining the concept of environmental 
security is to be satisfied. The literature which can be readily identified as 
pertaining to ‘environmental security’ is almost without exception ahistorical, so 
providing an historical account is a unique contribution. Because the problem of 
environmental insecurity is understood in this thesis in very broad terms, and is 
seen to be interrelated with a wide array of other insecurities, the history or 
‘trajectory of insecurity’ that occurs here is also very wide ranging.2
This chapter seeks to identify some key themes and processes that are 
considered to be of particular relevance, and so does not aspire to a complete 
understanding of the historical origins of environmental degradation and 
insecurity. It is therefore very much a ‘macro history’ (Boulding 1992a). Objective 
knowledge of the past is impossible, and all history is, in a sense, theory. Further, 
there can never be ‘a’ complete history, “there have to be as many parallel
1 Some ideas in this chapter were explored in Barnett 1997a.
Again, because of ANU dissertation guidelines which impose a word limit, some related 
aspects have been relegated to appendix II. There is also extensive use o f footnotes.
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narratives as there are people, communities, societies, religions, states and ways of 
life” (Toynbee 1966: 88). This chapter seeks to synthesise certain relevant 
narratives to elicit common understandings. Hence this chapter is not a study of 
history drawing on primary sources; it is a particular interpretation of history 
based on a synthesis of others’ interpretations, combined with the normative 
stance and intellectual purpose of this thesis.4
In short, this chapter is not intended as a review of competing historical 
narratives, nor does it claim to offer any original historical insights. The aim here 
is to synthesise others’ interpretations of history to present a history of 
environmental insecurity. A secondary aim is to use ‘insecurity'’ as a theme to 
interpret history.4 This chapter is not without certain biases, mostly arising from 
the author’s understanding of society which inescapably influences the particular 
historical narrative that follows (see Petulla 1985). Bias also emanates from the 
predominantly Western and masculine emphasis of the other macro histories from 
which this chapter draws (Boulding’s The Underside o f History helps compensate 
for this). There are also difficulties in understanding and interpreting the past 
using contemporary forms of language which reflect the particular culture and 
world views of our age (Bookchin 1982).
A degree of historical credibility is sought by a deliberate reading across 
perspectives and disciplines, a preference for ‘academically credible’ texts, a 
conscious effort to remain true to sources, and an emphasis on broad trends. Thus 
the analysis seeks to lessen dependence on any single approach or perspective.
This helps ensure that what is common is indeed common, but raises the recurrent 
problem of balancing depth and breadth, thus: “one must choose between not 
advancing at all and being dragged down into a bottomless bog of speculation. Let 
the reader be warned..” (Mumford 1961: 70).
This chapter is structured according to Boyden’s Western Civilisation in 
Biohistorical Perspective (1987) where human history is loosely divided into four
J This chapter might be understood as ‘environmental history’. The bulk o f ‘environmental 
history’ published to date focuses on changes in the biosphere from a biophysical 
perspective. There is less material available which focuses on the interaction between 
human culture and the biosphere. The difference is one of detail, the former discusses 
environmental change whereas the latter discusses the relationship between environmental 
and social change, or “the dialectic between nature and culture, the interaction of humans 
with the rest of nature through time” (Bailes 1985: 5). This chapter conforms more to this 
latter type of environmental history.
4 This is considered to be a relatively unique approach, although security/insecurity is used 
at times by Bookchin (1982) and Rifkin (1991).
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ecological phases.5 Others such as Mannion (1991), McMichael (1993), Miller 
(1994), Mumford (1961), Ponting (1991) and Toynbee (1966) loosely fit into the 
four phase model. The first phase concerns the earliest and longest stage of human 
history up until the advent o f agriculture some 10,000 years ago. This first phase is 
called the hunter-gatherer phase. The second phase - the early farming phase - 
began approximately 10,000 years ago with the gradual emergence o f settled 
agricultural communities. The third phase - the early urban phase - began 
approximately 5,000 years ago with the emergence of cities. The last ecological 
phase of history - the industrial revolution or ‘high energy phase’ - began around 
200 years ago (Boyden 1987). It is important to note the shortening time spans of 
each successive phase. Each o f these four phases is considered in turn. The 
availability o f information and the acceleration o f history means that more 
attention is given to progressively later stages. It should be stressed that the 
transition between each phase occurs incrementally. The following discussion 
generalises across time and space to some extent, but to reiterate, the analysis 
seeks not precision, but rather to identify general trends.
3.2 The Primeval (Hunter-Gatherer) Phase
The hunter-gatherer phase begins with emergence o f the genus Homo erectus (the 
ancestors of Homo sapiens sapiens) some 1.5 to 2 million years ago, and 
nominally ends with the emergence of settled agriculture some 10,000 years ago 
(Boyden 1987).6 7The hunter-gatherer lifestyle was the only way of life for tens of 
thousands o f generations. Two basic generalisations about this phase are valid: all 
hominids were relatively nomadic, and they gathered and foraged for their food. 
For the most part these early humans “were integral rather than dominant 
ecosystem components” (Mannion 1991: 80).
One of the principal sources of uncertainty for hunter-gatherers was the 
availability o f food. Food supply was not sufficiently regular that hunter-gatherers 
could settle in one place. In times o f drought or flood the group’s chances o f 
survival were greatly increased by their ability to move to new and more
5 The use of ‘phases’ should not be taken to infer the complete passing of each preceding 
phase, each still exists to some degree.
6 Modem humans - Homo sapiens sapiens - are thought to have evolved some 100,000 
years ago (see appendix II).
7 It should be stressed that the following observations are highly generalised because 
“prehistory is a big place” (Wall 1994: 21).
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hospitable environs and to refuge areas. So, adaptability through mobility provided 
food security. Hunter-gatherers ate from all levels of the food chain including 
plants, tissue from herbivorous animals and tissue from carnivorous animals. 
However, as a general rule, our ancestors derived most of their somatic energy 
from sources lower down the food chain (plants) (Boulding 1992a). Compared to 
modem Western diets the intake of animal fats was low. An important aspect of 
the hunter-gatherer diet was the diversity of foods consumed. This was conducive 
to good health. It also ensured stability of supply as there was no over-dependence 
on any single plant or animal which might not be regularly available due to 
seasonal and annual fluctuations. Whole group participation in food gathering and 
preparation also contributed to reliability of supply. There was equality in food 
availability among members of the group. Boulding estimates that women 
supplied up to 80% of the diet by weight and had a wealth of knowledge about 
plants, and says that although less risky than hunting, female food procurement 
had a “high survival value” (Boulding 1992a: 65).
In addition to uncertainty about food availability, nature (external) posed 
other risks. The risk of death and injury from accidents, infections, other animals, 
natural disasters, floods and droughts was ever-present (Tuan 1979). The absence 
of permanent shelter made the effects of climate pronounced. There was a much 
greater risk of serious injury and death at all stages of the life cycle. The constant 
fluctuations in the world around the primeval person equated to an ever changing 
mosaic of risks.
Hunter-gatherers lived in small groups. Average group size was around 25 
people, but varied according to food availability. In times of relative abundance 
there could be up to 100 people in the group (Boyden 1987, Boulding 1992a). 
Hunter-gatherers made conscious efforts to keep the size of the group in balance 
with food availability (Miller 1994, Ponting 1991). McMichael estimates that 
fertility in these times was in the order of 30 births per 1,000 people per annum, 
and that women had 5 children on average (1993: 113). The global population of 
hunter-gatherers late in this phase is estimated to be in the order of 5 million
8 Somatic energy is “that energy which is expended, through metabolic processes, within 
living organisms” (Boyden et al 1990: 335). So, somatic energy is the energy used by 
plants and animals. Extrasomatic energy is “that energy which flows in and is utilised by a 
human community and which is not expended through metabolic processes within living 
organisms” (Boyden et al 1990: 335). So, extrasomatic energy includes energy sources 
such as fire, solar radiation, wind power and fossil fuels.
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people (Boyden 1992). Hunter-gatherers lived in an estimated 100,000 or more 
groups in a wide range of habitats, but most of these were fertile and climatically 
hospitable (Sack 1986). Population densities were extremely low by modem 
standards. There was little day-to-day interaction between groups, but there were 
occasional ceremonial gatherings and there was some inter-group trade.
Hunter-gatherers tended to live shorter lives than modem humans, but for
the duration of life they were less afflicted by disease:
Primeval people are mainly free from such infectious diseases of civilisation 
such as cholera, typhoid, typhus, measles, smallpox, influenza and the 
common cold ... organic disorders like appendicitis, cardiovascular disease 
and cancer are believed to be uncommon (Boyden et al 1990: 41).
Although they were less likely to be sick than modem humans, once sick or
injured hunter-gatherers were more likely to die (Boyden et al 1990).
Nevertheless, the natural environment provided primeval humans with all that they
required; it “satisfied the survival, health, and reproductive needs of our ancestors
for many thousands of generations” (Boyden 1987: 59).
Compared to modem society, hunter-gatherer groups had minimal impact 
on their environs, leading to Diamond to suggest that they “practised the most 
successful and long-persistent lifestyle of the career of our species” (Diamond 
199T. 172). The use of tools became more sophisticated after 40,000 BC, but the 
use of resources such as stone and wood to make these was negligible in 
ecosystem terms (Boulding 1992a, Boyden 1992, Toynbee 1966). Better tools 
enabled better hunting and foraging practices, and it is widely suggested that 
primeval humans contributed to the extinction of a range of megafauna late in the 
Pleistocene era (Boyden 1987, Brown 1996, Ponting 1991). However, the most 
significant impact of early humans on nature was through the controlled use of 
fire. There is evidence to suggest that throughout prehistory fire was used to drive 
game, to protect against predators, to clear wooded areas to create grasslands more 
conducive to large game, to provide warmth, and to cook (Boyden 1987, Mannion 
1991, Ponting 1991, Boulding 1992a). Fire was the only source of extrasomatic 
energy used by hunter-gatherers, and its deliberate use distinguished humans from 
other animals (Boulding 1992a). In terms of energy use (arguably the best 
indicator of ecological demand), a primeval human used, on average, 3.5
9 In a recent paper Langton (1997) is highly critical o f Flannery’s (1994) suggestion that 
Aboriginal Australians eliminated megafauna. It is (rightly I think) argued that this 
(unproven) notion has been used politically to problematise and devalue the claim of 
indigenous Australians to stewardship of traditional lands.
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Gigajoules/year of extrasomatic energy (Dovers 1994: 14). This means that the 
average hunter-gatherer had at her disposal an amount of extrasomatic energy 
roughly equal to her own somatic energy (one Human Energy Equivalent)
(Boyden et al 1990).
Hunter-gatherers did not ‘own’ land. There is little evidence of territorial 
behaviour despite established patterns of movement (Sack 1986). Encroachment 
pressures were minimal as population densities were low and ‘space was virtually 
unlimited. Therefore there was little need to defend land from others. Indeed the 
very notion of ‘possession’ does not appear to apply to hunter-gatherer groups:
“the unconscious emphasis is on use itself, on need that is free of psychological 
entanglements” (Bookchin 1982: 50).
The most important institution of hunter-gatherer society was the family. 
With the family as their nucleus groups of people operated together, and relied on 
each other for survival. Membership of the group was not necessarily restricted to 
kin. Sharing and reciprocity were integral to group survival: “one frequently hears 
that no one starves in the primitive community unless everyone starves” (Sack 
1986: 56). As social beings hunter-gatherers experienced companionship and lived 
by the need for approval by the in-group (Boyden 1987). There was, it seems, a 
rich social fabric providing the intangible needs of emotional support, love, 
companionship, social interaction, personal involvement and responsibility. 
Boyden asserts that “by and large, ‘negative’ feelings, such as a sense of 
alienation, sense of anomie, sense of loneliness, sense of boredom, and of 
resentment do not appear to be common features of primeval people under usual 
circumstances” (Boyden 1987: 74).
It is generally thought that in most hunter-gatherer groups males and 
females had equal social status (Bookchin 1982, Diamond 1991). There was some 
gender and aged based division of labour, but there was little occupational 
specialism compared to modem society. The basis of politics was fundamentally 
consensual and egalitarian. This social solidarity and the inseparability of early 
humans from nature leads Bookchin (1982) and Merchant (1982) to describe the 
hunter-gatherer community as ‘organic’. Bookchin suggests that in such a 
community there is:
An outlook toward life that visualised people, things, and relations in terms 
of their uniqueness rather than their ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’ ... 
individuals and things were not necessarily better or worse than each other; 
they were simply dissimilar. Each was prized for itself... the concept of
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individual autonomy had not yet acquired the fictive “sovereignty5' it has 
achieved today (Bookchin 1982: 44).
The onset o f an ice age around 35,000 years ago made hunting an 
increasingly important means to procure a reliable supply o f food (Tuan 1979). 
Bands of hunters operated in larger and more organised groups to drive and 
capture larger forms of game. As hunting became more important as a survival 
strategy men slowly came to specialise in hunting and women increasingly partook 
in gathering (Boulding 1992a). However, for most of this long phase hunting was 
confined to small animals caught not far from temporary camps, so role 
differentiation was less pronounced than today (Boulding 1992a).
In the popular imagination it is common to assume that there was a high 
degree o f intra-human violence and brutality in hunter-gatherer societies.10 
However, there is widespread agreement in the literature that hunter-gatherer 
societies were peaceful and that violence occurred infrequently and sporadically 
(Boulding 1992a, Boyden 1987, Mumford 1961, Sack 1986, Toynbee 1966). Tuan 
suggests that:
The available archaeological evidence, sparse as it is, supports this calm 
domestic picture, and from what we know of primitive human foragers of 
modem times a life unburdened by conflict and the stressful demands of 
survival is indeed possible (Tuan 1979: 46).
There were few reasons for violence in the primeval phase. The general
absence of hierarchy and property, and the relative weakness o f material culture
served to eliminate many potential sites of conflict. Conflict was most often
resolved by non-violent means. The most extreme antisocial behaviour was
normally dealt with by expulsion from the group (Tuan 1979, Boyden 1987). So:
In sum, the evidence from recent hunter-gatherer societies does not support 
the notion of primeval society being characterised by continual violent 
hostilities between neighbouring bands. Nor does this idea make much 
biological sense, in that constant intraspecific killing is not a feature of other 
mammalian species in their natural habitats, and on evolutionary grounds, 
we would not expect it to be so (Boyden 1987: 65).
This is not to say that there was no violence in hunter-gatherer societies. What can
be said with confidence, however, is that the means to do violence were limited
10 The assumption of brutality is most often driven by the need to excuse contemporary 
violence as being innate in the human species. The most common set of assumptions 
revolve around Hobbes’ ‘brutish’ man in ‘raw nature’; ie that historically humans were in a 
state of constant violent conflict (Leviathan, Tuck 1991). This line of reasoning gives rise 
to socio-biological determinism. Such views exemplify the way ‘history’ is subjectively 
manipulated to serve ideology.
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and highly personal, and there was no warfare in the sense that one group 
deliberately planned and prepared to enact violence on another. In short, 
“Palaeolithic people were not the ignorant, fierce brutes that civilized humans 
imagine, a fact that places the onus upon us .. to reassess our self-concept” 
(Oelschlaeger 1991: 6)
As the hunter-gatherer phase progressed the building of shelters and the use 
of clothing became a more permanent and widespread feature of life (Goudie 
1986). Boulding (1992a) considers that factors contributing to the progressive 
settlement of primeval humans included the steady enlargement of the female 
pelvis which reduced running speed, the increasing success in hunting strategies 
which reduced the need to gather food over a wide region, and the ability of a 
‘home base’ to allow for nurturing of the young and care of the infirm. Mumford 
(1961) considers that the worship of the deceased contributed to a fixing of people 
in the places where their ancestors were buried. Burial sites served as meeting 
places and camps, as did certain permanent features in the landscape such as 
perennial springs and food-rich estuaries. This gradual settlement contributed to 
the evolution of early agricultural societies.
Summary
According to anthropologist Paul Radin:
If I were asked to state briefly and succinctly what are the outstanding 
features of aboriginal [hunter-gatherer] civilisations, I, for one, would have 
no hesitation in answering that there are three: the respect for the individual, 
irrespective of age or sex; the amazing degree of social and political 
integration achieved by them; and the existence of a concept of personal 
security which transcends all governmental forms and all tribal group 
interests and conflicts (cited in Bookchin 1982: 56).
The capacity of primeval humans to impact on nature was insubstantial by 
contemporary Western standards. Hunter-gatherers survived through a keen 
awareness of their surroundings and absolute dependence on the in-group. Hunter- 
gatherer societies were more egalitarian and non-hierarchical than modem society, 
and functional specialisation was rare. In terms of material possessions, food 
supply, health and social status, individuals in hunter-gatherer societies were all 
reasonably equal. There were extreme hazards associated with life in primeval 
conditions, the environs wholly determined security and survival. Human well­
being was thus both provided for by nature and yet was uncertain because of
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natural perturbations. Humans were the principal source of security, there was 
little insecurity generated among humans themselves.
3.3 The Early Farming Phase
The early farming phase began at least ten to twelve thousand years ago, and 
seems to have occurred in more than one location (Boyden 1987, Boulding 1992a, 
Diamond 1991). This phase includes all farming societies engaged in agriculture 
and horticulture which do not use fossil fuels as a source of energy. The basic 
function common to this phase is the cultivation of edible plants and the breeding 
of animals so “that a higher proportion of chemical energy fixed by photosynthesis 
in a given area flowed through a human population” (Boyden 1987: 83). The early 
farming phase marked the beginning of “a progressive intensification of the 
culture-nature interplay” (Boyden 1987: 83). It involved both “permanence and 
continuity of residence” and “control and foresight over processes once subject to 
the caprices of nature” (Mumford 1961: 21). Overall, the transition from the 
hunter-gatherer phase to the early farming phase occurred very gradually 
(Diamond 1991).
A number of reasons are advanced to explain the emergence of agriculture. 
Some explanatory variables are: the accumulation of knowledge about seeds and 
plants as they were observed to recur in annual camp sites (Boulding 1992a, 
Boyden 1987); the increasing fecundity made possible by the end of the ice age 
(around 15,000 years ago) (Boyden 1987, McMichael 1993); and increasing 
population pressure (Mannion 1991, Ponting 1991, Boulding 1992a). Boulding 
considers that the most important technological factor was the development of 
containers for storing food, including seeds, which facilitated the seed-technology 
necessary for agriculture (Boulding 1992a). Regardless of cause and effect, all of 
these factors probably coincided to create the agricultural revolution, an event 
which “made possible all the subsequent developments in human society” 
(Ponting 1991: 36).
The transition to farming was not “an inevitable or lawful process”, but one 
which was produced by the search by hominids for a more reliable and regular 
source of food (Bennett and Dahlberg 1990: 70). Agricultural practices were not 
initially necessary for human survival, yet society nevertheless organised itself
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around such practices and came to rely on them for continued survival. Boyden 
refers this growing dependence on the seeding of plants and the breeding of 
animals for food as the first significant example of ‘technoaddiction’ (Boyden 
1987: 89).11
The slow emergence of settled communities has also been referred to as the 
‘domestic transition’ as this involved a domestication of animals and plants as well 
as people (Boyden 1987, Mumford 1961). Many animals including cows, sheep, 
goats and dogs were domesticated between 12,000 and 8,000 years ago, however 
plant domestication appears to have occurred prior to animal domestication 
(Mannion 1991). For the most part, the early farmers produced only enough food 
to meet their subsistence needs, however food production was plentiful enough to 
feed larger numbers of people per a given area (Miller 1994). This resulted in a 
slow increase in human numbers, meaning that there was less land available for 
shifting agriculture. With population growth came a shift to static, steady-yield 
farming practices. The need to sustain yields from a given plot of land contributed 
to the development of new farming practices such as the oxen drawn plough 
(developed around 7,000 years ago) (Miller 1994). Manure also began to be used 
as a fertiliser to maintain the equilibrium between nutrient extraction and 
replacement in the soil. This further enhanced food supply and so further increased 
population growth and population densities. This cycle of increased food supply 
and increasing population “was particularly dependent on the discoveries, skill, 
and ingenuity of women as food gatherers and processors” (Boulding 1992a: 88).13
Whereas in hunter gatherer times population densities varied from 0.2 to 2 
persons per square kilometre, in early farming societies they ranged from 25 to 
1000 persons per square kilometre (Boyden et al 1990: 47). In terms of human 
health, increased population density was a mixed blessing. Now, the disabled and 
the debilitated had a secure base and could contribute in new ways to community 
survival (McMichael 1993). However, as people came to live closer together, and 
as they mixed more frequently with other animals, new infectious agents were
11 Technoaddiction is defined as: “the tendency of human populations to become 
dependent for health and survival on technological devices which were not necessary for 
health and survival when they were first introduced” (Boyden et al 1990: 336).
12 A practice that was ecologically sustainable as it allowed depleted lands to regenerate. 
lj In some circumstances increased food production allowed for larger populations, but it 
seems equally likely that in other cases growing populations triggered more intense 
farming practices. However, whatever the nature o f the causal relationship, the end result is 
large populations o f human beings entirely dependent on farming for their survival 
(Boyden 1987).
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introduced, and these were more easily transmitted (Diamond 1997, McMichael 
1993). As a result, the lifespan for many people was considerably reduced 
(Diamond 1991). Fertility rates in agricultural communities increased by 50% over 
hunter-gatherer times, and women were typically bearing 10 children (McMichael 
1993). However, death rates also increased, so the rate of population increase was 
slow.
The shift to a farming based society did not significantly change the use of 
extrasomatic energy. Although on an aggregate level more extrasomatic energy 
was used as there were more people, on a per capita basis the level of use was not 
significantly different from primeval times. Fire was still the most commonly 
available source of extrasomatic energy; it was used for cooking, heating and for 
land clearance. Later in the phase wind and water mills were developed, and 
animals were increasingly used, all of which supplemented human labour. At this 
later stage the extrasomatic energy available to humans increased to 2 Human 
Energy Equivalents (HEE) per day, which, in addition to the individual’s somatic 
energy meant that total energy use was 3 HEE per day (on average per person) 
(Boyden and Dovers 1997). This was an increase of one HEE per day above 
hunter-gatherer times. These new applications of extrasomatic energy were largely 
non-polluting.
The domestic transition heralded a new suite of ecological impacts. Farming 
involved land clearance, manipulation of soils, and the eradication of unwanted 
plants and animals. This caused localised redistributions of certain species of 
plants and animals.14 For the first time there was selective reproduction of certain 
plant and animal species, causing changes in the genetic constitutions of some 
species of plants and animals. With this, humans became significant controllers of 
the environment (Mannion 1991). Cultivated forms of cereals were among the first 
plants to be genetically varied from their natural forms, particularly through 
control of the times and types of seed released. There was also deliberate selection 
of individual animals for breeding to reproduce desired characteristics in 
offspring, creating what Boyden’s calls “culture-induced genotypes” (1987: 100).
For most of the early farming phase the tools and techniques used were 
simple, land areas under agriculture were small, and so, in aggregate, there was 
minimal impact on the environment (Miller 1994). With the passage of time came
14 Some species, such as rats, thrived in the changed ecological conditions whilst others, 
such as large predators, suffered (Boyden 1987).
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new tools and techniques, and crops became increasingly large and homogeneous. 
This had the effect of reducing biological diversity in the immediate environs of 
the farm. Stream diversion was an early form of irrigation (Bennett and Dahlberg 
1990). The advent of monoculture and the slow development of irrigation 
combined to produce (sometimes intense) localised soil salinisation and 
acidification, hydrological imbalances and nutrient depletion (Mannion 1991). 
Monoculture deliberately sought to replace diverse ecosystems with a single plant 
species. This increased dependence on a single crop for food supply, and humans 
became vulnerable to crop failure (Diamond 1991). Monoculture also increased 
the likelihood of infective agents or parasites as it created concentrations of host 
plants and favourable conditions for the spread of pathogens and microbes 
(Boyden 1987). In terms of food security then, the domestic transition meant that 
more was able to be produced, and agriculture reduced the need to engage in risky 
hunting activities. However, the decreased mobility and increased dependence on a 
given locale meant that in the event of crop failure, individual and group survival 
was seriously jeopardised.
The family was the basic societal unit in early farming societies. In the 
Neolithic village the household worked the land assigned to it by consensual 
community decision, there was no ownership or alienation of the land in the way 
that occurs in modem society (Sack 1986, Bennett and Dahlberg 1990). Village 
culture was one that stressed “the primacy of the community, the collective will of 
the people, and the idea of internal regulation and consent” (Merchant 1982: 76). 
Each member of the Neolithic village “is a whole human being, performing all the 
functions appropriate to each phase of life” (Mumford 1961: 24). There was little 
occupational specialism, although there was some division of labour according to 
gender and age. Communities grew and expanded through marriage, the ritualistic 
adoption of strangers, and links with neighbours formed through trade and totemic 
societies (Bookchin 1982).
The early agricultural way of life “was almost from the start a woman’s 
world. She would mark out the fields for planting because she knew where the 
grain grew best, and would probably work in the fields together with other women 
of the band” (Boulding 1992a: 98). Women not only conducted the planting and 
processing of food, they guided social relations and determined the organisation of 
land, housing and food: “she alone becomes the very protoplasm of sociality” 
(Bookchin 1982: 53). Despite the matrilineal character of the Neolithic
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community, control was not exercised in such a way as to confer personal 
advantage. The Neolithic group was essentially non-hierarchical and there is 
thought to have been mutual respect shown between males and females, and the 
young and the old (Boulding 1992a). However, with increasing population 
pressure later in this phase, administrative and distributive tasks became more 
important, and these seem to have been assumed more by men and by elders who 
claimed this as their part of the division of labour (Bookchin 1982, Boulding 
1992a). This gradually lead to a narrowing of the rights of women to resources, 
and a deterioration of their status and opportunities (Boulding 1992a, Diamond 
1991). Bookchin (1982) suggests that the authority of men came about through the 
organisation for defence and to distribute the food surplus. The implication is that 
power was not usurped from the female, but that it had hitherto not existed and 
was created by men. Even in the slowly stratifying community, however, there 
were no ‘classes’ as such, and the prestige that comes from legitimately serving 
the community’s needs seems to have been the original motivation for leadership 
(Bookchin 1982). ‘Power’ in this weak form was more episodic than institutional 
(Bookchin 1982).
For the most part there were not significant differences in the life conditions 
of individuals in early farming societies. Certainly within the in-group there was 
equality with respect to food availability and patterns of health and disease. With 
settled life came the accumulation of material possessions, although these were 
still few and rights of possession were still by and large symmetrical. However, 
with time some differentiation occurred and so the roots o f ‘poverty’ can arguably 
be traced back to this phase with the advent of differentially distributed ‘property’ 
(McMichael 1993, Sack 1986).
With the settlement of people in fixed places and the delineation of spaces 
for agricultural activity, there was an early form of territoriality.15 However, the 
territory of the Neolithic village was created in the first instance not to control 
people, but more to control nature and to promote the union of the people. 
Boundaries were determined by geographical features and were flexible and 
adaptable according to ecological changes, and changes in group and family needs 
(Bennett and Dahlberg 1990). The need to tightly control the space of the 
Neolithic village increased as competition for land increased later in the phase
15 Territoriality is defined by Sack as: “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, 
influence or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting 
control over a geographic area” (Sack 1986: 19).
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(Sack 1986). The Neolithic village marks an early and weak separation of humans 
from nature. Keeping the settled area free of weeds and foraging animals was 
constant and laborious work, and nature came to be seen as hostile and requiring 
vigilance to keep it at bay (Tuan 1979).
There was no systematic organisation of war nor any consistent pattern of 
warfare among early farming societies (Mumford 1961, Boyden 1987, Bookchin 
1982, Boulding 1992a). Like the hunter-gatherer phase there were some acts of 
violence - the walls of Jericho around 8000 BC are sometimes cited as evidence of 
this. However, walls and defences were rare in Neolithic communities, and most 
early farming societies lived in peace with their neighbours, suggesting that 
violence is “not an inevitable consequence of agriculture” (Boyden 1987: 114).
The act of violence was still of a highly personalised nature. People had to fight 
face-to-face using simple weaponry. The inability to extend control over large 
areas, the slowness of communication and transport, and the daily struggle to 
subsist in a given locale all constrained the ability of any single group to rise to a 
position of militant authority (Toynbee 1966, Leiss 1972).
Developments in agricultural practice allowed the generation of a food 
surplus in many societies. This meant that individuals could survive without 
participating in the food production process. In the early stages these individuals 
repaid the community through technological and organisational inventions which 
facilitated an even higher level of food surplus. In time a class of non-farming 
people who produced and traded in textiles and crafts emerged, eventually leading 
to the development of trading towns located on trade routes. The emergence of 
trade was facilitated not only by the production of surplus, but was necessitated by 
monoculture farming which lead societies to depend on each other for the 
provision of a range of foodstuffs. The aforementioned hazards of monoculture 
could be partly offset by trade among communities who by virtue of different 
location and crop production were not likely to be simultaneously struck by crop 
failure. Boyden refers to this reliance on other communities for provision of basic 
needs as a ‘lengthening of chains of dependency’ (1987: 115).16 The domestication 
of the horse and the development of the cart late in this phase also enhanced the 
capacity to trade (Goudie 1986).
16 In agrarian societies these chains o f dependency were very short and weak by 




The early farming phase saw humans develop a new capacity to influence nature 
such that food supply became on the whole more secure. This security was by no 
means absolute as regularity o f supply was offset by vulnerability to crop failure. 
Other forms of security were also conferred by the small farming village, 
including an ability to ward off predators, better shelter from the elements and an 
improved ability to nurture the young and tend to the infirm. This security came at 
the cost o f greater prevalence of disease, a progressive distanciation from nature, 
emergent forms o f environmental degradation, and embryonic forms o f social 
stratification.
3.4 The Early Urban Phase
The early urban phase began when the first cities appeared in the valleys of the 
Tigris, Euphrates and Nile Rivers around 5,000 years ago. It began to end with 
advent o f the modem high energy phase beginning in Europe some 200 years ago. 
The ‘city’ was a new phenomenon, although smaller urban societies had long since 
existed. The degree of change from ‘proto-city’ (“spring, shrine, village, market, 
stronghold”) to city was extremely incremental and gradual, as were 
transformations throughout this phase (Mumford 1961: 42). It should be 
remembered that throughout this time the bulk of the population did not reside in 
major cities.
The rise of cities can be attributed to the production of a food surplus which 
allowed some people to dwell elsewhere than the farm and engage in activities 
other than food production, such as trade in crafts and food. Mumford speculates 
that the evolution of the city was enabled by a transformation in the collective 
unconscious: “at some moment, it would seem, the local familiar gods, close to the 
hearth fire, were overpowered and partly replaced, certainly outranked, by the
17distant sky gods or earth gods. ’ (Mumford 1961: 41).
The early urban period heralded an unprecedented growth in human 
numbers made possible by increased agricultural output. Steady advances in
17 Thus for Mumford the city is the material expression of the “magnification of sacred and 
secular power” (Mumford 1961: 42). All of these explanations for the emergence of 
‘civilisation’ (a word which need not connote an improvement nor a displacement of 
barbarism) are speculative - the problem of causality vexes all historical narratives.
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agricultural productivity were made initially through better organisation and larger 
applications of human labour, and the increased use of better cultivation 
techniques (Merchant 1982).18 At the beginning of the phase there was in the order 
of 100 million people on the earth, 3,500 years later it had doubled to around 200 
million, and by the ‘end’ of the phase it had increased to around 1000 million 
people (Boyden 1992: 104, Goudie 1986: 8). In the latter part of early urban phase 
world population was growing by 50,000 people per year (Boyden 1992: 107). 
Poverty was a key factor in this population growth (McMichael 1993). Later in 
this phase advances in public and private hygiene and improved nutrition helped to
reduce death rates, however for a significant period birth rates did not fall, thus
19population grew at a rapid rate (Boyden 1987).
Urban societies had an unprecedented impact on the environment. As the 
city’s population grew so did its dependence on surrounding agricultural lands, 
leading to more intense agricultural practices. The need to supply more food 
within a transportable distance to the city resulted in large scale irrigation and 
fertilisation projects. This caused partial and at times complete degradation of 
ecosystems. The great floodplains where the first cities emerged were changed by 
widespread clearing of woodland, the draining of wetlands, large scale ploughing, 
long term salinisation and acidification of soils, erosion and subsequent water 
pollution (Kates et al 1990). Widespread environmental degradation jeopardised 
the health and well-being of the populations living within and around the city. This 
was a new level of environmental insecurity: “the threat of famine remained ever 
present”, and “almost every adult.. knew the threat and often the reality of 
hunger” (Tuan 1979: 56 and 60). However, these problems were not uniform in all 
civilisations, that some continued suggests that these were able to sustain 
themselves over time. Ponting notes, for example, that the settlements in the Nile
valley were a “striking example of a society establishing a sustainable balance
20between the natural environment and its demand for food” (1991: 83).
18 For example, in Europe in the 14th century the application of fertilisers such as lime and 
seaweed became common place (Mannion 1991). New crop varieties were also developed.
19 Advances in hygiene and sanitation were stimulated by the advent of the bubonic plague 
beginning in Europe in 1348. The plague was a particular pathogen that festered in poorly 
sanitised and dense populated areas. Up to 70% of some populations perished during the 
plague (Garraty and Gay 1981: 487).
20 The case of salinisation of the once fertile Tigris and Euphrates river valleys in 
Mesopotamia is cited as a case of ecological degradation undermining security (Hughes 
1994). Mannion suggests that the Mycenaen civilisation collapsed due to over worked 
agricultural systems and that many other ancient civilisations “may well have risen and
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A new source of environmental pressure emerged with the development of 
more complex economies and the increasing importance of non-essential or luxury 
commodities (Boyden 1987). With this, the per capita rate of resource use 
increased. The city accelerated deforestation with its increased demand for timber 
for construction and fuel. Later in the early urban phase added pressure was put on 
the forests (notably o f Europe) by the need to support larger mining activities, for 
fuel for slowly developing ‘industrial’ activities such as metallurgy (beginning in 
the agricultural phase), and for shipbuilding.
Throughout the early urban phase there was a continued struggle to bring 
more energy under human control. Initially, the energy for large infrastructure 
projects (temples, city defences, irrigation and roads) came from the application of 
larger numbers o f people in carefully coordinated and regimented labour gangs 
(Ponting 1991). Animals were increasingly used as a source of labour. The burning 
of wood as fuel also increased substantially, as did the harnessing o f wind and 
water power.21 Oils began to be burned and later in the phase coal was 
increasingly being used as a substitute for increasingly scarce timber . The 
burning of timber, and more importantly coal, created local and regional 
atmospheric effects. Between the birth of Christ and 1650 the world population 
increased its use of extrasomatic energy fourfold, and its use of somatic forms of 
energy doubled (in line with population growth) (Dovers 1994: 15). From the 
beginning o f the early cities to the start of the high-energy phase per capita 
extrasomatic energy use increased from 4 Gigajoules/year to 8 Gigajoules/year, or 
from 2 Human Energy Equivalents per day to 4 HEE’s/day.
In the city there were new forms of social power that revolved around the 
warrior chief/king high priests, and merchants. “ This new elite did not necessarily 
procure their power over the populace through the use o f force. A hypothesis is 
that the populace freely gave of their resources and authority in return for 
collection, storage and redistribution o f the food surplus (Sack 1986). It seems that
fallen on the strength of their ability to manipulate food production and the new resources 
... which ... facilitated agricultural intensification (1991: 102).
21 The first large scale systematic use of water was in Egypt around 100 BC with the 
development of the automatic irrigation wheel (Ponting 1991).
22 In 1550 English coal production was 210,000 tons, eighty years later it had risen to 
1,500,000 tons (Ponting 1991).
2j How this transfer of power transpired is a difficult question. The application of military 
power, initially used to defend the community, was at some point turned inward to control 
the community. Certainly, the extension of infrastructure and the organisation of mass 
labour occurred under the aegis of the military (Bookchin 1982, Mann 1984).
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the elite gradually expanded this distributive power into the power to organise all 
of society (Mann 1984, Boulding 1992a). The geographic centralisation of 
religious temples in the city, and their imposing and elevated form, was analogous 
with the centralisation and elevation of priestly power (Mumford 1961). With this 
religious centralisation came a centralisation of economic power (Sack 1986). It 
seems a reasonable proposition that the religious, capital and military elite 
conspired to maintain a social hierarchy with themselves at the top; Mumford 
describes this as “an alliance between the political, the economic and the religious 
agencies” (1961: 49). The urban hierarchy established what Bookchin calls 
“epistemologies of rule” which “foster the development of patriarchy and an 
egoistic morality in the rulers of society” (1982: 89). Boulding (1992a) notes that 
with the emergence of this hierarchy came the emergence of patriarchy.
The creation of a non-agrarian class was the beginning of a profound change 
in societal values. Boyden observes that “for the first time in human experience, a 
significant proportion of the population went through life without participating in 
the intimate interactions with the natural environment which are associated with 
the food quest’ (Boyden 1987: 126). This was a substantial disjuncture in the 
human-nature relationship, allowing urban dwellers to see themselves as distinct 
from nature and obscuring the biological reality that humans depend on nature for 
survival. Hughes speculates that in early Mesopotamia the attitude towards nature 
“is marked by a strong feeling of battle” (1994: 34). This human-nature 
disjuncture went hand in hand with new forms of worship that, unable to revere 
the now-tamed nature, began to revere instead the collective power that enabled 
the sublimation of nature:
Man [sic] was bound to be impressed by his collective power when it had 
won for him such sensational victories over Nature as the conversion of the 
once-savage jungle-swamps in the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley .... into 
docile canals, dykes and fields, and when the unprecedented productivity of 
these reclaimed wildernesses had raised the wealth and populousness of the 
local community from a Neolithic village to the level of a Sumerian city 
state (Toynbee 1966: 106).
The worship of collective human power slowly gave way to a conception of 
an ultimate being or beings - a ‘god’ or ‘gods’. This ultimate spiritual reality was 
consistent with the worship of human power (Toynbee 1966). As the gods became 
humanised their priestly human envoys laid claim to power within society: “the 
priestly corporation had acquired the role of a cosmic brokerage firm between 
humanity and its increasingly anthropomorphic deities” (Bookchin 1982: 91).
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Religion enabled an ethical code to be divined according to the ultimate spiritual 
presence rather than by the needs of society (Toynbee 1966: 73).24
The new religious consciousness supplanted the organic sensibility of 
hunter-gatherers and early farmers with a pervasive subject-object distinction. This 
enabled ‘nature’ to be seen as something ‘other’ than human. The ‘othering’ of 
nature later became analogous with the ‘othering’ of different, initially less 
‘civilised’ groups of humans.25 Nature became “despiritualized” and began to lose 
the prescriptive force it had in earlier organic societies (Leiss 1972: 181). Once 
nature was generalised and made distinct from humanity it became possible to see 
its exploitation as servicing rather than undermining human well-being. An early 
instrumental consciousness began to emerge. With time every animal came to be 
seen as serving some human purpose, as did every plant and mineral; exploitation, 
not stewardship became the dominant theme (Thomas 1983). Indeed, civilisation 
was “synonymous with the conquest of nature” (Thomas 1983: 25).
The growth of urban populations put pressure on the municipal authorities 
to ensure a regular supply of food. This lead to the ruling elite establishing 
granaries and food reserves - one of the earliest functions of government (Tuan 
1979, Sack 1986). Control of the provision of basic needs slowly became more 
widespread societal control. As populations grew the urban society increasingly 
exerted influence on nearby, and ultimately far distant farming communities. With 
the centralisation of authority and the expanding reach of its administrative power 
came “a greater territorial definition of social relations” (Sack 1986: 70). The 
development of roads enabled more fluent transportation of produce to the city, 
and enabled the city to extend its administrative reach.
The rise of cities was both a product of, and a fulcrum for, the development 
of occupational specialism. Soldiers, merchants, metallurgists and scribes were 
among the first full time specialists (Mumford 1961, Toynbee 1966). The need to 
administer the food surplus, organise the military, assert the authority of religious
24 Higher forms o f spirituality rested on a dualism between the ‘darkness’ and ‘light’, a 
metaphor that pervades contemporary culture and reflects {white skinned) Eurocentrism 
(Tuan 1979). Christian theology had a profound impact on Western conceptions o f time, it 
saw history as a linear progression o f ever higher forms of spiritual being and morality 
(Falk 1971, White 1997). The Christian way was premised on the earlier separation of 
people from nature: it is “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen” (White 
1997: 148).
25 Humans considered themselves to be distinct from nature for at least three reasons: the 
capacity for speech; the ability to reason; and the free agency and moral responsibility that 
was integral to theological teachings (Thomas 1983).
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leaders and maintain the hegemony of the elite created a bureaucratic class which 
was from the outset largely the domain of (some) men; females were increasingly 
left to attend to the household (Boulding 1992b).
Material wealth became a new social phenomenon and a determinant of 
social status. It was experienced differentially among members of the urban 
society, and between urban and agrarian societies. Consumption became an 
expression of self. For the urban poor, unable to feed themselves from the land - 
particularly as land holding monopolies emerged in Europe - subsistence 
demanded predation on other people. By the late Middle Ages in Europe the 
spread of poverty and alienation from the land was so pervasive that “violence and 
crime were endemic” (Tuan 1979: 132). With the rise of violence and robbery 
came enhanced governmental repression to maintain Taw and order’. However, for 
much of this period the wealthy capital classes were a law unto their own and this 
Taw’ was as often criminal as it was ‘order’ (Tuan 1979). Material wealth and 
poverty interacted in ways that inevitably favoured the wealthy; Europe for the 
poor became “an extremely insecure social landscape” with “desperate indigence 
existing side by side with opulence and power” (Tuan 1979:134).
Differences in social status and power gave rise to an unprecedented 
stratification of society, “unlike in earlier times, new societal developments could 
be good for one group of people in a community, but bad for another group” 
(Boyden 1987: 128). Marked deteriorations and differences in the patterns of diet, 
health and disease began to emerge. For the urban poor water pollution, inadequate 
sewerage, garbage accumulation, flies, rodents, cockroaches and other pests all 
contributed to serious health problems: “people were at times living in almost 
constant terror of being struck by one or other of the severe infectious diseases” 
(Boyden 1987: 148). So, the differentiation between people was also in terms of 
basic survival needs.
The growing prevalence of consumption and ownership was paralleled by 
the emergence of a cash economy. Money served as the common determinant of 
value which allowed comparison and exchange of an increasingly diverse range of 
commodities. Money heralded the removal of exchange from the contextual limits 
and locales that characterised the previous system of barter (Giddens 1985b). 
Money refined the process of accumulating surplus by allowing for an assessment 
of profit (Giddens 1985b). With the widespread use of cash came the first financial
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institutions. As a standard measure of commodity value, money had a profound 
influence on society - it became a standard measure of a human being’s value.
In Europe in the baroque period the accumulation of surplus coupled with 
the use of cash as a means of exchange contributed to the emergence of a 
(mercantile) capitalist economy, defined as “a social and economic system in 
which individuals are free to own the means of production and maximise profits 
and in which resource allocation is determined by the price system” (Bannock et al 
1992: 61) 26 In the principalities of 16th and 17th century Europe anything could 
be owned including land, animals and people. With the advent of intercontinental 
travel non-European people were transported to Europe and sold as the chattels of 
the ruling classes.27 A wealthy land owner could ‘own’ hundreds of human beings 
and people could be “born a slave, completely subservient to the will of others” 
(Boyden 1987: 128).28
With the advent of civilisation the extended family began to disintegrate as 
kinship relations were supplanted by territorial and class based control (Bookchin 
1982). There was most probably a strong sense of community in the earliest urban 
environments, however with time the degree of involvement, belonging and 
responsibility began to be experienced differentially between men and women. 
Women were slowly relegated to the ‘underside’ of public life: “the requirements 
of trade, territorial expansion, and warfare shift the focus away from the matrikin” 
(Boulding 1992a: 138). As participation in the urban economy became more 
valued, women became comparatively less valued by virtue of their exclusion.
Large urban centres contained previously unseen densities of people. 
Typical densities ranged from 50 to 300 people per hectare (Boyden 1987: 126).
26 With the growth of capitalist social relations household labour took on a new roles. The 
household became a unit of production as well as a site of subsistence and social activity. 
This additional labour requirement fell most heavily on women who were increasingly 
engaged in pottery, weaving, gardening, cooking, cheese and soap making, cleaning, beer 
brewing and healing, whilst continuing to raise children (Merchant 1982). Further, as 
patriarchal relations were consolidated in public life, these were gradually brought home to 
the domestic realm and undermined the security and authority of women: “both in home 
and economy, the social division of labour shed its traditional egalitarian features and 
acquired an increasingly hierarchical form” (Bookchin 1982: 63). In the countryside 
women were also increasingly burdened: “the story of the lot of rural women from the 
Middle Ages to the industrial revolution is one of increasing work loads and increasing 
severity of working conditions” (Boulding 1992b: 12).
27 Although slavery was also a feature of Egyptian and Meso-American civilisations.
28 An important aspect of slavery was the use of female slaves for the sexual gratification of 
men, which, Boulding observes, added “one more push to the set of forces that were 
combining to lower the status of women in the city” (1992a: 149).
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Whereas in past societies there was only the in-group, and ‘others’ were distant, in 
urban societies the in-group was less readily identifiable, and ‘others’ were in the 
milieu. The basis of individual identity changed and conformed to the stratification 
of occupations and status. Thus class and identity became inseparable.
The use of boats for travel was developed in the early farming phase and 
was a skill which Polynesian societies had developed well before Europeans. 
However, when Europeans acquired the skill in the 15th century it “changed the 
oceans from barriers into canals”, and enabled them to establish colonies in
29remoter parts of Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania (Crosby 1985: 557). 
European culture was able to enforce itself upon the rest of the world through a 
combination of indigenous good-will (shortlived), superior military technology, 
and the spread (frequently deliberate) of foreign pathogens to which non-European 
people had little resistance. Europeans imposed their ideas, technologies, 
infrastructures, diets and economies on the people and places they colonised. They 
saw the lands of the New World as empty space and uninhabited (Sack 1986). 
Although almost all the subjugated people of the New World were oppressed, 
Shiva (1989) and Boserup (1970) consider that women suffered more.
The European invasion was ecological as much as it was cultural. European 
farming practices were imposed in all newly settled areas. Non endemic species 
were introduced, creating a new wave of ecological niches and expulsions 
(Boyden 1987). Trade in resources from the new colonies included the trade of 
slaves in some cases. The extraction of raw materials and labour arguably secured 
the growth of wealth in Europe at the expense of the natural wealth and culture of 
other regions.
Throughout the early urban phase there was a growing appreciation that 
knowledge, when valued and fostered, becomes self propagating. This was 
reflected in the introduction of formal education and specialised training in 
disciplines such as medicine, metallurgy, alchemy and astrology. From the tenth 
century onwards universities were developed in the Middle East and China, and 
then in Europe from 1200 onwards. This knowledge explosion, however, formally 
excluded most women (Boulding 1992b). As the tangible manifestation of
29 The major oceanic powers were based in Portugal, Spain, Holland, Venice, Genoa, 
Britain and France (Mannion 1991).
It is thought that at the time of European settlement the Aboriginal population of 
Australia was in the order of 750,000, but by 1920 the remaining population numbered 60- 
70,000 - a decimation (Boyden at al 1990).
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knowledge, technology also began to proliferate. Tools and machines of the era 
included better wheeled vehicles, sailing ships, the potter’s wheel, pulleys, 
treadles, the Archimedean screw, bottles and bellows, and water powered mills 
(Toynbee 1966). All of the early machines relied on non-polluting sources of 
energy (although landform and hydrological changes resulted from the diversion 
o f water). Improved road design, the harnessing of the horse to wheeled vehicles, 
and the sailing ship, were all “modest steps towards the annihilation of distance” 
(Toynbee 1966: 77). Later in the urban phase extrasomatic energy began to be 
harnessed in the form of steam engines and gunpowder (Boyden 1987: 143). Other 
revolutionary technologies were the printing press, the compass, and aqueducts.
An important technological innovation o f the period was the mechanical clock in 
the early 14th century (White 1997).31
The chains of dependency between communities were strengthened and 
lengthened by trade in luxury items and new technologies which were 
indispensable to the functioning o f the hierarchical urban political-economy. Trade 
is a necessity o f urban life (Toynbee 1966). Trade entailed traversing distance 
between cities and population centres, which opened up the intervening spaces to 
exploitation and territorial competition (Bennett and Dahlberg 1990).
Another profound change of urbanisation was the institutionalisation of 
violence. Boulding considers that the peacefulness of earlier Neolithic and 
primeval society was unable to be sustained in the face of “an arms race heavily 
assisted by traders and metal smiths .. it was not destroyed; it simply armed itself 
and stopped” (Boulding 1992a: 145). Violence became corporatised, its means and 
motives - initially to secure food supply and defend the community - were 
controlled by the city-state (Falk 1971). Deliberately organised violence came to 
be regarded as a normal aspect o f social life, both in the form of warfare between 
urban societies, and in the guise o f legitimate control o f social behaviour. Those
The clock transfigured the conception of time to become linear, regular and forward 
looking rather than circular, seasonal and historically infused. The clock ‘emptied’ time 
and removed it from space. Time became measured not merely in units of time but in units 
of money. Labour could now be regulated to a new gauge of efficiency (Rifkin 1991). The 
ability to measure time more accurately was integral to the development of oceanic 
navigation. Indeed the ‘map’ (another urban development) went hand in hand with the 
measurement of time. With the map “there is no privileging of place (a universal 
projection), [it] is the correlate symbol to the clock in the ‘emptying’ of space” (Giddens 
1991: 17). The clock and the map made traditional grounded conceptions of space and time 
more abstract, they eroded organic society and planted the seeds of modernity.
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who partook in violence on behalf of the city-state were projected as heroes of 
society. Violence thus not only became normalised, it became desirable.
As technology developed, the geographic reach of warfare extended, and 
warfare itself became more destructive. But despite larger armies and more 
destructive weaponry, it was not until the development of gunpowder that the task 
of injuring others took on a remote and impersonal character. The development of 
gunpowder also substantially increased resource use, White writes that “when the 
first cannons were fired, in the early 14th century, they affected ecology by 
sending workers scrambling to the forests and mountains for more potash, sulfur, 
iron ore, and charcoal, with some resulting erosion and deforestation” (1997: 144).
When the city was able to firmly control the territory beyond its walls it 
became the city-state. A state is defined as “a political organisation whose rule is 
territorially ordered and which is able to mobilise the means of violence to sustain 
that rule” (Giddens 1985a: 20). In the Tigris-Euphrates valley, and in later 
European city-states, there was frequent conflict over competing claims to 
territory. The idea of ‘security’ became equated with territorial integrity, 
particularly in Europe. The waging of war was motivated more by expansionist 
desires than by defensive requirements. The threat/defence cycle that emerged was 
instigated by aggression. The ruling elite “found it expedient to conclude compacts 
with their populations offering protection in exchange for the revenues and 
manpower to fight wars” (Lipschutz 1992a: 408). The offer of protection and 
security made by the city to the populace was ironic, for protection and security 
themselves were not so necessary and had little meaning prior to the city-state. By 
the Middle Ages in Europe, warfare, poverty, famine, crime and internal 
repression all combined to render “people insecure to a degree that it is hard for us 
now to envisage” (Tuan 1979: 73).
The authority of the European city-states was undermined by the authority 
of religious leaders: “the church was strong enough to declare and enforce the 
Truce of God, spelling out where and when fighting could take place” (Boulding 
1992b: 2). But in 1648 the city-states of Europe signed the Treaty of Westphalia, 
“a crucial demarcation between an era still dominated by competing claims to 
religious universalism and hierarchical authority and an era of secular competition 
and cooperation among increasingly autonomous political communities” (Walker 
1995: 320). Westphalia was “a coup from below”, in undermining the authority of
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the church the city-states progressively gained authority within their own territory 
(Lipschutz 1992a: 400). With this came an unprecedented consolidation of 
political power underwritten by the “norms of anarchy, self-reliance, absolute 
sovereignty within the state, and no authority outside of if  (Lipschutz 1992a:
401 ).32
The city was engaged from the beginning with the codification o f property
rights and the establishment of a market system necessary for stable capitalism
(Mann 1984, Sack 1986). It also provided guarantees which enabled the
establishment of commercial banks. Capitalism was significantly strengthened by
land tenure developments in England beginning in the 15th century which saw
some common land transferred to private ownership. This ‘enclosure of the
commons’ removed many small farmers and squatters from the land and forced
them into urban areas. With the support o f the state a new land owning and leasing
elite emerged which increasingly accumulated common land under its exclusive
control.33 In removing more people from the land, enclosure consolidated two
preconditions for capitalism: the populace became dependent on commerce and
trade for subsistence such that the merchant became not a vendor of
‘conveniences’ but a vendor of basic needs; and people displaced from the land
were forced to sell their ‘labour’ in exchange for the means to purchase their
subsistence requirements (Sack 1986). This created a profound alienation as well
as fundamental disempowerment o f the individual:
The fact that a worker has to sell his or her labour to an employer in order to 
gain a living is the main constraint through which the compliance of the 
labour force is achieved. It replaces .. the various admixtures o f bondage 
and the threat of the use o f violence.. (Giddens 1985a: 131).
The power of capital slowly transfigured Western Europe from a primarily 
feudal to a overwhelmingly capitalist society (Tuan 1979). With this came the 
doctrine o f ‘freedom of enterprise’ which “was from the beginning not altogether a 
blessing. As the liberty to work or starve, it spelled toil, insecurity, and fear for the 
vast majority of the population” (Marcuse 1964: 2). With the spread o f capitalism
A number of political theories were advanced in Europe after the 15th century which 
rationalised the power and practices of the city-state. Machiavelli’s The Prince was written 
in 1513 and is hailed as a classic of Realpolitik (Garraty and Gay 1981). Hobbes’ 
Leviathan of 1651 was also notable for its explication of a system of rule of law and 
obedience rooted in the authority of the state. These early political writings are, as we shall 
see in chapter 4, often misappropriated. Boulding (1992b) and Tickner (1992) claim that 
these early conceptions of the state were both ontologically and practically masculine.
By the mid 17th century landlords controlled approximately 70% of the English 
countryside (Merchant 1982: 54).
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came the need for more growth and accumulation, bigger markets, more products, 
and innovation (Sack 1986). Change was entrenched as an imperative of the new 
social system and became embodied in the idea of progress. This emphasis on 
growth and expansion massively accentuated environmental degradation in Europe 
in a way that could not be attributed to population pressure alone (Merchant 1982). 
Mineral extraction and metalworking underwrote this early capitalist economy; 
coal, copper, iron, tin, gold, silver and mercury were all extracted. Indeed, in 
England in the sixteenth century mining operations quadrupled (Merchant 1982).
In the Renaissance period in Europe (14th-15th centuries AD), a natural 
cosmology was developed which drew on the Greek conception o f nature as 
orderly, but abandoned the idea o f a natural mind or soul.34 This abandonment 
arose in part because of the Christian theology that nature was God’s, and 
therefore man’s [sic] domain (Collingwood 1945). The Renaissance natural 
cosmology was motivated by anthropocentric, practical and utilitarian needs 
(Thomas 1983). Once European consciousness ceased to project itself into external 
nature “in search of security and validation o f standards o f conduct”, nature 
became an object of conquest (Leiss 1972: 185). Renaissance thinkers like 
Copernicus, Descartes and Galileao variously developed a conception of nature as 
being observable, quantifiable and knowable with certainty (Collingwood 1945). 
The experience o f the mechanical clock and increasing mechanisation of 
production saw the machine become a metaphor for external (and later even 
internal) nature. This paved the way for a conception o f external nature that was 
divorced from ethical considerations. Like the machine, nature and its constituent 
parts could be dissembled and dissected without due care for the act nor for the
36consequences.
The Renaissance natural philosophy was reinforced by capitalist relations 
and was refined during the European Enlightenment (16th century AD). With the
'’4 For the Greeks the world of nature was alive and in ceaseless motion, but this was a 
motion that was orderly and teleological, nature was seen to have a mind and a soul of its 
own (Collingwood 1945).
j5 Animals, for example, came to be seen as “mere machines or automata ... capable of 
complex behaviour but wholly incapable of speech (and) reasoning” (Thomas 1983: 33). 
By contrast, Europeans were distinguished by the ‘soul’ and religious sensibility. 
j6 The analogy was extended to apply to other humans, for example people of colour, 
women and the mentally infirm were at times viewed as ‘animals’, beastlike, soulless and 
bereft of sentience (Thomas 1983). Once inscribed as beasts, the oppression and denial of 
the rights of these ‘others’ became legitimated: “their dehumanization was a necessary 
precondition of their maltreatment (Thomas 1983: 45). Further, the Renaissance was a 
‘male’ humanism and its discoveries were not accessible by women (Boulding 1992b).
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Enlightenment nature came to be seen as “a world of dead matter, infinite in extent 
and permeated by movement throughout, but utterly devoid of ultimate qualitative 
differences and moved by uniform and purely quantitative forces” (Collingwood 
1945: 112). This destroyed the pre-civilisation idea of the organic cosmos. With 
the Enlightenment came “a huge outbreak of dualisms: eg. (a) in metaphysics, 
between body and mind; (b) in cosmology, between nature and God; (c) in 
epistemology, between rationalism and empiricism” (Collingwood 1945: 100).
The rise of dualisms reflected and accelerated the separation of people from 
nature, and people from people. As suggested in chapter 2, dualisms have 
continued to be a pervasive component of contemporary (Western) reason.
Summary
The city heralded a profound shift in the nature of intra-human and human -
environment relations. Bookchin is cogent on the shifts that transpired:
It was the city that provided the territory for territorial ism ... the 
marketplace for elaborate forms of exchange, the exclusivity of quarters and 
neighbourhoods for classes, and monumental structures of the State. Its 
timbers, stones, bricks and mortar gave enduring tangibility to social, 
cultural, institutional, and even moral changes.... the city crystallized the 
claims of society over biology, of craft over nature, of politics over 
community ... it fought back the ever-invasive claims of kinship, usufruct, 
and complementarity, affirming the sovereignty of interest and domination 
over sharing and equality (Bookchin 182: 97).
The concentration of power in the hands of an urban elite resulted in enhanced
security for a small minority and a growing insecurity for the majority of people.
The consolidation of power in hierarchical structures saw the advent of militaries
and a war-culture which served to heighten insecurity among the masses and waste
valuable material and human resources. New forms of structural violence and
oppression were imposed on women, labourers, peasants, the urban poor and
foreigners. Larger scale agriculture allowed for a food surplus most of the time,
but in times of shortages an unprecedented number of people were subjected to
hunger. Further, more widespread degradation of soils and water emerged as a new
cause of insecurity. The pre-civilisation organic outlook was gradually displaced
by an anthropocentric and later mechanistic conception of nature that created a
pervasive schism between humans and the environment. With the emergence of
the city the primary locus of insecurity shifted from the environs to humans, and
people shifted from being the principal source of security to being the principal
source of insecurity.
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3.5. The Modern High-Energy Phase
The modem high-energy phase began in the latter half o f the 18th century and has 
(by most accounts) not yet ended. The modem high-energy phase is also referred 
to more generally as ‘modernity’, defined as “the cultural experience associated 
with the break in the past signified by the onset of the Enlightenment”, which is 
“inextricably mixed with the progress of reason as a mode of thinking about the 
world, and rationalization as a means of intervening in it” (Cooke 1989: 287). This 
modem era has six notable characteristics: industrialisation as the dominant mode 
o f production, capitalism as the near-universal economic order, the intense use of 
extrasomatic energy, unprecedented rates of population growth, the nation-state as 
the dominant political institution, and the centralised control of the means of 
violence (Giddens 1985a, Boyden 1987). These characteristics were prefigured by 
important developments late in the early urban phase in Europe, notably: the 
development of scientific reason and experimentation in the Enlightenment, the 
rise of the sovereign city-state, and early forms o f capitalism following the
37enclosure o f the commons (see the previous section).
The industrial revolution was enabled by the Enlightenment. It sought to 
satisfy all material wants through production in large scale factories utilising 
human labour in conjunction with machines powered by fossil fuels. 
Industrialisation quickly came to be the dominant mode o f production in 19th 
century Europe and North America. Prior to the industrial revolution most goods 
were produced by craftspersons. The most distinguishing characteristic o f 
industrialism is the entrepreneur’s ownership o f the means of production, sources 
o f power, and raw materials (Giddens 1985a). It also involves increased control of 
labour both in terms of its procurement and its deployment into specialised 
divisions. With larger scale production, initially o f metals and textiles, came large 
scale mining and milling activities, and an increase in non-food agricultural 
production. Industrialisation involved increased use of raw materials and energy, 
and equally high outputs o f non-organic wastes.
It should be noted that only a quarter of the world’s population live in truly ‘modem’ 
high-energy societies, however this discussion focuses on these societies as they have had 
far-reaching effects throughout the world.
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The scientific revolution (a product of the Enlightenment) delivered 
advances in medical science, higher standards of hygiene, and public health 
facilities, all of which served to lower infant mortality rates and increase life 
expectancies in Northern (Anglo-) populations. As the modem high-energy phase 
progressed larger numbers of Europeans and North Americans entered the middle 
class, and with this came a decline in birth rates, albeit slowly. The time lag 
between lower birth rates and eventually lower death rates saw massive population 
growth, and population doubling times decreased substantially. This demographic 
transition ended only recently in today’s industrialised states when births and 
deaths reached approximate equilibrium (Wrong 1977). In industrialising 
societies, which constitute the vast majority of the world’s people, a similar 
demographic transition has been, it is widely hoped, underway. However, until the 
majority of people in these societies have their basic needs sufficiently and 
securely satisfied, rapid population growth will continue. The world’s population 
now stands at some 6 billion people, 1,200 times greater than it was at the time of
39the domestic transition. Most of this growth has occurred in the last 50 years.
Population growth in the first industrialising societies was made possible by 
massive increases in agricultural production through the application of machines 
and artificial fertilisers. Whereas in the early urban phase some 90% of the 
population was engaged in food production, in today’s industrialised societies only 
5-15% of the population is similarly engaged. The application of fossil fuels has 
delivered massive gains in productivity per unit of human labour.40 Since 1945 
worldwide use of artificial nitrogenous, phosphate and potash fertilisers has 
increased more than tenfold (Boyden 1987: 182). The widespread use of artificial 
fertilisers, which are themselves energy intensive products, invests still more 
extrasomatic energy into food production.
There are energy inefficiencies in food consumption in modem societies. 
The typical person in a modem society consumes around 0.8 tonnes of cereal grain 
per year, yet only 10% of this is consumed directly, the remaining 90% being used
38 Birth and death rates are now in rough equilibrium in Europe, North America, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand.
j9 Throughout the modem era there has been a progressive shift from rural to urban living 
as people (labour) migrate towards industrial centres. In 1800 only 2.5% of the world’s 
population lived in cities, by 1985 41% were living in cities. This rural-urban migration is 
another characteristic of industrialising societies (Ponting 1991: 300).
40 For example, modem rice farming in the USA produces some 150 times more food 
energy per hour of human labour than subsistence rice farming in the tropics (Boyden 
1987: 180).
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to feed animals who provide meat, milk and eggs (Boyden et al 1990). Globally, 
40% of the world’s grain crop is used to feed and fatten livestock (McMichael 
1993). One kilogram of American beef uses 5 kilograms of grain and the energy 
equivalent of 9 litres of gasoline (McMichael 1993: 95). These energy 
inefficiencies are matched by inefficiencies in the use of water in agriculture. The 
total water withdrawal by humans has increased from 100 cubic kilometres in 
1680 to 3,600 cubic kilometres in 1990 (Kates at al 1990: 1).
Fossil fuels are thus as important a factor in feeding the world’s people as 
water, sunlight and soil. The capacity of high energy agricultural practices to 
sustain current rates of output is diminishing as environmental degradation 
increases. The increased use of artificial fertilisers contributes substantially to long 
term problems of chemicalisation of waters and soils. This has been compounded 
by the widespread use of powerful pesticides after the second world war (Goudie 
1986). Irrigation occurs at ever wider scales, and therefore so does soil salinisation 
and erosion. The problems of agricultural sustainability are compounded still 
further by the clearing of natural vegetation (more trees are cleared every year 
than are planted), which contributes to soil loss. The present rate of soil loss 
throughout the world outstrips the rate of replenishment.
Despite increases in food production, there is an unprecedented level of 
hunger and malnutrition throughout the world (chapter 1). This is due to a 
synergism of factors including: inappropriate application of agricultural practices; 
climatic variations; land degradation arising from overpopulation and 
unsustainable resource use; armed conflicts; massive disparities in wealth and 
access to productive land within and between societies; Western diets which 
consume more photosynthetic energy from higher in the food chain; exploitative 
relations between industrial and industrialising societies which distorts allocation 
of resources away from basic needs; and the globalisation of capitalism which 
demands that a society function according to the dictates of the broader global 
economy rather than its own values. Nevertheless, on a global level enough food is 
produced to satisfy the dietary requirements of all the world’s people. The issue of 
malnutrition is very much an issue of maldistribution of foodstuffs, and this, as 
Boyden notes, “is not due to any innate lack of organising ability in the human 
species” (1987: 212). If a select group of humans could organise themselves 
sufficiently to threaten the world with nuclear annihilation, then it is hard to
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believe that the best efforts of the industrialised world could not manage to supply 
food to all those in need.
Energy use is the single best indicator of the degree of industrialisation in a 
society. Total human energy consumption has risen from 36 Petajoules (PJ) per 
year at the end of the hunter-gatherer phase, to 5,900 PJ per year in 1650, to 
380,000 PJ per year in 1990 (Dovers 1994: 14). All of humanity now uses 20,000 
times more extrasomatic energy than hunter-gatherers did, and 1,000 times more 
somatic energy (Dovers 1994: 14). In some industrialised areas the per capita use 
of energy is in excess of 100 Human Energy Equivalents per day (Boyden et al 
1990: 66). The global average extrasomatic energy consumption per person was 67 
GJ/year in 1990, a twenty-fold increase since hunter-gatherer times (Dovers 1994: 
14). The biggest increases in energy consumption have occurred since 1850. 
Regional discrepancies occur, in some parts of the world per capita extrasomatic 
energy use is 400GJ/year, whereas in other parts it remains at early farming levels 
(Dovers 1994: 15). This increase in energy use has come about primarily through 
burning fossil fuels which has resulted in pollution of the atmosphere, soils and 
water. Between 1860 and 1975, for example, there was a fifty fold increase in 
global C02 emissions (Boyden 1987: 204). Global sulfur emissions were 
negligible at the turn of the 20th century but the human output of sulfur now 
stands at some 150 million tons per year (Kates at al 1990: 1).
The earliest fossil fuel energy technology was steam power. In the second 
half of the 19th century experiments with oil, gas and coal lead to the development 
of the internal combustion engine which has since been of profound importance 
(Boyden et al 1990). Late in the 18th century the technology for electricity was 
being pioneered and by 1800 batteries were being used as a source of electrical 
power.41 However, the availability of electricity was not widespread until it was 
generated by burning coal, and until the development of the infrastructure 
necessary to transmit it. When this had been achieved in the twentieth century it 
facilitated far greater levels of automation in production, and generated a new 
wave of industries (Ponting 1991). Nuclear power was applied on a commercial 
scale after the second world war. It involves the generation of wastes that can alter 
genetic structures and remain harmful for hundreds of thousands of years. More 
recently, new energy technologies which utilise solar, wind and geothermal power 
have been developed; these are by and large pollution-free energy technologies.
41 Electricity was first generated in London in 1834 (Ponting 1991).
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The amount of resources consumed by humans has also massively increased 
in the modem high-energy phase. Annual production of automobiles, for example, 
has increased from 8 million in 1950 to 35 million in 1994 (Brown et al 1996). 
More primary metals have been consumed during the past 25 years than during the 
whole of previous history (Boyden 1992: 159). The large scale depletion of the 
world’s wood and forested resources in the modem age has been driven by 
demand for non-edible cash crops such as wood, tobacco and cotton, and by 
demand for minerals and agricultural produce (Tucker and Richards 1985).42 Of 
all the deforestation caused by humans, three quarters of it has occurred since 
1860 (Kates et al 1990). The growth in consumption of energy and resources is 
matched by a growth in the output of biologically harmful wastes. It is estimated 
that 30,000 different chemicals are produced each year in quantities greater than 1 
tonne, and that 1,500 of these are produced in quantities greater than 50,000 tonnes 
(Boyden and Dovers 1992: 66). The average person in a modem high-energy 
society annually discharges 20-30 tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere 
(Boyden at al 1990: 66).
Prior to industrialisation human metabolism remained more or less constant 
(Boyden 1987). It is estimated that humans now harvest at least 7% of all energy 
trapped by photosynthesis over the earth’s surface. However, only 1% of this 
biomass energy is actually consumed as food (Boyden 1987: 181). One single 
species - the human species - is therefore consuming a significant proportion of 
the total metabolism of the biosphere. McMichael estimates that “our aggregate 
impact upon the biosphere is ... about one million times greater than in .. pre­
agrarian days” (1993: 2).
Individuals in both industrialised and industrialising regions must now 
contend with the health impacts of ‘subliminal toxicity’ (the slow ingestion of 
harmful substances through food, water and air), including lethargy, fatigue, 
irritability, cardio-respiratory disorders and cancer (Boyden 1987: 267). Dietary 
patterns have changed substantially in modem societies, whereas the average 
hunter-gatherer diet was 30% protein, 15% fat, 1-3 grams of salt and 5% sugars a 
day, the average person in a modem society consumes 15% protein, 40% fat, 10 
grams of salt and 20% sugars a day (McMichael 1993).
42 For example, the consumption of paper in Australia has risen from 60kg per person per 
year in the 1950’s to 140kg/person/year in 1992, placing added demand on domestic and 
foreign timber resources (Boyden and Dovers 1992: 65).
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The concept o f ‘technoaddiction’ helps understand the perpetuation of 
environmentally degrading practices in modem societies. Boyden defines 
technoaddiction as “the tendency of human populations to become dependent for 
health and survival on technological devices which were not necessary for health 
and survival when they were first introduced” (1992: 257). Consider, for example, 
a world suddenly devoid o f electricity, or motorised transport, or 
telecommunications, or computers (Boyden 1987: 225). Advances in technology 
underlie humans’ capacity to influence nature, but the technology-environment 
problem arises not from technology, nor from science or knowledge per se, but 
from its manipulation by capitalism to produce extraneous consumer items rather 
than changes for the genuine betterment of all people.
One of the key features of modernity is the nation-state. Although the 
precursor for the nation-state was the European city-state that emerged late in the 
urban phase, it was the French revolution of 1789 that marked the beginning o f the 
‘nation’ proper (Hobsbawm 1992). The ‘nation’ is understood here as “any 
sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members 
of a ‘nation’” (Hobsbawm 1992: 8). This points to the extent to which the nation is 
a constructed entity. There are, however, three loose criterion which underpin the 
development of the ‘nation’: the historic association with a current or past state 
(such as the European city-states o f the urban phase); the existence o f a cultural 
elite with the capacity to foster nationalist sentiments; and a proven capacity for 
conquest, as “there is nothing like being an imperial people to make a population 
conscious of its collective existence as such” (Hobsbawm 1992: 39). Given these 
criteria, it is not surprising that modem nation-state emerged in Europe.43
Sovereignty (the supreme and unrestricted autonomy of the state) was
institutionalised after the first world war with the creation o f the League of
Nations. This created a “deep commitment to the sovereignty of nation-state as the
‘natural’ political condition o f humankind” (Giddens 1985a: 259). Giddens writes
of the emergence of international relations at this time:
The development of the sovereignty o f the modem state from its beginnings 
depends upon a reflexively monitored set of relations between states.... 
‘International relations’ are not connections set up between pre-established 
states, which could maintain their sovereign power without them: they are 
the basis upon which the nation-state exists at all. The period of the 
burgeoning of international organizations, including the League of Nations 
and the UN, is not one of the growing transcendence of the nation state. It is
43 See appendix II for a further discussion of nations and nationalism.
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one in which the universal scope of the nation-state was established 
(Giddens 1985a: 263-4).
The modem nation-state generates an internal unity that corresponds to 
definite borders (Giddens 1985a). It is unique for its ability to impose firm and 
distinct boundaries on otherwise porous geographical edges. States are a series of 
cartographically delineated insides and outsides which dominate contemporary 
political space (Harvey 1985, Cooke 1989). They are also integral in maintaining 
the boundaries and institutions necessary for modem capitalism to operate 
successfully. In this sense, the state secures the conditions for capitalism (Giddens 
1985a, Harvey 1985, Cooke 1989). The modem nation-state has also successfully 
laid claim to the legitimate use and monopoly of the means of violence (Giddens 
1985a). The nation-state differs in size, scale and nature from the forms of 
community that existed elsewhere in human history.
Capitalism preceded the industrial revolution. Indeed, if capitalism is 
“defined in terms of the rational organization of economic activity” to generate 
profit, then industrialisation - involving the use of extrasomatic energy, 
mechanisation, routinisation and unification of production processes - was perhaps 
an inevitable outcome (Giddens 1985a: 141). Capitalism necessitates expansion, it 
is a permanent and continuous revolutionising force (Hobsbawm 1994). Between 
1850 and 1960 global output grew from a value of $611 billion to $ 6,936 billion, 
and the goods and services produced in the industrial regions (mostly Europe and 
North America) grew from $212 billion to $6,103 billion (all in 1993 US dollars) 
(UNDP 1996: 12). This growth occurred mostly in the already wealthy regions. In 
the non-industrial world growth was slower, from $399 billion in output 1860 to 
$833 billion in 1960 (1993 $US), during which time their share of world output 
dropped from 65% to 12% (UNDP 1996: 12). The UNDP describes the global 
economy at present:
During 1965-1990 world merchandise trade tripled, and global trade in 
services increased more than fourteenfold .... More than a trillion dollars 
roam the world every 24 hours, restlessly seeking the highest return. This 
flow of capital is not just offering unprecedented opportunities for profit 
(and loss). It has opened the world to the operation of global financial 
markets that leaves even the strongest countries with limited autonomy over 
interest rates, exchange rates, or other financial policies (UNDP 1996: 8).
The flow of material and resources between the industrialised and the 
industrialising world has not lessened, but the terms of trade and the value of trade 
to the industrialising world has deteriorated. The transfer of wealth from
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industrialising to industrialised nations occurs not only through undervalued 
resources, but also through finance and debt repayments: “traditional imperialism 
has been replaced by economic colonialism” (McMichael 1993: 25). The 
industrialising world pays some four times more in interest on loans than it 
receives in aid transfers (George 1988, Miller 1994). The International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank have been central to this proxy colonisation and have 
affected a situation where “the policies of a great many countries are, in effect, 
now being controlled by financial interests” (Rees and Rodley 1993: 225). The 
connection between this impoverishment of the industrialised world and 
environmental insecurity was succinctly put by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe in 
1987:
Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their immediate 
environment in order to survive .. They [the industrialising countries] are 
faced with falling commodity prices, a rise in protectionism, a crushing debt 
burden and dwindling or even reverse financial flows. If their commodities 
bring little money, they must produce more of them to bring in the same 
amount or at times even less. To do this, they cut down trees, bring under 
cultivation marginal land, overgraze their pastures and in the process make a 
desert out of previously productive land. But in these actions the poor have 
no choice. They cannot exercise the option to die today so as to live 
tomorrow (cited in McMichael 1993:125).
Industrial-capitalism went hand in hand with increased demand for luxury 
items. From the 19th century onwards the consumptive ethic came to dominate the 
value system of Western societies. The personal desire to have more, and to have 
more choice, was conducive to the assumption that growth based on increased 
production and the greater accumulation of capital was inherently Good. For the 
wealthy, growth meant the chance to have more, and for the underprivileged, 
growth offered hope for improvement (Boyden 1987). But the tension of economic 
growth is that growth for growth’s sake is not socially rational, it should be seen as 
a means to the end of enhancing the provision of basic needs (after UNDP 1996).44 
The scarcity that growth eliminates has always been primarily a scarcity of luxury 
items rather than a scarcity of basic needs. For most people the ‘reality’ of growth 
is “a form of enslavement” (UNDP 1996: 43). Like growth, the notion of 
‘progress’ became entrenched as a Good after the 17th century. ‘Progress’ became 
the discursive symbol of the application of science and reason for the betterment
44 Doubts about the desirability o f growth have been expressed by, among others, Thomas 
Carlyle (1795-1881) (1971), Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) (1987), John Stuart Mill (1806 - 
1873) (1992) and Mahatma Gandhi (1869 - 1948) (1946). Gandhi argued that the earth was 
capable o f providing for ‘every man’s need but not every man’s greed’ (UNDP 1996: 45).
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of people. Belief in progress is the belief in a continuous change to the new, the 
better and the previously unavailable (Sack 1986).
With industrial-capitalism came the ideology of the free market. This laissez 
faire ideology holds that the maximum public Good would be achieved by the 
unregulated efforts o f private, autonomous, rational and self seeking individuals in 
an unregulated market place (Mumford 1961).45 This ideology erodes cognition of 
the fundamental purpose o f government - to look after the well-being of the people 
- and supplants instead an economic rationality that limits state action (Cardoso 
1996). Capitalism is unique for the “sweeping power” it gives to economics and 
the way in which it isolates the ‘economic’ from the ‘political’ (Bookchin 1982: 
134, Giddens 1985a).46 Leiss writes that this “legend of the equality o f rights and 
individual freedom .. together with the illusion of popular choice under the 
conditions of mass democracy, still veils the reality in which the decisions of the 
few govern the lives of the many” (Leiss 1972: 168-9). This dominance o f the 
(economically rational) means over the consideration of the (political) ends is a 
fundamental feature of modernity. The emptying of political discourse of 
substantive issues o f the Good, supplanted by instrumental considerations of 
economic means, has undermined the basic precondition necessary for society to 
peacefully resolve its social and ecological problems. This will be revisited in 
chapter 11.
Modernity has severely degraded the supportive social fabric that had 
managed to survive in a diluted form up until late in the urban phase. In the past, 
very few people had no means o f subsistence, and these were often looked after by 
the local community and the church. However, industrial-capitalism ushered in the 
new phenomenon o f ‘unemployment’ at the same time as urbanisation eroded the 
strength o f community and the bureaucratic state undermined the authority and 
power o f the church. So, whereas in earlier times almost everybody was a part of
45 Laissez faire ideology is commonly associated with Adam Smith (1723 - 1790).
46 This division between economics and politics is a characteristic of neo-liberalism in the 
1980’s and 1990’s (Rees 1995). This separation of the ‘political’ - understood in chapter 2 
as the determination of desired social goals - from the ‘economic’, understood here as the 
efficient pursuance of profit, is integral to the instrumental rationalisation deplored by 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1979 - see appendix I).
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society, in the impersonal, highly structured industrial era, the individual could 
become a ‘victim of society’.47
Modem social life is characterised by radical reorganisation of time and 
space such that social relations are lifted from the context of specific locales and 
restructured across indefinite spans of time and space, Giddens calls this the 
process of disembedding (1990). With the rise of urban living an individual’s
48relationship to ‘community’, and ‘sense of place’, have also been weakened. 
Personal meaningless (“the feeling that life has nothing worthwhile to offer”) is 
now a fundamental psychic problem of late modernity (Giddens 1991: 9), as is 
anomie (“the general dissatisfaction of individuals with modernity’s major 
cultural values such that they no longer fully respond to them”) (Giddens 1985a: 
323). Explanations for the anomie and alienation experienced in modem times are 
numerous. The use of machines in conjunction with manual labour, the use of 
computers in white-collar professions, and the managerialism (“the bulldozer of 
market intent”) associated with neo-liberal economics are all contributing factors 
(Rees and Rodley 1995: 233). Giddens understands all these effects of modernity 
as undermining the ontological security of the individual (1991). These changes 
“have interfered with some of the important psychosocial health needs of human 
beings” and may contribute to knowingly harmful practices such as smoking, 
alcohol and other substance abuses. (Boyden 1987: 291).
Therefore the richness, diversity, creativity and traditions that characterise 
primeval, agrarian, and to some early urban life, and which are “optimum life 
condition conducive to health in Homo sapiens”, have been displaced in the 
modem age (Boyden 1987: 79).50 As well as contributing to behavioural problems, 
the intangible effects of modernity foster consumer behaviour as a substitute for
4' Women were particularly oppressed, their domestic work, as well as children’s 
household labour, was frequently appropriated by males in “oppressive monogamous 
family structures” (Boulding 1992b: 187).
48 Bookchin considers the market to have colonised every aspect of social and personal life 
and the buyer-seller relationship to be the substitute for all human relationships: “it 
calcifies and dehumanizes the most intimate relationships between people” (Bookchin 
1982: 137).
49 Bureaucracy is also responsible. It has replaced the traditional social order that held the 
individual and society together (Bookchin 1982).
50 Technological advances and the reshaping of society into a regulated productive and 
consumptive system have driven these changes. In Marcuse’s terms, “technological 
rationality reveals its political character as it becomes the greater vehicle of better 
domination”, which is to say that the technical interest in the domination of nature 
integrally involves the domination other human beings (Marcuse 1964: 18, Leiss 1972, 
Adomo and Horkheimer 1979).
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genuine psychosocial fulfilment: “consumer behaviour in modem western society 
compensates in a most important way for the decline of various intangible meliors 
- meliors associated, for example, with creative behaviour, a sense of 
responsibility, and a sense of personal involvement” (Boyden 1987: 301). The 
market is involved in “the whole scheme of substituting vicarious satisfactions for 
direct ones, and money and goods for life experiences” (Mumford 1961: 499). So, 
given the limitations industrial capitalist society places on avenues for personal 
fulfilment, consumption becomes a prosthesis for genuine satisfaction. Consumer 
behaviour reproduces itself by consolidating industrial-capitalism, and in so doing 
consolidates the generation of individual anomie and alienation. Further, as has 
already been noted, consumption is a key component in the intensification of 
environmental degradation.
The inequalities that exist between and within societies give rise to feelings 
of deprivation. The saturation and spread of telecommunications considerably 
exacerbates these feelings of deprivation. The media, conforming to capitalist 
imperatives, promotes consumption of the latest goods and services. Every person 
within earshot of a radio or television is made aware of where they stand in the 
have/have not hierarchy. This relative deprivation leads to continual increases in 
consumption of goods and services and thus continual increases in the use of 
resources and the generation of wastes (see chapter 11).
Throughout the modem high-energy phase the destructive power of 
weapons has increased. In the 19th century muskets and 12 pound guns were state 
of the art weapons. Today there are supersonic jets, submarines and long range 
nuclear missiles (Smil 1994). Developments in weaponry reached their nadir with 
nuclear weapons. Humans now have the means to destroy themselves (and much 
else besides) in a single fleeting moment. Technology has also depersonalised 
warfare. The more weapons become long range, the more killing becomes 
scientific rather than intimate: “the new modes of aggression destroy without 
getting one’s hands dirty, one’s body soiled, one’s mind incriminated. The killer 
remains clean, physically as well as mentally” (Marcuse 1964: 265). Military 
advantage now increasingly equates with technological advantage: “knowledge, in 
short, is now the central resource of destructivity” (Toffler and Toffler 1993: 83). 
An estimate of the proportion of global scientific research devoted to military 
purposes is problematic, but Egea thinks that “military R&D is by far the single 
most important item in the world’s budget for scientific and technological
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research” (Egea 1994: 133). The relative priority given to military spending in the 
interests o f ‘security’ as opposed to aid was indicated in chapter 1.
Throughout the twentieth century an international consciousness has 
emerged, largely in response to the ‘world risks’ o f environmental degradation and 
nuclear warfare (Beck 1996).51 Beck (1996) argues that modernity is being 
transformed into risk society, “a world where the basis o f established risk-logic 
has been whittled away, and where hard-to-manage dangers prevail instead of 
quantifiable risks” (Beck 1996: 15). Giddens generally concurs, saying that the 
modem world introduces new risks which previous generations have not had to 
face, adding that; “now that nature, as phenomenon external to social life, has in 
some sense come to an ‘end’ - as a result of its domination by human beings - the 
risks of ecological catastrophe form an inevitable part o f our horizon of day-to-day 
life” (1991: 4). In response to these concerns the number of international 
intergovernmental organisations grew from 123 in 1951 to 365 in 1984 
(Hobsbawm 1992: 181). There are now in excess of 30,000 nongovernmental 
organisations, and more than 1,400 were officially involved at the Earth Summit 
(Renner 1997: 152, UNCED 1993).
In recent times there has been a concentration o f political and social power 
into the hands of private corporations. Whereas early in the industrial-capitalist 
phase the state and the corporation were engaged in a synergistic self promoting 
relationship, in the modem age the promotive behaviour, employment practices, 
and capital utilisation of the modem transnational corporation increasingly 
undermines the autonomous control and authority of the state. McMichael (1993) 
estimates that the world’s largest 500 transnational corporations account for one 
third o f global production. The multinational corporation has a capacity to move 
capital and technology rapidly to gain access the cheapest raw materials and 
labour, and to access the most favourable markets. Harvey calls this “capacity to 
command space and use geographic differentials” (1985: 142). The modem
51 Although global, what makes this risks important is their effects on people.
52 Beck and Giddens speak more to the sociological phenomenon of risk rather than of the 
risks themselves. For Falk, the ‘planetary crisis’ is the product of the interrelated factors of 
population pressure, pollution, resource depletion and the danger of wars of mass 
destruction; these combine with modem technology to make accidents greater in scale in 
scope (Falk 1971). Harvey suggests that the crises that are inherent in capitalism, such as 
stock market crashes, certain forms of scarcity, and recessions, are all more universally 
experienced than in the past (Harvey 1985). Habermas considers that, as well as the 
dangers of nuclear war and disturbance of the ecological balance, “the violation of the 
personality system (anomie)” is also a crisis of global proportions (1989: 271).
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corporation is the principal agent of production of goods, services and wastes, and 
so is central to the generation of environmental degradation and environmental 
insecurity.
Summary
With modernity has come an increase in the “complexity, magnitude and 
frequency” of human impacts on the biosphere (Goudie 1986: 24). Fossil fuel use, 
resource use, the production of wastes, and population have all grown 
exponentially. The systemic causes of environmental insecurity today are two; 
excess consumption and waste generation in the industrialised world, and poverty 
and debt in the industrialising world (which creates population growth and 
unsustainable resource use). These two phenomenon are totally interconnected to 
the synergistic features of the modem high-energy phase which themselves create 
insecurity, namely: industrialisation and capitalism; the massive use of fossil fuels; 
centralised control of intensifying means of violence; the nation-state system; and 
the alienation and ontological insecurity of the individual. In the modem high- 
energy phase insecurity includes the risk that human induced environmental 
degradation will (and does) undermine the stable provision of basic needs with 
detrimental consequences for health and well-being. There are also risks to well- 
being and welfare associated with more powerful forms of direct and structural 
violence. Mische summarises the shift in environmental insecurity that has 
occurred since modernity: “once more the threats have to do with nature, but this 
time not what nature can do to humans, but rather how human activities may be 
damaging nature, and in turn, the way this damage may diminish the prospects for 
future human survival, security, and peace” (Mische 1992: 107).
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to trace some of the major processes which have given 
rise to environmental insecurity. The discussion has been wide ranging as the 
problems of environmental degradation and environmental insecurity are products 
of a large number of historical processes which are interrelated in complex ways.
For 99% of the history of Homo erectus we lived as nomadic hunter- 
gatherers. The hunter-gatherer way of life was secure in that there was no 
structural violence, there were few material and social disparities within or
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between groups, social life was collectively and cooperatively organised, and there 
were few episodes of direct violence. The primeval individual would have had a 
strong sense of purpose and place within the social group. Fellow hominids, then, 
were not a principal source of insecurity. The prime locus of insecurity was nature 
itself as humans lived according to the constraints of their immediate environs. 
Their impacts on nature were primarily localised depletions of plants and animals, 
and the clearing of vegetation through the use of fire. There was no significant 
threat posed by humans to the functional integrity of ecosystems.
The shift to cultivation around 10,000 years ago provided security in the 
sense of a regulated source of nutrition. However, when crops failed, few 
alternative sources of food were available. So although the domestic transition in 
some ways transcended nature’s immediate constraints, the prime locus of 
insecurity was still nature. Agricultural practices in this period resulted in 
degradation of the immediate environs, but large scale ecosystem changes were 
few. More predictable and efficient production of food allowed for increases in 
population size. Society continued to be peaceable, the family remained as the 
basic social institution, and communal life was organised cooperatively. This 
organisation was direct and observable, and, at least in the early stages, there were 
few discrepancies in material wealth within or between communities.
The emergence of the first cities around 5,000 years ago saw an increase in 
the scale of social organisation necessary to produce sufficient food and to control 
food surpluses. Control of the supply of basic needs became control of society. 
Although the city provided some small security against nature, a new class of 
threats emerged as poor diets and social diseases became prevalent. Significant 
disparities in wealth began to appear and society began to stratify along lines of 
occupation, wealth, and power. Another insecurity arose with the development of 
armies and warfare. A religious reorientation began in the city which saw a 
convergence of religious power with political and economic power. As the scale 
of agriculture necessary to feed the urban population increased, so too did its 
ecological impacts. Soil loss, salinisation and acidification became more likely, 
more severe, and more widespread. By the end of the early urban phase the 
world’s population was in the order of 500 million, a hundred times greater than 
the hunter-gatherer era. The early urban phase gave rise to the (European) 
Enlightenment which began to systematically investigate and manipulate nature 
for the purposes of human emancipation, and it saw the progressive enclosure of
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the commons from the 15th century onwards. Another significant development 
was the imposition of European culture and agriculture onto other peoples in other 
parts of the world. So, in the early urban phase risks from external nature were 
lessened as humans learned to provide basic needs more reliably. However, with 
the organisational skills that gave rise to this liberation from nature came the 
power to deprive and exploit people for personal gain. The locus of insecurity 
shifted from external nature to human nature; people became a source of threat and 
uncertainty.
The modem high-energy phase began with the industrial revolution some 
200 years ago. We can trace the rise of almost all contemporary environmental 
problems to the development and widespread application of fossil fuels, excessive 
personal consumption, and population growth. The world now has a thousand 
times more people than it did 10,000 years ago. New production techniques and an 
ever expanding range of consumable luxury items translated into ever increasing 
extraction of resources and growing pollution of the planetary sinks. Modem 
society conforms to industrial capitalist dictates of time and space, and social 
relations are subservient to productive relations. Where people were once sure of 
their places and beliefs, the traditional bases for certainty have now been 
undermined. The industrial revolution sought to supply everyone with basic needs 
with a minimum of human labour, but has been problematised by failures in 
distributive justice, the intensification of warfare, the undercutting of essential life 
support systems, and the erosion of political dialogue to foster consensus.
The potted and imperfect history delivered in this chapter suggests that 
‘security’ is, if nothing else, a relative phenomena. Bookchin observes that “the 
stream of human progress has been a divided one: the development toward 
material security and social complexity has generated contrapuntal forces that 
yield material insecurity and social conflict” (Bookchin 1982: 64). Whereas for 
most of human history the environment was the omnipotent threat and determinant 
of welfare, and humanity was the common source of security, the biosphere is now 
subservient to a humanity that threatens itself in direct, structural, and psychic 
ways. Risks have become larger in scale. Today, environmental insecurity is about 
the welfare of individuals and the survival of whole societies at risk from large 
scale human induced degradation of the biosphere, and the radical uncertainties 
and instabilities this creates. Humans have thus moved from being at the whim of 
the environment to being its persecutor - and yet dialectically still its victim.
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Integral to this increasing scale of environmental insecurity are increases in the 
destructive power of modem warfare, hunger, poverty and exploitation, and a loss 
of power and certainty for the individual. McMichael provides an excellent 
summary of these interrelated causes of environmental degradation and subsequent 
environmental insecurity:
The one underlying problem is the entrenched inequality between rich and 
poor countries, which predominantly reflects recent imperial history, power 
relationships and the global dominance of Western industrial technology 
and economic values. Second, the two central manifestations of this 
inequality are: 1) rapid, poverty-related, population growth and land 
degradation in poor countries, and 2) excessive consumption of energy and 
materials, with high production of wastes, in rich countries. Third, the three 
possible (perhaps coexistent) adverse outcomes of those manifestations are: 
1) exhausting various non-renewable materials, 2) toxic contamination of 
localised environments, and 3) impairment of the stability and productivity 
of the biosphere’s natural systems (McMichael 1993: 7).
This chapter has sought to crudely historicise the development of environmental 
and related insecurities. The following chapter seeks to discuss more fully 
contemporary understandings of ‘security’.
Part II
A Critical Examination of Environmental Security
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Introduction to Part II
A Critical Examination of Environmental Security
Part I of this thesis has established the foundations upon which the following 
critical examination of existing approaches to environmental security is based. It 
outlined the critical green perspective which will now be applied, it defined key 
terms, and it established many of the key processes which, over time, have 
generated environmental degradation and environmental insecurity. Having 
established these foundations, the critical examination of environmental security 
which now follows can proceed in an informed, consistent, and accessible manner.
The aim of Part II is to provide a thorough examination of the literature 
which links environmental issues with the concept of security. Ambiguity and 
diversity are characteristics of this literature. It would be wrong to describe 
environmental security as a discourse or even a paradigm, although particular 
discourses are evident. Rather, there is a collage of overlapping and disparate 
theories, discourses and debates. Part II aims to make sense of this literature and to 
make an appraisal of it terms of the this thesis’ critical green perspective (chapter 
2), and in the light of the historical overview made in chapter 3.1 On the basis of 
the limitations identified in Part II, Part III advances a human-centred 
environmental security concept, and discusses the implications of this for politics, 
policy, and governance.
The environmental security literature is ambiguous and contested for 
reasons which will shortly be discussed. There is thus a need for an heuristic guide 
to assist in comprehending the literature and structuring discussion (after page 96). 
It should be noted quite clearly that Part II addresses all the literature which links 
environmental issues to security issues, in whatever manner. It was from this (not 
much) broader context that the specific label ‘environmental security’ was born. It
1 The ideas for Part II have been developed over a number of papers, including seminars 
delivered at Canterbury University (1998), Keele University (1997) and Lancaster 
University (1997), as well as conference papers given at the 1996 general conference of the 
International Peace Research Association (University of Queensland), the 1997 annual 
British International Studies Association Conference 1997 (University of Leeds), and the 
1997 Institute of Australian Geographers/New Zealand Geographical Society annual 
conference (University of Tasmania). Two seminars were given over the course of this 
thesis at the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National 
University (1996 and 1997).
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is extremely difficult, and ultimately pointless, to make the distinction between 
works which use the specific label ‘environmental security' or ‘ecological 
security’, and those which discuss environment-security linkages in a more general 
way.2 Perhaps the only thing that can be said with confidence is that 
‘environmental security’ as a phrase per se arose in the mid-1980s (see chapter 5).
Ambiguities
The absence of an unambiguous and generally agreed upon account of 
environmental security can in part be explained by the conflation of the two terms 
- environment and security - which are themselves not unproblematic. The 
difficulties of talking about security will be considered in the following chapter. 
Some of the difficulties with ‘environment’ were discussed in chapter 1, where it 
was noted that ‘environment’ denotes all the external conditions of an organism, 
and so denotes literally everything there is. This thesis’ understanding of 
‘environment’ and environmental insecurity was established in chapter 1. It 
remains important to remember Harvey’s observation that the word ‘environment’ 
is instructive for the way it is deployed to serve particular interests (Harvey 1996).
A particular difficulty that pervades the environmental security literature is 
an absence of agreement on the problem that is being addressed (hence the 
definition of environmental security in chapter 1). In some respects 
‘environmental security’ is the answer to a question that was seemingly never 
asked (Brock 1996). The problem can be understood in a number of possible ways: 
in terms o f the threats to national security that might arise from environmental 
degradation (variously considered in chapters 5, 6 and 7); as the human impacts on 
the security of the environment itself (chapter 9); or the way in which 
environmental degradation threatens the health and well-being of people (much 
like the environmental insecurity problem established in chapter 1, see Part III).
One certain theme of the environmental security literature is that 
environmental problems are ‘new’. However, as chapter 3 has established, not all 
environmental problems are new, but what is new is the global extent o f some 
environmental problems. With respect to this newness the theoretical legacy left to 
us by classic social and political theory is (perhaps) not immediately relevant




























































(Goldblatt 1996).3 There is, in general, a notable lack of political and social theory 
in the environmental security literature.
With the meeting o f words ‘environment’ and ‘security’ comes a 
convergence o f divergent epistemological and ontological predispositions, all 
speaking of the common concept - environmental security - in implicitly and 
explicitly different ways. This array of philosophical viewpoints is a key 
contributor to the ambiguity o f the concept. It is also a root source o f debates 
which, whilst being ostensibly about epistemology and political strategy, are as 
much about different philosophical predispositions. In this respect, environmental 
security is not dissimilar to any other contested notion (including that of 
sustainable development) in that the level of debate is far deeper than is 
immediately apparent.
All this convergence points to the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
arriving at an agreed concept of environmental security. The debates over the 
meaning of environmental security can be seen to be indicative o f a healthy and 
seemingly honest and meaningful exchange of ideas. From the broader 
perspective, this should hedge against paradigmatic entrenchment and discursive 
dominance, and will hopefully advance communication about strategies to address 
environmental insecurity. One hopes this will lead to a broad region of agreement 
which will maintain healthy introspection, but be able to advance a set of 
recommendations for meaningful positive action. This optimism aside, much 
needs to be clarified, and many spurious notions and conceptions o f environmental 
security dismissed. This corrective function is an implicit aim of this thesis. In 
order to make sense o f the literature, and to structure discussion, a heuristic guide 
to the literature has been developed (previous page), this will now be discussed.
An Heuristic Guide to the Literature
The heuristic guide to the literature presented on the previous page helps to 
facilitate coherent discussion of the environmental security literature. This should 
be seen as a loose device to aid comprehension, and should not be seen as an 
overly literal or accurate classification. In conjunction with the previous 
discussion of ambiguities, it serves as a cursory introduction to some key
J However, more work could be done to apply the relevance of socialist and utopian visions 
to contemporary environmental problems. This is a long term project for environmental 
politics and sociology.
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dimensions of the environmental security literature which are explored in greater 
depth throughout the remainder of this thesis.
It is possible to identify seven broad categories of the environmental 
security literature. First, there are the various efforts at redefining security which 
will be discussed in chapter 5. These efforts seek to contest and reinterpret the 
dominant political Realist approach to security (outlined in chapter 4); they are the 
beginnings of the concept of environmental security, and they very much frame 
the subsequent literature. Soroos (1994) calls this category the conceptual 
rationale for environmental security. Flowing from these efforts has come 
investigation of the linkages between environmental degradation and conflict 
(chapter 6). Soroos (1994) calls this the theoretical dimension, arguing that it 
focuses on cause - effects relationships. This second category is closely related to 
the third, which considers the environment in terms of national security (chapter 
7). The fourth category arises from exploration of the links between the traditional 
agent of security - the military, and the environment (chapter 8). A fifth category 
is the literature which adopts the deepest green perspective by considering the 
biosphere as the penultimate referent of security (chapter 9). Soroos calls this the 
normative case (1994). Closely related to this is the sixth category which considers 
environmental degradation as an issue for human security (chapter 10 in Part III). 
The most important underlying theme (and tension) in the environmental security 
literature is the (open-ended) question of the desirability of understanding 
environmental issues as security issues. Securitising environmental issues calls for 
extraordinary responses from governments equal in magnitude and urgency to 
their response to (military) security threats. Hence the identification of the final 
category (securitisation) which concerns the ‘political rationale’ of environmental 
security (Soroos 1994). This securitisation issue pervades all of the literature and 
recurs throughout Parts II and III. To stress the point again, these categories should 
be seen as general subsets rather than hermetic entities, there is considerable 
overlap and there are common themes that run throughout all the categories.
Establishing the links between each of these categories is an imprecise 
exercise. These are depicted in the heuristic guide, but their implications should 
not be overstated. The most salient point is the way in which redefining security 
and securitisation can lead to either a focus on national security or on ecological 
security, and that these two referent objects are closely associated with a concern 
for conflict and a concern for human security respectively. The heuristic guide also
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implies a disjunctive between national and human security (no links), a reasonable 
assumption given their different ontological predispositions (see chapters 7 and 
10). Further, there is for the most part no connection between the theoretical 
concern about environmentally induced conflict and the ecological security 
approach (see chapters 6 and 9). Finally, the category that considers the effects of 
the military in war and peace can also be analytically linked to both of these major 
constellations in the literature, but the link between this and the redefining security 
and securitisation categories is generally not well made.
There is one other obvious feature of the heuristic guide presented in figure 
1, that is the depiction of a positive-negative peace continuum. Again, this should 
be regarded as a device to aid comprehension rather than an definitive 
classification. The continuum implies that those approaches that are concerned 
with conflict and national security adopt a negative peace/security perspective, and 
those that favour human security and ecological security adopt a positive 
peace/security approach. Attempts to redefine security, discussions of the impact 
of the military in war and peace, and the question of securitisation are all, more or 
less, neutral with respect to this positive-negative continuum (however the tone 
and implications of these tend to favour positive peace). Finally, concomitant with 
this positive-negative continuum is a policy focus that respectively favours 
proactive as opposed to reactive solutions.
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Chapter 4. Security: Conceptual Notes and the Realist
Approach
4.1 Introduction
Having discussed sources and changes in the nature of insecurity throughout time 
(chapter 3), this chapter seeks to discuss the meaning of security. This is 
considered necessary for three reasons. First, the idea of environmental security 
stems mostly from the discipline of International Relations’ understandings of 
security, the dominant approach being that of political Realism. A preliminary 
understanding of this therefore enables a better appreciation of the environmental 
security literature. Second, and related to the first point, environmental security 
involves reconstructing or reconceptualising security to some degree. Any attempt 
to understand environmental security must therefore appreciate the Realist 
approach and the way it has conferred power and plausibility to the concept of 
security (Walker 1997). Third, the concept o f ‘security’ warrants exploration as it 
distinguishes ‘environmental security’ from other environmental problem-solving 
concepts, such as sustainable development.
There is a massive amount of political science and International Relations 
literature that addresses the concept of security. This chapter seeks to make a brief 
discussion of some of the key themes of this literature. It does not seek to offer a 
definitive review. The aim of this chapter, then, is to sketch the general 
dimensions of the concept of security so the security element of environmental 
security can be better understood, and to outline the basic features of the dominant 
Realist approach for the purposes of contextualising the idea of environmental 
security in the broader literature. This chapter begins with a brief and general 
discussion of the concept of security. It then outlines the basic features of the 
political Realist conception of security which informs the national security policies 




Security is a universal yet nebulous concept. It is a concept that, despite lying at
the heart of contemporary political theory, has generally been under-theorised
(Buzan 1991a, Baldwin 1997). The word ‘security’ comes from the Latin root
meaning ‘lack of care’ (Dower 1995). According to the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary on Historical Principles, security is:
1. The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety. 2. 
freedom from doubt. Now chiefly, well founded confidence, certainty. 3. 
Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety (Little et al 
1973: 1927)
The use of ‘secure’ as an adjective is dated to 1533, and is defined as:
1. without care, careless; free from care, apprehension, anxiety or alarm 
(Little et al 1973: 1926).
The use of ‘secure’ as a verb is dated to 1593, and is defined as:
1. To make free from care or apprehension., b. to satisfy, convince. Also to 
make (a person) feel secure of or against some contingency (Little et al 
1973: 1926).
The concept o f security, then, has historically been concerned with safety and 
certainty. It also infers maintenance of the status quo.
Security is, in general terms, something intuitively desirable. It can be 
characterised in two ways. First, it can be subject specific in that it entails stability 
in the face of a particular risk. The particular risk can be referred to as the what of 
security. The risk o f food shortages discussed in the previous chapter is an 
example of an answer to this what question. Second, security can be more 
generically understood as an entity in its own right, ie a state of low risk and 
(relative) stability o f all things to a given person or community. In both cases there 
is a particular object or group to be secured (Dower 1995). The particular entity to 
be secured can be referred to as the who, or referent o f security. In the case of the 
uncertainty o f food availability, the who to be secured is the group at risk o f food 
shortages. As a minimum standard, both the who and the what questions ought to 
be satisfied in any consistent discussion of security.1 Further, in as much as 
contemporary understandings of security talk in terms of threats and dangers, it is 
often revealing to ask where does the threat come from and how? In the case of
1 A recent publication by the Canadian Global Change Program (1996) sought to provide 
an overview of environmental security, but “chose not to define security” (p.3). No clear 
sense of security or environmental security is stated up front. This enabled it to offer a 
particular interpretation of what it deemed to be important (environmentally induced 
conflict and national security) to the exclusion of other interpretations of security and 
environmental security.
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food insecurity the answer to these questions is systemic social and ecological 
failures which defy the ascription o f threat to any particular agent in any specific 
place (see chapter 3).2
The concept o f security is inherently about risk and vulnerability, 
regardless of whom is vulnerable, what the risk is, and how it is generated. Risk is 
an inescapably subjective assessment. There is no purely objective basis upon 
which to assess the probability o f food shortages, military aggression, a nuclear 
reactor accident, or rape. We can say, on the basis o f evidence, that such events 
might in a general sense be more or less likely, and we can consider with some 
accuracy the impact of such an event, but we cannot objectively quantify the risk 
per se (Smithson 1989, Wynne 1992). The assessment of risk and security, 
therefore, is a personal and value laden process, as such, a judgement made by an 
expert on the behalf of others should be open to debate. The availability and 
character o f information and knowledge therefore become important components 
of risk assessment. Expert assessments of risk and security are suspect when the 
knowledge that informs them is not freely available, or is ideologically laden.
So there is no ‘reality’ to risk and security. This makes it possible for people 
to feel secure despite a seemingly high degree of risk, and conversely, to feel 
insecure yet be relative free from risk (Dower 1995). On the basis of evidence 
presented in chapter 1, this thesis clearly considers that environmental degradation 
is - and may increasingly be - a significant risk to the welfare o f people, yet the 
degree to which this is perceived by most people is questionable. Alternatively, the 
likelihood of military aggression against a country such as Australia is (at least 
implicitly) considered by policy makers to be high (hence billions spent on 
defence), yet the likelihood that Australia will be invaded is arguably extremely 
low.3
The meaning o f security is thus ambiguous and contested (Buzan 1991a). 
Security can mean different things to different people, although this is not always 
obvious when reading the mainstream literature on the concept. The remainder of 
this chapter addresses the political Realist approach to security which dominates 
contemporary political discourse, and which conditions much of the environmental
2 Other questions that might be asked of security are - how much security? - by what 
means? - at what cost? - and in what time period? (Baldwin 1997).
True, Australian defence policy does at times recognise that the likelihood of military 
invasion is low, yet paradoxically, defence spending remains high.
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security literature. Approaches to security which radically differ from Realism are 
discussed in chapters 9 and 10.
4.3 The Realist Approach to Security
The so-called political ‘Realist’ approach to security views the state as a unitary
and rational political actor. It understands the international arena (and nature) to be
anarchic, with no rules or norms to guide behaviour. Realism views the state’s
ability to use force to be both the principal threat and principal means to national
security. Keohane and Nye summarise the Realist approach:
Realist assumptions define an ideal type of world politics. They allow us to 
imagine a world in which politics is continuously characterised by active or 
potential conflict among states, with the use of force possible at any time. 
Each state attempts to defend its territory and interests from real or 
perceived threats. Political integration among states is slight and lasts only 
as long as it serves the national interests of the most powerful states. 
Transnational actors either do not exist or are politically unimportant. Only 
the adept exercise of force or the threat of force permits states to survive, 
and only while statesmen succeed in adjusting their interests, as in a well­
functioning balance of power, is the system stable. (Keohane and Nye 1989: 
24).
Norms that undergird the Realist approach to security include:
A ‘bad faith model’ of human nature as self-serving and conflict prone;
The balancing of national (military) power as means to provide stability and 
order;
‘Hegemony’ of the major military powers to ensure for themselves a 
manageable and predictable international system;
Independence from all links that might limit state power;
Intervention in the affairs of other states if necessary (the pragmatic 
recognition of sovereignty);
‘National interest’ and nationalism as key concepts;
A ‘them vs us’ mentality;
Violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution.
(Gurtov 1991: 16).
This discussion is aware that the meaning and effect of Realism can be 
overdetermined.4 Nevertheless, Realism is the dominant academic and policy
4 A more subtle understanding is that Realism and its International Relations counterparts 
of ‘idealism’ and ‘liberalism’ depend on each other and share an instrumental conception 
of politics. As Walker observes, the opposition between Realism and idealism serves as a 
“substitute for serious theoretical reflection and critical engagement” which reduces 
historical and philosophical positions to a “very simple opposition” (Walker 1993: 107).
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approach to security; it is “the most common metatheoretical discourse among 
practitioners of the discipline of International Relations” (Campbell 1992: 4).5 
There are different forms of Realism and there are subtle nuances that evade 
capture in a brief summary such as this, however common to all is a belief that the 
world is populated by unitary ‘rational’ actors called states, and that these are 
discrete and autonomous entities which (following a simple abstraction and a 
conflation of polity with personality) behave similarly to the way individual 
people are thought to behave (in Realist terms as rational competitive actors)
(Palan and Blair 1993).
A cogent definition of security from the Realist perspective is difficult. 
Clements is perhaps closest to the mark in saying that security is “whatever 
national security elites say it is” (1990: 3). However, in general the ‘who’ of the 
Realist understanding of security is the nation-state, the ‘what’ is most frequently 
war, and the source of the threat is ‘other’ groups of people. For Realists, ‘peace’ 
is seen as a contractual matter rather than as a moral obligation. In this view’, peace 
means the absence of direct violence (notably war), and this is at best a temporary 
abeyance of the inevitable recurrence of conflict: “in relation to the contract, peace 
is, by definition, an armed peace” (Paggi and Pinzauti 1985: 6).
Political Realism is nominally connected to the works of Machiavelli (1469
- 1527) and Hobbes (1588 - 1679).6 However, it is misleading to place both “in the
same undifferentiated category of political Realism” as they are both are open to
sharply different interpretations (Walker 1993: 112). Realist readings of these (and
other historical figures) are simplified to prove an ideological point:
In place of a history of political thought is offered an ahistorical repetition 
in which the struggles of these thinkers to make sense of the historical 
transformations in which they were caught are erased in favour of assertions 
that they all articulate essential truths about the same unchanging reality and 
usually tragic reality: the eternal game of relations between states. (Walker 
1995: 322).
5 Cheeseman and McKinley state that “Realism is the dominant perspective in Australia (as 
well as many places elsewhere)” (1990: 3).
6 The historical origins of national security were discussed in the previous chapter. It was 
suggested that the predecessor of the nation-state - the city-state - was engaged in the 
expansion (and defence) of the area under its control, and that it synergised this expansion 
with its internal constituents through an informal contract whereby protection was offered 
in exchange for revenues and labour to pursue ‘national security’ (Lipschutz 1992a). It was 
also suggested that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) set the standard model for international 
politics when it tied together sovereignty and territory as the defining characteristics o f the 
autonomous state. National security is a consequence of this emergence o f the territorially 
defined and militarily capable sovereign state as a law unto its own. Indeed, for Paggi and 
Pinzauti “security is the constitutive principle o f the modem state” (1985: 8).
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Realism therefore treats history as “a quarry providing materials with which to 
illustrate variations on always recurrent themes” (Cox 1981: 131). So, although the 
materials Realism uses are of historical origin, its approach is in effect ahistorical.
The ‘classical’ Realism that resurfaced after the second world war defined 
itself against the failure of the interwar period - particularly the policies of British 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain - to prevent the outbreak of the second world 
war.7 89Realism recentred security in the autonomy of the nation-state and reinstated 
the explicit consideration of force as a means to resolve conflict between states 
(Baldwin 1995). A number of works were written which outlined the Realist 
approach to security. An important forerunner was Carr’s The Twenty Years Crisis 
(1939), but the most frequently cited ‘great text’ of Realism is Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations (1950). Morgenthau considered that the security of the 
state was best achieved by the maximisation of military' power which in turn 
depended on national economic scale and territorial size, national self sufficiency
g
in resources, and strong technological capability (Morgenthau 1950).
Waltz’s Man, the State and War (1959) is seen to be the harbinger of neo- 
Realism. Waltz considered independence to be both the means and the ends of 
national security policy, and that military power was essential to defend against 
hostile states (Waltz 1959). Neo-Realism is a modified version of classical 
Realism and there are some differences between the two. However, both neo- 
Realism and classical Realism focus on state-centricity and have a foundational 
belief in anarchy, so this thesis does not make much of the difference.
The phrase ‘national security’ took on renewed importance at the end of the 
second World War. An important early event was Secretary for the U.S. Navy 
James Forrestal’s speech to a Senate hearing in 1945, where the term ‘national 
security’ was reasserted (Griffiths 1997). With the advent of the cold war, security 
studies was increasingly conflated with strategic studies, particularly in the United 
States. Baldwin discusses the effect of the cold war on security theorising:
The cold war ... focused attention on nuclear weaponry and strategies, on
East-West relations, and on the security problems of the United States and
Europe ... the primacy of national security, defined largely in military terms,
7 Between the world wars the approach to peace and security was one which emphasised 
democracy, arbitration, disarmament and collective security (Baldwin 1995).
8 He also introduced an element of scientific rationality into the Realist understanding of 
security (George 1994).
9 The distinction between Realism and neo-Realism is ably discussed in Burchill (1996a), 
and in a more critical way by George (1994).
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came to be viewed more as a premise than as a topic for debate. Similarly, 
military instruments of statecraft became the central, if not the exclusive, 
concern of security specialists. (Baldwin 1995: 126).
The influence of Realism can clearly be seen in contemporary Australian
security policy. The 1994 Australian Defence White Paper opens with a chapter
titled ‘Defence and Australia’s Security’, the first sentences are:
The Government has a fundamental responsibility to ensure Australia’s 
defence. It meets this responsibility by ensuring that we can prevent or 
defeat the use of armed force against us. To do that we maintain defence 
forces .... (Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 3)
The Realist element is clear, security equates with the nation and with military
capability. Alternative approaches such as alliances and treaties are considered,
but the ultimate backstop, and the overwhelming paradigm, is military
capability.10 More recently the current Australian Government has said:
If a nation is to be truly sovereign in the eyes of the world it must have the 
capability to deter threats to its interests and to counter threats to its security 
with military force if there is no other recourse left to it... the best way to 
ensure the security of Australia is to maintain a capable defence force .. we 
have adopted a policy of defence self-reliance .. this means that Australia 
should be sufficiently armed to meet foreseeable security threats ... (Liberal 
and National Party Coalition 1996: 3 and 10).* 11
This Realist approach to security prevails in Australia despite it being “arguably
one of the least militarily threatened states on the planet” (Dalby 1996a: 59).
The Realist approach to security justifies large expenditures on defence. 
This is arguably economically counterproductive, and it is counterproductive to 
the welfare of domestic citizens (Ball 1985, Deger and Smith 1985, Luckham 
1987a and 1987b). That military expenditure is also detrimental to peace, 
development and ecological sustainability has been established in a series of 
reports including North-South: A Programme for Survival (ICIDI 1980), Common 
Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery (ICIDI 1983), The 
Relationship Between Disarmament and Development (United Nations 1982), 
Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (ICDSI 1982) , and Our Common 
Future (WCED 1987).
Realism discounts the significance of social relations to international 
politics. It understands the state as a ‘given’ rather than as a socially constructed
10 Sylvester (1996) provides an excellent critical reading o f The Defence White Paper.
11 See Cheeseman (1993) for a critique of Australia’s policy o f defence self-reliance, and 
Cheeseman (1996) and Cheeseman and Bruce (1996) for critical insights into Australian 
security policy.
12 Although these earlier reports can be seen as somewhat neo-Realist in orientation.
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and therefore mutable entity. Indeed, for all the emphasis Realism places on the 
nation-state, there is a general absence of theorisation about the state itself 
(Walker 1993). Because Realism believes that anarchy and power are fundamental 
and permanent conditions of social life, it is incapable of offering meaningful 
alternatives to the current system. In this respect Realism is conservative, its 
commitment to the world as it is forecloses on the possibility of change, and 
instead it reasserts (continually) the impossibility o f lasting peace (Linklater 
1995).
The ‘reality’ of the world which Realism depicts is open to differing 
interpretations. Realism tends to describe the world in the way it thinks it is rather 
more than it tell us how things really are (Walker 1997). A well known effect o f 
the Realist belief in anarchy and the utility of military power is that o f the 
‘security dilemma’, in which the individual pursuit of military power exacerbates 
insecurity among nations, causing each to procure more weapons to secure
13themselves, thereby generating more insecurity and triggering an arms race.
Realist discourse portrays the security dilemma as inevitable, making the expertise 
o f Realists indispensable for a nation to successfully negotiate world politics.14 
However, from a critical perspective the security dilemma is the (not inevitable) 
product of Realism’s particular representation o f the world. The security dilemma 
is thus the ‘unreason’ in Realist security rationality.
The widely applied policy of procuring national security through military
capability creates a strategic rationality which permeates contemporary
understandings o f international politics (Buzan 1991a). This strategic rationality:
(T)akes objective defence capability (eg. weapons) as its figurative form. 
Thus, defense postures become a pretext for the hidden value o f security, a 
value which can then remain undifferentiated or assumed since it appears to 
be less substantial in comparison to a concrete interest in an array of 
weapons (Dyer 1996: 30).
Strategic reasoning “is engaged in the construction and circulation o f particular 
visions o f political life” (Klein 1989: 99). Realism’s strategic visions become
lj India and Pakistan’s individual testing of nuclear weapons in May of 1998 is a recent 
example of the threat perception-armaments cycle. Both arguably perceive a threat to their 
national security from each other, and from China, and this forms the principal justification 
for the development of a nuclear weapons capability. The rhetoric of the enemy is deployed 
to foster nationalist sentiment which serves to enhance the legitimacy and re-election 
prospects of the respective governments.
14 Booth (1997) suggests that the internal culture of the security policy-community works 
toward the exclusion of confounding evidence, and favours self perpetuating and self 
aggrandising scholarship.
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reified as political praxis as the language “creates that to which it purports to be 
responding” (Klein 1989: 100). Thus strategic discourse is “the intellectual sphere 
within which these practices of ‘organised peacelessness’ become standard 
operating procedure” (Klein 1989: 102). This is a deeper reading o f the security 
dilemma, a dilemma which would not be if Realism did not construct a world of 
anarchy and brutality.
Realism’s belief in autonomy and self-sufficiency as a condition of security 
is questionable. Autonomy and self sufficiency are arguably not possible and are 
indeed counterproductive to national security in a world o f ‘complex 
interdependence’, an image of the world which, according to Keohane and Nye 
“comes closer to reality than does Realism” (1989: 23). Interdependence is 
arguably a more accurate concept for describing international relations. It suggests 
that trade, a variety o f international organisations, person-to-person exchanges, 
and telecommunications linkages are more characteristic o f the relationship 
between countries than is warfare (Stephenson 1988). Indeed, “the practical 
exigencies o f world politics in our time mean that interdependence is an 
unavoidable condition and autarky nothing more than an illusion” (Campbell 
1993: 95). Interdependence implies that because nations are economically 
interdependent, seeking autonomy exacerbates national (and ultimately global) 
risk and uncertainty.
So, Realism discounts the possibility that the international system is 
regulated by principles other than that o f power. It holds to a crude understanding 
of the world as it was in the pre-modem era, where there was a convergence of the 
state as the dominant site of politics as well as the primary economic unit (Walker 
1987b). Hence, crudely speaking, Realism has difficulty countenancing the 
possibility that states may act in common to ensure the absence o f war, or to 
secure steady economic growth, or for any other collective project (like those 
needed for environmental problems). But in an era o f globalisation and 
transnational capital, economic relations are crucial determinants o f international 
relations (Halliday 1994).1:5
It is necessary to question who is being secured by national security 
discourse and policy. For Luckham the answer is “either particular states ... or
15 Fukuyama (1992), for example, considers liberal-democracies to be inherently peaceful 
(at least in terms of the absence of war), because they supplant warfare and military power 
with the imperative of growth.
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particular social classes” (1984: 160). National security and its armament culture 
is an ideological tool “to extend the hegemony of national ruling classes .. by 
using the rhetoric of armament, nationalism and empire, these classes can put 
forward claims to allegiance which transcend the confines of class politics” 
(Luckham 1987a: 26). So, the Realist view of political life as a system of 
domination is less a representation of reality and more a discursive depiction that 
serves the interests o f those in power. National security therefore secures the state 
(and as we shall see generates the ‘nation’), but does not really secure many of the 
constituents of the nation-state.
That Realism serves the interests of the state elite is demonstrated by the use 
o f  national to justify internal surveillance and oppression. National security 
discourse is engaged in the identification of threatening ‘Others’ who provide “the 
justification for limiting political activity within the bounds of the state” (Dalby 
1990b: 172). Throughout the cold war the states aligned with both the Soviet 
Union and the United States monitored and persecuted domestic individuals and 
groups which held different political values. In the U.S. the repression of socialist 
and communist movements was seen to be justified on the dubious grounds that 
these groups were unpatriotic and a threat to national security. The real threat 
posed by these groups was the possibility that they might undermine the 
legitimacy of the state and its elite.16 So national security discourse secures itself 
from debate and democratic participation by invoking the supposed necessity for 
secrecy, and by setting standards o f behaviour that make challenging the wisdom 
o f national security an ‘unpatriotic’ act. That national security discourse serves the 
security makers and justifies control of the populace leads Dalby to understand 
security as “a relationship of power” (Dalby 1991: 11). In this relationship the 
needs o f the people are vastly subordinate to the need to maintain the legitimacy of 
the state and the elite.
National security discourse depicts the ‘outside’ world as a dangerous place. 
This marginalises consideration o f domestic sources of insecurity. Violences such 
as rape, disappearances and unlawful imprisonment are scripted as subordinate 
insecurities to the meta-insecurity o f warfare. Hence what goes on within the state
16 Toynbee critiques a western catchphrase of the time referring to the presence of the 
communist enemy within and without: “ ‘Better dead than red’ is a value judgement that a 
twentieth-century human being is entitled to make only for himself and not for any other 
human being, either alive or unborn. If ‘better dead than red’ is his considered judgement, 
he can act on it, without much inconvenience to his neighbours, by putting his head in a gas 
oven after turning on the tap” (Toynbee 1966: 49)!
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is a peripheral concern to Realist security discourse. Marginalising the domestic 
conveniently ignores the many ways in which the state is a principal source of 
insecurity. Therefore national security discourse is complicit in the generation of 
insecurity within as well as between states; so “the more security is defined in 
terms of the interests of the citizens of states, the more it is undermined for the 
inhabitants of the planet” (Walker 1987a: 178). To return to a common theme, 
then, security policies informed by Realism undermine human security.
The Realist approach has firmly established the label ‘security’ as an 
“indicator of a specific problematique, a specific field o f practice” (Waever 1995: 
50). Waever calls security a “speech act” in that when the state refers to a 
particular problem as a security problem it asserts its control over that problem 
(Waever 1995: 55). Historically:
The use of this speech act had the effect of raising a specific challenge to a 
principled level, thereby implying that all necessary means would be used to 
block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as 
existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state w'ould not be limited in 
what it could or might do (Waever 1995: 56).
In a similar vein Dillon calls security “a principle of formation that does things”
(Dillon 1996: 19). This is a critically important aspect of the use of security, it
enables political action. This is an important and underlying theme of the politics
of security and environmental security.
17
The Realist vision of politics so dominates modem politics that other
expressions and understandings of politics have been marginalised, if not in
certain times and places erased (Walker 1997). Thus:
The dominant understandings of what politics is all about, and thus of what 
security must mean, arise precisely because the very form of statist claims 
to a monopoly on legitimate authority challenges the possibility of referring 
to humanity in general - and by extension, to world politics or world 
security - in any meaningful way.... State sovereignty defines what peace 
can be and where peace can be secured: the unitary community within 
autonomous states (Walker 1997: 73 - 74).
The most basic and ongoing challenge of critical security studies is to escape this
narrow account of political life. This thesis makes the attempt in chapters 9, 10,
and 11.
However, as suggested above, what goes in within the state is of concern to security 
practitioners (if not their discourse) in so far as this may threaten the legitimacy o f the state 
and its elite.
I l l
Realist accounts of national security understand power in terms of the 
ability to control space (Dalby 1990a). For example, according to Gray “there can 
be no .. escape from the struggle for power” because “the influence of the 
geographical setting upon international power relations is so pervasive” (Gray 
1996: 254 and 259). Considerable attention has been paid to these geopolitical 
formulations which underwrite Realist conceptions of national security. The 
‘practical geopolitical reasoning’ that informs national security policies portrays a 
world of geographically delimited Others who must be controlled if the ‘we’ of 
the nation is to be secure (Dalby 1990b, O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992). In this 
Realist description of the world the complex geographies of global ecological, 
economic, cultural and political processes are all reduced into a simplistic dualism 
between inside and outside. Thus O’Tuathail and Agnew suggest that Realism’s 
geopolitical reasoning entails the “suppression of the complex geographical reality 
of places in favour of controllable geopolitical abstractions”, and so security logic 
is “anti-geographical” (O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 195 and 191). Dalby suggests 
that these constructions of space are indeed “political constructions”, and so the 
geopolitical formulations that inform national security are ideological more than 
geographical (Dalby 1990a: 40).
The particular and limited geographic imagination of Realist security
discourse helps to secure the common identity necessary for the ‘nation’ in the
nation-state (Campbell 1992). The inside/outside binary which underlies Realist
accounts of national security assumes:
Simplistic constructions of places as stable entities with discrete and 
permanent boundaries ... what is usually rendered secure .. is a particular 
geopolitical entity, an understanding of who the ‘we’ who are threatened 
are; one usually defined at least in part in contradistinction from the external 
‘other’ (Dalby 1996a: 60).
So, national security discourse is a key part of the way the state universalises 
identity and seeks to control difference. It constructs a particular yet universal 
conception of national identity which is intolerant of difference. In turn, national 
security policy “must protect the inside from the outside, or everyone must be 
brought inside, into a realm of identity” (Walker 1987b: 20). The construction of 
the inside/outside dichotomy and the bolstering of nationalism in this way is 
integral to the reification of sovereignty (Giddens 1985a).
18 See for example; Agnew 1998, Dalby 1990a, Dalby 1994a, Dalby 1996a, Dalby and 
O’Tuathail 1996, Dalby and O’Tuathail 1997, Dodds 1994, O’Tuathail 1996, O’Tuathail 
and Agnew 1992.
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The Realist approach to national security is rife with dualisms. Indeed, 
“prevailing conceptions of security are unthinkable without them” (Walker 1987b: 
4). The complementary inside/outside and Us/Other dichotomies truncate 
meaningful examination of the links between the causes and effects of insecurity. 
The responsibility for threat - and the necessity to organise society to meet it - is 
attributed to the distanced ‘other’ on the outside, in this way “our complicity in 
evil is erased” (Campbell 1993: 3). Thus the mutual nature of the security dilemma 
is suppressed, Klein calls this a “textual strategy to mask responsibility” (1989:
104). The dualisms underlying Realist accounts of security intertwine with this 
masking of responsibility: “in the mouth of the enemy, peace means war, and 
defense is attack, while on the righteous side, escalation is restraint, and saturation 
bombing prepares for peace” (Marcuse 1964: 261). However, in thinking critically 
about insecurity it becomes clear that the enemy is also Us (Walker 1988, Dalby 
1998a). Both the Us and the Other are abstract and spatially simplistic 
constructions of community. Policies premised on these constructions do little to 
meet the needs of most people in most places.
A more Marxist mode of analysis such as that of Marcuse suggests that the 
construction of the Other as enemy is a deliberate tactic to foster domestic 
economic mobilisation:
The Enemy stimulates growth and initiative .. by virtue of the fact that the 
whole of society becomes a defense society. For the enemy is permanent.
He is not in the emergency situation but in the normal state of affairs. He 
threatens in peace as much as in war ... he is thus being built into the system 
as a cohesive power... The Enemy is the common denominator of all doing 
and undoing (Marcuse 1964: 51-2).
In a not dissimilar vein Klein (1997) implicates the Realist notion of security in 
the generation of Western political/economic hegemony. Emerging in the post- 
World War II era, security became the “mechanism for binding the civil societies 
of the West and its aspiring allies” as liberal societies sought to construct a global 
order that conformed to Western norms (Klein 1997: 362). The Realist exploration 
of security dilemmas and anarchy therefore masks the “deeper global politics of 
state building, elite recruitment, modernization, military-police training, and 
societal incorporation” (Klein 1997: 362). So, security is a cultural practice that 
defends a common way of life (Klein 1997: 362). This is a little appreciated aspect 
of (Realist) national security, but is one which will be explicated in chapter 7 when 
recent U.S. environmental security pronouncements and initiatives are examined.
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That Realism clearly favours the nation-state and treats it as a coherent, 
natural and preordained entity excludes the historicist understanding (made in the 
previous chapter) of the state as a particular product of recent history. So, with 
Realism “the historicity of states and state systems recedes into the background, 
and world politics begins to be portrayed as a permanent game, which can appear 
to have followed the same rules more or less since time immemorial” (Walker 
1995: 321). A narrow reading of history also explains Realism’s bad faith model 
of human nature, exemplified by Morgenthau: “all history shows that nations 
active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, 
or recovering from organized violence in the form of war” (cited in Keohane and 
Nye 1989: 23). This approach not only reduces the history of politics to an 
ahistoric nation-state, it also denies alternative readings of history. For Dalby “this 
denial of history reduces the possibility of politics, by erecting the spectre of the 
permanent adversary, against which perpetual vigilance is needed” (1990a: 158). 
However, as Gandhi reminds us, history is a ledger of rare instances of violence 
rather than a record of more commonplace instances of cooperation (Gandhi 
1951).
From the feminist perspective, Realist accounts of international relations 
and security “are defined in terms of everything that is not female” (Tickner 1992: 
130). The human nature that informs Realism’s understanding of social behaviour 
is that of a (instrumentally) rational, power seeking, competitive, independent and 
autonomous individual. For feminists this is an idealised masculinity that reflects 
prevailing gender relations and excludes alternative modes of being and reason 
(Enloe 1990, Tickner 1992). Feminists argue that this metaphoric individual is 
abstracted from the social context, and that were this individual properly 
contextualised, relationships that are not merely of the self-help kind would be 
identified (True 1996). The Realist account of state behaviour is informed by this 
selective understanding of human nature, and so security becomes a necessity 
between states in the same way that it is seen to be a necessity between 
individuals. This man/state analogy inscribes a male-masculine identity onto the 
state (Sylvester 1994). Further, feminists see important connections between 
national security, patriarchy, militarisation, nationalism and masculinity. These are
19
There are clear parallels between political Realism and neo-classical economics, both are 
founded on a similar (masculine and abstract) social ontology (see Tickner 1992). In this 
respect Homo economicus is consistent with Homo securitas.
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seen to be mutually reinforcing such that the security-military-industrial system is 
maintained (Enloe 1987, 1998a; Elshtain 1987).
From a Green theory perspective the Realist approach to security is flawed 
for the most part by its association with modernity and its ecologically and 
socially disruptive effects (see chapter 3). The Realist account of security owes its 
inception to the same Enlightenment philosophy that produced industrialisation, 
economic growth and instrumental reason. Indeed, at its most fundamental level, 
in seeking to secure the state Realist security discourse seeks to secure one of the 
anchor points of modernity. From a Green perspective, then, the Realist approach 
to security is a cornerstone of the contemporary order to which Greens attribute 
the degradation of the environment. Further, “Realist approaches are largely 
inappropriate for dealing with environmental issues because they focus on states as 
unitary actors, where internal factors are downplayed and they usually fail to deal 
with indirect transboundary effects” (Dalby 1992: 505). So, although complicit in 
environmental degradation, Realism is incapable of recognising the importance of 
environmental issues and either ignores, or at best marginalises them (Vogler 
1996)
Realism also excludes consideration of ethics and so marginalises a key 
component of the Green transformative agenda (Laferriere 1996).20 Laferriere 
suggests that Realism is the “clearest antithesis to the ecological world view”, and 
that “Realist prescriptions cannot improve life or even preserve life: Realism’s 
basic conception of the Other is ultimately self-defeating” (1996: 66). Not unlike 
the feminist critique, the Green perspective argues that atomistic and competitive 
individualism is not the reality of social life, instead identifying cooperation and 
collective behaviour as basic human traits. Like the poststructuralist critique,
Green theory objects to Realism’s claims to universality and the way it 
homogenises political life (Laferriere 1996). Laferriere summarises the failings of 
Realism:
In sum, Realism’s path to knowledge (and away from freedom) opposes the 
organicism, subjectivity, and historicism characteristic of ecological 
thought. ‘History’ may be present, but serves as either a crude source of data 
or as a mere ‘story’, a detached text, vindicating timeless assumptions about 
social relations and human destiny (Laferriere 1996: 69).
20 Laferriere (1996) is favoured here as it is the best of the recent literature which 
addresses International Relations from an ecological perspective.
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A more superficial critique of the Realist approach to security is implicit in 
the concept of environmental security. As chapter 5 details, the notion of 
environmental security emerged from efforts to include environmental concerns 
into the calculations of national security planners - implying that the Realist 
approach ignores a range of fundamental threats to national security. A deeper 
reading, however, focuses not only on Realism’s inability to account for 
environmental issues, but also its failure to accommodate other referent objects of 
security (see chapters 9 and 10). In this latter respect, Realism can be said to 
monopolise the concept of security to render it synonymous with national security, 
and so alienates alternative claims to insecurity.
The Realist approach to security normalises danger, threat and risk. The 
Realist security discourse is a discourse of risk, but in its particular view the 
preferred risk is the menacing and eternal danger of military aggression. It sees 
this ‘risk’ as ‘natural’, implying that violence is a natural aspect of human nature 
and political behaviour. This particular discourse of risk is like all discourses of 
risk in that it is socially constructed. It is therefore contestable, and more than 
most, it deserves serious attention for its expensive habits and destructive effects. 
When risk is narrowly interpreted in this way, so too is the notion of resilience - as 
strategic planning to deter and engage with armed forces. In this sense the 
response of Realist security discourse to uncertainty is negative and reactive. It 
presents immediate solutions that are, indeed, not solutions but are exacerbations 
of insecurity and uncertainty. Realism’s approach to change is similarly negative 
and similarly imbued with violence. According to Walker, Realist claims to reality 
are “always in danger of breaking the one cardinal rule of political wisdom: things 
change” (Walker 1997: 62). Because change is an inevitable aspect of life,
Realism is in this respect fundamentally anti-realistic.
The power of Realist thinking is enhanced through the widespread use of 
Realist nomenclature - however ideologically encoded - in mainstream, if not all 
discussions of international politics (Burchill 1996a). In setting the vernacular, 
Realist conceptions of security have determined the discursive terrain upon which 
most subsequent discussions of security take place. This linguistic closure impedes 
the possibility of alternative conceptions. The very notion of a Realist theory is 
indicative of the centrifugal pull Realism has on the study of international
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relations.21 Alternatives are polemically identified as ‘idealistic' or ‘utopian’, and 
so are seen to lack the explanatory and prescriptive power of the Realist account of 
‘reality’. The difficulty in speaking of a ‘reality’ has been established in chapter 2, 
the danger of doing so when deliberating on warfare in a nuclear age cannot be 
underestimated.
4.4 Conclusions
The concept o f security is nebulous, but can be given greater clarity by identifying 
the referent object to be secured (whose security?), the risk to be prevented or the 
vulnerability to be lessened {security from what?), and the processes by which that 
risk might detract from the referent object’s well-being {insecurity how?).
The Realist approach to security is but one particular account o f political 
life, yet it currently dominates security discourse and policy-making. It refers to 
the security o f the nation-state against what are seen to be deliberately imposed 
external threats, most commonly in the form of militant aggression. Realism is 
based on a (masculine) social ontology which has a limited understanding of 
human nature, and this understanding is then crudely abstracted to explain the 
behaviour o f nation-states. Realist security discourse constructs threatening Others 
against whom the state must defend, thereby legitimating the power o f the 
guardian elite and maintaining the privileged position o f Realist theorists 
themselves. Historically, the Realist world view is inseparable from the emergence 
of modernity, and in securing the state Realism secures the environmentally- 
degrading modem world. Realism identifies a narrow set o f risks as deliberately 
imposed threats. In denying alternative risks and in reacting to selected risks in a 
violent manner, the Realist approach to security impedes peaceful proactive 
behaviour. Finally, in its abstract account o f political life, Realism and the 
practices it generates undermines the security of people and, as we shall see in 
chapter 8, it undermines environmental security.
Establishing the Realist approach to security is important because, as we 
shall see in chapters 5, 6 and 7, this approach dominates the concept of 
environmental security. Having explored contemporary understandings of security
21 Not unlike the intuitive pull of ‘rational’ such as when used in the context of 
‘economically rational’. Rational in this sense is also a means to deride others as ‘irrational’ 
(Rees 1994).
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in this chapter, the following chapter will explore in depth the literature which, in 
seeking to ‘redefine security’, introduced environmental considerations into 
mainstream security discourse. This served to broaden the array of responses to the 
question security from what? beyond military threats to encompass economic, 
energy, food and environmental issues.
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Chapter 5. Redefining Security
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the core features of the Realist approach which 
dominates the meaning and practice of security and, as we shall see in later 
chapters, environmental security. This chapter seeks to examine the origins of 
environmental security.1 2It discusses alternative conceptions of security which 
provide alternative answers to the question - security from what? (approaches 
which provide alternative answers to the question - whose security? - are 
considered in chapters 9 and 10). This discussion is limited to considering those 
attempts to rethink security which began in the 1970s, a trend which coincided 
with the period of detente between the superpowers and the integration of critical 
theory into the social sciences. It does this by first briefly discussing an array of so 
called ‘new’ security issues. The early literature which considered the environment 
to be a security issue is then discussed, followed by consideration of the notion 
that environmental problems require a common and comprehensive approach to 
security. Some of the difficulties with these new definitions of security are then 
considered.
5.2 Beyond Military Threats: New Security Issues
Since the 1970’s different types of risks to national security have been identified, a 
common understanding is that “new threats are emerging, threats with which 
military forces cannot cope” (Brown 1977: 5). Buzan categorises these new threats 
into different ‘sectors’ or components (1991a, 1991b). He identifies military, 
economic, political, social and environmental components. Other components
1 This chapter is based on Barnett 1997b.
2 For Buzan, political security is about “the organisational stability of states, systems of 
government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy”, and societal security “concerns 
the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, o f traditional patterns of  
language, culture and religious national identity and custom” (1991a: 19). It is no doubt 
possible to conceive of political and societal security differently to the way Buzan does. 
Buzan’s definitions fundamentally pertain to the maintenance o f the requisite conditions for 
nationalism and national resilience, as such they do not in any substantive sense decouple 
security from the state. Buzan remains constrained by Realism and captured by state- 
centrism (see Walker 1987b, Dalby 1991, and Shaw 1993).
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can be identified and the notions of energy and food security will also be 
considered here. Military security was considered in the previous chapter.
5.2.1 Energy security
It was noted in chapter 3 that energy use has increased massively since the onset of 
the industrial revolution, and particularly in the post-WWII period. This expansion 
received a severe setback in 1973 when the Organisation o f Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of oil on world markets, creating 
considerable anxiety for both industrialised and industrialising economies alike 
(Dovers 1994). By constricting temporarily the lifeblood o f industrial economies 
(energy), the oil crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of national economies to the 
dictates o f the global economy: “for the U.S. public, the lines at the gas pumps 
which the OPEC crisis produced forced a rapid understanding o f our economic and 
energy interdependence” (Stephenson 1988: 62). The current notion o f ‘energy 
security’ stems from this period.3
Energy Security is the theory and practice o f ‘securing’ energy for the
nation-state. According to a recent report by the Trilateral Commission (North
America, Western Europe and Japan), energy security is maintained by utilising
national power to secure a steady supply o f affordable energy (read ‘oil’) for the
purposes of economic growth (Martin et al 1996). The continued importance of oil
supply is made clear in this report; the Persian Gulf War is referred to as the
“successful defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia” and is seen to be demonstrative
of the understanding that “energy security requires foresight and years of
preparation” (Martin et al 1996: 16).4 Such a Realist account o f energy security is
common; it involves the need to project force to secure uninterrupted supplies of
oil, and it pragmatically and at times forcefully engages with nations who by dint
of (mis)fortune have energy resources but apparently little sovereignty. The 1990-
1 U.S. National Security Strategy was unselfconscious about this:
Secure supplies of energy are essential to our prosperity and security. The 
concentration of 65 percent o f the world’s known oil reserves in the Persian 
Gulf means we must continue to ensure reliable access to competitively 
priced oil and a prompt, adequate response to any major oil supply 
disruption (Bush 1990: 83).
Energy security is not really a new concern, much of the naval conflict in Pacific during 
the second world war was driven by the need to secure/disrupt sea lanes for delivery of 
energy resources, particularly oil to Japan.
Barnett (1997c) provides a review of the Trilateral Commission’s report on energy 
security.
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However, the problem of energy security is not only the need to alleviate scarcity, 
it also concerns the ecological impacts of burning fossil fuels. The only presently 
viable solution must therefore be clean renewable energy technologies such as 
solar and wind power, or abstinence and greater efficiency of energy use.
5.2.2 Economic security
The oil embargo accelerated examination of the economic dimensions of national 
security. This gave rise to the term ‘economic’ security, which infers regular 
access to those resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain national 
economic growth and state power (after Buzan 1991b, see also Opschoor 1989). 
The economic security policy-discourse of the United States confirms the 
suspicion that U.S. foreign/security policy is shaped by the need to protect access 
to materials, markets and investments (Schultze 1973). Economic security is 
associated with the export of capitalist values such that consumption becomes the 
standard of the Good life, and Western producers become the supplier of the Good 
(Barnet 1984). For the U.S. at least, economic security is thus a discourse of 
economic self interest; it justifies muted imperialist foreign policies to preserve 
national “economic effectiveness and independence in the global market place” 
(Sorenson 1990: 7). Security of supply remains the central issue (Dalby 1991). 
Economic security is inseparable from national security not simply because 
economically unfavourable conditions jeopardise the national interest, but because 
economic power is a crucial determinant of military power, and because the state 
at times uses its military power to advance its economic agenda (Kolodziej 1992). 
The oil embargo and subsequent exploration of economic security helped to 
weaken the myth of independence.
5.2.3 Food security
At the same time as the oil embargo (1973), the U.S. grain stockpile and cropland 
reserve failed (for the first time) to hedge against global food shortages (taking 
into account distortions in distribution), and the concept of ‘food security’ became 
a practical concern (Brown 1977). Like the oil crisis, the impending food 
shortages highlighted the vulnerability of those countries which depended on 
outside sources for food (Myers 1986). Food security has been understood 
primarily in terms of national resilience, as “a common source of political 
instability” (Brown 1977: 7). Thus the notion has remained captured by Realism’s 
state-centricity. However, in a more intuitive sense, food security introduced a
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dimension to security that could not be completely fixed to the nation-state. 
Couched in terms of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, food (and water) security 
pertains as much to the basic right of people to fundamental subsistence 
requirements (Maslow 1954). Later understandings of food security have broken 
away from the statist perspective, for example the UNDP defines food security as 
the right of all people to physical and economic access to basic food (UNDP 
1995). This understanding of food security (for people) is closely related to that o f 
‘environmental security’ (for people): “for rural producers in developing countries, 
the distinction between food insecurity and the environment does not exist” 
(Davies e ta l 1991: 19).
5.3 The Environment as a Security Issue
Environmental degradation has been a central issue in the reinterpretation and 
redefinition of security.5 Richard Falk’s (1971) This Endangered Planet is a 
landmark in the literature that links environmental issues to security. Falk did not 
coin the phrase ‘environmental security’, but he established many themes central 
to the subsequent literature. His basic point was that the international political 
system is unable to come to grips with environmental degradation as a security 
problem; for example: “specialists in foreign policy or world affairs still seem 
oblivious to the relevance of environmental hazard to their professional concern 
with the management o f national power” (1971: 181).
A particularly insightful passage from Falk begins by stating that “there is at 
yet no firm evidence that human nature is violent by genetic disposition” (Falk 
1971: 59). It then goes on to describe the relationship between resource scarcity 
and violence as being one of the mobilisation of the already powerful to defend 
against those who have less power:
(U)nder world conditions o f insufficient resources to satisfy total demand 
there is a natural tendency for those with less to seek a larger share. This 
tendency induces those with a larger share to organise their defences against 
those with less and to use their superiority to obtain still more. The rich get 
richer, the powerful grow more so (Falk 1971: 59).
5 It could be argued - via a definition of environmental security as a biosphere free from 
anthropogenic disturbances - that earlier environmental texts were implicitly about 
environmental security; Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring would certainly qualify in this 
respect. However, what is being considered here is that literature which explicitly links 
environmental problems to the concept of security.
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So, for Falk, the powerful are likely to deploy the means of violence to maintain 
their power in the face of increasing calls for justice. This can be understood as 
counterrevolution (see Marcuse 1972). This argument is also made by Ophuls 
(1977). The implication is that responsibility for violent behaviour, and conversely 
for finding peaceful solutions, rests primarily with the already wealthy and 
powerful.
Falk is not immune to the idea that engendering a sense of urgency about 
environmental problems is necessary to induce change. However, he is sensitive to 
the presentation of problems in the language of ‘crisis’, arguing that “the great 
danger of an apocalyptic argument is that to the extent that it persuades, it also 
immobilizes” (1971: 5). This is an observation of relevance for the notion of 
environmental security, which has a tendency to present environmental problems 
as an apocalypse and a ‘coming anarchy’ - bringing disease, pestilence, famine 
and warfare (Kaplan 1994). This kind of approach arguably does little to stimulate 
constructive and positive engagement on the substantive problems at hand, 
particularly their causes. A question emerges, then, about the politics of discourse. 
This pre-empts the larger debate, discussed later, of whether addressing 
environmental problems in terms of security is a desirable strategy.
This Endangered Planet also recognises that a parochial national emphasis
restricts attention to localised environmental impacts. Falk argues that this ignores
the role of the nation in generating global environmental degradation, and
marginalises awareness of global responsibilities.6 In this way a state-centric focus
limits action to local adaptive measures, rather than stimulating more widespread
and globally-oriented restructuring. As the speech performance which delineates
the national from the global, security discourse is fundamentally implicated in
these denials and emphasis shifts. Falk identifies these concerns in his response to
the 1970 (U.S.) State of the Union Address:
(N)ote that the definition of environmental problems continues to emphasise 
its domestic character and its sharp separation from concerns about 
population pressure, resource depletion, and the war system. Nothing in the 
recent flourishes of public concern express the realisation that we need to 
revamp our entire concept o f ‘national security’ and ‘economic growth’ if 
we are to solve the problems of environmental decay. (Falk 1971: 185).
A further passages stresses the point:
A prevalent misconception persists that national efforts, if sufficient, will 
guard the environment. The misconception arises from the failure to
6 As we shall see in chapter 7, the converse - that global processes threaten national 
security - also leads to a denial of a nation’s global responsibilities.
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appreciate the actualities of interdependence: what we do needs to be 
coordinated with what others do... (Falk 1971: 196)
Also written in 1971 was Harold and Margaret Sprout’s Toward a Politics 
o f the Planet Earth (1971). Like Falk, the Sprouts saw the degradation of the 
environment as a major problem that requires a rethink of the state and national 
security. The Sprouts were concerned with the way interdependence, including 
issues of transboundary pollution, presented problems that were “becoming 
increasingly resistant to military solutions” (1971: 406).
Another early publication that explored the links between environmental 
degradation and security is Brown’s Redefining National Security (1977.) The title 
suggests that Brown remains captured by the ‘national’ component of security, 
however an underlying intent of the paper is to problematise national security 
practices:
In a world that is not only ecologically interdependent but economically and 
politically interdependent as well, the concept o f ‘national’ security is no 
longer adequate... Neither individual security nor national security can be 
sensibly considered in isolation. In effect, the traditional military concept of 
‘national security’ is growing ever less adequate (Brown 1977: 40-41).
Brown talks specifically in terms o f ‘the deterioration of biophysical 
systems’, and he identifies four systems under stress, fisheries, grasslands, forests 
and croplands. He also discusses the problem of climate modification, and he 
relates these to food security. Very little of this discussion talks in terms of the 
potential of environmental degradation to cause conflict, although this is given 
some consideration in the conclusions. The paper’s main contribution is a cogent 
overview of the social processes that pressure biophysical systems, their physical 
responses, and the resulting implications for human welfare. Brown’s paper should 
have provided policy makers and security analysts with an excellent background to 
the ecological dimensions of security, and its implications should have lead to a 
set of responses that took these causes and effects seriously. However, both the 
literature and the policy (see chapter 7) rarely demonstrate the same degree of 
awareness.
Brown considers that militaries are incapable of meeting the challenges
posed to human well-being by the deterioration of biophysical systems:
National defense establishments are useless against these new threats. 
Neither bloated military budgets nor highly sophisticated weapons systems 
can halt deforestation or solve the firewood crisis now affecting so many 
Third World countries. (Brown 1977: 37)
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Brown therefore makes the reasonable suggestion that disarmament and budgetary
*7
reallocations are important initiatives for resolving environmental degradation. A 
year before this, O ’Riordan made a similar observation, saying that the scale of 
military expenditure is worth focusing on because “it exemplifies the willingness 
to waste valuable resources and to destroy large areas of ecological value in the 
interest o f security” (O’Riordan 1976: 22).
In 1983 two important works were published on the subject o f environment 
and security. The first edition of Buzan’s People, States and Fear was a sweeping 
discussion o f security, and it made passing reference to environmental degradation 
as a national security issue (Buzan 1983 - see note 2). A more influential work (at 
the time and in terms o f environmental security) was Ullman’s Redefining Security 
(Ullman 1983). The principal contribution o f Ullman’s widely cited paper is the 
definition o f a national security threat as anything which can quickly degrade the 
quality of life of the inhabitants of a state, or which narrows the choices available 
to people and organisations within the state. In many ways Ullman’s paper stands 
at the watershed of contemporary environmental security studies. It carries with it 
murmurings o f peace and human security, yet it introduces an uncritical message 
of coming conflict which was has since been a key theme of the literature.
Redefining Security is notable for its crude discussion of ‘Third W orld’ 
poverty as an engine for armed conflict and illegal immigration. Ullman suggests 
that environmental degradation is “likely to make Third World governments more 
militarily confrontational in their relations with the advanced, industrialised 
nations” (1983: 142 - my emphasis). The imagery in Redefining Security is 
provocative and ethnocentric, for example: “the image o f islands o f affluence 
amidst a sea of poverty is not an inaccurate one”, and “the pressure engendered by 
population growth in the Third World is bound to degrade the quality o f life, and 
diminish the range o f options available, to governments and persons in the rich 
countries” (Ullman 1983: 143). This reference to islands of affluence is indeed 
inaccurate, if for no other reason that this is a speculative observation about the 
future. It may become ‘accurate’ only in so far as this imagery contributes to a 
defensive Western disposition which reifies the theory (as we shall see in chapters
7 Another Worldwatch publication, by Deudney in 1983, made considerable inroads into 
the myriad of connections between military activity, nuclear weapons, ecological 
interdependence and human survival; Hardin’s ‘lifeboat ethics’ is a key theme. This is an 
important precursor to Deudney’s later contributions to the literature.
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6 and 7 it has). Further, the assumption that deprived ‘Third World governments’ 
may be ‘more militarily confrontational’ is notable. The possibility that they might 
seek to resist and engage for their betterment through non-violent means is not 
countenanced.
Ullman argues that “conflict over resources is likely to grow more intense” 
(Ullman 1983: 139). Lost in the analysis, however, is consideration of who will 
initiate this conflict. As Falk suggests, it may not be the poor who resort to force 
of arms (see above). Ullman is concerned with national security and threats to 
U.S. interests. These are identified as coming from the “outside” in the form of 
disrupted access to essential resources, and proxy wars (Ullman 1983: 140). To the 
list of traditional threats Ullman also adds the possibility of illegal immigration by 
environmental refugees (now a popular concern). So, Ullman views the problems 
industrialising countries face as problems only in as much as they might endanger 
the quality of life for the governments and inhabitants of industrialised countries. 
Little concern is paid to the problems that are experienced in these Other places, 
problems which are surely of concern in and of themselves. Because Ullman’s 
paper is very much framed in terms of national security, it appeals to Realist 
security discourse. These early analytical closures have been subsequently 
rewritten throughout much of the environmental security literature.
In 1986 Myers explicitly argued for the incorporation of environmental 
issues into security thinking. Myers claims to have been talking about 
environmental security as early as 1984 when he was a “senior adviser” to the 
World Commission on Environment and Development process (Myers 1996: 5-6). 
Myers has consistently argued that environmental degradation will induce violent 
conflict, for example:
If a nation’s environmental foundations are depleted, its economy will 
steadily decline, its social fabric deteriorate, and its political structure 
become destabilized. The outcome is all too likely to be conflict, whether 
conflict in the form of disorder and insurrection within the nation, or 
tensions and hostilities with other nations (Myers 1986: 251).
This concern has been the most influential. In his 1986 paper Myers considers
food shortages, fisheries depletion, water scarcity, climate change and
deforestation to be issues likely to induce conflict. Environmental refugees also
figure prominently, and he focuses solely on industrialising countries.8 Despite the
assertion that in many cases “the linkages [to conflict] are readily apparent”, the
8 For a more reasoned analysis of environmental refugees see Fell (1996), Jacobson (1988, 
1989), and Kane (1995).
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causal chain by which these issues might lead to conflict are not explicated,
although the assertion that they might is repeatedly made (Myers 1986: 252).
Indeed, Myers seems aware o f this causality paradox:
While certain o f the linkages are diffuse in their workings, hence difficult to 
discern in their immediate operation, they are nonetheless real and 
important, and growing increasingly significant in their number and extent 
(Myers 1986: 253).
On the ‘nature of linkages’ Myers offers this supposed explanation:
(E)nvironmental deficiencies supply conditions that render conflict all the 
more likely. They can serve to determine the source of conflict, they can act 
as multipliers that can aggravate core causes of conflict. Moreover they can 
not only contribute to conflict, they can stimulate the growing use o f force 
to repress disaffection of those who suffer the consequences of 
environmental decline (Myers 1986: 253)
This is no explanation at all. Instead what is offered is a reassertion o f the
assumption that environmental change will lead to conflict. This is a trend that is
repeated throughout most o f the literature which seeks to explain the links between
environmental change and conflict (see chapter 6). The danger of course is that if
9the assumption is made often enough, it becomes reality.
What Myers does do well is explore the ‘trade-offs with military-based 
security’:
Political leaders might ask themselves whether each additional annual 
outlay of, say, $25 million for extra military hardware provides a greater 
incremental increase in security than could be accomplished if the funds 
were assigned to a host o f alternative ways of promoting stability through 
environmental safeguards. Whereas such a sum represents only an ultra­
marginal expansion o f many military budgets, it would make an absolute 
difference if applied to most national budgets for, say, improved water 
supplies (Myers 1986: 254).
It is difficult to disagree with this observation. However, this argument is unlikely 
to be an effective mobilising strategy given that it comes after a lengthy discussion 
o f the threats to the nation from the outside (refugees, wars ect) which may well 
involve military engagement. There is thus a political naivety here that endangers 
the environmental cause. The particular combination of issues (conflict with 
demilitarisation) is analytically incongruent as it does more to mobilise the 
institutions of national security than it does to threaten them with a green peace
9 Myers is aware, however, that environmental change “may not trigger outright 
confrontation”, but adds that it can “help destabilize societies in an already unstable world” 
(1986: 252). This particular line of reasoning can be summarised by saying that violent 
conflict happens sometimes, and sometimes environmental degradation is implicated in this 
(in some unexplained way).
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dividend.10 Myers does, however, provide a definition of security which
complements the positive, human-centred approach of those who seek to reclaim
security to serve the interests of positive peace:
Security applies most at the level of the individual citizen. It amounts to 
human wellbeing: not only from protection from harm and injury but access 
to water, food, shelter, health, employment, and other basic requisites that 
are the due of every person on earth (Myers 1996: 31)
In contrast to the emphasis on conflict present in Myers’ paper, in the same
year (1986) Westing entered into the debate with a more peace promoting
discussion of the conceptual connections between environment and security
(Westing 1986a). Westing’s focus is on preventing resource wars, and on using
environmental measures to strengthen international security. Westing was an early
proponent of cooperation on environmental issues among states, for example:
It is thus inescapable that any concept of international security must in the 
last analysis be based on this obligate relationship of humankind with its 
environment.... Accordingly, it is necessary that consistent with the concept 
of equitable utilisation of shared natural resources, States co-operate with a 
view to controlling, preventing, reducing or elimination adverse 
environmental effects which may result from the utilization of such 
resources. (Westing 1986a: 195).
There is a sense in Westing’s early analysis that development should be 
conducted in as an environmentally benign way as possible. This was precisely the 
theme of the World Commission on Environment and Development’s (WCED) 
Our Common Future (WCED 1987). Because it identifies with the earlier Brandt 
and Palme reports (see chapter 4), it is not surprising that Our Common Future 
made much of the links between environmental degradation and security.* 11 The 
WCED established some important connections between peace, security and 
sustainable development. It also identified many of the causes of environmental 
degradation, which, in the context of the environmental security literature, is quite 
rare. Our Common Future revisited key themes of the earlier literature, including 
the environmental stress-conflict connection, and the need for cooperative 
international arrangements. It also made much of the environmental impacts of 
war, particularly those arising from the potential use of nuclear weapons.
Significantly, the WCED report is seemingly the first to explicitly use the term
12‘environmental security’ (on page 345).
10 Ironically, Myers’ contribution to the environmental cause is far more potent and peace 
promoting when he is not talking ‘security’ (see Myers 1979, 1984, 1987a).
11 North-South: A Programme for Survival (ICIDI 1980) made passing reference to 
environmental degradation and security.
12 Which might support Myers’ claim discussed earlier in this section.
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The environmental security literature expanded significantly after 1989, 
when (at least) ten articles on the subject were published. The increased 
juxtaposition of security and environment came at a time when conventional 
understandings of security were no longer so obviously politically relevant (due in 
large part to the decline of the cold war), and when environmental concerns were 
increasingly in the forefront of public concerns (Dalby 1992).14 Of these ten 
papers, Matthew’s Redefining Security warrants brief discussion here. Mathew’s 
paper consolidated the earlier insights of Falk, Brown, Ullman and Myers, and 
emphasised the transboundary character of environmental problems and the 
challenge this presents to sovereign states. Matthew’s also introduced the complex 
issue of biodiversity into the environmental security agenda, an issue which has, 
by and large, remained unaddressed by the literature.15 The paper was notable for 
its presence in Foreign Affairs, an established U.S. foreign policy journal. 
Publishing there meant Mathews was taking aim at “White House policymakers, 
the Cabinet agencies, the Pentagon, the U.S. Congress, and relevant interests 
groups and thinktanks” - in short the U.S. security policy community (Lipschutz 
1995: 5). Mathews was seeking, then, to elevate environmental concerns to the 
level of security issues - in effect to ‘securitise’ environmental problems such that 
they might be accorded higher priority on the policy agenda.
5.4 Common and Comprehensive Security
A theme of the redefining security literature is that environmental degradation
requires collective action, as Thomas puts it:
A common thread uniting disparate authors is the belief that the nation state 
as a political unit cannot, acting alone, address successfully the problems 
which beset it, and that development and international cooperation are vital 
components in any strategy aimed at greater security nationally, regionally 
and globally (Thomas 1992: 117).
lj The idea that these should be counted can be attributed to Cobb (1996), who identifies 
nine papers. The ten papers o f immediate relevance identified here are; Brown 1989,
Carroll 1989, Holst 1989, Mathews 1989, Mische 1989, Myers 1989, Renner 1989, 
Schrijver 1989, Opschoor 1989, Westing 1989a (Westing 1989b might also qualify).
14 According to Smil, environmental security has replaced the threat of global nuclear 
warfare as it shares two characteristics: both are global in reach and the effects o f both 
could be highly devastating (Smil 1997).
15 Which suggests that the prevailing environment-conflict discourse is unable to cope with 
issues that defy its particular amalgam o f inside/outside, utilitarian and direct threat 
rationality.
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This linking of environmental concerns with common security was clearly 
established in Our Common Future (see above). That such a common security 
approach is required is self evident given the transboundary character of some 
forms of environmental degradation, thus “it becomes increasingly clear that each 
nation is at the mercy of others’ actions” (Funke 1994: 74). This leaves little 
choice for policy but to act in a framework of common security, and to act in such 
a way as to prevent the onset of environmental problems which have a 
transboundary character (Fairclough 1991, Porter and Brown 1991). Thus Buzan 
argues that “the appeal to national security has no practical logic unless it can be 
linked to collective action” (Buzan 1991a: 132). On issues with a regional or 
bilateral impact and a relatively identifiable cause, such as acid rain, a common 
security approach is likely to be successful (Carroll 1989). However, with respect 
to a global issue such as climate change, where there is uncertainty and 
complexity, and where tracing causes and effects exposes the contradictions 
inherent in modernity (ecological and social degradation, injustice and violence - 
chapter 3), then effective action and truly common security may be a long time 
coming. As Mayer-Tasch (1986) has argued, common environmental problems are 
far more intractable than those issues that have traditionally been the domain of 
common security; hence whilst environmental problems fit easily into the common 
security framework, the framework itself may be in need of a fundamental reform 
to be truly effective.
Westing is a staunch advocate of common security, but he also recognises 
that more profound changes are required: “threats to the long-term security of us 
all require for their amelioration ... economic re-ordering, and social adjustments 
on truly grand scales” (Westing 1989a: 130). Similar to Westing, Kakonen (1992), 
Stem (1995) and Thomas (1992) have advocated a comprehensive security 
approach which involves linking environmental security initiatives with a broader 
array of complementary activities. For Kakonen “underdevelopment and the 
phenomena connected with it, as well as environmental problems, are phenomena 
of destruction caused by development. In other words, different threats are closely 
connected to a set of values and a way of life..” (Kakonen 1992a: 147-148). In this 
respect, like Westing, Kakonen appreciates that comprehensive security must 
entail more than a superficial linkage of issues within a framework of common 
security, it must involve “a peaceful transformation of the whole international 
system” (Kakonen 1992a: 152). This line of thinking is no doubt correct, 
environmental problems cannot be seen in isolation from development and
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economic issues, and any serious attempt to provide environmental security 
requires addressing the broad array o f causes of environmental degradation; hence 
“a holistic conception of security is an imperative” (Thomas 1992: 151). Renner, 
too, has been a staunch advocate of the common and comprehensive security 
approach, arguing that there needs to be disarmament for there to be 
environmental security (Renner 1989, 1997).
Linking environmental issues into a common and comprehensive security 
framework has implications for existing international institutions. Various options 
have been proposed, including new international institutions such as a United 
Nations (U.N.) environmental security council, and a green cross or green U.N. 
police force (Schrijver 1989). However, the most immediate option is to reform 
and strengthen existing institutions, and it is here that Imber’s work on U.N. 
reform has much to offer (Imber 1991, 1994). Despite an array of criticisms about 
the U.N., Imber is positive about its potential role, arguing that “the U.N. is the 
appropriate forum for much necessary7 environmental diplomacy” (Imber 1991: 
211). Imber suggests that the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has 
been, and can continue to be, a valuable institution for promoting environmental 
concerns; he offers ‘two cheers’ for the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED); and, most importantly, he suggests 
that, the U.N. “is the only place in which all the world’s states can m ee t... to 
negotiate new norms of behaviour and adopt binding conventions on a range of 
issues” (Imber 1994: 114).16 According to Imber, the U.N. is appropriate for 
collecting and disseminating large data sets, for the consensus negotiation o f 
norms, for establishing rules of law, and for the monitoring of compliance with 
environmental regulations (1994: 116). On the basis of these, and given the post­
cold war international environment, Imber suggests that “the possibility o f co­
joining environment, security and U.N. reform is .. more apparent now than at any 
time previously” (1994: 140). This thesis is in general agreement with Imber’s 
optimistic view of the role o f the U.N. Certainly, despite many shortcomings, the 
U.N. has been crucial to the promotion of environmental concerns on the global 
agenda, and given the difficulties of international diplomacy, it must surely have a 
key role to play in ongoing common and comprehensive security efforts to provide 
environmental security (see chapter 11).
See Chatterjee and Finger (1994) for a full discussion of the shortcomings of UNCED. 
Imber is aware of many of these.
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The immediacy of environmental problems can be seen as an important 
impetus to furthering collective action on a range of related common security 
problems; hence “environmental concerns can stimulate diplomatic cooperation 
which in other political contexts would be less likely” (Thomas 1992: 61, see also 
Burnett 1989, Zarsky 1995 and 1996). The salient point about common security is 
that for the most part responsibility still rests with nations who are urged to act to 
secure their common interests; it works by extending the logic of national security, 
and does not challenge the legitimacy of the way the nation-state dominates 
political life. A difficulty with common security then, is that it does not make clear 
what the (inferred) more encompassing political community might look like 
(Walker 1997).
5.5 Redefining Security: What’s at Stake?
By the late 1980s Realism’s view of security and the practices it generated were 
becoming increasingly untenable (Stephenson 1988). According to Stoett, the end 
o f the cold war in 1989 lifted the “perceptual fog” which obscured certain 
understandings o f contemporary security issues (Stoett 1995: 19). The fall o f the 
Berlin wall ushered in a new round of identification of ‘new’ security issues, 
including pre-existing ‘dangers’ (mostly to U.S. interests) such as: the strength of 
the Japanese and German economies (economic security); global environmental 
change (environmental security); an array o f difficulties associated with the ‘Third 
W orld’; and energy availability (energy security). Other security issues which are 
identified include: drug use at home and drug trafficking (the ‘war’ on drugs);17 
failed states which may behave aggressively inwardly and outwardly; 
transboundary crime; hostage taking; terrorism;, ethno-political conflicts;18 the 
migration of diseases and people across national borders;19 and the threat posed by 
large groups of people who subscribe to a different religious orientation that that 
o f the Judao-Christian West (Islam gets much attention) (after Campbell 1992, 
Dalby 1997a). These new threats are still, for the most part:
17 Lee (1995) gives a brief introduction to this issue.
18
Glut (1995) offers an insightful and peace-promoting discussion of ethnic tension as a 
source of conflict.
19 Chow (1996) gives a brief introduction to this issue.
_0 O’Neill (1996) seems to think that global warfare and regional scale warfare is still 
likely, the usual enemies of Russia, China and radical Islam are cited as being possible 
protagonists. Dupont (1996) also offers a Realist account of many of these ‘new’ security 
issues.
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Represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant 
during the cold war .... these challenges are represented as dangers located 
in an external and anarchic environment which threaten the security of an 
internal and domestic society, often via recourse to violence (Campbell 
1992: 7).
It is not surprising then, that according to a U.S. defence expert “the world remains
a highly uncertain place with increasingly complex and dangerous national
security threats” (Holmes 1997: 1). The discourse of danger in these new security
issues is thus clear, as Rosenau is wont to put it, we still live in a ‘turbulent world’
(Rosenau 1995a). Holmes gives an insight into the logical response of Realists to
these new threats and turbulent times:
To be prepared to fight and win our nation’s wars, to be capable of a range 
of challenging contingency operations and to be ready to assist our friends 
and allies in the Third World in establishing a secure, stable environment, 
we must continuously develop new tactics and equipment that address the 
new age warfare we will face in the 20th century (Holmes 1997: 6)
The most important critique of expanded conceptions of security, of which
environmental considerations are part, concerns this militarised response. Security,
as Deudney (1990) and Dalby (1991, 1994b) note, carries with it an array of
sentiments and a narrow problem-solving mindset that possibly (Dalby), or does
(Deudney), make it an inappropriate concept for addressing these issues. These
critiques speak to the prevailing Realist conception of security which is, in Dalby’s
words, “mired in ideological straightjackets” (199T. 29). So the Western response
to the current era of world politics is “characterised by the representation of novel
challenges in terms of traditional analytics, and the varied attempts to replace one
enemy with (an)other” (Campbell 1992: 8). This holds true for environmental
security as well:
In thinking about the new horse of environmental degradation, it is really 
the old gibbons heart of national security that many of the new securitarians 
want to preserve. They alter, dilute, and extend the meaning of security 
beyond any classical recognition, but they never give up on its original idea 
which embodies conflict and violence. This is because the idea carries them 
to the heart of existential anguish and moral peril, fears without which their 
message would not merit such an anxious hearing by politicians, the 
military, or the mass media (Smil 1997: 108).
Therefore, this post-cold war security agenda is still basically the Realist agenda,
but now exhibiting previously secondary concerns brought forth with the sudden
absence of the mobilising West-East threat. Sorenson (1990) seems to admit that
strategic studies has sought for new security issues to fill the strategic vacuum left
after the collapse of the cold war: “the search for a new national security focus has
begun” (Sorenson 1990: 1). Thus the hidden goal of security - that of maintaining
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power within the state - remains unchallenged so long as security is projected as 
an absolute imperative. In short, the effect of broadening national security to 
include social, political and environmental issues - without changing the referent 
away from the nation-state - is the further colonisation of domestic society by 
Realism’s ultimately violent logic.
In as much as the Realist conception of security dominates, this thesis is in
agreement with Campbell, Dalby and Deudney. For as long as security remains
tied up in the state-centric Realist paradigm, introducing new issues will be
conceptually counterintuitive and practically counterproductive to these issues,
and to peace. In most of the accounts discussed in this chapter, the logical confines
of Realism are not broken, and the state remains the site of politics, hence:
Broadening the issue-agenda of security studies from the military-strategic 
dimension does not necessarily involve broadening the conceptual base. The 
recognition of additional dimensions of security - however welcome this 
may be - may be an ad hoc enlargement of a still state-centred concept of 
security (Shaw 1993: 162).
Therefore, expanding the security agenda without seriously contesting the 
meaning of security perpetuates Realism’s failure to take into account the needs of 
people. In this broader (but not deeper) agenda, security is still the preserve of 
states acting in their own interests - interests which for the most part do not 
correspond to the needs of people.
However, the expansion of the concept of security is only malignant for as 
long as security equates with national security as constructed by Realism. There 
are a range of other definitions of security that identify alternative referents 
(chapters 9 and 10). These do more than expand the meaning of security, they 
seek to ‘reclaim’ it by deepening the concept such that it speaks to the security 
needs of people (not nations), and by addressing risk and uncertainty in proactive 
and peaceful ways (Barnett 1997b). Even given these radical approaches, it 
remains an open and ongoing question as to whether the notion of security is too 
thoroughly contaminated with associations of power and violence to warrant 
further use. This issue is taken up again in chapter 10 where the advantages and 
disadvantages of securitising environmental problems are considered.
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5.6 Conclusions
The attempts to redefine security discussed in this chapter do so in 
contradistinction to the dominance of the military emphasis and national focus. As 
Waever puts it “to the extent that we have an idea of a specific modality labelled 
‘security’ it is because we think of national security and its modifications and 
limitations” (1995: 48). If, as Waever suggests, security only has meaning because 
of its close association with the nation, then all of the environmental security 
literature that speaks directly to, or explicitly against national security, is still 
nevertheless taking in terms of the nation-state.
Where the stated referent is still the nation-state, most efforts at redefining 
security serve the interests of the national and security elite rather more than they 
serve the interests of people. So, in this thesis’ view, despite good intentions, the 
search for ‘new security issues’ has lead to the discursive reinvigoration of the 
state and its self appointed protectors via the continued construction of Others and 
discourses of danger. In this context it is not surprising that we read that 
“environmental degradation is becoming (along with extreme nationalism, 
religious radicalism, and economic conflict) a prime threat for the 21st century” 
(Winnefeld and Morris 1994: 2). The beginning of this discourse of environment 
as a threat can be largely attributed to Ullman and Myers, who presented 
environmental insecurity in terms of conflict and national threats. This issue of 
conflict and the environment will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6. Environmental Degradation and Conflict
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter raised the idea that environmental degradation might lead to
conflict. In the 1990s this notion has become the dominant theme of the
environmental security literature; few articles do not mention it, and the majority
of the literature focuses exclusively on it. According to Dabelko and Simmons:
Relative to other conceptions of environment and security, the academic 
literature on environment and conflict linkages is arguably the most 
developed. It has also received the most sustained attention from 
policymakers and a broader groups o f scholars, perhaps because it fits easily 
into predominant state-centered views o f security (Dabelko and Simmons 
1997: 135).
This dominance makes it crucial that this literature be subjected to critical 
examination. Such an examination is rare, and rarely detailed, so the following 
discussion seeks to make a significant contribution to the literature.1 2This chapter 
begins with an examination of the idea that there will be ‘water wars’ in the future. 
Then it examines arguments that there will be wars fought over scarce resources, 
and that population growth may induce conflict. There is also a critical 
examination of one significant research program - the Project on Environment, 
Population and Security - which sought to identify the possible connections 
between environmental degradation and conflict. Attention is also paid to Kaplan’s 
influential Coming Anarchy paper (1994) - an extreme example of the argument 
that environmental degradation will induce conflict and instability. The chapter 
ends with some critical comments on this literature.
6.2 Water Wars
A major concern of the environmental security literature is the likelihood of
2conflict over water. According to Starr, for example, “water security will soon
1 Elliott (1996) and Gleditsch (1998) make sceptical, if not critical examinations.
2 A selection includes: Bennett (1991), Cooley (1984), Falkenmark (1986), Frederick 
(1996), Gleik (1990, 1991, 1993), Holst (1989), Lowi (1996), Myers (1986, 1987a, 1987b, 
1989, 1996), Naff (1992), Oswald (1993), Porter and Brown (1991), Renner (1997), Starr 
(1991), Stoett (1995), Tickell (1993). Water is an interesting phenomena for the study of 
the linkages between environment and conflict (and peace) because it directly serves 
economic, health and ecological functions (Falkenmark 1986). It is thus a multifaceted
resource.
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rank with military security in the war rooms of defense ministries” (1991: 19); and
for Buzan “it is not difficult to imagine the issue of allocations of water along
rivers such as the Nile, the Mekong and the Indus becoming causes for the use of
military force” (Buzan 1991a: 132). The literature makes much of the observation
that 214 major river systems are shared by two or more countries (Renner 1997).
Naff exemplifies the reasoning that underlies the water wars thesis:
In sum, the strategic reality of water is that under circumstances of scarcity, 
it becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, intense, salient, 
complicated, zero-sum, power- and prestige-packed issue, highly prone to 
conflict and extremely difficult to resolve. (Naff 1992: 25-26).
There is a typical pattern to this literature; the geographical misfit between 
water and national boundaries is explored, and then a healthy dose of practical 
geopolitical reasoning is applied. The usual case in point is the Middle East, a 
region already suffering from religious, ethnic and political tensions. For many 
authors, when they factor in water scarcity it becomes the proverbial spark that 
starts the metaphorical Middle East bonfire, which in turn is seen to threaten 
‘international security’ (Gleik 1993). Having made much of the prospect of water 
wars, there is usually a brief discussion of remedial measures which reads more 
like an afterthought or an addendum to the substantive issue of warfare.
Bulloch and Darwish (1993) provide the most comprehensive study of the
likelihood of war over water in the Middle East. The title of their book - Water
Wars: Coming Conflict in the Middle East - neatly encapsulates its tone. The final
chapter is titled ‘The Dangerous Future’, and the final paragraph says:
Rising populations and dwindling resources combine to make the Middle 
East the most vulnerable of all regions to water shortages. As we have 
shown, wars have already been fought to ensure adequate supplies, and the 
politicians have made it plain that they would be ready to use military 
means again to protect their interests, while army commanders have devoted 
thought and effort to ensuring that the orders of the politicians, if they come,
can be carried out.....The potential for violence is always present in the
Middle East.....Although the battles may be about land, or autonomy, or
human rights , or protecting borders, every confrontation in the future will 
be affected by the hydrography of the region. Water wars are on the way 
(Bulloch and Darwish 1993: 199).
This passage highlights the difficult, perhaps irresolvable question, of which 
factors contribute most to warfare. Contrary to discussions about the 1948 Arab- 
Israeli war for example, it seems that few wars have been induced singly by water 
shortages. Lowi (1996) is more forthright than most, arguing that the broader 
political context is more relevant than the specific issue of water scarcity. This is a
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point of concern for Lipschutz as well: “the evidence for true ‘water wars’ is 
problematic .... those examples offered as evidence o f wars over water tend, under 
closer inspection, to be about something else” (Lipschutz 1992b: 4-5).
Nevertheless, there appears to be sufficient evidence - particularly that provided 
by Kelly and Homer-Dixon (1996) and Percival and Homer-Dixon (1995a) - that 
water is an important variable in violent conflict within, if not always between 
states. Further, with respect to the case of interstate conflict in the Middle East, 
pronouncements by the region’s politicians (see below) suggest that in as much as 
politicians identify water as a cause of violence, the prospect of water wars should 
be taken seriously. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this thesis that the 
argument about water wars is overstated, is a particular product of Realist security 
reasoning, and undervalues the historical and contemporary evidence that water is 
as likely to “cement peace” as it is to induce violence (Cooley 1984: 3).
Authors concerned about water wars have made much of (then Egyptian 
Foreign Minister) Boutrous-Ghali’s observ ation that “the next war in our region 
will be over the waters o f the Nile, not politics” (cited in Gleik 1991: 20).
However, if Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other 
means’ is still relevant, then war over the waters o f the Nile is still a war about 
politics. Put another way, if there is conflict over water, then that conflict is the 
result of a failure ofpolitics to negotiate a settlement over the shared use o f water. 
As Holst puts it: “it is a question o f political organisation, of the carrying capacity 
of political systems..” (1989: 128). So, the popular idea that a war over water, or 
any other resource, is not a war about politics is dubious. Politicians and the 
military might wish to present war in Darwinian or Malthusian terms as a fight 
over subsistence needs, but this ‘state of nature’ rhetoric is a pragmatic device that 
denies responsibility for peaceful action, and justifies violence in lieu of 
meaningful dialogue.
That much of the water wars literature focuses on the Middle East is 
instructive.3 It suggests that the issue is important not because of an a priori 
concern for those people who may suffer from warfare (if it was we might see 
more discussion o f the everyday problems of water scarcity as well), but because 
of the problems war in the Middle East might create for Northern interests in the 
region. The Middle East is certainly vulnerable to water shortages, but Central and
J It is interesting to note that predictions of water wars come mostly from Northern 
commentators.
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Southern Africa have similar, if not worse, water scarcities and hydrological 
perturbations. There are also equally long standing political and social tensions.
Yet there is no superpower presence in Africa, no supposed religious threats to 
world order, and perhaps most importantly, there is no media interest. The Middle 
East, in contrast, is a zone of importance to Northern strategic interests and is 
prominent in the Northern political agenda, hence the focus of attention there. So, 
it seems that the discourse on water wars in the Middle East is motivated by 
Northern interests in the region rather than by a concern for the people of the 
region.
Should there be examination of water issues in Southern Africa, a picture 
which confounds the water wars thesis might emerge. The Okavango River, for 
example, is a little studied but exemplary case of the way in which water scarcity 
can lead to cooperation rather than war. The Okavango River is shared by Angola, 
Botswana and Namibia, and has important health, economic and ecological 
functions. As a result of impending tensions over scarce water resources, an 
interstate commission was established by these three states in 1994. Since then, the 
commission has effectively and peacefully co-managed the river, demonstrating 
that water can form a common basis for peace (OKACOM 1998) 4
So, the selection of cases to prove the water wars thesis is suspect. What is 
truly notable is the failure to examine successful and peaceful water management 
regimes, such as those in Western Europe and North America. This omission 
might be explained by an absence of scarcity, or the relative balance of military 
powers, although this is not the case with U.S.-Mexico cooperation over the waters 
of the Colorado River. The failure to examine positive cases might also be a 
function of the way in which warfare appeals to our sensationalist and militaristic 
culture, which helps authors with publication and career advancement.
The water wars literature can be read as a case of ‘civilised’ Europeans 
constructing a barbaric Other. It suggests that there is really a pervasive disinterest 
in peace, and that warfare is more exciting. The overwhelming preference for 
discussing conflict rather than peace suggests that the limiting Realist ontology 
belies this literature.
4 ‘Peacefully’ only in so far as interstate violence has been averted. There are a range of 
development projects being planned, the effects o f these on local people could yet be 
violent. The International Rivers Network has documented the resistance to the Epupa Dam 
project in Namibia See http://www.im.org/index.html
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A counterargument to the prospect of water wars has come from Deudney 
(1990, 1991, 1992). Deudney supports the view that cooperation and co­
management of water resources may be the more likely outcome of water scarcity. 
This suggestion is supported by strategic considerations as well, namely that:
Exploitation of water resources typically requires expensive - and 
vulnerable - civil engineering systems such as dams and pipelines. Large 
dams, like nuclear power plants, are potential weapons in the hands of an 
enemy. This creates a mutual hostage situation which greatly reduces the 
incentives for states to employ violence to resolve conflict (Deudney 1991: 
26).
In short, water is not likely to be a source of conflict because it is difficult to 
securely enclose; it is “a ‘fugitive’ resource - naturally flowing from one location 
and one state (liquid, gas, or solid) to another” (Frederick 1996: 9).
Historically, water has for the most part been peacefully co-managed. Water 
rights have always been central to coping with water scarcity: “water rights are as 
old as the first Neolithic farmers” (Bennett and Dahlberg 1990: 75). This is also 
true in the case of the Middle East, where there has been a complex system of 
water rights, and where water was an integral part of traditional customs (see Isaac 
and Shuval 1992). Prior to the modem state then, water was a basis for negotiation 
and cooperation, which suggests that despite the impediments imposed by the 
state-system, the peaceful resolution of water disputes is still (at least culturally) 
possible.
6.3 Resource Wars
The issue of ‘resource wars’ is a traditional concern of International Relations. 
This concern is prevalent in the environmental security literature (Elliott 1998). 
For example, for Gleik “a strong argument can be made linking certain resource 
and environmental problems with prospects for war or peace. There is a long 
history suggesting that access to resources is a proximate cause of war” (1990: 
507). A difficulty with this literature is the conflation of resources with 
environment. Gleditsch identifies this difficulty as well, asking if the literature is 
talking of “resource scarcity or environmental degradation?” (Gleditsch 1998: 
387).
With respect to the question of resource scarcity and war, the literature is by 
and large concerned with resources o f economic value, rather than the
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environment per se.5 For example, Magno (1997) considers the case of resource 
scarcity in the South China sea, arguing that it “fits well within the framework of 
environmental security ... The expansion of economic activity, mixed with the 
depletion of natural resources in the region, has intensified the scramble for 
resources..” (1997: 100). Magno’s work reflects the traditional Realist concern 
with war over resources, the environmental dimensions are not particularly 
evident. Mandel (1994) explicitly conflates resources with environment. He has a 
chapter titled ‘Resource/Environmental Security’, and in a revealing passage he 
says that “analyzing the link between resource/environmental concerns and 
national security without a foundation in the substantial geopolitical literature 
would be foolhardy” (Mandel 1994: 77). Thus, for Mandel, like many others, 
resource and environmental security are related, they are of interest only in as 
much as they relate to national security, and the key to understanding them lies in 
the study of Realism’s traditional geopolitical texts.
At times ‘resources’ is used to describe environmental services in a way
that, although not altogether wrong, can be misleading. The confusion is perhaps
most clear in Gleik’s work (1990, 1991). Gleik argues that there are ‘clear
connections’ between environment and security (my emphasis in italics):
Resource and environmental threats to security can be separated into five 
components: resources as strategic goals, resources as strategic targets; 
resources as strategic tools; resource inequities as roots to conflict; and 
environmental services and conditions as roots to conflict (Gleik 1990: 508).
Of these five components, only one speaks directly to environmental issues. The 
first four are speaking of resources as strategic goals, targets, tools and sources of 
conflict.6 This conflation of resource scarcities with environmental issues gives 
Realist modes of analysis a foothold in the environmental security literature 
because resources and conflict are part of the Realist stock-and-trade. The notion 
that there has to be a ‘resource’ factor for it to be considered as a security issue is a 
stale reflection of Realism.
5 With respect to the question of scarcity it should be noted that scarcity is a relative 
phenomena. The problem of scarcity is in most cases the problem that comes from “the 
expectation of abundance” which is “denied for structural economic reasons rather than 
natural ones” (Bookchin 1982: 71).
6 Gleik is not unlike Myers in that his work is more benign when not sensationalising the 
security dimension, see for example Gleik 1994. The question to be asked is why both of 
these (basically) credible scientists choose to engage in dramatic politics. The answer 
perhaps lies less in ‘securitising’ environmental issues, and more in the personal 
aggrandisement that comes from talking tough about high politics.
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It behoves this thesis, then, to make the distinction between resource
scarcity and environmental disturbance clearer. To begin, remember Julian
Simon’s argument (chapter 1) that there is no environmental problem because
economic processes can account for scarcity through price mechanisms and
substitution (Simon 1981, Simon and Kahn 1984). Hence the dismissal in chapter
1 of resource scarcity as the most pressing environmental problem. Next, it is
instructive to examine the definition of a ‘resource’. A resource is:
[Som ething material or abstract that can be used to satisfy some human 
want or deficiency, ie. by definition the existence o f a resource depends on 
it value to humans. What makes a thing a resource is not its intrinsically 
valuable properties but the fact that a given society expresses a desire for it 
and is willing to pay for it. Resources are therefore a cultural concept... 
(Goodall 1987:409).
The very word resource is a clear indicator that what is being discussed is 
something o f direct utilitarian value to humans. If  a scarce resource can be costed, 
its price altered according to the balance o f supply and demand, and if necessary 
substituted, then it’s scarcity' is an economic rather than an environmental problem. 
Environmental problems are understood in this thesis to be those effects or 
externalities that cannot be costed or reasonably substituted. That economic 
rationality discounts these externalities is integral to the problem; if they were 
calculable then we might assume that they could be redeemable through market 
processes. But increasing rates of cancer, biodiversity losses, and the effects of 
climate change, for example, defy simplistic estimation. These are issues 
characterised by pervasive uncertainty and ignorance, and the word ‘resource’ 
seems an inappropriate label for these problems. These issues are already 
discernible in declining human security, felt mostly by the already insecure. These 
are what is new about environmental insecurity.7 If consider that the causes and 
effects of environmental insecurity are felt differentially, that is if we consider the 
element o f injustice, then these problems acquire a further resistance to 
calculation; the market has never been able to put a price on justice.
Therefore, if a scarce resource is one which has an immediately calculable 
economic value, it should not be considered as an environmental security issue. If, 
however, the problem arises from an ecological disturbance whose effects defy 
economic calculation, then it could be considered as an environmental security
7 Porter (1996a) therefore misses the point altogether when suggesting that environmental 
threats to national security can be costed.
142
issue.8 *This explication should serve as an approximate guide to considering the 
question of which issues might be considered under the ambit of environmental 
security. Exceptions to this rule will no doubt abound, but it is hoped that the
9
distinction is by now reasonably apparent.
The prospect of war over resources is dubious even without considering
environmental factors. Lipschutz and Holdren (1990) have suggested that military
action to secure access to resources is not likely given interdependence among
states in the global economy. They argue that war is less cost effective than
pursuing the same goal through trade; that technological advances have increased
the substitutability of materials; and that raw materials are now less important to
economic success.10 Deudney supports this view, arguing that the “robust
character of the world trade system means that resource dependency is no longer a
major threat to a nation’s military security” (Deudney 1991: 26).11 But at the same
time as dismissing the possibility of war over economic resources, Lipschutz and
Holdren predict that environmental problems now pose “the greatest threats to
international stability” (1990: 126). They argue that if we consider:
The potential for drastically increased levels of deprivation in the South 
caused by global biogeophysical change, as well as the likelihood that the 
pre-eminent role of the North in generating these problems will, even more 
than usual, incline the South to blame the North for its predicament -... the 
threat to peace should be fully apparent (Lipschutz and Holdren 1990: 129).
Lipschutz and Holdren are, in this thesis’ view, correct to point out that the North 
is the generator of most environmental problems, and that there are indeed great 
discrepancies between North and South. Further, they do make some effort to 
distinguish between resource and environmental issues. But their argument about 
environmentally induced conflicts is premised on consideration of the same 
inequalities and disparities between states that they deem of no significance for 
conflict over economic resources. So, if the oppressed and exploited South has not 
resorted to force thus far as a means to free themselves from the North, it seems
8 Of course contingent valuation seeks to ascribe a monetary value to environmental 
functions. It is, on the balance of evidence, an economically and ethically inadequate 
procedure. See Common 1995, and for the author’s own foray see Barnett 1996a.
Energy resources, for example, are, as a cause of conflict, an economic resource - as in 
the case of the Persian Gulf War or Magno’s discussion of the Spratley Islands. However, 
when oil, coal and to a lesser extent natural gas resources are burned to generate power, the 
resulting effects can be considered to be environmental problems. The link between these 
latter effects and violent conflict, however, are less than clear (see Holdren 1992).
10 Opschoor (1989) makes the important point that trade is another means by which wealth 
is transferred, and so does not imply mutual benefit and resolution of injustices.
11 However, this liberal-internationalist type of argument holds more for interactions 
between industrialised states than for the whole global economy (see Burchill 1996b).
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questionable to assume that they will in the future on the basis of additional 
environmental pressures. In short, if the argument that interdependence is peace 
promoting holds for resource based conflicts, then it should hold equally for 
environmentally based conflicts.
The ontological priority given to conflict over cooperation therefore seems 
to prevail even in more reasoned works such as Lipschutz and Holdren’s. A 
particular Northern world view of the South as barbaric is discernible. There is 
apparently:
Superabundant indigenous sources of tension - a rich array o f religious and 
racial hatreds, ideological incompatibilities, and territorial disputes, 
compounded by the frustrations of poverty, the frictions o f modernization 
and development, and, in many cases, the birth traumas of new statehood. 
(Lipschutz and Holdren 1990: 129)
That this was written before the disintegration of Yugoslavia should be noted, 
however, the Yugoslavia case reveals that Europeans are no less prone to ‘racial 
hatreds, ideological incompatibilities’ and so on. The revealing question, 
therefore, is why is Yugoslavia the exception for the North, but assumed to be the 
norm for the South? To this we might provide three immediate responses. First, 
common to much of the environmental security literature is the scripting o f people 
from the South as barbaric. Second, and related, there is an ethnocentric 
assumption that the North is more civilised. Third, there may indeed be a degree of 
institutional/social resilience in industrialised societies that hedges against large 
scale violence most o f the time. Hence Lipschutz suggest that “if the capabilities 
of a state are broad and deep enough, and it is technologically advanced, marginal 
changes in resource quality will not make much difference” (Lipschutz 1992b: 3). 
Of these three explanations, only the latter offers hope as a meaningful research 
agenda for environmental security. Thus Conca has suggested that “a lot o f good 
work on management o f environmental cooperation and institution building is 
being done, but that work is often separate from environment and conflict 
discussions and needs to be incorporated” (1995a: 63).
There are at least three reasons for the resilience o f industrialised societies. 
First, as the industrialised economies partake of the global division o f labour they 
effect a global division o f environmental degradation as well, thereby preventing 
environmental degradation at home. Given this, practicing environmental
12 Hence “the question of the location of environmentally benign societies is in part a 
convenience of territorial state boundaries and the assumptions of states as containers of 
politics and environments” (Dalby 1998c: 4).
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security seems to be the practice of securing the ecological health of the nation 
(but not the biosphere) by transferring environmental externalities. Second, the 
levels of wealth in the industrialised world - wealth gained through the 
exploitation of cheap labour and materials abroad - allows for institutions that 
provide stability and resilience to environmental change. The market, well 
financed government, the insurance industry, transport and communications 
infrastructure, a degree of democratic participation, and a base level of personal 
affluence all seem to help hedge against internal turmoil in the face of 
environmental stress. Third, trade between similarly affluent liberal-democracies 
assists in the transfer of necessary food and technology that helps enhance 
resilience and decreases the likelihood of rivalry. Underwriting all this, however, 
is the ability to pay and to participate in the domestic and global economy without 
great disadvantage. This ability, of course, is limited to the few and underwritten 
by the exploitation of the many.
This brings us to a pervasive analytical difficulty of the literature which 
posits the possibility of environmentally induced conflicts. If, as Gleik suggests, 
“developing countries have far fewer technical and economic resources at their 
disposal”, and hence are less able to adapt to environmental change, then this 
institutional impoverishment surely applies to their ability to wage war as well 
(Gleik 1990: 518). The threat from the South could scarcely manifest itself as 
large scale warfare, despite Gleik’s observation that “Third World arms 
capabilities are impressive and growing” and so “the threat to peace and security 
becomes fully apparent” (1990: 519). There may indeed be some possibility of 
Tow-intensity conflict’ driven by desperation and resentment of the policies and 
practices of the North, but it is important to step back and view the broader 
picture. Once again we should ask whose peace and security? The absolute peace 
and security problem is not that in the face of intolerable oppression the oppressed 
may resist; the problem is the oppression and injustice itself. The task, then, is to 
eliminate this injustice.
The real irony of the environment-conflict literature is that it is the 
industrialised world which assumes that the South will threaten; the North creates 
its own fiction, based on little or no evidence. In this literature the Northern 
strategic vision projects onto the industrialising world its own violent rationality.
It assumes that the South will behave as the North would - that is with aggression 
and force. Yet this is merely an assumption, there may be rogue states (Iraq,
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Libya, North Korea), but these few are exceptions and do not represent the vast 
majority of industrialising states. Hence the ‘threat to peace and security ’ which is 
‘fully apparent’ to Gleik is by no means apparent. The peace and security being 
referred to, then, is the peace and security of the industrialised states, not the 
positive peace and security to which the majority of the world’s people are 
entitled. This Northern ‘peace’ is a negative peace, and its ‘security’ is a resistance 
to change.
6.4 Population, Environment and Conflict
It is common in the environmental security literature to assume that excess
population can cause warfare. A large amount of attention has been paid to the
links between ‘population, environment and conflict’ (Myers 1987b). The standard
line here is that population growth will overextend the natural resources of the
immediate environs, leading to deprivation which, it is assumed, will lead to
conflict and instability either directly, or through the flow of ‘environmental
refugees’ (Lee 1994). Myers puts it thus:
So great are the stresses generated by too many people making too many 
demands on their natural-resource stocks and their institutional support 
systems, that the pressures often create first-rate breeding grounds for 
conflict (Myers 1987b: 16).13
The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation 
are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to 
conflict are difficult to prove (Leroy 1986). In lieu of this, there is a negative style 
of argumentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: 
“the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion”, but “we may surmise that 
conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated 
factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate” (Myers 
1987b: 16). It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation 
and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war; as Deudney notes, full 
bellies, not empty ones, are more predisposed to warfare (Deudney 1991). Indeed, 
the famines in Africa in recent decades hardly seem to have produced ‘first rate 
breeding grounds for conflict’. Rather, the overwhelming outcomes are 
malnutrition and large losses of life.
lj As Stoett notes “Myers knows one sells products by appealing to insecurities” (Myers is 
a consultant) (Stoett 1994: 134).
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To equate famine with warfare and threat is to deny the prima facie issue of 
the responsibility of the industrialised world to those in affected regions.14 To 
focus on the conflict potential is to ignore the real causes of poverty and 
vulnerability, namely the economic disadvantages many people in the 
industrialising world experience from their exposure to global capital. Ignoring 
global processes also leads to impoverished policy.15 Vulnerability to famine can 
be lessened through substantial increases in access to employment, health care, 
education for women and children, and contraception. Resilience to famine can be 
enhanced by protecting traditional societies from the disruptive effects of modem 
society, by creating safe political conditions, and by permitting more autonomous 
governance at the local level. The consequences of famine can be lessened by 
making use of the efficient collection and delivery mechanisms that characterise 
world trade between industrialised nations to deliver necessary supplies. All these 
concerns are ignored or treated as afterthoughts when the issue of population 
growth is understood as a probable cause of violent conflict.
This population-environment-conflict reasoning is captured in an early 
pronouncement by Robert MacNamara (former U.S. Secretary of Defense and 
President of the World Bank), who said in 1984 that: “short of thermonuclear war 
itself, population growth is the gravest issue the world faces over the decades 
immediately ahead” (cited in Myers 1987b: 15). We should be immediately 
suspicious when pronouncements likening population growth to nuclear war come 
from key figures in the Northern world order such as MacNamara; whose ‘world’ 
is MacNamara referring to? If MacNamara the philanthropist is talking here about 
the plight of those who are adversely affected by rapid population growth and 
famine, then the ‘world’ in question may be that of the Southern people at the 
receiving end of the exploitative, poverty-making global economy. This ‘world’ is 
at risk from those very institutions with which MacNamara is so familiar - the 
World Bank, the Pentagon, and Ford motor company. More probably, MacNamara 
the former defense secretary is referring to the world of U.S. interests and the 
possibility that the growth in the number of Others might undermine the stability 
of (Northern) world order; as Dalby (1998b) and Shiva (1993) both note, claims to 
the ‘global’ often turn out to be a disguise for the interests of the industrialised 
world. Thus:
14 To be sure, some industrialised countries are more responsible than others, see the 
military/development assistance ratios in chapter 1.
15 Engelman (1997) and Gelbard (1996) offer a more reasoned approach to policy for 
population and environmental security.
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The word ‘global’ is a mirage. It turns out to be the illusion created by the 
traditional agents and major stakeholders in order to maintain their 
privileges and to avoid questioning the fact that their traditional problem­
solving mechanisms are bankrupt” (Chaterjee and Finger 1994: 173).
For Conca, too, claims that environmental issues are global “serves to blur the
very real questions of power and authority, and to mask highly unequal degrees of
responsibility for current environmental problems” (Conca 1994a: 15). So, it
seems that the ‘world’ view of MacNamara is the view that comes with a position
of power; the view that comes from directing aircraft carriers and satellites, and
from granting billion dollar loans and shaping national economies to fit the global
economy. The ‘world’ in question seems to be the world of the wealthy and
powerful.
There are three principal problems associated with this population- 
environment-conflict literature. First, by scripting population growth in 
industrialising countries as a threat to the interests of the industrialised countries, it 
presents population growth as an issue which requires management by the 
industrial powers. However, this is rarely seen to involve the relinquishment or 
adjustment of economic power. Second, it assumes that the number of people is 
absolutely indicative of ecological impact. This totally ignores the question of 
what kinds of lifestyle these people lead. A basic environmental studies text such 
as Miller (1994) demonstrates clearly that overall environmental impact is not 
merely a function of numbers, but also a function of the resources people use and 
the wastes they generate. This has been recognised by none other than U.S. 
President Bill Clinton, who is reported to have said that the greatest threat China 
poses to U.S. security is the potential for all Chinese people to acquire wealth and 
display consumption patterns similar to that of U.S. citizens. Clinton is alleged to 
have said that “unless we try to triple the automobile mileage and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions ... we won’t be breathing very well”, and that this “will 
be partly our fault, because we got there first and we should be able to figure out 
how to help .. solve this problem” (Friedman 1996).16 As well as suggesting that 
the U.S. President is more attuned to population-environment issues than many 
analysts, this also indicates the central point that lifestyle is as important as the 
number of lives. In this respect the most overpopulated country in the world is the 
United States, which has 4.7% of the world’s population, consumes 25% of all 
processed minerals, and produces 24% of the world’s greenhouse gases (UNDP
16 This was relayed to me via the environment and security mailing list 
«envsec_d@aaas.org» operated by the American Academy for the Arts and Sciences
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1996, Miller 1994). In contrast, an ‘overpopulated’ country like India has 16% of 
the world’s population, but consumes only 3 % of all minerals and produces around 
4% of greenhouse gases (Miller 1994). Hence overemphasising population turns a 
blind eye to the complicity of industrialised nations.
The third problematic feature o f this literature is the way it totally ignores 
and completely devalues the whole notion o f birth, and indeed life. By viewing 
population as a threat, by indicating this threat through impersonal demographic 
statistics, and by seeing this from a global perspective and in Malthusian terms, 
this literature ignores the social and biological aspects of birth.17 For the 
population doomsayers another birth is a negative incremental addition to the 
problem. Further, the life that comes from birth is seen to be miserable and 
burdensome. Yet high population growth in the industrialising world is generated 
in part by the realisation on the part o f parents that prospects for survival are 
increased by having children (Wrong 1977). To be sure, other factors such as the 
exclusion o f women from public life, inadequate maternal and post-natal medical 
care, unavailability of birth control devices and religious and cultural factors all 
play a part as well. However what is surely of some significance is that having 
children is both socially rewarding and is basic biological behaviour. Having 
children is one thing that people have always done. Giving birth and raising 
children points to non-instrumental modes of reason and ethics which involve a 
respect for life and community, nurturing, love, responsibility and a long term 
focus on the future. These positive aspects of population growth are wholly 
ignored by this population-environment-conflict literature.
6.5 The Project on Environment, Population and Security
O f all the literature that addresses the links between environmental degradation, 
population and conflict, the work by the Project on Environment, Population and 
Security is the most engaging and thoughtful. Blanket assumptions and 
simplistic connections are less obvious here, the sorts of biophysical processes that 
are considered are generally o f a more ecological nature, and considerably more
1; Malthus’ essay can be found in Nelissen et al (1997). See Dalby (1996b) for a discussion 
of the way Malthusian principles underwrite much of the environmental security literature. 
18 Homer-Dixon founded the project, and is principal or co-author of virtually every 
publication.
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effort is spent to explain the processes by which environmental disturbances might 
lead to conflict.19
The project began in 1994 and aimed to answer three questions, namely: 
what is known about the links among population growth, renewable resource 
scarcities, migration and conflict?; what can be known about these links?; and 
what are the critical methodological issues affecting research on these links?
These questions can be understood as seeking to substantiate what this thesis has 
thus far called the assumption that environmental disturbances will induce 
conflict.
The project was based on an early paper by Homer-Dixon (1991). The key
premises of this are worth citing at length:
I propose that poor countries will in general be more vulnerable to 
environmental change than rich ones; therefore, environmentally induced 
conflicts are more likely to arise first in the developing world. In these 
countries, a range of atmospheric, terrestrial, and aquatic environmental 
pressures will in time probably produce, either singly or in combination, 
four main, causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural 
production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of 
regular and legitimized social relations. These social effects, in turn, may 
cause several specific types of acute conflict, including scarcity disputes 
between countries, clashes between ethnic groups, and civil strife and 
insurgency, each with potentially serious repercussions for the security 
interests of the developed world (Homer-Dixon 1991: 78).
The logic here is of the positivist kind. Homer-Dixon developed a number flow 
charts to explain the processes whereby the ‘more likely’ and the ‘may cause’ are 
explicated (see also Homer-Dixon 1992 and 1995). These flow charts are models 
which depict a hypothetical ‘reality’. Smil seems to have Homer-Dixon’s 
models in mind when he says that:
Many natural scientists must be amused, if not appalled, by the often crass 
environmental determinism of the securitarians (eroding slopelands = 
environmental refugees = overcrowded cities = political instability = 
violence; or water scarcity = civil or interstate war) (Smil 1997: 109).
Environmental determinism indeed seems an appropriate label for the positivist
and linear style of analysis Homer-Dixon and other such as Gleik and Myers use.
19 A similar project was undertaken by a Swiss research project (ENCOP 1996). RAND 
has also made a foray into the field (Winnefeld and Morris 1994).
20 The analysis was convincing enough that Scientific American ran a similar piece in 
1993 (Homer-Dixon et al 1993).
21 A similar strategy is deployed in hazards research, about which Hewitt says: “thus 
encapsulated, the problem appears neutralised, objectified .... The work can then develop as 
a well crafted monologue” (Hewitt 1983: 14).
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Despite such concerns, the popularity of this research no doubt stems from this 
pseudo scientific approach.
The subsequent research programme that emanated from this early paper 
continued these positivist overtones. A large number of principal case studies were 
used to shed light on the three basic research questions. These cases were: the 
Asia-Pacific (Howard 1996), Bangladesh-India (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996), 
Chiapas in Mexico (Howard and Homer-Dixon 1995), Gaza (Kelly and Homer- 
Dixon 1996), Pakistan (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1996), Senegal-Mauritania 
(Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996), post-apartheid South Africa (Percival and 
Homer-Dixon 1995a), and Rwanda (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995b). There was 
also investigation o f the links between urban growth and violence (Gizewski and 
Homer-Dixon 1995), and some discussion of institutional adaptation and 
technological innovation (Barbier and Homer-Dixon 1996). These case studies are, 
to varying degrees, well researched background briefings on the difficulties 
experienced in particular regions; although they are more like development case 
studies than issues for “students o f security affairs” (Homer-Dixon 1991: 79).
What these case studies demonstrate is that inequitable distributions of 
renewable resources are exacerbated in times o f scarcity, and in such times elites 
may try to capture resources to secure their interests.^ This in turn leads to 
population displacement, often forcing people into more environmentally fragile 
areas, where the cycle may begin anew. The initial problem of environmental 
scarcity thus creates a cycle o f enclosure, capture and displacement, and in such a 
cycle the potential for violent episodes increases. The first of ten key findings is 
that:
Under certain circumstances, scarcities o f renewable resources, such as 
cropland, forests, and water produce civil conflict and instability. However, 
the role of the “environmental scarcity” is often obscure. Environmental 
scarcity acts mainly by generating social effects, such as poverty and 
migrations, that analysts often interpret as conflict’s immediate causes 
(Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996: 6).
In Homer-Dixon’s view then, environmental disruptions are not immediate causes 
o f conflict, but can at times be contributing factors. The logic of this conclusion is 
very similar to that of Homer-Dixon’s early prognostications (1991 cited above), 
so it would seem that the research project has largely confirmed the initial
22 This analysis has largely avoided the aforementioned confusion over resources by talking 
about renewable environmental resources (although the word ‘resource’ may be 
inappropriate).
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assumption that there is some connection between environmental degradation and 
social unrest.
Other key findings are that societies adapt by either using their 
environmental resources more efficiently, or by reducing their dependence on the 
scarce environmental resources, and that “in either case, the capacity to adapt 
depends on the level of social and technical ingenuity available in the society” 
(Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996: 7). Homer-Dixon finds that failure to adapt 
results in impoverishment, migration, and weakening o f the state, and that this 
may “sharpen distinctions among groups and enhances their opportunities to 
participate in violent collective action” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996: 8-9). 
Finally, and contrary to the allegations of others, the project found that 
“environmental scarcity' rarely contributes directly to interstate conflict” (Homer- 
Dixon and Percival 1996: 9).
In terms o f the broader literature it is important to note that this research has 
shifted attention away from global and regional issues to local issues. It offers a 
scale o f analysis which was previously ignored by environment and security 
scholarship, but which is surely equally valid. It is also significant in that it 
dismisses the suggestion that environmental degradation will lead to conflict 
between states. To stress the key point, however, this research has not conclusively 
shown that conflict inevitably flows from environmental degradation, nor even 
that environmental degradation is a principle cause o f violence. What it has shown 
is that environmental problems are contributing to social disturbances, which may 
involve violence, or less sensationally but no less importantly, more structural 
forms o f disadvantage.
One of the ‘debates’ about environmental security concerns Levy’s 
criticisms of Homer-Dixon’s research. Levy is generally dismissive of all the 
environment and security literature, although his review of it is far from 
comprehensive (Levy 1995a, 1995b).24 He is particularly ungenerous in his regard 
for Homer-Dixon’s work, arguing that it is ‘bland’ and offers nothing substantially 
new to security studies - although we should note that Homer-Dixon for the most
2j This core of this debate can be seen in the 1996 Environmental Change and Security 
Project Report (Simmons 1996). Porter (1996b) and Goldstone (1996a) make some 
interesting observations about this debate.
24 Levy ignores much of what this thesis calls the military-environment, human, and 
ecological security literature; he also offers a simplified account of the ‘securitisation’ issue
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25part was not talking about ‘security’ per se, focusing instead on violence." Levy is 
also overly concerned with the failure of Homer-Dixon’s research to suggest 
implications for “contemporary U.S. security policy”, another aspect that Homer- 
Dixon did not purport to address (Levy 1995a: 55).
Levy argues that Homer-Dixon’s research has “serious methodological 
flaws”, the most pressing o f which (for him) is the need to explore “causes of 
regional conflict as an important end in itse lf’ (1995b: 44). This seems to be less a 
critique o f methodology and more a confusion of method with scale. Levy 
suggests that “the logical strategy .. would have been to compare societies facing 
similar environmental problems but exhibiting different levels of violent conflict” 
(1985b: 45). It is true that the cases Homer-Dixon selected for study are all 
instances where there have been violent episodes, thus the claim that cases were 
selected to prove the initial assumption has merit (Gleditsch 1998 agrees). 
However, it does seem questionable to assume that two similar cases can be found 
given different ecological, cultural, and political contexts. What is most interesting 
is Levy’s implicit suggestion that a case is not worth studying unless there is some 
element o f violent conflict. The issue for Levy, then, is the need to examine the 
factors that explain ‘different levels o f violent conflict’, and not the need to 
examine those factors which might explain the absence o f conflict altogether. It is 
this thesis’ contention that the more revealing strategy would be to examine cases 
without a violent outcome. This would shift the emphasis away from negative to 
positive peace, and would be more likely to lead to positive and long-term 
responses.
With respect to the core methodological issues debated by Levy and Homer- 
Dixon, the crux of the debate seems to hinge on the attempt by both to speak in 
positivist vernacular about an issue which both seem to acknowledge cannot be 
explained by positivist research strategies. This aspect of the debate is most useful 
as a demonstration o f the frustrations associated with a strict adherence to 
positivist social science dictums. Finally, at the risk of overstating the claim, it 
must again be noted that all this attention (both from Homer-Dixon but even more 
so from Levy) given to violent conflict is misplaced. The issues that should be of 
more concern (at least in this thesis’ view) are the day-to-day insecurities 
associated with the erosion o f individual and group welfare and resilience.
25 ‘Conflict’ actually seems to be the preferred word; a word, it should be noted, that does 
not necessarily imply direct violence.
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Despite a sensitivity to complexity, and despite the shift of focus away from 
the international to the local scale, Homer-Dixon has still said little about the 
fundamental question of what makes people resort to violence? The early notion of 
‘a threshold’ seems indicative of this fundamental shortcoming. A threshold is the 
“border, limit (of a region); the line which one crosses in entering ... the beginning 
of a state of action, outset, opening” (Little et al 1973: 2294). The implication of 
its use the is that at some point communities experiencing ecological disruption 
will cross the threshold, transcend the limit of civility, and resort to violence. The 
discussion of pressures, scarcities and conflict depicts the circumstances and the 
conducive factors, but there is a leap of analysis from these to the decision to 
resort to force. In effect the key question - why fight? - cannot be wholly 
explained by compiling a litany of pressures. Were this wholly sufficient to 
explain the likelihood of violence, Gandhi would have preached bloody revolution 
and Mandela would have made recourse to militant retribution. Perhaps the more 
telling question to be examined then, is why do people not resort to violence? 
Hence, to repeat, a more productive research agenda would be to examine cases 
where, in the face of similar pressures, violence was not the end product (not cases 
where there were lesser degrees of violence as Levy suggests).
Homer-Dixon’s research “provides additional support for a range of policies 
- from selective debt relief to enhancement of indigenous technical capacity - that 
many development experts have long recognised as valuable” (Homer-Dixon and 
Percival 1996: 4). This is important despite Levy’s suggestion that it is “banal 
advice” which does not identify “key intervention points” (a profoundly 
dismissive attitude towards conventional wisdom about redressing environment 
and development problems) (Levy 1995a: 57). Although not the emphasis of 
Homer-Dixon’s work, the point is that strategies for peace, justice, development 
and sustainability are necessary for there to be security. The implication is that 
there is little connection between environmental degradation and security when 
security is understood as a national concern. Instead, the problems of 
environmental insecurity are seen as problems of inadequate development. This is 
the subversive intent of Homer-Dixon’s work. It adds impetus to the argument that 
environmental problems only have meaning for security if security is understood 
in human terms (see chapter 10).
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6.6 ‘The Coming Anarchy’
A particularly notable exposition of the environment-conflict thesis is Kaplan's 
The Coming Anarchy, published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1994. Kaplan s paper 
is said to have been widely read in the White House, and is reported to have made 
an impact on U.S. President Clinton (Dalby 1996b). Kaplan relies heavily on a 
superficial interpretation of Homer-Dixon’s work, which suggests that despite its 
qualifications, Homer-Dixon’s message is one which appeals to doomsday 
prophecies and ethnocentric Realist accounts of the world.
Kaplan paints a grim and apocalyptic vision of the future. He seeks to depict 
“what the political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first 
century” (1994: 45). He begins with the evocative line: “the Minister’s eyes were 
like egg yokes”, and offers “a premonition of the future” which includes “disease, 
overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the 
increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the 
empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels” 
(Kaplan 1994: 44 and 46). The Coming Anarchy speaks of “the environment as a 
hostile power”; it says that “nature is coming back with a vengeance, tied to 
population growth”; and that “it is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what 
it is: the national security issue of the twenty first century” (1994: 54, 60 and 58). 
Thus “the natural environment is the key villain” in Kaplan’s account of the world 
to come (Dalby 1996b: 472).
The Coming Anarchy is an ideologically laden, simplistic and apocalyptic
account of the development and environment problems faced in the industrialising
world. Smil says Kaplan “preaches with conviction and with the simplistic zeal of
a prophet” and that “his conclusions are based on unqualified generalisations
unmindful of enormous environmental and socio-economic peculiarities; he does
not hedge his remarks” (Smil 1997: 124). The Coming Anarchy is
comprehensively critiqued by Dalby (1996b). In the process, Dalby also provides
telling insights into the broader environment-conflict thesis:
Kaplan is in some ways a continuation of long-established lines of 
argument. But he is new in that his powerful articulation of environment as 
the cause of threats to national security has updated Malthusian themes and 
brought the ‘environmental security’ policy discussions forcefully to the 
attention of a wider public. In doing so Kaplan revisits many of the 
geopolitical assumptions in security thinking, and does so in specifying the
environment as a cause of threat.... In the case of neo-Malthusianism and the
more general policy discourse o f ‘environmental security’, the ‘threat’ is
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often at least partly from somehow external ‘natural5 or ‘environmental5 
phenomena;
Kaplan’s analysis can be read in terms of a persistent textual dualism 
between postmodern consumer aspirations and fear of ‘reprimitivized5 
violence and environmental degradation;
The political violence and environmental degradation are not related to 
larger economic processes anywhere in this text .... Kaplan’s text show[s] a 
very limited geopolitical imagination, one that focuses solely on local 
phenomenon in a determinist fashion that ignores the larger trans-boundary 
flows and the related social and economic causes of resource depletion;
He notes the dangers of the criminals from ‘there5 compromising the safety 
of ‘here5, but never countenances the possibility that the economic affluence 
of ‘here5 is related to the poverty of ‘there5. The spatial construction of his 
discourse precludes such consideration (Dalby 1996b: 475, 480, 482, 484).
The Coming Anarchy is not so much an extreme exception as it is the logical 
conclusion of the environment-conflict literature. The ethnocentrism, Realism, 
exclusion, presupposition and denial of complicity that underwrites most of this 
literature is crystallised in The Coming Anarchy. It demonstrates this thesis’ 
principal and overriding critique of this subset of the environmental security 
literature; that is that it misunderstands the causes of environmental degradation, 
favouring instead a recycled Realist reproduction of Others to the exclusion of 
legitimate humanitarian concerns. It also imposes a negative interpretation of 
possible futures, favouring apocalyptic visions and barbarity over a consideration 
of a peaceful future (Swart 1996). Its reputed success with the U.S. President is 
indicative of the U.S. approach to security policy, a point worth keeping in mind in 
the following chapter’s appraisal of U.S. environmental security policy discourse.
6.7 Comment
Arguments that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict and social 
instability are theoretically lead rather than empirically informed. As theories, they 
are consistent with the Realist ontology, and share Realism’s shortcomings as 
identified in chapter 4. This sub-section seeks to offer some further critical 
observations about the environment-conflict literature, with particular emphasis on 
the use of history, readings of nature, the use of the words ‘conflict5 and 
‘instability5 and the interpretation of peace, the way in which it narrows the 
meaning of environmental security, and the possibility that it may be reified.
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History
In much of the writing on the linkages between environmental degradation and 
conflict there is little appreciation of the long history leading up to contemporary 
environmental insecurities (as in chapter 3). This a fundamental failing given that 
it is the broader social and ecological degradation wrought by modernity which is 
the overriding context for any discussion of security and social tension. Thus Smil 
writes that “any thoughtful historian, and especially those fascinated by the 
complex relationships between civilisations and their environment, must be 
astonished by the utter neglect of long term historical perspectives” (Smil 1997: 
109). There is also a lack of historical contextualisation of the specific cases where 
environmental degradation is thought to have been a factor in violent conflict.
Even a recent history of these places would more than likely reveal the vitally 
important factors of unequal terms of trade, World Bank ‘restructuring’ programs, 
colonial and post-colonial imperialism, and the corruption of traditional cultures 
with Northern values and aspirations. However, all these other factors (there are 
no doubt more) are rarely acknowledged.
Many authors tend to pick and choose historical evidence in a way that 
highlights the negative instances whilst ignoring the positive (Elliott 1996). Myers, 
for example, asserts that “as far back as 6,500 years ago, Lagash and Umma went 
to war over water” (1996: 38); however it is Westing (1986b) who (perhaps 
unwittingly) perpetrates the greatest misperception here. Appendix 2 of Global 
Resources and International Conflict lists all the ‘wars and skirmishes i- volving 
natural resources’ in the 20th century. Westing counts 12 conflicts with . resource 
dimension, including the first and second World Wars. The first World War, he 
argues, was in part caused by population pressures, and the second by the need for 
added living space. The point of this is not to dispute the assertion that 
environmental factors were involved in past conflicts, although this is questioned 
given the difficulty of proving this even in contemporary times. Rather, the point 
is to assert, again, that history is a biased record that tells us far more about 
violence than it does about peace. As a body of evidence to support general 
arguments about any aspect of violent behaviour, history is thus suspect. It is even 
more suspect when it is presented as a list of isolated and uncontextualised 
instances of warfare in the way that Westing does. A more honest use of history 
would include discussion of those cultures that have lived sustainably and in 
peace. The overarching message of history is that that humans as individuals and
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as a species continually adapt and survive, and are therefore able to adapt to 
environmental pressures. This historical perspective stands as perhaps the greatest 
counterfactual to declarations o f ‘the coming anarchy’.
The nature o f nature
A second feature of the environment-conflict literature is its essentialised readings 
of human (internal) and external nature. It has already been suggested that there is 
a form of environmental determinism involved (Smil 1997, see above). This arises 
in part as the literature involves biological scientists (such as Gleik and Myers) 
commenting on matters of political science; and political scientists such as Homer- 
Dixon and Levy commenting on issues pertaining to biological science. The 
assumption made o f human nature is fundamentally a political Realist one - 
humans are expected to resort to force and coercion to achieve their goals. 
Rousseau’s stag hunt is the lasting metaphor here. That Rousseau chose to 
allegorise human nature through the hunting o f an animal is suggestive of the 
Realist conflation o f nature internal with nature external, understanding both to be 
anarchic and brutal. With this, nature itself can be seen in threatening terms by 
people such as Kaplan (1994) and Winnefeld and Morris (1994). The scientific 
cosmology that denies order in the Other, and which has always underwritten 
modernity, resurfaces in this environment and conflict literature. The discourse, 
then, is one of barbaric southern Others residing in a decaying natural environs 
(over there). It is not surprising, but nevertheless not encouraging that this has 
intuitive * fsonance in the heartlands of modernity.
The environment-conflict literature also tends to perpetuate a dualistic 
understanding of the relationship between humans and the natural world. The 
relationship is depicted as one in which humans are threatened by nature, or in 
some texts, humans are threatening nature. The relationship is always seen to be 
antagonistic - the exchanges are threatening. This recourse to dualisms ignores the 
dialectical understanding o f humans as nature rendered self-conscious (Bookchin 
1982 - see appendix I). Most contemporary understandings of environmental 
security, and certainly those understandings true to the Realist tradition, assume
26 This is not to say that this is a bad thing. Chapter 2 made it clear that interdisciplinary 
work is required, however, integrative approaches require taking each discipline seriously. 
In this respect the political scientists for the most part have made the transition better. The 
biological scientists tend to rush into political analysis without any care for meta-theory.
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this simplistic dualism between humans and nature, and, as discussed in chapter 2, 
such dualisms are exclusionary and frequently violent.
Conflict, instability and peace
The environment-conflict literature talks of peace and conflict in particular ways. 
Conflict is almost always equated with direct violence. It is used to denote a 
fundamental Bad which harkens to images of tribal warfare and guerilla 
insurgence (both repeatedly referred to). This use of ‘conflict’ works in 
conjunction with the Realist natural cosmology which considers that in any contest 
violence is the ‘natural’ outcome. This ‘conflict ergo violence’ is a critical 
assumption of the literature, but is masked by the unexplained and vague use of 
the word ‘conflict’.
Conflict, however, is not necessarily Bad, nor does it necessarily involve 
violence of either a direct or a structural kind. Many struggles over resources can 
be seen to be situations of ‘conflict’, however the vast majority of these are 
resolved without recourse to violence. The Collins Dictionary of Sociology 
defines conflict as “the overt struggle between individuals or groups within a 
society, or between nation states” (Jary and Jary 1995: 113). Many forms of overt 
struggle, such as that between political parties, between sporting teams, or 
between academics, do not involve violence. Indeed, discrepancy, disagreement 
and struggle are inevitable given a degree of social diversity. The peaceful 
resolution of these differences is a basic function of ethics and politics.28 The 
failure to peacefully resolve these overt struggles may lead to direct violence 
occasionally, and perhaps to structural forms of violence more frequently, but 
violence is not the inevitable outcome of conflict. Indeed, depending on the lens 
one uses, violence is rarely the outcome of conflict. Further, according to Marxist 
analysis at least, peaceful conflict is a necessary dialectical process which 
generates the syntheses that drives historical change (see appendix I).
Much of the literature uses the word ‘instability’ in a way very similar to its 
use of conflict - that is to denote an undesirable state of affairs. Instability in this 
context means sudden upheaval and radical change. It equates to a threat to the 
existing state of affairs which, by implication, is the desired state. So, the
See Ribeiro (1996) for an example of water and drought in the San Fancisco River basin 
in Brazil, where he explains that these pressure have not lead to direct-violence.
Although, as Aristotle realised so long ago, and as shall be explained in chapter 11, the 
two are not distinct.
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environment-conflict literature holds to a typically negative conception o f security. 
What is to be secured is the modem global capitalist order from the threat of 
change. However, to make the point again, instability, not unlike conflict, does not 
necessarily imply change for the worse. Indeed, given that the areas where 
instability is anticipated are all areas where there are numerous and pervasive 
injustices and deprivations, change and instability are often to be welcomed. If 
environmental security means resisting, avoiding and suppressing change, as 
suggested in this literature, then it is implicated in the defence of injustice. 
Furthermore, given that social changes are inevitable, just as evolution is 
seemingly natural, suppression of change is ultimately futile. Instead, change 
should be welcomed and negotiated to ensure that it is non-violent.
Consistent with this negative conception o f conflict and instability is a 
negative understanding o f peace. Peace was discussed in chapter 2 as the striving 
for justice. This involves an absence o f direct violence, but it also integrally 
involves the absence of structural violence; both are necessary. However, the 
equation of peace with anti-war or not war in the environment-conflict literature 
ignores the broader and more lasting positive dimension to peace. Indeed, the 
present emphasis on peace as not war manifests itself as peace through stasis; it is 
a negative peace acquired through the defence o f modernity. In this way the 
environment-conflict literature works to defend against changes for positive peace.
Narrowing the issues
The emphasis on conflict occurs at the expense o f awareness and understanding of 
the causes, effects, and solutions to environmental insecurity (as it is understood in 
this thesis). This is perhaps a product o f the volume of this literature and its 
intuitive appeal to mainstream International Relations. Dabelko and Dabelko are 
surely right to suggest that “all issues o f environmental degradation should not be 
forced to fit the matrix o f security and conflict” as this literature is wont to do 
(1995: 8).
29 A classic example of this misdirection is the International Centre for Security Analysis’ 
approach to environmental security. The ICSA “believes that, when studying 
environmental security, it is essential to answer two questions: what are the social effects of 
environmental change or damage? What types of conflict are most likely to result from 
these social effects?” (ICSA 1998). The question of how environmental damage is 
generated seems the more pressing one if there is any real interest in rectifying the 
problem. The question of whether the social affects might lead to positive outcomes also 
seems important.
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It is desirable, then, to adopt a fuller and more holistic perspective on 
environmental insecurity. Some of the salient features of this would include 
appreciation of: cause - global economic and political processes and the macro­
history of modernity; context - the history behind any particular case, the effects of 
culture and cultural mixing in any particular case, the biophysical setting, and the 
ways in which people adapt in ways that do not lead to violence and which may be 
effective in the short and long term; and effects - declining health and welfare, 
natural disasters, slow cumulative changes, accidents, and conflict. In this more 
holistic perspective conflict and instability are only one of numerous effects of 
environmental degradation. Overemphasising conflict therefore precludes 
recognition of these other effects. Further, when conflict does occur it should be 
seen as a particular and specific instance, not as proof of ‘the coming anarchy’. 
Finally, a holistic approach implies that environmental security necessitates 
fundamental reform of the global political economy, and reform of the socially 
and ecologically degrading features of modernity. This holistic approach is 
explored more fully in chapter 10.
Theory and Prophecy
In that Soroos (1994) calls the environment and conflict literature a theoretical
argument it is valid to briefly consider the possibility that this theory may affect a
change in social ‘reality’ consistent with its image. Rogers succinctly touches on
the problem of the environment-conflict thesis:
There is much evidence that violent conflict occurs because violent conflict 
is anticipated. The idea of a preemptive strike may grow out of basic fight or 
flight instincts, but it may equally be a self-fulfilling prophecy; the 
behaviourist product of positivist/Realist assumptions about self interest 
(Rogers 1996: 3).
Similarly, Elliott suggests that predictions which “posit more conflict as 
environmental decline increases will become self-fulfilling prophecies” (Elliott 
1996: 165). In short, in describing a world o f ‘coming anarchy’, the environment- 
conflict literature helps to reify this world. This is borne out in the following 
chapter’s discussion of U.S. environmental security' policy.
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6.8 Conclusions
Arguments that environmental degradation will lead to conflict either within or 
between states are numerous and prominent, but are for the most part 
unsubstantiated. These arguments are theories and not reflections of what goes on 
in the world. As theories, they are consistent with the political Realist approach to 
security, and they share all of Realism’s weaknesses, including a focus on states at 
the expense of people. As theories they significantly encroach upon the otherwise 
peace promoting domain of Green theory. In this respect, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, they enable a colonisation of environmental matters by the 
traditional security apparatus.
In the final analysis the more telling question about the linkages between 
environment and conflict is not - is environmental degradation likely to lead to 
violence? - nor even - how might environmental degradation lead to violence? - 
but rather - why are we interested in the linkages between environmental 
degradation and violence? In short, why this literature? This chapter has shown 
that in general there is little evidence to suggest that environmental degradation 
will lead to violence and at that the processes by which this might occur are by no 
means clear. This is to say, then, that the first two questions are by and large 
irrelevant. It is valid at this stage to recall the earlier observation by Falk that 
scarcity will lead to the (potentially violent) defence of power by the already 
powerful. Given this, the answer to the latter why question appears to be that the 
environment-conflict literature is an ethnocentric and discursive primer to 
legitimate defence of the status quo. Thus the obsession with only one of the 
possible effects of environmental degradation (conflict) - at the expense of other 
effects and at the expense of taking seriously the root causes of the degradation - 
suggests that the net effect will be the justification of a state response that 
maintains the legitimacy of the security and military elite, and the justification for 
military and economic defence of Northern lifestyles. This will be demonstrated in 
the following chapter where recent U.S. government pronouncements on 
environmental security are discussed.
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Chapter 7. Environmental (National) Security and U.S.
Policy
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has discussed efforts to redefine security to include environmental 
considerations, and has examined the literature which makes linkages between 
environmental degradation and violent conflict. Implicit in both of these categories 
is the notion that environmental degradation affects the security of the nation-state. 
This is to be expected given the dominance of the state-centric Realist approach to 
security. This chapter seeks to consider the connections between national security 
and environmental degradation, and to critically examine policy manifestations of 
environmental security; both are necessary to meet this thesis’ overarching aim of 
a critical examination of environmental security. It meets this latter goal through 
an examination of U.S. environmental security policy. A comprehensive critique 
of U.S. environmental security policy is lacking; meeting this need is a unique 
contribution to the study of environmental security.
This chapter begins by discussing the ways in which environmental 
degradation affects national security. Objections to the linkages between 
environmental degradation and national security are considered. It then examines 
U.S. government pronouncements and initiatives on environmental security, these 
are collectively referred to as the U.S. environmental security policy-discourse. 
These are classified into statements made in the National Security Strategy, 
statements and initiatives made by the Department of Defence, and statements and 
initiatives made by the State Department. These are discussed in turn. The chapter 
ends with some critical observations on this U.S. environmental security policy- 
discourse.
7.2 Environment and National Security
There are numerous links that can be drawn between environmental degradation 
and national security.1 First, the economic foundation of military strength is itself
1 This discussion is based on Barnett (1998a).
163
underwritten by the natural environment. If the natural capital base of an economy 
erodes, then so does the long-term ability to militarily defend against external 
aggression.2 Accordingly, the ability of the industrialised North to transfer 
environmental externalities to the industrialising South helps the Northern 
economies to maintain their natural capital base, therefore sustaining economic 
growth and military superiority. Nevertheless, if we accept that economic 
development can be ecologically unsustainable, then we should consider that 
national security can be similarly unsustainable. The collapse of the former Soviet 
Union was due to an amalgam of causes of which ecological unsustainability was 
a part (Feshbach and Friendly 1992, Funke 1994, Peterson 1991). It is a reasonable 
assumption, then, that the state of the environment is an essential and 
unappreciated component of the Realist approach to security, and this is true even 
without considering the possibility that environmental degradation might cause 
conflict.
Second, in terms of the national interest, environmental degradation has 
many and complex negative effects.3 It threatens individual and collective 
economic livelihood by eroding the natural capital base of the economy (Meadows 
et al 1972); it affects health through contamination of water, air and food, and by 
disrupting ecological processes thereby exposing humans to new health risks 
(McMichael 1993); declining environmental amenity reduces quality of life; and 
environmental degradation exacerbates inequalities between people - it has clearly 
become another factor in our have/have not societies.
In Australia, environmental degradation is arguably the biggest threat to the 
national interest.4 Since European settlement Australia has lost 75% of its tropical 
forests (Bolt 1992: 90); 306 species of native plants and 47 species of native 
animals are presumed extinct or threatened with extinction (Boyden et al 1990: 
142); in many parts of the country drinking water quality doesn’t meet World 
Health Organisation guidelines (Nix 1990); and in urban areas in particular air 
pollution is having a detrimental affect on health (Commonwealth of Australia 
1992a: 109). Further, given that three quarters of Australia’s population lives on
2 Another consequence of this discussion is that economic and military strength may not be 
wholly accurate measures o f national security.
J Security policy frequently purports to protect the ‘national interest’ (although exactly 
what the interest is - is never made clear). For example, the mission of the Australian 
Defence Force is “to promote the security of Australia, and to protect its people and 
interests” (Commonwealth o f Australia 1996b: 1)
4 Porter makes a similar case for the United States (1995).
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the coastal fringe, the very real prospect of sea level rise caused by global 
warming is an enormous threat to Australian interests and way of life (Zann 1995: 
29).5 However, even a single organism can wreak havoc with Australian interests, 
for example, foot and mouth disease could cause rural output to decline by $6 
billion in the first year alone (Commonwealth of Australia 1993: 19). Bolt (1992) 
compares land degradation with military invasion in terms o f their relative 
likelihood and impacts. Land degradation has a greater overall cost to the 
Australian economy than military invasion due to its continued recurrence; in 1990 
the cost o f land degradation was $1.2 billion in lost agricultural production alone 
(Bolt 1992: 102, Boyden et al 1990: 118). In terms o f loss o f territory, over half o f 
Australia’s land surface suffers from some form of land degradation; an impact 
which is not likely to be matched by any foreseeable type o f military engagement 
(Bolt 1992). Thus “it can reasonably be concluded that the security o f Australia 
and Australians is far more at risk from environmental pressures than from 
military threat” (Bolt 1992: 104). This analysis questions the efficacy of 
Australia’s present security and defence policies and the selective view of threats 
and impacts upon which these are premised.
A third connection between environmental degradation and national security
comes from the recognition that national boundaries have little meaning with
respect to environmental problems. This is of relevance to national security as
transboundary environmental problems “challenge the primacy of the sovereign
state actor in safeguarding territory, populations and interests” (Dabelko and
Dabelko 1995: 9). Transboundary flows differ from traditional external security
threats in that they are uncontrolled and most often unintended (Samson 1995).
Climate change, for example, undermines national security in important ways:
The possibility o f [wo]man-made change in the world’s climate is only one 
o f a range o f credible dangers that should lead to a major reappraisal and
expansion o f our basic concepts of national security......we are talking about
the basic strategic resources and systems that support life on this planet.
And with these at risk, it is obvious that all nations, by definition, are 
insecure today, and survival — the most elemental o f human goals and the 
first duty of all governments -- is called into serious question....if the earth is 
threatened, so is each national subdivision o f Earth, if the whole is insecure, 
so are its parts. There is simply no such thing as national security on an 
insecure planet -- nor can there be! (Wilson 1983: 71).
5 See also Jacobson (1990) and Lewis (1989).
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Similar pronouncements abound.6 78Rowlands argues that flows of “unwanted 
natural material from one state to another” are “the most vivid example of an 
environmental challenge to a state’s way of life” (Rowlands 1991: 100). Boulding, 
however, is the most eloquent (and dialectical) on the nature of the environment 
with respect to national boundaries:
In nature, everything flows. Water flows, air flows, soil flows, ice flows,
and molecules dance in and out of stones....Walls have never stopped flows
of anything, not in ancient China and not in modem Europe. All boundaries 
are permeable.... Unilaterally formulated national security policies have 
little meaning in this context (Boulding 1991: 85).
These transboundary problems imply a common security approach (see chapter 5).
Integral to the identification of transboundary environmental problems is the
question of sovereignty, this is discussed in chapter 9.
A fourth line of reasoning connecting environmental degradation to national 
security is the notion that environmental degradation may induce conflict among 
nations. This line of reasoning is generally flawed and has been adequately 
covered in the previous chapter. A fifth set of linkages occurs when considering 
the military (as the agent of national security) and its environmental impacts, as 
well as its potential contribution to enhancing environmental security. This will be 
considered in the following chapter.
The understanding that environmental problems are national security issues 
is not unproblematic. According to Jervis, for example, environmental problems 
are “too far off, the scientific evidence is too ambiguous, the domestic interests 
involved are too conflicting, and the alternative approaches are too many” (1991: 
64).; Deudney’s concerns about linking environmental degradation to national 
security are the most compelling (Deudney 1990, 1991, 1992). Deudney offers 
three reasons as to why he thinks the linkage is analytically misleading. First, he 
argues that military threats are patently different from environmental threats, 
particularly in that military threats are deliberately imposed; as Prins eloquently 
puts it: “you can’t shoot an ozone hole” (Prins 1991: 2). Deudney suggests that 
national security logic is incapable of grasping environmental issues or dealing 
with them effectively. This is for the most part true in so far as national security
6 See, for example: Brown (1989), Byers (1991), Mathews (1989 and 1993), Mische 
(1989), Myers (1996), Porter (1995), Renner (1989).
7 This scepticism plays upon the uncertainties inherent in natural science predictions. Gray 
and Rifkin are also sceptics, arguing that with respect to climate change “it would be 
irresponsible to commit disproportionate resources to solving a quandary whose very 
existence and severity are still uncertain” (1991: 51).
8 Environmental problems are therefore ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins 1993b).
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continues to be the domain of the military - and it seems particularly true in the 
U.S. context in which Deudney writes. However, few authors outside o f the 
military/security establishment suggest that a traditional security response is 
required to meet environmental problems. The overwhelming message from non­
military commentaries is that a redefinition o f security is required, and that 
common security should be the preferred paradigm (chapter 5). In this respect 
Deudney perhaps misses the point of the literature, but in as much as Realist 
conceptions of security prevail, Deudney’s point is not invalidated.
Deudney’s second argument against linking environmental degradation and 
national security is that declaring “environmental changes as a threat to national 
security (as many environmental activists do) in order to mobilise action may be 
counterproductive and produce undesirable side-effects” (1992: 171). This is 
undoubtedly Deudney’s most important contribution to the literature, and it is a 
concern which cannot be easily dismissed. Brock (1991, 1992, 1996) and 
Lipschutz (1992b) have also noted this dilemma. This is a concern which has been 
implicitly raised in previous chapters, and which will be given further 
consideration in the following discussion of U.S. environmental security policy. 
Finally, Deudney’s third argument against environmental security as it applies to 
the nation-state is that “environmental degradation is not very likely to cause 
interstate wars” (1990: 461). He suggests that eco-war or greenwar is a weak 
mirage - this thesis is in agreement (chapter 6) (Deudney 1992).9
7.3 Environmental Security and U.S. Policy
The United States is the world’s largest economy, has the world’s largest military, 
and produces more greenhouses gases than any other country. For these reasons, 
the way in which the U.S. engages with the problem of environmental degradation 
is crucial for environmental security (however conceived). The U.S. government is 
the only government to significantly engage with environmental security.10 In 
addition, the U.S. security policy community has been at the forefront of setting 
what Elliott calls the dominant ‘environment and security’ agenda (Elliott 1996).
9 ‘Greenwar’ is the term used by Bennett (1991).
10 Although the former Soviet Union was in its latter days making similar gestures (see 
Khozin 1989 and Thomas 1992), and at the time of submission of this thesis the Australian 
Department of Defence was beginning to the use the term.
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The policies discussed in this chapter are an important reason for this dominance 
as they operationalise the concept of environmental security in certain ways.
The subject of environmental security has been promoted in influential U.S. 
policy journals such as International Security, Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Policy.11 Given this, it is not surprising that the U.S. security and defence 
community eventually took environmental security on board. Dabelko and 
Simmons set the context:
The number of US government and scholarly endeavours exploring the 
issues of environment and security, or “environmental security”, is 
proliferating .... Many senior figures in the Clinton Administration have 
embraced environment and security ideas. Whilst these ideas have not 
produced a common policy agenda or focus, numerous rhetorical statements 
and government initiatives addressing the environment in the context of US 
security interests have appeared since 1993 (Dabelko and Simmons 1997: 
128).
The Clinton administration has created a number of high-level positions to deal 
with environmental security, including a Senior Director for Global Environmental 
Affairs at the National Security Council, a National Intelligence Officer for Global 
and Multilateral Issues at the National Intelligence Council, elevating 
environmental management to the level of Deputy Under Secretary within the 
Department of Defense, and an Under Secretary for Global Affairs within the 
Department of State (Dabelko and Simmons 1997, Thomas 1997).
Recent U.S. statements and initiatives which incorporate the notion of 
environmental security can be loosely attributed to the National Security Strategy, 
the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. Given that each of these 
three institutions are mutually reinforcing and overlap in their promotion of U.S. 
security interests, this should be seen as a loose categorisation that helps facilitate 
discussion. The environmental security efforts of these three institutions will now 
be discussed.12
11 For example: Ullman (1983), Cooley (1984), Mathews (1989), Myers (1989), Homer- 
Dixon (1991), Starr (1991), Gleik (1993), Levy (1995a).
12 This discussion is based on a number of documents available only (as far as I know) on 
the Worldwide web. There is no single hard-copy publication that contains all the necessary 
material. A forthcoming book edited by P. Harris from the project on Environmental 
Change and American Foreign Policy at London Guildhall University should help 
overcome this problem. This discussion of U.S. environmental security policy has been 
submitted for consideration as a chapter in this forthcoming book (publisher being 
negotiated).
168
7.3.1 The U.S. National Security Strategy
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) is the most important unclassified 
statement of U.S. security policy. It has made reference to environmental concerns 
since 1991. Environmental issues figure prominently in the most recent (1997) 
NSS:
Protecting the security of our nation - our people, our territory and our way 
of life - is my foremost mission and constitutional duty.... the dangers we
face are unprecedented in their complexity....environmental damage and
rapid population growth undermine economic prosperity and political 
stability in many countries;
We must continue to move strongly to counter growing dangers to our 
security: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, drugs, 
illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage.... [these] are global 
concerns that transcend national borders.... [these] threaten American 
interests and citizens, both directly and indirectly;
We are protecting the global environment - managing our forests, stopping 
the spread of toxic chemicals, working to close the hole in the ozone layer, 
reducing the greenhouse gases that challenge our health as they challenge 
our climate;
Our [last] strategy focused on the security implications for both present and 
long-term American policy raised by transnational problems that once 
seemed quite distant - such as resource depletion, rapid population growth, 
environmental degradation and refugee migration;
We must always retain our superior diplomatic, technological, industrial and 
military capabilities to address this broad range of challenges;
Crises are averted - and U.S. preventative diplomacy actively reinforced - 
through sustainable development programs that promote voluntary family 
planning, basic education, environmental protection, democratic governance 
and rule of law, and the economic empowerment of private citizens;
Natural resource scarcities often trigger and exacerbate conflict. 
Environmental threats such as climate change, ozone depletion and the 
transnational movement of dangerous chemicals directly threaten the health 
of U.S. citizens... our national security planning is incorporating 
environmental analyses as never before.
(Clinton 1997: 2-24)
That the environment figures in the NSS leaves no doubt that it is now a security 
issue for the United States. By virtue of the dominant influence of the U.S. on 
world affairs, all nations will now need to be conversant in environmental security. 
Although ‘global’ in name, the environmental security agenda is nevertheless 
being lead by the U.S.
It is therefore extremely important to try to understand what U.S. policy 
means when it talks of environmental security. The NSS makes continued 
reference to the environment as a ‘danger’, a ‘threat’ and a ‘risk’. This
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intertwining of risk with danger conflates the language of probability with the 
language of harm imposed by others. This is clear in the repeated likening of 
environmental degradation to drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, and 
terrorism. The NSS normalises the threat (most often involving and unspecified 
Other) by speaking of it as an objectified ‘risk’. What is seen to be threatening and 
dangerous, however, is only that which might threaten U.S. interests - such as 
environmental refugees flowing into the U.S., or environmentally induced 
conflicts. How these perceived dangers specifically threaten the U.S. is not made 
clear; these are existential rather than specific threats. Hence the question - 
insecurity how? - is never adequately answered in the NSS. At least part of the 
answer is that the U.S. foreign policy community is still fundamentally concerned 
about environmental degradation restricting access to important raw materials (de 
Sherbinin 1995). Equally important is the need for “access to foreign markets” (a 
subsection of the 1997 NSS). Thus the insecurity of concern is the risk of a 
declining rate of economic growth.
International stability and political stability are also of prime concern to the 
NSS. This is not surprising given that Kaplan’s Coming Anarchy “played a 
catalytic role in bringing the environment-conflict thesis to the attention of the 
highest levels of the Clinton Administration and the larger Washington policy 
community” (Dabelko and Simmons 1997: 136). That conflict is of prime concern 
is made clear by the Senior Director for Global Environment Affairs at the 
National Security Council: “from my perspective, the environment and security 
relationship builds in part on important linkages between resource scarcity and 
conflict” (Claussen 1995: 40). President Clinton has also referred to the likely 
outcome of “terrorism, tension and war” if environmental degradation is not halted 
(cited in Simmons 1995: 51). However, as argued in the previous chapter, it is by 
no means clear that environmental degradation will result in any violence, 
particularly between nation-states.
It is assumed that by ‘instability’ the NSS means direct violence, given that 
no definition of security is made, and that the security/not-war conflation is strong 
in U.S. security discourse. However, the most probable forms of international 
conflict are not likely to involve direct violence, but will take the form of 
exacerbated diplomatic tensions between North and South arising from the 
structural violence generated by the U.S.-led global economy. These may well 
escalate if the U.S. behaves hegemonically in its engagement with the South to
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secure the environmental interests it perceives to be important. The NSS can be 
read as a discursive primer for such an engagement.
There is a danger that what the U.S. appears to fear most (refugees and 
conflict) is likely to be reified by its own policy discourse. In terms of the broader 
North-South issue, the contradictions and injustices that are exposed in the 
environmental insecurity of many people requires not a defence of the Northern 
‘territory’ and ‘way of life’, but radical and profound change in modem 
institutions and beliefs. The NSS’s security/defence discourse treats these 
contradictions and the immanent potentiality of radical change in a particular way 
(see section 7.3.4 below). It perpetuates the status quo and denies the need for 
change. The long term success of such a ‘strategy’ is an open question, but what is 
more certain is that continuing to defend ‘our way of life’ will see more 
exploitation of those people and ecosystems in the industrialising world, and 
consequently more insecurity for the many in the name of the security of the few.
Despite these problems, the 1997 NSS is notably more benign and informed 
with respect to environmental degradation than the 1996 NSS, which 
(astonishingly) countenanced the possibility that there might be competition 
between nations for “dwindling reserves of uncontaminated air” (in Simmons 
1995: 47-48). Although the 1997 NSS is still very much about national security 
and threats emanating from outside the United States, there is significantly greater 
awareness of the measures required to promote environmental security, including 
increasing aid, and promoting family planning and education. The NSS also aims 
to implement the Program of Action on population growth developed at the 1995 
Cairo Conference, and it seeks to achieve Senate ratification of the Biodiversity 
Convention. So, however rhetorical the understanding, and however questionable 
the achievements the 1997 NSS claims to have made, it nevertheless demonstrates 
a more sophisticated understanding than it predecessor. This is a welcome sign of 
a gradual shift in the approach of the U.S. to global environmental politics.
Counterbalancing these positive developments, however, is a particularly 
strong free trade agenda which is arguably contrary to the goals of environmental 
security. Economic security still takes priority over environmental security in the 
U.S. strategic vision. Also of concern is the perceived “responsibility., to build the 
world of tomorrow by embarking on a period of construction - one based on .. 
enduring American values and interests” (Clinton 1997: 3). The U.S. appears
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willing to impose its values on others. Striving to be a value hegemon in this way 
is far from consistent with the interests of peace, and given that the U.S. is one of 
the biggest polluters in the world, a world shaped in its image would be far from 
environmentally secure. Finally, it is alarming that the United States considers that 
its nuclear weapons “serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of 
our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would 
contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons” 
(Clinton 1997: 18-19).
7.3.2 The U.S. Department of Defense
In 1995 the then U.S. Secretary of Defense (William Perry) asserted that 
“environmental secur ity is now an essential part of the U.S. defense mission and a 
high priority for DOD” (Perry 1995: 1). The involvement of the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) began in 1990 when Senator Sam Nunn - Chair of the Senate 
Armed Forces Committee - said:
There is a new and different threat to our national security emerging - the 
destruction of our environments. The defense establishment has a clear stake 
in countering this growing threat. I believe that one of our key national 
security objectives must be to reverse the accelerating pace of 
environmental destruction around the globe (cited in MacDonald 1995: 2).1j
Nunn uses a particular discursive strategy here - namely the reference to ‘global’
environmental problems as threats - which justifies the ongoing need for military
involvement. At this point it is worth remembering Deudney’s argument that the
military is an inappropriate institution for dealing with environmental problems. It
is less than obvious how the U.S. military might help ‘reverse the accelerating
pace of environmental destruction around the globe’, unless Nunn is proposing to
disburse the Pentagon’s budget (which he is not). There are some potentially
positive roles for the military with respect to environmental degradation (see
chapter 8), however none of these justify continued high levels of military
expenditure.
Also in 1990, Senator A1 Gore (now Vice President) published a paper 
calling for a Strategic Environment Initiative (Gore 1990). Gore stated that “the 
global environment has thus become an issue of national security”, and proposed 
that what was required was “a mobilisation of talent and resources usually
lj In 1994 in his Annual Report to the President and Congress the then Secretary for 
Defense Les Aspin said: “new environmental health and safety threats to U.S. security have 
emerged over the past two decades. They threaten U.S. national security and quality of life. 
They also threaten the Department’s military mission” (cited in Dunaway 1995: 1).
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reserved only for the purposes of national defense” (1990: 60 and 63). Gore is by 
far the most thoughtful of prominent U.S. officials speaking of environmental 
security. In his 1990 paper he argued that radical changes in the meaning and 
implementation o f development were required if environmental degradation is to 
be halted. Gore’s SEI was consistent with the policy integration idea o f sustainable 
development in that it sought to cut across all U.S. policy sectors. He rightly 
identified energy research and development policy as the sector most urgently 
requiring reform. He sought to reverse the funding priorities of the U.S. 
Department of Energy, which, in 1990, devoted two-thirds of its budget to 
defence-related programs and only one-fifth for energy Research and 
Development (Gore 1990: 66). However, Gore was reluctant to draw on funds 
from defense to finance environmental policies. This reluctance explains in part 
why his otherwise commonsense proposals were ultimately reduced to a set o f 
narrow military and foreign policy responses.
Following Nunn and Gore’s appeals, the U.S. Congress allocated US$200 
million to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program 
(SERDP) operated by the Department of Defense (Thomas 1997).14 The SERDP 
has four functions, namely: to promote research of relevance to the DOD and the 
Department of Energy (DOE) to enable them to meet their environmental 
obligations; to identify technologies developed by DOD and DOE which would be 
useful to other governmental and private organisations; to supply other 
governmental and private organisations with data and data handling mechanisms 
for use in environment related research and development; and to identify 
technologies developed by the private sector that might be of use to the DOD and 
DOE (Thomas 1997). Therefore, the implicit function of the SERDP seems to be 
to make sure that DOD and DOE compliance with environmental regulations is 
cost effective, and that any potential marketing possibilities from DOD and DOE 
research and development are exploited. This commercial function is revealed in 
Perry’s report to Congress: “the Department’s [technology] strategy is to ... 
expedite the use and commercialization of these technologies” (Perry 1995: 3-4). 
The SERDP steering council is comprised o f six representatives from DOD, three 
from DOE (a long standing partner in the U.S. nuclear weapons program), one 
from the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), and one from the Coast Guard
14 According to recent information, the forthcoming 1999 Defense Authorisation Bill seeks 
to radically reduce funding for the SERDP (see the Environmental Change and Security 
Project discussion group: « http://ecsp.si.edu») This questions the U.S. government’s 
environmental credibility.
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(Thomas 1997). The EPA has been coopted into the SERDP, one suspects, to add 
environmental credibility.15
In 1993 the Department of Defense upgraded its division responsible for 
environmental matters to the level of deputy undersecretary (Thomas 1997). The 
department’s official title is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Environmental Security); with an untypically bland, but obligatory acronym of 
DUSD(ES) (one would have thought DUDES was possible!). Initially, DOD 
involvement in environmental matters was domestically-oriented and not linked to 
security as such. This involvement began in 1984 with the establishment of the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Account (Perry 1995). A number of legislative 
acts progressively forced the DOD and DOE to comply with environmental 
legislation. The two most important were the 1986 Superfimd Amendments and 
Reauthorisation Act, and the 1992 Federal Facilities Environmental Compliance 
Act (Perry 1995, Thomas 1997).16 Hence, much of the impetus for the DOD’s 
environmental activities was not internally driven but externally imposed. Thomas 
(1997) suggests that at the bureaucratic level, the DOD moved to take 
responsibility for its environmental problems in order to prevent the EPA from 
gaining some leverage over defense policy.
This im position o f  com pliance is clearly revealed in the first o f  the
DUSD(ES)’s “overriding and interconnected goals” which is “to comply with the
law” (DOD 1997a: 1). The other three goals are:
To support the military readiness of the U.S. armed forces by ensuring 
continued access to the air, land and water needed for training and testing;
To improve the quality of life of military personnel and their families by 
protecting them from environmental, safety, and health hazards and 
maintaining quality military facilities;
To contribute to weapons systems that have improved performance, lower 
cost, and better environmental characteristics.
15 The EPA has a clear position on environmental security: “Environmental Security is an 
emerging concept in U.S. policy that combines traditionally defense-related activities with 
environmental protection. A broad definition o f U.S. national security encompasses 
elements such as food, energy, and economic security that can be affected by 
environmental degradation originating from sources outside the United States” (EPA 1997 
- my emphasis). This suggests, then, that the EPA understands the focus of the DOD to be 
on threats from the outside.
16 Between 1990 and 1995 the DOD increased its expenditure on environmental programs 
from US$1.4 billion to US$5 billion (more than half Australia’s total defence budget) 
(Thomas 1997). Thomas notes that US$5 billion is about 2% of the total defense budget, 
and so suggests that the best that can be said of this effort, in context, is that environmental 
concerns at least now register with the DOD, but are nevertheless still not taken seriously. 
Thomas adds that at current rates o f expenditure, DOD would not comply with current 
legislation until around 2050.
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(DOD 1997a, Environmental Security Mission Statement: 1).
In this view environmental security is clearly a matter for defense, an outcome 
neatly prepared for by the NSS. It is clear that that which is to be secured is the 
‘military readiness of U.S. armed forces’. The threat is the possibility that 
environmental degradation might undermine the effectiveness of the US military 
by limiting access to training areas, or by detracting from the health and welfare of 
military personnel. The nature of the DOD’s response is consistent with the 
reactive and rhetorical position many other sectors and government agencies 
throughout the world have adopted in response to environmental concerns and 
laws.
The reference to weapons systems with ‘better environmental 
characteristics’ is ambiguous, but in Perry’s report to Congress he suggests that 
DOD is seeking to “incorporate environmental security considerations into all 
aspects of weapon system acquisition, maintenance and operations” (Perry 1995:
3). The aim seems to be to factor in environmental benefits and costs into weapons 
systems purchasing. Perry uses words like “where possible” and “as feasible”, 
which suggests that this is a rhetorical - more than it is a practical - goal (Perry 
1995: 3). It is difficult to see a secretive weapons negotiation process devoting 
much attention to the environmental characteristics of the weapons in question. 
Indeed, where this may be given most attention is the ability of the weapon to 
destroy life rather than to conserve it. It seems highly ironic and indicative of the 
hollowness of the DOD’s acquiescence to environmental issues that it can 
seriously speak of “environmentally benign” weapons when it has a massive 
arsenal of nuclear weapons (Perry 1995: 3).
Having made these criticisms, it must be acknowledged at least tacitly that 
if there is to be a military, it might as well be one which seeks to minimise its 
environmental impacts. If the U.S. DOD has to use 25 million acres of land, and 
own the “largest federal archaeological collection in the world”, it is a small 
blessing that it now acknowledges its environmental responsibilities (Perry 1995: 
5). However, these responsibilities should be met through substantial action. In the 
absence of, say, a substantial redistribution of funds and personnel, it seems that 
the DOD is using environmental security (a term which ideally suits its needs) to 
promote its (questionable) green credentials and to marginalise the efficacy of 
critical social movements. It thus stands as perhaps the most telling example of 
empty institutional co-optation of environmentalism; a co-optation made possible
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by the vagueness of concepts like sustainable development and environmental
. .  17security.
The DUSD(ES) claims that it has “a vibrant and growing role in enhancing
international environmental security” (cited in Simmons 1996: 132). As well as
turning their enforced compliance with environmental regulations into a ‘good
citizen’ policy within the U.S., the Pentagon is seeking to extend its environmental
security activities to other regions. Thus:
The U.S. military’s role in environmental protection is manifold: it 
demonstrates leadership in the U.S. and abroad, helps guarantee access to 
the air, land and water needed to train U.S. forces, and helps promote 
environmentally sustainable behaviour on the part o f other militaries around 
the world;
DOD’s view o f ‘environmental security’ [also] com prises.... understanding
where environmental conditions contribute to instability and where the 
environment fits into the war and peace equation; bringing defense-related 
concerns to the development of national security; [and] studying how 
defense components can be used as instruments of U.S. global 
environmental policy.
(cited in Simmons 1996: 132-133).18
Thus the Pentagon sees itself as a promoter o f sustainability and a leader in 
environmentally responsible behaviour amongst militaries. These claims are made 
unselfconsciously and in spite of Renner’s (1991) observation that the Pentagon is 
very likely the world’s largest consumer of energy worldwide, and is therefore
19most likely the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases (see chapter 8). 
Further, these claims ignore the point that this damage transpires for no productive 
outcome other than the dubious need to maintain national security.
The leadership that the U.S. military apparently demonstrates is therefore 
highly suspicious. It may indeed be an ecologically modem military, but it is 
nevertheless the world’s most omnipotent, has the largest stockpile of nuclear
17 See Beder (1997) for a discussion of the way private corporations have similarly 
manipulated green vernacular.
18 See also the document Philosophy o f DoD International Environmental Security (DOD
1997b) which is in point form and scarcely contains a proper sentence (perhaps a posting of 
a seminar outline but nevertheless accessible via the DOD’s website).
19 Seager also points to the extensive environmental degradation wrought by military 
activities, particularly by U.S. forces: “increasingly, the presence of a military facility is the 
most reliable single predictor of environmental trauma” (1993: 33). Militaries are perhaps 
the greatest institutional perpetrators of environmental damage and are - by virtue of then- 
masculine culture and very presence - a significant perpetrator of social degradation (see 
Enloe 1990 and Seager 1993). This will be discussed further in the following chapter.
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20weapons, and has the largest budget of any military in the world. Thus the 
environmental security discourse propagated by the U.S. DOD is not unlike 
‘limited nuclear war’ in its ability to obscure the bigger picture of unnecessary 
destruction.
When ‘access to the air, land and water needed to train U.S. forces’ applies 
to environmental security within the U.S., it is problematic given that many 
military training areas have significant environmental contamination and lie 
adjacent to indigenous people’s homelands (see Renner 1991 and Seager 1993). 
However, when understood in terms of ‘international activities’, as it is in the 
citation above, it seems to be a blunt admission of the desire to enclose other 
people’s lands for U.S. military training. On this point it is also worth noting that 
although the DOD may be working towards cleaning up its bases at home, and 
prides itself on reducing its record of violations of domestic law, there is no 
similar commitment with respect to cleaning up its existing and former bases 
abroad. Perry’s nine page report to the President and Congress devotes only seven 
lines to the issue of overseas bases, as opposed to one and a half pages to restoring 
DOD facilities at home (Perry 1995). Of these seven lines the salient points are 
that (my emphasis): “DOD will consult with the host nations on environmental 
compliance and clean up”, and that for the most part “funding ... will be negotiated 
with the host nation” (Perry 1995 : 9). So, “the official position of the U.S. 
government is that it is not generally obliged to clean up hazardous wastes at 
foreign military bases” (Siegel 1996: 16). If there were a genuine commitment to 
‘global’ environmental security issues then there would be action to support this 
limited recognition of responsibility for U.S. bases abroad.
The desire to understand where ‘environmental conditions contribute to 
instability’ (see above) demonstrates the way in which the environment-conflict 
literature supports military appropriation of environmental concerns. This is also 
consistent with the Realist approach to security. That this desire is also related to 
national security only serves to strengthen the links between the military and 
environmental security. Indeed, when the DOD begins looking at ways in which
20 Indeed, the limitations o f the ‘weak’ account ‘ecological modernisation’ are no more 
apparent that when examining the efforts of the Pentagon (see Christoff 1996, and 
Appendix I).
21 Indeed, Dabelko and Simmons (1997) suggest that a briefing given by Homer-Dixon (in 
1993) to the National Security Council Global Affairs Directorate stimulated the 
incorporation of environment and conflict ideas into the DOD’s work. This casts doubts 
over the legitimacy o f Homer-Dixon’s claim that his work has sent the wrong signal to U.S. 
policy (see Griffiths 1997 for a broad coverage of this issue).
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U.S. troops can “help meet Asia’s environmental protection needs” (Vest 1995), 
the conflation of security policy, military-led imperialism, and environmental 
issues becomes somewhat more obvious. If nothing else, the Pentagon’s interest in 
environmentally induced conflicts suggests the construction of new reasons to 
maintain military readiness, and so more reasons to forestall payment of the post­
cold war peace dividend. The possibility of a peace dividend is reduced when the 
impossibility of peace is constantly proven through discourses of danger.
The assistance the U.S. DOD gives to other militaries around the world is 
not given according to need but according to traditional geopolitical dictates. For 
example, the environment has been a key element of the continuation of NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) beyond the end of the cold war. Former 
Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Womer, is particularly revealing, saying 
that “no other NATO country, in our traditional division of labour, equals the 
United States in its global responsibilities” (1991: 101).22 The ‘responsibility’ to 
which Womer refers is “to be the purveyor of stability, not only vis a vis East and 
Central Europe, but also the world at large” (1991: 102). This can be read as the 
search for new reasons for old orders, what Womer himself calls a “sh ift... in the 
rationale for our defense” (1991: 102). Womer refers to “the immense conflict 
potential that is building up in Third World countries, characterised by ... climate 
shifts and the prospect of environmental disaster”; which suggests that the 
environment now figures as part of the rationale for the Northern management of 
global affairs. Thus for Dalby “this NATO understanding of the post-cold war 
world is clearly one of the persistence of ‘Northern’ institutions as the core 
political arrangements from which the rest of the world can be ‘managed’...
[hence] the theme of a select few managing the world’s affairs is clear” (1998b). 2j 
This is precisely the outcome that critics in Southern states feared would result 
when environmental matters began to be understood as security issues (see for 
example Saad 1995). It should be noted that these managerial ambitions run 
counter to an important theme in Green theory, which is that local responses and 
local autonomy are necessary to overcome environmental degradation.
Bearing in mind Dalby’s observation that adding the environment into 
traditional geopolitical security formulations merely perpetuates ‘the threat from
See Dalby (1998b) for a more comprehensive discussion of Womer and NATO in the 
post-cold war era.
Forthcoming, cited from draft - page number unknown.
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the South’ to justify further the hegemony of the North, it is instructive to look at
DOD-NATO environmental security initiatives. The U.S. DOD is involved in:
An agreement on environmental protection with the militaries of Norway, 
Sweden, Poland and Russia;
A NATO pilot study on environmental aspects of re-using former military 
lands;
A NATO pilot study on environmental management systems;
A NATO pilot study on “environmental security in an international 
context”;
An Arctic military environmental cooperation program with Norway and 
Russia;
A Baltic Sea initiative;
NATO’s Committee for Challenges to a Modem Society;
A trilateral agreement with Canada and Australia on environmental security 
issues;
An Asia-Pacific defense environmental security initiative “to open up a 
military environmental venue for cooperation with Pacific Rim countries”.
(Cited in Simmons 1996: 134)
The DOD tells us that it is “earning a reputation for strong environmental 
leadership within NATO”, which, following the critical reasoning above, suggests 
that it is strongly complicit in the extension of NATO and the U.S’s managerial 
agenda (Perry 1995: 9). Further, “DOD is helping to educate Eastern European 
military personnel” on environmental matters to help with “cleaning up military 
facilities for conversion to civilian use” (Perry 1995: 9). It is not difficult to see 
why NATO and the DOD would be interested in conversion of Eastern European 
bases to civilian use; it seems the old enemy can be converted under the auspices 
of environmental security. This would of course be no bad thing if a similar 
conversion were underway in NATO countries, but the DOD is not as clear about 
the conversion of its own bases as it is about the conversion of former Eastern 
Bloc bases. There also seems to be military intelligence gains in such cooperative 
ventures; as Goodman of DUSD(ES) has tellingly put it: “environmental security 
cooperation yields the benefits of traditional security cooperation; insight into, and 
influence upon, another nation’s military structure” (Goodman 1996: 100).
This may be an overly sceptical reading of NATO and the DOD’s motives, 
but were Eastern Europe not empowered with nuclear weapons and significant 
conventional war fighting capacity, and were it not adjacent to western Europe,
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then NATO/DOD interest would surely be less intense.24 Using environmental 
security as means to reach out to other nations through military institutions is 
geopolitical speak for environmental security as means to contain threatening 
Others. The tangible initiatives thus far have focused on Eastern Europe, largely 
through the auspices o f NATO/U.S. confidence building approaches. The reason 
for this lies in the discourses o f danger that have always underwritten the Realist 
approach to security. Containment and engagement is seen to be required, and 
environmental security is one means for NATO to achieve this. In contrast, the 
impoverished South, although scripted in most of the literature as a barbaric Other, 
has less capacity to threaten the North. Hence despite the efforts of some authors 
to depict the South as a threat in terms of refugees flows, declining access to 
valuable resources, and a vague disruption to ‘international security’, these threats 
are by no means as real in the Realist imagination as the threat from the usual 
enemy in Eastern Europe. In this context, environmental security is not about the 
environment, it is about (Realist) security. So, there is virtually no action to help 
the South, the lack of clear economic returns no doubt compounds the 
disincentives for doing so. The threat from the South, then, is nothing more than a 
discursive ploy to keep open the possibility o f military intervention in other parts 
of the world.
For the DOD the problem of environmental insecurity is still fundamentally 
a problem of Realpolitik. Ethical concerns are absent and the Good is understood 
in a highly parochial (not universal) way. Further, in that military activities create 
environmental insecurities for people living within the U.S., this sense o f the Good 
often does not apply to the very people the state alleges to protect. More 
importantly, two thirds o f the world’s people may well face greater insecurity and 
deprivation in the future (let alone now), but this is not seen as sufficient cause for 
substantial action. Indeed, turmoil in the industrialising world is arguably less o f a 
problem and more o f an opportunity for capitalist speculation - keeping the 
industrialising world ‘lesser developed’ may well be necessary for the 
accumulation o f profits to U.S. based transnational corporations (Pilger 1998).
Therefore, it seems that efforts to build peace (however feeble) only focus 
on those who threaten the capitalist peace. Thus the question must be raised - is 
the best path to world peace not to arm the South? Would a proliferation o f the
24 The selective vision here was clearly indicated in the 1994 NSS which stated that: “this is 
not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that 
will help us most” (cited in Dunaway 1995).
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means of violence expose the ethical interruption that Realpolitik creates? One 
would hope not, the logic of violence cannot be used to overcome violence; such 
an immanent critique clearly has limitations in this context. This discussion, 
however, points to the limitations of the self-interest rationality prevalent in much 
of the environmental security literature: to wit, we should act because it is in Our 
(the nation’s) interest. If this remains the strategy of environmental security and 
environmental foreign policy more generally, then motivating discourses of danger 
will have to be constantly recreated in a disturbingly similar way to which threats 
are sought out by strategic planners to justify militarised national security (indeed 
the two logics are interdependent).
7.3.3 The U.S. State Department
The U.S. State Department became formally involved in environmental security in
1996 when (then) Secretary of State Warren Christopher delivered a landmark
speech at Stanford University. Christopher said that “as we move into the 21 st
century, the nexus between security and the environment will become even more
apparent” (cited in Dabelko and Simmons 1997: 127). The Stanford speech is
laden with references to the effect of environmental degradation on U.S. interests
and security. Christopher identified two principal reasons why environmental
issues should be incorporated into U.S. foreign policy:
First, environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly 
the health, prosperity and jobs of American citizens. Second, addressing 
natural resource issues is frequently critical to achieving political and 
economic stability, and to pursuing our strategic goals around the world 
(Christopher 1996)
He added that:
The United States is providing leadership to promote global peace and 
prosperity. We must also lead in safeguarding the global environment on 
which that prosperity and peace ultimately depend (Christopher 1996).
This is similar to the claim to global managerialism present in NATO post-cold
war security doctrine. It also scripts ‘environmental forces’ as threats. The
question - whose security? - or in this case - whose ‘peace and prosperity’? - must
be asked. The answer is less the peace and prosperity of all people, and more the
peace and prosperity of the U.S. and its allies. Further, the question - insecurity
how? - remains unanswered. It seems that the threats are existential, suggesting a
discursive ploy to maintain U.S. management of the world in the name of ‘global’
peace and prosperity.
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A notable feature of Christopher’s speech was the way in which he managed 
to transfer responsibility for environmental problems away from the U.S. and onto 
the ‘globe’ via a continued recourse to threats to the national interest. For 
example:
Across the United States, Americans suffer the consequences of damage to 
the environment far beyond our borders. Greenhouse gases released around 
the globe by power plants, automobiles and burning forests affect our health 
and our climate, potentially causing many billions of dollars in damage from 
rising sea levels and changing storm patterns (Christopher 1996).
Christopher did not mention that 24% of the offending greenhouse gases come
from the U.S. alone, nor that that the U.S. produced 276,000,000 metric tons of
hazardous wastes between 1991 and 1994 (as opposed to 7,800 in Canada and
2,000 in the U.K.) (UNDP 1996).
Christopher indicated the degree to which military power is involved in 
affecting U.S. ‘strategic goals’:
In carrying out America’s foreign policy, we will of course use our 
diplomacy backed by strong military forces to meet traditional and
continuing threats to our security, as well as to meet new threats....But we
must also contend with the vast new danger posed to our national interests 
by damage to the environment and resulting global and regional instability 
(Christopher 1996 - my emphasis).
This passage clearly reveals the linkage of military diplomacy with environmental 
degradation and instability, suggesting that the military has a potential role to play
25in managing (anticipated) environmentally induced conflicts.
The latent economic agenda in U.S. foreign policy is evident in 
Christopher’s speech. For example, he talked of the U.S’s “enormous stake in 
consolidating democratic institutions and open markets” (1996). Democracy and 
free markets are twin pillars of contemporary U.S. foreign policy, yet the two are
25 The usual foreign policy targets are referred to in Christopher’s speech; water wars in the 
Middle East are mentioned, China is discussed, and on the former Soviet Union 
Christopher says that “governments that abuse their citizens too often have a similar 
contempt for the environment” (Christopher 1996). So, environmental degradation is now 
added to the list o f the old foe’s complicity in evil.
26 Winnefeld and Morris (1994) also suggest that promoting free economies should be a 
key element of U.S. environmental security policy. This was a theme of the 1993 NSS as 
well, where Bush referred to liberalised trade and “international institutions for financial 
cooperation and development assistance” as “proving their worth in responding to the new 
challenges of aiding the former Communist countries” (cited in Dunaway 1995). Butts is 
more transparent than most, arguing that NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 
and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) are designed to open economies to 
U.S. capital; and that “economic growth is threatened by regional instability, resource 
tensions and environmental problems [which] can .... deny the U.S. access to new markets” 
(Butts 1996: 23).
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by no means as mutually dependent as the State Department would wish the world 
to believe. An ‘open’ economy need not respect the rights of its people, indeed, 
arguably, a government that opens it economy is negligent of its responsibilities to 
its people. Further, opening the economy is not necessarily what democracies do.
The economic self-interest goes further. Christopher said that “American 
businesses know that a healthy global environment is essential to our prosperity”; 
and that “protecting the environment also opens new business opportunities. We 
are committed to helping U.S. companies expand their already commanding share 
of a [US]$400 billion market for environmental technologies” (Christopher 1996). 
Thus a part of the rationale for DOD involvement in Eastern Europe, and the 
SERDP, becomes clearer.
Christopher’s speech unveiled the State Department’s Environmental 
Initiative for the Twenty-First Century, which involves creating alliances between 
the various divisions of the State Department; creating various forums on issues 
and ‘key regions’; and progressively establishing ‘environmental opportunity 
hubs’ in key embassies (Department of State 1996). One of the objectives for these 
opportunity hubs is to “help U.S. businesses sell their leading-edge environmental 
technology” (Christopher 1996). The Initiative also introduced the ‘partnership for 
environment and foreign policy’ program which seeks to promote greater cohesion 
on environmental issues among the various divisions of the State Department.
A key part of the Environmental Initiative is the production of an annual 
report, the first of which was issued in 1997. From an environmental perspective, 
this first annual report is a far more encouraging document that Christopher’s early 
speech. The inside/outside theme is far less evident, although it has by no means 
disappeared. However, there is now some degree of recognition of the U.S’s 
contribution to environmental problems. What is also encouraging is a sense of the 
borderless, for example:
The State Department now operates on the premise that countries sharing 
common resources share a common future and that neighbouring nations are 
downstream and upwind, not just North and South or east and west, of each 
other. Threats to a shared forest, a common river, or a seamless coastline are 
forcing countries to expand their existing bilateral relationships to include 
environmental issues, and to create new regional frameworks to confront 
and combat shared environmental challenges (Department of State 1997).
This is not say that the State Department has completely reformed; its efforts must
still be read in the context of the National Security Strategy and Christopher’s
early speech as part of the U.S’s managerial ambitions. Words like ‘threat’ and
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‘combat’ certainly indicate a less than benign discourse. However, what is striking 
here is the presence of a global outlook that seems to depart from the practical 
geopolitical imagination underlying earlier pronouncements. There is a certain 
ecological sensibility in the reference to ‘downstream and upwind’ for example, 
which indicates either a better awareness of ecological realities, or a more 
sophisticated ‘spin’; both possibilities suggest taking the State Department 
seriously as an actor in global environmental politics."7 This possible shift in 
sensibility is encouraging, but more strident reforms are necessary to break away 
from the limited and environmentally counterproductive Realist conception of 
security and foreign policy.
7.3.4 Comment
According to Porter: “the Clinton Administration’s acceptance of the 
environmental security approach clearly has not lead to the militarisation of 
environmental policy issues” (1995: 222). Porter’s view is supported by Myers, 
who writes that: “I had never thought I would raise a cheer for the Pentagon view 
of life. Hallelujah, it seems there is no limit to what enlightened people can 
envision” (Myers 1996: ix-x). Such views fail to recognise the way in which the 
U.S. defence and foreign policy community has narrowed the concept of 
environmental security to justify their position as elite guardians of the national 
interest; this is a “classic bureaucratic effort to retain comparable budgetary 
outlays and reap public relations benefits” (Dabelko and Simmons 1997: 132, see 
also Dabelko and Dabelko 1995).29
The NSS, DOD and State Department interpret environmental security in a 
way that maintains the legitimacy of the U.S. government in the face of pressing 
environmental problems. By deploying a green rhetoric - however vacuous - the 
state makes enough of a token gesture to placate the concerns of the general 
public, and to forestall what Habermas would call a ‘legitimation crisis’ - where 
state legitimacy is seriously undermined by a failure to provide for its 
constituents’ interests (Habermas 1976). This completely fails to engage with
27 Tim Wirth, the Under Secretary o f State for Global Affairs, displays a similar ecological 
sensibility: “simply put, the life support systems of the entire globe are compromised at a 
rapid rate - illustrating our interdependence with nature and changing our relationship to 
the planet” (cited in Simmons 1995: 54).
28 To be fair, Myers goes on to add that he is sceptical given Congressional cuts to foreign 
aid, but his scepticism does not in any way extend to the Pentagon itself.
29 Pirages calls the U.S. response “cosmetic” and “timid”, arguing that environmental 
security has “not revamped foreign policy and security thinking” (Pirages 1997: 37).
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environmental problems themselves. As chapter 3 has argued, environmental
insecurity is a product of capitalism, militarism, industrialisation and instrumental
reason, yet U.S. environmental security policy-discourse shirks consideration of
these root causes through what Hay calls “a complex repertoire of responsibility
and crisis-displacement strategies” (Hay 1994: 217).30 The U.S. approach to
environmental security maintains legitimacy by:
A combination of symptom amelioration, token gesturism, the “greening” of 
legitimating political ideology, and the displacement of the crisis in a 
variety of different directions: either downward into civil society; or upward 
onto a global political agenda: or, indeed, sideways in presenting the crisis 
as another body’s (eg state’s) legitimation problem (Hay 1994: 221).
These various tactics can be seen in the U.S. environmental security policy- 
discourse. The tardy effort to clean up contaminated bases ‘at home’ (but not 
abroad) is indicative of the ‘symptom amelioration’ tactic. The ‘greening of 
political ideology’ is most clearly manifest in the environment-conflict discourse 
which is fundamentally consistent with the Realist ontology. There appears to be 
little evidence for displacement downwards into civil society - perhaps not 
surprising given the enormous variety of non-governmental groups vying for 
legitimacy in domestic U.S. politics. However, the tactic of displacing problems 
up to the global level is clear, particularly in State Department pronouncements. 
That this global rhetoric also serves to enhance U.S. aspirations to global 
management further enhances the lure of this tactic. Finally, the displacement 
sideways to present environmental degradation as someone else’s legitimation 
problem is also apparent in the constant references to ‘instability’ and political 
upheaval which intertwine with the environment-conflict discourse. For the U.S. 
government then, environmental security is used to preserve legitimacy, avoid 
meaningful change, and distract attention from the (environmental) contradictions 
of modernity. Such continued strategies of displacement are “dysfunctional long­
term tendencies” which render advanced capitalist states like the U.S. “a profound 
threat to global security” (Hay 1994: 227).
In line with the environment-conflict literature discussed in chapter 6, U.S. 
environmental security policy-discourse interprets the environment as a direct or 
indirect threat to U.S. interests. Talking in terms o f threats in this way conflates
Hay’s paper is a remarkable insight into the politics of environmental security. He 
understands environmental security to be the intuitive goal of securing the environment. 
Remarkably, he makes no reference to any work which could reasonably be said to be part 
of the environmental security literature. Further, he seems completely unaware of any of 
the U.S. government’s initiatives.
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environmental problems with military problems. This is an inappropriate way to 
understand environmental problems, particularly given that “threat in security 
discourse is a potent symbol of deliberate and malignant danger to the inside 
emanating from the outside. In this respect the environment is scripted as another 
danger which helps constitute the sense of ‘Us’ necessary for nationalism and state 
legitimacy. Talking in terms of global threats blurs the distinctions between 
subject and object and cause and effect in ways that obscure the U.S’s complicity 
in environmental degradation.
Talking in terms of threats is a discursive tactic that simultaneously 
downgrades the interdependence of environmental problems whilst excluding 
from consideration the role of U.S. businesses, consumers and government in 
generating environmental problems. Campbell is succinct about this discourse of 
threats and Others:
One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East-West 
understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation 
by suggesting that the ‘they’ in the East are technologically less 
sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than the ‘we’ in the West. 
This produces a new boundary that demarcates the ‘East’ from the ‘West’ in 
the period when the old frontiers of identity are no longer sustainable. But 
environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges 
traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the 
‘West’. As a discourse of danger which results in disciplinary strategies that 
are deterritorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic 
relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different reading of 
‘reasoning man’ than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal 
capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than 
anticommunism (Campbell 1992: 197).
It is precisely these implications of deterritorialization, communal cooperation and 
refiguring economies that threaten the U.S. security elite, and so which are denied 
and excluded in U.S. environmental security policy-discourse.
Another failing of the ‘threat’ discourse is that it focuses attention on issues 
“only when crises are imminent, by which time it is often too late for effective 
interventions and corrective measures” (Dabelko and Simmons 1997: 142). This is 
an example of what Prins calls the ‘environmental catch-22’; by the time 
environmental problems are unambiguously overt it is too late to rectify them, yet 
unless the problems are immediately pressing there is insufficient motivation for 
action by mainstream political institutions (Prins 1990, 1993a). Thus the particular 
interpretation of environmental security by the U.S. policy community ignores a 
telling implication of environmental problems for politics - that is that long term
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and fundamental reforms are required to address the underlying structural causes 
of environmental degradation.
Underwriting this presentation of environmental problems as threats is a 
recurrent conflation of threat with risk. Environmental security in this sense 
represents the state’s particular and highly politicised assessment of risks rather 
than any scientific account of them. There is little correlation between the two.
The U.S. government’s assessment of risks is far less a matter of credible 
scientific assessment and far more a matter of the politics of identity and 
Otherness. Thus “the response of individual states to environmental pathologies is 
often determined by contingent political factors as opposed to informed risk 
assessments” (Hay 1994: 226). The challenge for the environmental movement, 
according to Hay, is “not only to continue to provide such informed risk 
assessments, but also to expose the distortions imposed by the state’s own 
consequence-risk calculus” (Hay 1994: 226). This chapter has sought to help 
expose these distortions.
Underwriting current U.S. initiatives and pronouncements on environmental 
security is a resistance to meaningful change and a defence of the status quo. As 
Dalby notes, “in so far as security is premised on maintaining the status quo it runs 
counter to the changes needed to alleviate many environmental and economic 
problems because it is precisely the status quo that has produced the problems” 
(Dalby 1994b: 33). The U.S. government’s response to environmental security is 
not the new foreign and security policies we might have expected to flow from the 
concept of environmental security, rather it has responded with the usual approach 
to foreign policy based on the usual Realist inside/outside rationality. For the U.S., 
environmental security is about securing the very lifestyles and institutions that 
degrade the environment against the risks associated with this same degradation. 
This is a paradox lost on most, and a dangerous and counterproductive outcome 
which cannot be ignored by any proponent of environmental security. Thus 
President Bush’s comment at Rio in 1992 - that the lifestyle of the U.S. is not 
negotiable - still holds true.
The U.S. environmental security policy-discourse does not help to minimise 
the causes of environmental insecurity, indeed it seems fundamentally implicated 
in their perpetuation. It also does not recognise that fundamental long term 
changes in the structure of the global political-economy are required, and it does
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not recognise that if any single country needs to implement this reform, it is the 
U.S. itself. Instead, it holds to a singular belief that the best way to secure against 
threatening Others is to prepare for war; the irony in this strategy of securing 
against violence by advocating violence is by now well known. But, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, preparing for war is a significant cause of the 
very environmental degradation the U.S. military finds so threatening, and so the 
outcome of this Realist-infused environmental security discourse is a continued 
spiralling downwards of the interrelated problems of direct violence, structural 
violence and environmental insecurity.
There are, at least, two principal positive features to the U.S. environmental 
security policy-discourse. First, that environmental concerns now figure in 
national security reasoning suggests that the U.S. policy community is at least 
attentive to environmental concerns, even if it interprets them in overly narrowly 
and parochial ways. Perhaps the most valuable function of the U.S’s inclusion of 
environmental security into policy is that it creates a common point of dialogue 
between environmentalists and national security planners. The incorporation of 
environmental security into U.S. foreign policy therefore serves an extremely 
important epistemic function which offers the possibility of a more benign and 
environmentally effective foreign policy.
The second positive aspect of the U.S. environmental security policy- 
discourse is that there is a discernible shift in both the NSS and the work of the 
State Department towards a more sensitive and benign understanding of 
environmental problems. Between 1996 and 1997 the NSS dropped a number of 
references to environmental degradation as a threat, and has downplayed the 
possibility of environmental degradation leading to violent conflict. The NSS now 
recognises the need for non-coercive forms of diplomacy and the ratification of 
existing international conventions and treaties. Over the same short period the 
State Department has also developed a more sophisticated approach to 
environmental problems, and has downplayed the inside/outside theme which has 
traditionally underwritten U.S. engagement with the world. However, there is a 
danger that the self-congratulatory, vague and militaristic interpretation of 
environmental security by the Pentagon will counteract these small positive gains 
made by the NSS and the State Department.
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7.4 Conclusions
This analysis of U.S. environmental security policy-discourse has shown that there 
are real dangers in linking environmental security to the concept of national 
security. The most pressing danger is that Realism and the military appropriate the 
concept to advocate business as usual. However, despite the fundamental problems 
that arise from associating environmental security with national security, the 
concept should not be completely divorced from the national referent. As was 
shown in section 2 of this chapter, there are at least some valid connections 
between environmental degradation and the national interest; although the 
implications of making these connections needs to be carefully considered. The 
issue is one of degree and emphasis. In short, while there is no doubt that 
environmental security is highly problematic when viewed solely in national 
terms, there is equally no doubt that the nation-state has an important role to play 
in acting for the betterment of the environment and the environmentally insecure 
because the nation-state is not likely to soon disappear from the political 
landscape. The concept of environmental security therefore needs to be 
conceptualised in such a way that non-national - particularly human - referents 
take precedence over the national referent. In such a conceptualisation national 
policy becomes the means to secure people rather than the means to secure the 
state. An alternative and human-centred environmental security concept and its 
policy implications are developed in chapters 10 and 11 (Part III of this thesis). 
Before this, there is a need to expand on the linkages between the military and the 
environment, and the difficult problem of what to do with the military. This is the 
subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter 8. Military-Environment Linkages
8.1 Introduction
A significant amount of the environmental security literature considers the 
linkages between the traditional agents of security - the military - and the 
environment. This can be a source of confusion at times; because in most countries 
the military is integral to security policy, talking about environmental security 
frequently leads ipso facto to consideration of the role of the military.1 2It is 
important to remember though, that security is not merely about nations, and that 
the military is only one - albeit an immensely powerful - institution that allegedly
provides security. It is this immense power that necessitates an examination of the
2
links between the military and the environment.
This chapter seeks to examine the links between the military and 
environmental issues by looking at three principal connections. First, there is the 
connection between warfare and environmental degradation. Second, there is the 
connection between preparation for warfare (the day-to-day business of the 
military) and environmental degradation. These first two rather uncontentious 
categories will be briefly discussed in turn. Third, there is the connection between 
militaries and the potential for them to assist in the recovery and protection of the 
environment. This complex and difficult issue is given relatively little attention in 
the literature, and so receives the most attention in this chapter. A case study is 
presented of the potential for Australia’s military forces to assist with 
environmental recovery and protection.
8.2 War and the Environment
Warfare leads to environmental degradation; “deliberate ‘scorched earth’ tactics 
have been part of the military repertoire since classical antiquity at the very least” 
(Stem 1995: 221). In recent times the use of defoliants in Vietnam (Westing 1976
1 The term ‘military’ is used in this chapter, and indeed this thesis, to denote the armed 
forces as well as the defence bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex; therefore 
‘military’ denotes the general sector which is devoted to war-fighting.
2 This chapter is based on Barnett 1996b and 1998a.
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and 1980), and the burning of oil wells in Kuwait (Ramachandran 1991), have 
demonstrated that war has significant environmental consequences. Environmental 
degradation is a legacy of war that is manifest long after the last shots are fired 
(Seager 1993: 16). Because warfare is precisely about the destruction o f life, it is 
axiomatic that it also damages the environment. Nevertheless, any evidence that 
highlights the negative effects of warfare serves the interests of peace.
Environmental degradation can be an unintended outcome of war; the 
‘nuclear winter’ that would likely result from a nuclear war is a classic example. 
The environment can also be deliberately manipulated as a military strategy. There 
is more to this than targeting certain facilities (such as nuclear power plants, dams 
and oil pipelines) to degrade an opponent’s operational environment and natural 
capital.3 The deliberate destruction or manipulation of the environment has more 
“elegant” forms as well (Westing 1997: 145). Among these more ‘elegant’ forms, 
the release o f harmful micro-organisms is one strategy that it is not difficult to 
imagine being deployed in warfare. Indeed, this is the function o f biological 
weapons which might disperse, for example, the anthrax virus; biological warfare 
is the dark side o f microbiological research. Other more ‘elegant’ forms o f warfare 
include seeding clouds to induce rainfall, and the dispersal of unspecified 
substances into the troposphere to hamper the effectiveness of radar (Westing 
1997). Westing goes as far as to imagine that “it may become possible to 
temporarily disrupt the ozone layer above enemy territory for the purpose o f 
permitting injurious levels of ultraviolet radiation to reach the ground” (Westing 
1997: 147) 4
There is a considerable amount o f literature that addresses the international 
agreements and cultural norms required to limit degradation o f the environment in 
times o f war and not-war (for example Lorenz 1994, Westing 1984, 1986b,
1988a). The partial Test Ban Treaty which sought to minimise fall out from 
atmospheric nuclear tests is an early example o f efforts to reduce the 
environmental impacts o f military activity (Stem 1995). Other existing treaties 
include The Outer Space Treaty, The Sea-Bed Treaty, The Biological Weapons
3 Gleik’s “resources as strategic targets” (1990: 510) - see chapter 6.
4 Westing has dominated this field of study and it is difficult to assess the intent of his 
work. Certainly he does not seem enamoured with the military and national security; he is a 
‘peace researcher’ with a liberal-institutional IR emphasis on rule of law and regime 
building. However, the military surely does not need any assistance with its “fantasies 
about new ways to wage war (Westing 1997: 145); the link between imagination and 
happening is no more dangerous than this.
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Convention, The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the Environmental Modification 
Convention (El-Hinnawi and Hashmi 1982: 26-27). In that all rules of military 
engagement are for the most part ineffective given that war is far from a civilised 
and organised event, this approach is perhaps less useful than the promotion of 
common and comprehensive security which addresses the meta-problem of 
warfare itself (see chapter 5).
8.3 Preparing for War and the Environment
In addition to having significant environmental impacts in times of war, military 
activities in periods of not-war are also environmentally degrading. When not 
fighting wars, militaries are preparing to fight the next war. There is thus a state of 
continuous low intensity warfare with cumulative environmental impacts. The 
landmark paper on this subject is Renner’s Assessing the Military ’s War on the 
Environment (1991). Renner identifies numerous ways in which military activities 
degrade the environment. These include the use and degradation of land, the 
pollution and use of airspace, the use of energy and material resources, and the 
generation of toxic wastes.
Modem armed forces require large amounts of land for training. For 
example, the U.S. DOD controls 25 million acres of land (Perry 1995), and the 
Australian Department of Defence controls 3.6 million hectares (making it the 
largest land holder of any Commonwealth Government department) (Cooksey 
1988). With advances in weapons technology these requirements increase (Renner 
1991). The irony is that “in the name of defending a nation’s territorial integrity ... 
larger and larger areas are given over to the armed forces, effectively withdrawing 
them from public access” (Renner 1991: 134). Some militaries use the land of 
other countries for training. For example, in the 1980s the U.S. military was the 
largest holder of agricultural land in the Philippines (Renner 1991: 135). Seager 
notes that there are more than 3,000 military bases located on foreign soil, and that 
“if anything, the environmental record of militaries operating on foreign soil is 
worse than home-based military operations” (1993: 57).
Weapons testing is a major cause of land degradation. In Australia, for 
example, the Port Wakefield weapons testing area cannot be used for alternative 
purposes as a result of unexploded ordinance accumulated over some 50 years of
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testing (Social and Ecological Assessment Pty Ltd 1985). Military contamination 
of land is most extreme where nuclear weapons have been involved. The U.S. 
nuclear weapons program was conducted in thirty-four states and covered 2.4 
million acres of land; clean up costs are expected to be in the order of US$2-300 
billion (Dycus 1996: 5). In Australia, British nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga 
and the Monte Bello Islands have rendered these area uninhabitable (DPIE 1990). 
In the South Pacific, whole islands remain uninhabitable as a result of U.S. and 
French nuclear weapons tests (Siwatibau and Williams 1982, Seager 1993).
The manufacture and storage of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the 
storage and improper disposal of fuel, paints and solvents generates significant 
amounts of toxic waste on military sites. The former Soviet Union, for example, 
has dumped up to 17,000 containers of nuclear waste and up to 21 nuclear reactors 
into the Barents and Kara seas (Heininen 1994: 156); and the U.S. military 
generates more toxins than the top five U.S. chemical companies combined 
(Renner 1991: 143). Seager lists 26 U.S. military bases with significant toxic 
hazards, and cites a clean up figure of US$400 billion (1993: 34-35). Ackerman 
notes that there are some 14,000 U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force sites which 
require some degree of clean up (1990: 37); later estimates put this figure at 
25,000 potentially contaminated sites (Siegel 1996: 15).5 So, “if every military- 
blighted site around the world were marked on a map with red tack-pins, the earth 
would look as though it had measles” (Seager 1993: 14).
The use of airspace for military aircraft is a significant environmental 
hazard. Renner notes that “an F-18 jet flying at supersonic speed for 10 minutes ... 
can ‘boom’ an areas of more than 5,000 square kilometres” (1991: 136). The 
intense noise generated by military aircraft negatively impacts on human health 
and ecosystem integrity (Seager 1993).6 Flight training in the U.S. is conducted on 
the territories of 14 Native American nations, which suggests that not all people 
are secured when national security is procured through the military. Thus “in the 
name of defending one society’s freedom and life-style, another’s is
5 The U.S. military has for a long time been able to pollute without hindrance by hiding 
behind the shield o f ‘national security’ (Finger 1991, 1994). However, as discussed in 
chapter 7, it is slowly being brought to task, although the response thus far has been less 
than sufficient, and the pressures from Congress are waning. In times o f war militaries are 
likely to be exempted from even the minimal environmental standards that operate in 
periods o f not-war (Finger 1991).
6 The recent collision between a low-flying U.S. military jet and a cable car in Italy has 
highlighted the ongoing problems of military training, even in the post-cold war era when 
the need for a U.S. presence is Europe is less than obvious.
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compromised” (Renner 1991: 136). Indeed, traditional cultures frequently suffer 
from military activity; to note but one example, during the Kangaroo 95 military 
exercises held in Northern Australia a Leopard tank drove through, and damaged, 
an Aboriginal sacred site (Alcorn 1995).* 7
Militaries use massive amounts of energy and other resources. The 
worldwide use of aluminium, copper, nickel, and platinum for military purposes 
exceeds the net demand for tfiese materials in the all the industrialising countries 
(Renner 1991: 140). One quarter of all the world’s jet fuel is consumed by military 
aircraft (Renner 1991: 137). Renner figures that the U.S. military-industrial 
complex may be responsible for at least 10% of the United States’ total C02 
emissions, which makes the U.S. DOD responsible for some 2-3% of total global 
emissions (Renner 1991: 139). The U.S. DOD therefore emits more C02 than all 
of Canada, or more than all of Australia, Finland, Sweden and New Zealand 
combined (after UNDP 1996: 206). On the basis of rough estimates, Renner 
concludes that the world’s militaries use the same amount of petroleum products 
as Japan - the world’s second largest economy (Renner 1991: 138). A recent 
release from the Australian Ministry for Defence gives the following annual fuel 
costs for Australia’s various weapons platforms: F-111 aircraft - A$8 million; 
F/A-18 aircraft - A$19 million; DDG destroyers - A$19 million; and FFG frigates 
- A$15 million.8 The total annual fuel bill for operating Australia’s eight major 
weapons platforms is A$48.6 million; to compare, Federal funding for renewable 
energy research and development is A$16 million (Parer 1998).
The environmental legacy of military activities works in other less direct 
ways as well. The social impact of military bases is important. Enloe (1990) and 
Seager (1993) have both documented the extremely disruptive effects of military 
bases on local communities; an effect which is more pronounced in industrialising 
countries and in places with non-Westem cultures. Seager argues that there are 
strong linkages between a foreign military presence, exploitative prostitution, 
sexist socioeconomic segregation, and the deterioration of public safety and the 
environment. The generation of poverty by undermining traditional livelihoods
According to Sharp, Australian Army training areas are potential “cultural heritage
islands” (1994: 44). The evidence for the preservation o f cultural heritage in Australian
Defence Force training areas is actually more ambiguous than Sharp suggests. In many of
these sites traditional owners have limited access, so whose culture and for whom?
8 This information was passed on via the Australian Coalition to Reduce Military 
Spending. The initial communique was issued by Peter Jennings (consultant) on behalf of 
the Minister for Defence on April 4 1997.
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and supplanting them with a largely prostitution based economy, as in the 
Philippines for example, has significant ramifications for ecological and social 
sustainability in these areas. The other great (and perhaps most pervasive) impact 
of militaries everywhere is the dissemination of a militarised masculinity which 
propagates itself in a culture that glorifies violence and denigrates peace (Enloe 
1990).
A final negative aspect of military activity is that it displaces expenditure on 
programs to improve social and ecological sustainability (Gleditsch 1994). As U.S. 
President Eisenhower noted: “every gun that is made, every warship fired, 
signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those 
who are cold and not clothed” (cited in Seager 1993: 41). Some comparisons 
illustrate the point:
[F]or the price of one British Aerospace Hawk aircraft, 1.5 million people in 
the Third World could have clean water for life;... the money spent on one 
nuclear weapons test could provide installation of 80,000 hand pumps to 
give Third World villages access to safe water; the money needed to supply 
contraceptive materials to women around the world already motivated to use 
family planning is the equivalent of 10 hours of global military spending;... 
in ten days of the Persian Gulf War, the US military spent the equivalent of 
the entire annual domestic budget for energy development and conservation 
(Seager 1993: 41-42)
In this sense, environmental security implies redirecting military expenditure.
In short, the world’s militaries are most probably the single largest source of 
environmental degradation because:
Whether at peace or at war .... Militarized environmental destruction is more 
global, more ubiquitous, and more protected than the actions of even the 
most flagrantly irresponsible multinational corporations or governments 
(Seager 1993: 15)
This raises serious questions about the third kind of military-environment linkage - 
that militaries can play a positive role in environmental protection and recovery.
8.4 A Positive Contribution?
Because the military is the principal agent of national security, understanding 
environmental degradation as a security issue implies a role for the military 
beyond being involved in (questionable) environmentally induced conflicts (see 
chapter 6). Besides being required to take care of its own environmental impacts 
(as discussed in chapter 7), there are a number of potential roles for the military: it
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can assist with the enforcement of environmental standards; it can, along with 
intelligence agencies, monitor and collect information about environmental 
degradation; and it can be deployed in broader non-coercive roles to help with 
environmental conservation and restoration. This section seeks to consider these 
roles in turn. This issue of a potential positive role for the military is not 
uncontentious. In many ways it crystallises the difficulties of the concept of 
environmental security. These difficulties will also be discussed.
8.4.1 Coercive roles
Given that militaries have traditionally used force to achieve a desired outcome, it 
is inevitable that some authors have advocated military enforcement of certain 
environmental goals. For example, Julian Oswald (former First Sea Lord of the 
United Kingdom) envisions a “traditional coercive task” for militaries, including 
enforcement of international law at sea (1993: 129). Further, in that there is much 
speculation about environmentally induced conflicts, there is also a latent 
suggestion that militaries may be embroiled in such conflicts (Hughes 1997). For 
Elliott, this line of logic suggests that “defense forces might engage in defensive or 
preemptive action in cross border resource conflict, act as agents of internal 
repression in the case of environment-related instabilities, or be used to ‘secure’ 
borders against environmental refugees” (Elliott 1996. 162). The possibility of a 
U.N. sanctioned green police force (like that of the peacekeeping force) also 
implies a coercive role for militaries (Schrijver 1989).
There are numerous military-to-military programs which involve transfers 
of technology and training for civil and environmental policing activities. For 
example, the U.S. Security Assistance Program has been involved in assisting 
some African countries manage the problem of illegal fish and wildlife poaching 
(Butts 1994). The Pacific Patrol Boat Program operated by the Australian Navy 
performs a similar function in the South Pacific (Bergin 1994). These programs 
operate in the grey zone between military and non-military threats to security, yet 
they nevertheless entail responding with military means. This can lead to a 
paramilitarisation of environmental regulation.
Invoking this traditional military reasoning “redefines environmental 
security as an environmental defense debate” (Elliott 1996: 163). These coercive 
roles are a reactive and short term response that does not deal directly with the 
underlying causes of environmental degradation. Byers explores the possibility of
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a coercive role for the military in biodiversity protection, and concludes that 
“shooting poachers and illegal loggers is [not] a good idea ... as usual with violent 
means, the means may corrupt and compromise the ends” (Byers 1994: 125). 
Byers’ most persuasive point is that locally derived solutions will always be more 
effective and long lasting that externally imposed ones - particularly when those 
impositions involve the use of force. Thus he argues that “a long-term solution 
requires ecologically sustainable economic alternatives for local people” (Byers 
1994: 125). Aside from being a reactive, short term, and ineffective policy 
response, the greatest problem with the use o f military power to force 
environmental compliance is the way it enables the military to colonise 
environmental issues. It also justifies the maintenance of armed forces. If  the 
concept of environmental security induces the cooptation of the environmental 
agenda in the way that it has in the United States (as discussed in chapter 7), then 
actively encouraging coercive military engagement with environmental problems 
is likely to lead to ‘ecofascism’ (Adams 1990 - cited in Byers 1994: 111). Military 
force will not help overcome environmental insecurity.
8.4.2 Intelligence and surveillance
A more benign suggestion is to use military and intelligence agencies to assist 
with analysing, predicting, monitoring and ameliorating environmental problems 
(Dabelko and Simmons 1997). Oswald calls this a ‘precautionary role’ (1993: 
118).
There have been a number of environment-related programs involving the 
U.S. Department of Defence and intelligence agencies. These are for the most past 
reconnaissance missions. For example, in 1993 the U.S. Navy allowed non­
military scientists to use the classified Integrated Undersea Surveillance System to 
track whales in the Western Northern Atlantic ocean (Thomas 1997); the extension 
of the military designed Global Position System into civilian use has also had 
significant benefits for environmental science; and in 1995, 800,000 o f the U .S’s 
earliest satellite photos were de-classified and released for public scrutiny - largely 
for the purposes of environmental monitoring (Thomas 1997). In Australia, the 
work of the Navy Hydrographer in charting the coastline is arguably a function 
which assists in environmental monitoring and assessment (Leech 1996).
9 This satellite data was produced by now obsolete systems (Thomas 1997).
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Intelligence agencies are important in this information gathering process
(Smith 1996). The Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency talks about
‘environmental intelligence’, and is extremely revealing as to its purposes:
Much of the work that now falls under the environmental label used to be 
done under other names - geography, resource issues, or research. For 
example, we have long used satellite imagery to estimate crop size in North 
Korea and elsewhere. This allowed us to forecast shortages that might lead 
to instability and to determine the amount of agricultural production a 
nation would need to import - information valuable to the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture and to America’s farmers. We have also tracked world
availability of natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals....
Environmental intelligence will also be a part of our support to economic 
policymakers. They need to know, for example, whether or not foreign 
competitors are gaining a competitive advantage over American business by 
ignoring environmental regulations. (Deutch 1997: 114).
If we decipher the conflation of foci and function, it seems that Deutch is
admitting that the U.S. uses its satellites to monitor global agricultural production
and then to modify domestic output and target markets accordingly. This makes a
further mockery of the idea of a ‘level playing field’ in global trade and the
attendant neo-liberal abstraction that all rational economic actors have equal
access to information in the market. The most deplorable irony, however, is that
the same technology that confers this advantage will be used to enforce the
environmental standards that are only tenable in industrialised economies. In
effect, the U.S. presses it information advantage for the purposes of profit whilst
ensuring that it maintains authority in the affairs of other states under the ambit of
environmental monitoring. Deutch understands non-compliance to be important
only in so far as competitors might gain an ‘advantage’, which reinforces the point
that environmental intelligence for the U.S. is wholly subservient to the main
function of intelligence in the post-cold war globalising economy - that of
maintaining comparative advantage.
The CIA is working with EPA to combat black market trade in ozone 
depleting chloroflourocarbons, and the U.S. intelligence community also monitors 
illegal driftnet fishing (Dabelko and Simmons 1997). A particularly interesting 
program is the Global Fiducial Data Program which uses high resolution spy 
satellites to collect data about environmental change (Thomas 1997). This program 
is coordinated by the CIA and administered by the National Reconnaissance 
Office. A key feature of this program is that the data is to remain secret in order to 
conceal the U.S’s reconnaissance capabilities (Deibert 1996, Thomas 1997). This 
enclosure of information renders it virtually useless for the peaceful resolution of
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environmental problems. Instead, it gives the U.S. a privileged and exclusive
monopoly of knowledge, the use o f which will always be suspicious. Thomas
(1997) suggests that most of these ‘dual use’ strategies are secrecy preserving and
that this secrecy will serve more to protect the security establishment rather than
serve environmental interests. Deibert is close to the mark when he says that:
Should the military cooptation of environmental satellites continue, there is 
a real possibility that the military will become a clearing house for 
environmental data, with all o f the attendant problems associated with its 
deeply ingrained secrecy culture (Deibert 1996: 31).
So if there is to be any information contributed by military and intelligence
agencies, this information must remain accessible by all for it to affect a positive
environmental outcome.
A more reasoned but cautious argument in favour of intelligence agency 
involvement in environmental problems comes from Dalby (1995). Dalby argues 
that intelligence agencies have a mandate to think about long term threats to 
security. He argues that a positive contribution might involve monitoring the state 
o f renewable energy technologies, and predicting future effects and analysing 
evidence about environmental change, possibly using ‘worst-case’ reasoning 
(which would be consistent with the precautionary principle).10 Dalby suggests 
that this new intelligence function would mean that different sources - such as 
Vital Signs and World Resources - would become the new references for 
intelligence analysts. He also suggests that the privileged position o f intelligence 
analysts in the security policy community might enable them to promote positive 
and long-term policies. Dalby suggestions are welcome because they seek to 
change the practice o f national security. Indeed, any serious non-Realist security 
project is obliged to suggest ways to overcome the reticence o f the security 
establishment to change. This subject of constructive engagement with the security 
establishment is fraught with danger and there are no easy answers; the remainder 
o f this chapter tackles this difficult subject.
10 The precautionary principle applies “where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage”, and it holds that “lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation” 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992b: 8). O’Riordan and Jordan explore the implications of 
the precautionary principle: “precaution challenges the established scientific method; it 
tests the application of cost benefit analysis in those areas where it is undoubtedly weakest 
(ie. situations where environmental damage may be irreversible or potentially catastrophic); 
it calls for changes to established legal principles and practices such as liability, 
compensation and burden of proof; it challenges politicians to begin thinking through 
longer time frames than the next election or economic recession” (O’Riordan and Jordan 
1995: 193).
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8.4.3 Civil defence and non-core roles
Militaries often have civil defence functions:
Military units are commonly allocated rescue and disaster relief missions, 
which may involve responding to natural cataclysms (such as earthquakes, 
floods, volcanoes, hurricanes, and so on) or to technological catastrophes 
with serious environmental consequences (such as nuclear accidents or oil 
spills). Military engineering and medical capabilities, transportation 
infrastructure, logistical readiness and organizational discipline suggest that 
the military is well suited for such missions (Stem 1995: 222).
It could also be argued, as Dycus (1996) does, that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers makes a positive contribution to environmental protection by building
water-resource infrastructure (this is questionable). In Australia, the most
significant funding and research conducted on hazards and emergency
management occurs under the auspices of the Department o f Defence.11 These
civil defence functions are non-coercive and have little effective training function
for the military. Therefore these are ostensibly non-military functions.
These civil defence functions serve as an important precedent for a third 
kind of positive contribution from the military - the application of the military to 
non-military environmental tasks. Militaries generally have some unique 
characteristics that make them useful for dealing with environmental problems; 
they are well organised, large scale, well resourced, and located in most areas of 
most countries (Butts 1994: 84). It is the contention of this thesis that the military 
should be involved in environmental protection and restoration. This is made on 
the basis o f a broad interpretation o f national security which understands 
environmental degradation to be a risk to national security (chapter 7). Further, 
addressing this problem is the responsibility of government and all government 
agencies. The qualification is that the military should participate in non-coercive 
ways, and should not operate beyond its own nation’s borders. In addition, any 
activity should be unclassified, including any information collected. This 
proposition will now be grounded by applying it to Australian defence and security 
policy.
8.4.4 A positive role in Australia?
The Australian Defence Mission is “to promote the security of Australia, and to 
protect its people and interests” (Commonwealth o f Australia 1996b: 1). As has
11 The Department of Defence funds the Australian Emergency Management Institute at 
Mt Macedon, Victoria.
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been shown in chapter 7, environmental degradation does threaten Australia’s 
‘security’, ‘people and interests’ in important ways. A broad interpretation of the 
Defence Mission therefore suggests that the Australian Defence Force’s 
contribution to society has been overly narrow, and that there is a need to redefine 
the role of the military in light of widespread domestic environmental degradation. 
So, as environmental degradation increases, a policy of expanding the military s 
involvement in environmental protection and restoration becomes increasingly 
relevant.
There are important precedents for this proposal. The Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) has already made a worthwhile contribution to Australia’s 
environment by managing its own affairs in an environmentally responsible 
manner (Crabb et al 1996). Of particular importance is the biodiversity value of 
well managed defence estates. For example, a recent public inquiry into the Army 
training area at Shoalwater Bay determined that the ecological integrity of the site 
has improved during the Army’s period of tenure (Commonwealth Commission of 
Inquiry into Shoalwater Bay 1994, Johnston and Darlington 1994). There is 
therefore some in-house competence and familiarity with environmental problems 
that can serve as a foundation from which the Australian Defence Forces can 
develop a more proactive environmental program.
The Australian Defence Forces have made positive contributions to the 
environment in ways that go beyond traditional military roles, examples of this 
include: Army provision of water purification equipment (Canberra Times 1991); 
participation in ‘clean up’ days (Ballarat Courier 1990, Herbert River Express 
1990, Richards 1991); and the use of soldiers for marine fauna surveys (Twin 
Cities Advertiser 1990, Commonwealth of Australia 1995). Although these 
contributions to local and regional environmental operations occur on an ad-hoc 
basis, they are nevertheless indicative of the practical application of the ADF to 
environmental problem solving.
Resistance?
As with any challenge to the status quo, resistance to the proposal to involve the 
military in environmental action can be expected. In a related exploration of 
resistance to change, Cheeseman identifies two likely sources of opposition to this 
proposal (Cheeseman 1995). The first is of an ideological nature, namely that 
Australian defence discourse is incapable of considering alternative conceptions of
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security as these challenge state authority and the assumption of the need for 
military might in an (uncritically presumed) anarchic world. Thus an ideological 
shift is required. The second source of opposition is related. Alternative security 
policies would make explicit the recognition of the multidimensional nature of 
security in the post-cold war world. This would radically change the business of 
the ADF, and fundamentally challenge the expertise and authority of existing 
defence policy makers:
The incantation that Australia should structure its armed forces solely for 
the defence of Australia helps block out these kinds of nagging questions 
and their implications. It is part of the strategists’ realist agenda of 
translating Australia’s new and complex environment into a more familiar 
form which continues to privilege their own world views and positions of 
power, and can be used to marginalise and ignore alternative theoretical 
concepts and prescriptions (Cheeseman 1995: 10).
Thus the suggestion that the Australian defence establishment adds environmental
protection and restoration to its core agenda will meet with substantial
ideologically and pragmatically driven resistance. Overcoming this resistance
requires developing detailed proposals that promote environmental objectives at
the same time as offering some return to the ADF for its involvement (most
probably in the form of improved public relations, but this should not be given
freely). Overcoming this resistance also requires continued challenging of the
meaning and practice of security.
Environmental groups may also resist the prospect of military involvement 
in environmental management - for good reason given the experience in the U.S. 
thus far, and given the extensive environmental damage militaries create. These 
concerns will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. However, for now it is 
necessary to note that whatever environmental programs the military might be 
involved in, these must be practical, domestic and non-coercive. The following 
discussion explores the idea of a surveillance network in Northern Australia which 
would be beneficial for the environment of the region, and which would offer 
enough inducement for the ADF to participate.
‘Defence in depth Northern Australia
It is in Northern Australia that there is the most potential for a significant 
contribution from the Australian Defence Forces to environmental protection and 
restoration. Northern Australia is defined as the area between Cairns and Broome. 
This is the area of direct military interest for current Australian defence policy; 
however, it is of crucial importance for environmental, economic, social and
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cultural security as well. Northern Australia contains vast tracts of unique 
wilderness areas, making it vital to Australia’s natural heritage. Preserving the 
ecological integrity of the region would be environmental security in its purest 
interpretation (see the following chapter on ecological security). The region is also 
vital to Australia’s cultural heritage as it is an area where traditional Aboriginal 
culture has been (relatively) least disrupted. Furthermore, throughout the region 
there are large areas of Aboriginal land which are environmental, social, political 
and economic assets to all Australians.
The environment of the region is at risk, and many of these risks have 
already materialised (unlike highly subjective military risks); the outbreak of the 
papaya fruit fly in 1996 was only the most recent of many ecological invasions 
which have had negative environmental (and economic) consequences. Northern 
Australia is a zone of transboundary environmental traffic. The region is a major 
and the most proximate gateway between Australia and Asia; it has a large volume 
of people, flora and fauna flowing across its borders. With this volume of traffic, 
both official and unofficial, comes the importation of harmful biological 
organisms. Although this is also true for Australian airports and ports, Northern 
Australia is the most problematic of these high risk areas as the coastline is over 
6,000 kilometres long and most of it is sparsely populated and has little 
infrastructure (Wolfe 1995). This makes adequate coverage of the area, for 
whatever purpose, exceedingly difficult. In terms of biological organisms, the 
smuggling of native fauna, illegal immigration and drug trafficking, there is 
currently no comprehensive monitoring system in place. Even in military security 
terms, despite being the focus of extensive effort, Northern Australia continues to 
be virtually indefensible against low intensity threats (Evans 1990).
Australian defence policy currently adopts a layered approach (defence in 
depth) to the surveillance of the sea-air barrier and inshore areas of Northern 
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1994). At present, ADF activities in 
Northern Australia do little for the environmental security of the region, but there 
is much potential for a convergence of activities to address these not dissimilar 
interests. The best strategy would be a multi-purpose, coordinated and 
comprehensive surveillance and monitoring system. Such a system would 
integrate civilian and military communication, transport, and aerial infrastructure, 
in conjunction with local communities, to look for signs of environmental 
disturbances such as new species of weeds and wildlife smuggling. This would be
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impossible in the near term without the involvement of the Australian Defence 
Forces. Involvement in a comprehensive, wide area surveillance network would be 
an ideal first step towards an environmental component to the Australian Defence 
Force’s corporate goal. It would contribute positively to Australian security in 
every respect. Such a program might also enhance employment and welfare in 
Aboriginal communities in the region; the Army already has a working 
relationship with many Aboriginal communities (Ball 1991a, Millie 1995).12 Any 
information gathered by such a network must be made publicly available.
This brief case study has sought to show how the Australian military can 
expand its involvement in environmental protection and restoration in a useful 
way. It has sought to show how a policy to involve the ADF in environmental 
protection and restoration can be operationalised. The implementation o f such a 
policy needs to be carefully steered by environmental groups and other 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, as chapter 7 has suggested, this is a dangerous idea so 
further discussion is warranted.
8.4.5 Counterarguments
Arguments against military involvement in environmental issues come from two
vastly different perspectives. From the traditional security camp there is resistance
to any expansion o f military activity lest it undermine war-fighting ability.
According to Cohn (1996), Republicans in the U.S. Congress, and military leaders,
are opposed to non-military functions as these divert time and resources away
from core functions. Dabelko and Simmons summarise this case:
A more traditional security perspective argues that the armed forces should 
not sacrifice operational readiness for involvement in non-traditional 
activities like environmental protection. Time and resources expended to 
monitor environmental treaties and to perform other environmental tasks 
detract from the military’s primary mission (Dabelko and Simmons 1997: 
138).
This counterargument seeks to preserve the sanctimony of national security and 
the military. However, it should by now be apparent that this sanctimony warrants 
destabilisation (for the many reasons that this thesis has discussed thus far). Given 
this resistance to change, there appears to be at least some merit in the argument
12 The relationship is not as harmonious as it might be. A recent initiative to employ Army 
engineers to develop water and sanitation infrastructure was welcomed by some indigenous 
Australians, but regarded indifferently by others because there was insufficient prior 
consultation with the communities involved (Kitney and Scott 1996, Windsor 1996). The 
lessons from this process must be learned before any further initiatives - such as that 
proposed here - be implemented.
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that militaries should be involved in environmental protection and restoration if  for 
no other reason than the security elite finds it problematic.
The second counterargument against military involvement in environmental 
protection and restoration is less easy to dismiss. For most environmentalists, the 
prospect of military involvement in environmental protection and restoration 
triggers a sense of unease. This is in part due to the intuitive baggage that 
accompanies environmental sensibility; environmentalism holds to values such as 
anti-authoritarianism, cooperation, social justice and peace - all of which are the 
antithesis of military culture and practice (Brock 1991, Deudney 1990). Further, 
given the extensive environmental damage wrought by military activity, it is valid 
to argue that “the military must be addressed as a cause and not a cure of global 
environmental problems”, and that “in the long run, the industrial-military 
complex must be dismantled. This is the sine qua non for effectively dealing with 
the entire global environmental crisis” (Finger 1991: 225). Tirman agrees, adding 
that “applying military ideas and assets to environmental issues will solve 
nothing” (Tirman 1990: 19). This is undoubtedly true in principal.
A further danger in arguing for military involvement, even in the non- 
coercive way that this chapter has argued for, is that it may justify the continued 
existence of the military and intelligence agencies by giving them a mission 
(Deibert 1996). This seems borne out in the Deutch’s observation that applying 
intelligence collection assets to environmental issues is relatively cheap and easy; 
therefore the environment serves as a further justification for traditional military 
and intelligence functions (Deutch 1997). In a similar vein, Ball (1992) has argued 
for a geosynchronous satellite in Northern Australia in part on the grounds that it 
can have an environmental monitoring function; but the ostensible function of this 
would be to assist in military operations in the area. Thus military and intelligence 
agency involvement in environmental protection and restoration may well be a 
pragmatic strategy designed to maintain current levels of funding for defence; a 
bureaucratic tactic designed to hedge against payment of the post-cold war peace 
dividend (Dabelko and Dabelko 1995, Finger 1991 and 1994, Dabelko and 
Simmons 1997).
These are all extremely valid concerns with which this thesis has much 
empathy. However, they are all negative in their implications in that they advocate 
a return to a situation before the concept of environmental security emerged. But if
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the concept of environmental security is to have any positive effect, the question 
of what to do with the military must be addressed, not ignored; W esting’s question 
- “how can the need for a military sector be reduced?” - is therefore salient 
(Westing 1988b: 156). Renner, too, is concerned that “a lasting peace cannot be 
built without dealing with the remnants of the war system” (1994: 12). Eckersley 
also supports this view:
[S]imply documenting and censuring the multiple ecological sins of the 
military ... avoids the more difficult question of determining whether the 
military has any legitimate role in promoting national and global 
environmental protection. Perhaps some of the fog surrounding the concept 
o f environmental security might lift with a tighter clarification of the proper 
role o f the military... (Eckersley 1996: 143).
In this respect, Finger’s reference to ‘the long run ’ (1991: 225 - see above) ignores
the more immediate and pragmatic question of what to do in the short term. It is
precisely this need for a short term strategy that careful and controlled military
involvement in environmental restoration and protection might be able to satisfy.
There is a temporal/transitional issue involved here:
In the policy realm, it is probably most fruitful to focus attention on how 
existing institutions might alleviate the dangers environmental change poses 
to human welfare .... while continuing to explore the need for structural 
changes and our capacity to work towards a satisfactory relationship 
between society and nature. With this in mind, one concern is that we adopt 
a realist approach to the capacity o f existing institutions (Matthew 1995 :
68).13
The present response to the problem of what to do with the military takes 
two forms. First, it is simply ignored. Second, there is a focus on conversion, 
defined as the “reallocation of resources from the military to civilian purposes” 
(Luckham 1987b: 40); and added to by Renner: “conversion goes beyond a mere 
re-shuffling of people and money. It involves a political and institutional 
transformation” (Renner 1990: 157). While ignoring the issue obviously 
contributes nothing to the problem, the latter approach has produced negligible 
results. Conversion is a prescription for change based on high ideals rather than 
practicality; it does not seriously address the power of the military to resist change. 
The contention of this thesis, then, is that although fraught with problems, a policy 
to involve the military in environmental protection and restoration is an achievable 
and relatively non-threatening way of overcoming this sector’s inertia. Byers 
seems to support this contention: “if the armed forces ... avoid overt violence 
wherever possible, they may become part of the process o f conversion of military
13 Leaving aside the description of such a strategy as ‘realist’!
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forces to civilian tasks” (Byers 1994: 126). Involving the military in 
environmental protection and restoration should be seen as a transitional step 
towards overcoming the structural causes of environmental degradation; to put it 
another way, it is a pre-conversion conversion. A danger of this policy proposal is 
that the military may colonise the environmental agenda, this can be averted by 
ensuring that a diverse array of interests (all stakeholders) are involved in steering 
its implementation.
The military’s pragmatic use of environmental security to maintain 
relevance and legitimacy is a double edged sword. It is similarly pragmatic to 
involve the military given that a) environmental degradation is a challenge for all 
institutions, b) this is also an opportunity for biophysical scientists to gain 
assistance and resources, and c) it is an opportunity for peace researchers to “grasp 
in reality what had for so long merely been a quaint couplet in the minds of 
Utopians - a chance to beat swords into plowshares” (Deibert 1996: 29).14 Further, 
there is something to be said for involving the military in environmental protection 
and restoration because it is the most autonomous of government institutions, and 
hence the most difficult of all institutions to modify. There is a paradox here in 
that “the more important the military-industrial complex is within a country, the 
more likely it is that the nation-state will act as a protector of its military rather 
than as a protector of the biosphere” (Finger 1991: 224). So, involving the military 
in environmental issues is least likely to be successful in those places where its 
transformation is most necessary. But by the same token, the most resistant to 
change will be the most resistant to any initiative for change; so whilst Finger’s 
point is well received, it does not suggest an alternative option for reform of the 
military. The option proposed here seems more probable and plausible than many 
others, particularly given a high level of public concern about environmental 
problems in many countries. Indeed, given the tendency of people to profess 
concern about environmental degradation but actually do little except expect 
government to take control, a policy to involve the military may well be extremely 
popular (at least in Australia).
14 A further consideration is that any state that acts first can affect a flow-on by setting an 
example that other militaries may follow (Maddock 1995, Soroos 1994, Thomas 1997). If 
the U.S. were to take such a lead others would be sure to follow. Alternatively, a coalition 
of middle powers might, by their example, prove the possibility of a shift in military 
purpose and culture.
207
Such a policy has relevance in other countries; however, it is not universally 
applicable. The desired approach to military involvement in environmental 
protection and restoration is to operate on a case-by-case, country-by-country 
basis. The nature o f military involvement in environmental protection and 
restoration in a totalitarian state, for example, would be patently different than in a 
liberal-democratic middle power such as Australia, or in a superpower such as the 
United States. There are marked differences in the complicity of various militaries, 
thus in practice the potential contribution of each would need to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. However, even in a totalitarian state characterised by military 
dominance of public life, it is possible that little would be lost were the military to 
engage in environmental protection and restoration; yet much could be gained if 
this were to result in even a slight shift in culture or a slight shift in energies away 
from repression. In some cases, then, military involvement in environmental 
management may be a valid strategy, in others it may be a recipe for disaster. It is 
important to note that the crucial consideration in such a strategy is not the 
potential environmental contribution a military can make, as it will almost always 
be a better environmental outcome if militaries were disbanded and resources 
redirected to social and environmental policies. The crucial gain comes from 
shifting an otherwise rigid, autonomous, and violent institution and culture.15
In sum, large and fundamental structural changes are required to achieve a 
more benign world, and so we need to keep an open mind when considering what 
each institution - including the military and perhaps most importantly the military 
- has to offer. The goal of sustainable development requires us to address the 
military's place in society. Our Common Future referred to the “institutional 
challenge” of sustainable development which means incorporating environmental 
issues into all sectors of society, public and private (WCED 1987: 354). This 
challenge is at its most difficulty when it comes to the military. Providing the 
military can be encouraged to participate (which the notion o f environmental 
security may help affect), and providing this participation is conducted in a 
practically and ethically acceptable manner, then military involvement in 
environmental protection and restoration is a significant step towards structural
15 This question of changing military culture is not unproblematic. This, too, is a 
component of U.S. DOD environmental security policy-discourse; and so should be treated 
with caution. But this should not obscure the need to do something. Even in the case of the 
U.S., ignorance and denial is not the most helpful response. Instead, a continued effort to 
engage the military to effect a genuine cultural shift, and ultimately conversion, is still 
required, however difficult this may be.
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change. To reiterate, a vital caveat is that any military-environment program must 
seek to a affect positive environmental outcome, it must be of a non-coercive 
nature, and it must be restricted to action within the country concerned. Involving 
the military in environmental protection and restoration should be seen not so 
much as a definitive response in itself, but as a means towards a more desired 
institutional configuration for sustainability. It is a practically and symbolically 
significant mechanism for change.
8.5 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the claim that militaries are a significant - if not the 
most significant - cause of environmental degradation in both times of war and 
times of not-war (it should be apparent that periods of not-war are not periods of 
peace). Further, in conjunction with chapter 7, it has argued that the military 
responds to the concept of environmental security in such a way as to maintain its 
privileged position as the guardian of national security. This is the recurrent and 
fundamental danger of the idea of environmental security. However, to argue 
against any role for the military, and to more generally argue against the hitching 
of environmental issues to the notion of security, is to avoid a significant and 
potentially rewarding site of conceptual and theoretical investigation. Furthermore, 
it is for the most part too late to avoid the connection of environment with 
security. Deudney (1990) and Brock (1991) were no doubt right to caution against 
these linkages. However, that the U.S. security establishment has taken 
environmental security on board invalidates the questions - why? - and - why not?
- environmental security. This thesis contends that the question - how can we 
contest and reclaim the concept o f environmental security? - is the one that critical 
scholars should now be seeking to answer. To ignore this question is to foreclose 
on the only strategy that can halt the colonisation of the environmental agenda by 
the security establishment. The notion of environmental security and the policy 
implications that flow from it must now be contested at every turn (hence this 
thesis).
A policy of careful and controlled military involvement in environmental 
protection and restoration is consistent with the linkage of environmental security 
to a broadly defined notion of national security. This policy must be accompanied 
by clear caveats, namely that any military role must be non-coercive, it must take
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place within the nation concerned, and it must be considered on a project-by- 
project basis with the full cooperation and involvement of Green groups and local 
communities. Further, this is not a policy of generic validity for all nations in all 
periods of time; specific contexts must be taken into account. The fundamental 
goal of such a policy is not the continuation of the security establishment; on the 
contrary, it seeks its gradual conversion. This then, is one implication of the 
concept of environmental security that may, in the long-term, serve the interests of 
peace and human security. Alternative conceptions of environmental security are 
also required, and these will be discussed in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 9. Ecological Security
9.1 Introduction
Chapters 5 to 8 have examined those approaches which are in various ways 
predominantly concerned with the security component of environmental security. 
Counterbalancing this, there is a need to explore the environmental, or ecological 
approach, often expressed through the concept of ecological security. This is a 
relatively underdeveloped theme of the literature. The concept of ‘ecological 
security’ emerged at the same time as environmental security. The concept implies 
a different security philosophy than that of the prevailing Realist approach, it also 
suggests a different security referent. However, these possibilities are not 
particularly explicit in current conceptualisations of ecological security. This 
chapter seeks to elicit these latent possibilities to advance the concept of 
ecological security.
This chapter seeks to examine the concept of ecological security. The 
chapter begins with a cursory review of the use of the term in the literature. Then it 
discusses the notion, of resilience to further the concept, it also discusses the 
relationship between ecology and sovereignty. The chapter then deploys a 
framework to help determine which problems warrant consideration under the 
rubric of ecological security, and on this basis it is argued that nuclear power is an 
example of ecological insecurity. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the concept of ecological security.
Before proceeding some qualifications are necessary. There is, at times, a 
conflation o f ‘ecological’ security with ‘environmental’ security. This conflation 
creates considerable confusion for any discussion that seeks to distinguish 
ecological security from environmental security. The principal difference is one of 
emphasis. Ecological security, it is argued, emphasises at least implicitly that it is 
ecosystems and ecological processes that should be secured; the prima facie 
referent is therefore non-human. Environmental security for the most part 
emphasises the state as the security referent, most often in a way such that the
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Realist approach dominates - as evident in the U.S. response and in the 
preoccupation with the environment-conflict thesis.1 *
9.2 An Overview of the Literature
Ecological thought entered the International Relations literature (at least) in 1965
%
with the Sprout’s book The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With 
Special Reference to International Politics (Sprout and Sprout 1965). Mische 
(1992) ‘claims’ to have coined the phrase ‘ecological security’ in 1986 - although 
she gives no reference for this. In 1987 the United Nations General Assembly 
explored the possibility of an International Ecological Security System, and UNEP 
began using the term in 1988 (Brigagao 1990). The Warsaw Treaty member states 
also began using the term in 1988 (Timoshenko 1989). The link between ecology 
and security was consolidated in 1989, at which time Brown argued that security 
strategy should grapple with ecological issues (Brown 1989). Also in 1989 Eduard 
Shevardnadze formally made the link between ecology and security (in his terms 
'political ecology’) in a speech to the U.N. in which he said that: “political 
ecology requires urgent planetary decisions at the highest political level... and 
since we are speaking of a major component of international security, political 
ecology requires the involvement of the Security Council” (cited in Thomas 1992: 
53). The specific label ‘ecological security’ emerged in the same year with papers 
by Mische (1989), Timoshenko (1989), and Tolba (1989).3 Also in 1989, the 
International Peace Research Association newsletter published a special issue on 
Ecological Security and Peace (IPRA 1989). Indeed, ecological security generally 
seems to be the preferred term of peace researchers.4
The distinction between ecological as opposed to environmental security is 
often blurred in the literature. The terms are used interchangeably and there is a 
general unwillingness to distinguish between ecology and environment. Rogers 
argues that ecological security requires a clear definition, and she defines it as:
1 There is, however, a vastly different alternative - that of the human 
security/environmental security nexus. This will be discussed fully in the following chapter 
as means to move beyond many of the shortcomings o f the literature discussed thus far.
“ However, this book did not discuss the notion of security explicitly.
See also Lee who discusses ecological dynamics and national security with reference to 
industrialising countries (Lee 1989).
4 Ecological security also seems to be the preferred term of feminists, Tickner (1992) in 
particular favours the term.
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“the creation of a condition where the physical surroundings of a community 
provide for the needs of its inhabitants without diminishing its natural stock” 
(Rogers 1997: 30).5 The distinction for Rogers is that environmental security 
refers more to the defence of natural resources - in effect a negative/reactive 
security like most prevailing conceptions of security - whereas ecological security 
refers to a positive security that seeks to proactively maintain ecological 
equilibrium in the long-term. The focus is thus on ecosystems as the referent 
object of security. The referent object is therefore reversed to make the biosphere 
the primary security referent; humans are secured only in so far as they inhabit the 
biosphere - indeed human activity is the principal threat in such a 
conceptualisation (a point lost on most environmental security analysts). Rogers 
therefore suggests that ecological security allows scholars to think about security 
beyond state-centrism, and that it “encourages, and in fact requires, that multiple 
actors become involved” (1997: 30). Rogers’ definition is essentially sound, 
particularly given that it distinguishes ecological security from environmental 
security. It is this definition that this thesis has in mind when referring to 
ecological security.6
Like environmental security, the notion of ecological security is deployed as 
a means to contest the national and military emphasis of the dominant Realist 
approach to security. This has implications for common security, disarmament and 
financial disbursements, as discussed in earlier chapters (Evteev et al 1989,
Ribeiro 1989). There is a notable absence of concern about violent conflict in the 
ecological security literature.7 8
Few authors discussed in part II of this thesis have attempted to take note of 
history; this, however, is a strength of Mische’s work on ecological security. She 
argues that for the earliest of human societies the principal threats to survival were 
natural phenomena, and that over time humans learned to lessen their vulnerability 
to these risks - much as suggested in chapter 3 of this thesis. Also similar to 
chapter 3, Mische argues that over time the locus of risks to survival shifted from
5 This is not unlike the Ecological Economists’ definition o f sustainability - see Common 
and Perrings (1992) and Pezzey (1992).
6 Elsewhere I have argued for similar definition, presenting ecological security as “a 
biosphere free from anthropogenic damage”; hence the biosphere is the referent object, and 
human activity the principal threat (Barnett 1996c: 8). Timoshenko similarly argues that 
ecological security is a “biospheric approach” which seeks to “sustain equilibrium of 
principal natural-based forces and to avoid catastrophic effects thereupon” (1989: 238).
7 Mische (1994) is an exception to the rule.
8 Pirages also has a historical sensitivity, see for example Pirages (1991a).
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(external) nature to inter-human relations (internal nature). In the present phase, 
Mische argues, “the danger arises not what from nature can do to the human, but 
rather the impact of human activities on nature and, in turn, the consequent effects 
on the human” (Mische 1989: 392) This dialectical human-nature interplay is 
compatible with Social Ecology (appendix I) and this thesis’ understanding of the 
problem of environmental insecurity (chapters 1 and 3).
The concept of ecological security, Mische (1989) reckons, is useful for the 
way it fosters awareness of the common vulnerability of all people to 
environmental degradation. This is thought to motivate people to act on the basis 
of self-interest. However, vulnerabilities are not particularly common, and the 
responsibility for action and the likely effectiveness of action is not equally 
weighted. So, to return to a key theme of this thesis, some people are more 
vulnerable than others, and some are more complicit in environmental degradation 
than others. Accordingly, motivating action on the basis of a common self-interest 
is unlikely to be particularly effective in the industrialised world where wealth and 
institutional resilience lessen vulnerability, and where privilege and a consumption 
culture are most entrenched. Yet it is precisely the behaviour of individuals, 
governments and corporations in the industrialised world where action is most 
needed. This question of motivating action is complex, it will be discussed in 
chapter 11.
Another key theme of Mische’s work is the need to “change our minds” and 
the “way we think about the earth and human/earth relations” (Mische 1989: 420). 
Mische argues that the notion of ecological security assists in a change of outlook 
and helps people to see “the significance of even seemingly small activities 
relative to their impact on the whole earth system” (Mische 1989: 420). Ecology, 
she argues, is “a new cultural force” (Mische 1989: 424). This argument is valid 
enough, but it pertains to an ecological outlook and does not say much about the 
specific security dimension of ecological security. The question that remains, then, 
is why hitch ecology to security?
It is this question that most concerns Brock (1992).9 10 Brock is more cogent 
than most in warning about the dangers of securitising environmental problems.
9 Conca (1994a) calls this the metaphorical function o f ecological security, saying that it 
embodies symbols and imagery that shape thought and action.
10 The debate between Brock and Mische in New Agenda for Peace Research (Boulding 
1992c) is far more informative than that between Deudney and Gleik in the Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists (1991), and than that between Levy and Homer-Dixon in The
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He argues that the risk is that the concept - regardless of intent - “may be invoked 
to defend the status quo of the present world ecological order, in which the 
distribution of benefits from environmental degradation is clearly in favour of the 
highly industrialized countries” (Brock 1992: 95). Brock is concerned that linking 
security with ecology may affect an active non-resolution of environmental and 
social problems. In this sense his question - “why not refer to sustainable 
development?” - is pertinent (Brock 1992: 94). The intent of ecological security, 
he answers, is that it instrumentalises the high standing of security for 
environmental purposes (the tactic of securitisation). However, ecological security 
may offer more than simply a raising of the profile of environmental problems. If 
we unpack ecology we find a radically different and non-instrumental world view. 
Further, if we unpack security we may find something that sustainable 
development does not do particularly well - that is consider issues of risk and 
resilience (remembering that security is at its core a discourse of risk - see chapter
4).
In response to Brock’s concerns, Mische explains why she “consciously and 
deliberately” uses the term ecological security and why she believes that “the 
merits outweigh the objections” (Mische 1992: 103). Her argument is that it is 
premature to evaluate the concerns about military appropriation (on this score this 
thesis has demonstrated that military appropriation is indeed a very real problem). 
Even so, Mische is not wholly dismissive of the prospect of military involvement, 
arguing that there may be genuine benefits because of the advanced state of 
military technologies relative to civilian technology, and because, as argued in the 
previous chapter, “using such technologies ... could be a positive step toward 
economic and technological conversion” (1992: 104). Mische is fully aware of the 
dangers here, but her principal rejoinder is that despite what the military and 
security elite may do, this does not make ecological destruction “less a real 
security issue - one that vitally affects the future prospects of war or peace - 
indeed, the very survival of future generations” (1992: 104). So, it makes sense to 
talk of ecological security because ecological degradation is a security issue.
The pivotal issue in this debate is how security is understood. Mische 
conceives of security in terms of general threats to well-being, as “the primary 
need to survive”, a need “intrinsic in all human beings, indeed all species” (Mische
Environmental Change and Security Project Report (Simmons 1995; see also the debate in 
Simmons 1996).
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1992: 105). This differs from the dominant Realist conception of security. Thus 
there is a conflict o f ontology and theory here that is reducible only by 
contestation o f this “power word”; yet the difference is not likely to be resolved in 
the near term (Mische 1992: 105). Mische is right, then, to suggest that a key part 
o f achieving peace “lies in human perceptions o f the meaning and scope of 
security ... and o f the best means and systems to promote and sustain it” (Mische 
1992: 111) - this is a key rationale for this thesis.
It is these ‘human perceptions’ that Mische seeks to influence with the 
notion of ecological security. Mische argues that “citizens initiatives may be even 
more important” than the intergovernmental implications o f the term (1992: 113). 
She is sensitive to the local-global synergies in the processes of ecological 
degradation, arguing that individuals and local communities have key roles to 
play, thus: “we need to develop a global culture o f ecological responsibility” 
(1992: 113).11 What is required, she argues, is “global civic literacy” which 
entails “a deep understanding o f the earth system on which our lives and 
economies depend, and of the ways our human activities affect this life system” 
(Mische 1992: 113). As well as information and education, agency is a key issue 
here: “we need not wait for government legislation ... we can take responsibility 
for our own actions in the laws we establish in our own hearts and minds” (Mische 
1992: 115). These are certainly important issues, and will be given further 
consideration in chapter 11.
Ecological security puts forward the idea o f the earth as the larger frame o f 
reference against which ideological differences can be put into perspective 
(Mische 1989: 419). Mathews argues a similar point: “a deepening understanding 
o f ecological relationships will gradually force us to shift our focus from an 
overriding concern for the welfare o f our own species to that of the planet as a 
whole” (Mathews 1993: 31-2). This points to the intuitive difference between 
ecological and environmental security; the former adopts a more ecocentric 
approach. Ecocentrism rejects the human-centred and instrumental 
(anthropocentric) world view. It recognises that all forms o f life have value 
independent o f humanity, and it has a morality based on ecological principles 
(Eckersley 1992, O’Riordan 1995). The potential of the idea of ecological security
Mische’s ecological security project is therefore more than a project of International 
Relations and ‘high politics’.
12 This is very like Boyden’s (1987) conclusion.
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may well lie in this deep ecology-like sentimentality.13 As Mische has noted, 
ecological security requires a new cosmology and a new approach to security; it 
requires moving from a homocentric to a biocentric view of the world” (Mische 
1992: 108).
Mische agrees with this thesis’ contention that security is about risk:
There is a need for some balance between risk and security, and the effort to 
arrive at some balance implies activity and change in response to changing 
conditions. Within living systems, including human social systems, security 
is not a fixed or steady state, but functions more like an organizing principle 
stimulating and steering a dynamic, evolutionary process (Mische 1992: 
105).
This conception of security points to resilience as an organising principle; yet 
resilience has been largely unexplored in relation to ecological and environmental 
security. Indeed, Dalby (1997b) identifies this as a silence in the literature.14 There 
is therefore a need to flesh out some dimensions of this ecology-resilience aspect.
9.2.1 Ecology, resilience and security
There is need for caution when referring to ‘ecology’ in terms of security. Ecology 
is the field which studies biophysical systems. However “most ecological theory is 
highly contested” (Dovers et al 1996: 1151), and there are both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
forms of ecology (Shrader-Frechette 1995). The uncertainty about what ‘ecology’ 
is and constitutes implies that the use of the term in political theory and 
International Relations generalises and possibly ignores important points of 
disagreement among ecologists themselves. In this sense Shevardnadze was more 
correct to refer to ‘political ecology’ (see above).15 Having noted these difficulties, 
what can be safely said of the ‘ecological’ in ecological security is that, at a 
minimum, it refers to a (normative) Green sentiment or ecological outlook. This is 
ecology in the sense of a ‘soft’ and qualitative paradigm emphasising community, 
integrity and stability (Shrader-Frechette 1995: 126).16
lj See Naess (1993) for a review o f deep ecology.
14 It has also received little attention in international agreements on environmental issues 
(Dovers et al 1996).
15 However, political ecology itself is a less than unitary notion. It is used as a critical 
paradigm (Finger 1992, Sachs 1993); as a more geography oriented empirical-investigative 
approach (Blakie and Brookfield 1987, and Bryant 1992); and as an emergent normative 
framework (Low and Gleeson 1998).
16 Rifkin’s Biosphere Politics is a good example of this ecological sensibility applied to 
security (Rifkin 1991). For Rifkin: “the resurrection o f the earth as an organism profoundly 
alters our notion of security, creating the basis for both a cultural and political reformation” 
(Rifkin 1991:255).
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Few authors are sensitive to this problematic use o f ‘ecology in political
theory. Dalby, however, takes the word more seriously, and begins the difficult
process of using ecology in its original sense (as the study o f biophysical systems)
to examine and reformulate security (Dalby 1997c). To understand security
through the use of ecological metaphors is to provide a vastly different perspective
than that of Realism which draws on metaphors o f physics (Dalby 1996c). So:
Ecology suggests a very different understanding o f security. Strength is not 
measured in terms of physical metaphors o f power but in terms of diversity 
and redundancy. Interdependence and symbiosis are crucial to survival. 
Survival relates to sustainability which depends on cycling and conservation 
o f natural resources. This is very different political language, one that 
challenges the claims of state sovereignty, precise boundaries and military 
force. It also challenges the modem presuppositions of security and 
sovereignty as control (Dalby 1992: 515).
Ecological science is increasingly revealing that natural systems are 
complex, heterogenous and subtle (Dovers at al 1996). The principal lessons that 
have been drawn from ecology are that all life depends on a complex web of food 
chains; that these chains involve plants and animals, energy, water, carbon, and 
nutrients; that there are thresholds below which the viability of a species may 
rapidly and perhaps irreversibly decline; and that simple ecosystems tend to be 
more unstable than complex ones (Pezzey 1992: 325).17 Another lesson from 
ecology is that there are finite limits imposed by energy and material availability, 
hence there are limits to the growth of human systems (Meadows et al 1972).
An important and often overlooked lesson from ecology is that ecological 
systems are constantly in short-term flux and long-term change. Dalby (1997c) 
uses this as a metaphor for rethinking political change, arguing that it helps us to 
understand ourselves “as in motion” (Dalby 1997c: 18). The most crucial point 
about ecology, Dalby notes, is that the object o f analysis is less the particular 
entity and more the complex and interconnected system in which it is situated. 
This is reflected in the increasing attention being given to ecological processes 
rather than single species or ecosystems in ecological research (and policy). 
Security from an ecological theory perspective therefore involves thinking about 
the whole rather than the parts. This means shifting the geographic focus from 
sharply delimited political spaces to a milieu o f ill-defined locales in the broader 
setting of the earth. Politics therefore becomes less hierarchical and mechanical; it
17 This latter point is contentious but is generally agreed upon in principle.
18 This dialectical flux/evolution perspective suggests that the Realist tendency to resist 
change is irrational (unrealistic).
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becomes “about discussing matters in ways that deal with practical consequences 
of local actions and which engage in debates about political life that grapple with 
the questions of how one ought to live” [ethics] (Dalby 1997c: 17). In this 
ecology/politics view, the individual is reconfigured as “a participant in eco- 
geographical processes with multiple distant consequences” (Dalby 1997c: 17). 
Drawing on the lessons from ecological theory in this way sheds new light on, and 
reinforces, the dialectical outlook discussed in chapter 2. The implications of this 
for politics, policy and governance are discussed in chapter 11.
Ecological theory posits the notion of resilience to explain the character of
ecological systems which are able to cope with major perturbations:
Essentially, resilience in ecology is concerned with the longer-term survival 
and functioning of populations, species, and ecosystems in changing or 
fluctuating operating environments. Vulnerability, defined generally as 
susceptibility to injury, may be seen as inversely related to resilience: the 
more resilient, the less vulnerable (Handmer and Dovers 1996: 486-487).
In ecological theory, resilience means the propensity of an ecosystem to retain its
organisational structure following perturbation; in other words, the ability of a
system to recover after sudden disturbances (Holling 1973). Ecosystem resilience
is seen to be a function of the complexity of internal interactions between
organisms. According to Holling (1986), the more interconnectedness and
complexity, the more resilient a system is to perturbations. Generally speaking,
individual species within an ecosystem are therefore more ‘secure’ when the
system is complex and diverse. As a metaphor for security, resilience suggests that
human security is a function of social diversity and that that security should be
about reducing vulnerability to change (not resisting change per se). O’Riordan
and Rayner’s (1991) analysis of global environmental risk management supports
the proposition that diversity provides security' when they argue that institutional
plurality enhances social resilience.
Resilience, ergo security, means fostering heterogeneity, keeping options 
open, and keeping a broad view (Handmer and Dovers 1996). These ideas are 
inherent in Bookchin’s Social Ecology (see for example Bookchin 1982, 1986, 
1993). According to Bookchin, nature is a “participatory realm of interactive life- 
forms whose most outstanding attributes are fecundity, creativity, and 
directiveness, marked by a complementarity that renders the natural world the 
grounding for an ethics of freedom rather than domination” (1986: 55). So, 
welfare and well-being are grounded in social diversity; just as diversity is a
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determinant of an ecosystem’s resilience, social diversity, diversity of experience, 
and diversity of lifestyle provide a meaningful wholeness to being, and a benign 
synergism between humans and their habitat.
This theme of diversity offers a new perspective for peace research (Conca 
1994b, Laferriere 1996); thus Mische argues that “respect for the diversity of life 
forms and a diversity of human cultures and expressions is vital to a Peace of the 
Earth” (1991: 142). Diversity also complements the poststructuralist concern for 
plurality; modernity stifles social, cultural and experiential diversity, making it the 
antithesis - and indeed the downfall - of security obtained through unity in 
diversity and complementary difference (see chapter 2 and appendix I). Here we 
see, then, the starkest possible contrast between the prevailing conception of 
environmental security which seeks to secure modernity, and an ecological 
conception of security which seeks to overcome modernity and its homogenisation 
of experience.
Ecological theory emphasises a cyclical conception of time. Ecological 
processes are circular in nature: “study biochemistry and you will see that all of 
nature’s systems are circular designs. Nothing is linear, as most man made 
processes are” (Mathews 1993: 30). There is therefore a misfit between modem 
economic and political systems which are linear in nature, and natural processes 
(Durr 1993). Prins interprets this to mean that there is a need to “drive the linear 
logic of politics circular” (Prins 1990: 729).
Ecological theory and the theory of evolution puts the temporal scale of 
human existence into perspective. If we remember that Homo sapiens sapiens have 
been in existence for approximately 100,000 of 4,000 million years of life on 
earth, it becomes apparent that humans are inconsequential in the scheme of 
evolution; although to be sure, humans have an unheralded capacity to destroy life 
(see chapter 3). Even in this 100,000 year time span it is only in the last 200 years 
(at most) that humans have had the capacity to seriously and irrevocably alter 
natural systems. So, the broad sweep of history demands humility and prudence 
with respect to human behaviour and speciesist claims of supremacy (among all 
species and among human cultures). This long-term perspective radically 
contextualises national political time frames where all problems are held hostage 
to the two-four year electoral cycle (at least in liberal-democracies).
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There are also political-geographical implications of ecological theory. 
Because biophysical process are diverse, complex, and are the sum of untold 
billions of minutiae eventually totalling the entirety of the biosphere, the 
implication for human systems is the need for complex, interdependent, multi­
level and cybernetic systems of governance. Eckersley, for example, recommends 
a multilayered political structure which shifts authority both downward to local 
communities and upward to regional and global bodies, with authority allocated 
according to particular needs (Eckersley 1992). O’Riordan and Rayner also argue 
that to properly deal with the risk of global environmental change there needs to 
be a redistribution of power and “self-reliant anarchic interconnectedness at both 
personal and communal levels” (1991: 97). The argument is that complete 
decentralisation lacks coordination, whereas complete governance from above 
means a lacks sensitivity to context. This argument is revisited in chapter 11. 
Ecological theory strongly suggests that the nation-state’s dominance of formal 
politics and governance is inappropriate, it also problematises the theory and 
practice of sovereignty.
9.2.2 Ecology and sovereignty
Central to ecological theory (and the ecological outlook more generally) is the
notion of interdependence. That ecological and human systems are fundamentally
interdependent suggests that the arbitrary drawing of political boundaries and the
Realist emphasis on national sovereignty are flawed impositions; in Mische’s
terms: “today there is no walling out the rest of the world .... Our national
boundaries .. are permeable membranes through which there is flow of life
between our existence and that of the rest of the world” (Mische 1989: 390); and
“the Earth does not recognise sovereignty as we now know it” (Mische 1989: 394).
Tolba says that “the reality is that sovereign boundaries and political blocs are
already irrelevant in may important ways” (1989: 35). In response, Mische
recommends a new philosophy of sovereignty which regards sovereignty as a:
[DJynamic, interactive process involving a system of relationships and a 
flow of energy and information between different spheres of sovereignty. 
Even among humans, sovereignty can dwell in more than one place at the 
same time: in a family, with parents, in people at local or national civic 
levels, in the state, in a global authority (Mische 1989: 394).
Mische’s alternative geographical imagination challenges Realism’s exclusionary
and simplistic view of the world as a series of homogeneous and independent
political spaces defined by territorial boundaries. However, despite this
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destabilisation of the ideal of sovereignty, the notion is not so amenable to 
manipulation. Westing (1989a) and Byers’ (1991) promotions of bioregions as the 
basis of a new political geography also fail to fully grasp the complexities of 
sovereignty. All of these authors tend to omit consideration of the autonomy that is 
integral to the theory and practice of sovereignty; they do not resolve the 
dilemmas of independence in an interdependent world (Stewart 1997). Conca 
(1994c) argues that the literature which proposes a reconfiguration of sovereignty 
on ecological grounds makes excessively general assumptions about sovereignty. 
Sovereignty, he says, entails a complex bundle of rights, some of which, such as 
non-intervention, are strongly asserted against certain claims that interdependence 
demands a revocation of sovereignty. This is certainly the case when wealthy 
countries exert pressure on pariah countries (which they construct - these are 
typically industrialising countries, for example Brazil and its use of the Amazon 
forests). In response these pariah countries (rightly) stress the sovereign right of 
non-intervention as a norm that must be preserved. So, a positive aspect of 
sovereignty is that it is a means to resist globalisation from above, both in terms of 
environmentally-oriented discourses such as that of the U.S. (see chapter 7), and in 
terms of the imposition of global economic regulations. In sum then, sovereignty 
is multi-faceted and complex, and this “should make us humble about drawing 
general conclusions” (Conca 1994c: 708).
In the final analysis, what is perhaps most difficult about Mische’s new 
philosophy of sovereignty is that she continues to use the term to describe a 
geographical vision which is anti-autonomy, and is therefore fundamentally anti­
sovereign; it is not so much that sovereignty resides in multiple places and 
contexts, it is that individuals have multiple responsibilities. This is not to suggest 
that revisioning politics is easy, as Dalby notes, thinking beyond sovereignty, 
place and enclosure is extremely difficult (Dalby 1997d). However, it is the 
contention of this thesis that what is required is not a reconfiguration of 
sovereignty as such, but rather, what is required is a new vision of politics that 
emphasis community, responsibility and wholeness. This new vision of politics is 
the subject of Part III of this thesis.
222
9.3 What Issues are Ecological Security Issues?
Some critics of ecological security argue that it degrades the analytical and 
normative significance of the concept of security (Deudney 1990 and 1991, Stoett 
1994, Levy 1995a). However, the prevailing Realist security agenda is far more 
robust than this, not least because o f its ability to co-opt and appropriate 
conceptual threats and turn these to its advantage - a process which this thesis has 
already explained. Most importantly though, if security loses its analytical and 
normative significance, this would be a positive outcome for peace and the 
environment given that in the name of security millions have been killed and 
trillions o f dollars wasted on socially and environmentally destructive military 
programs. Because security as presently practiced by states is inherently a practice 
of violence (Dalby 1998c), if security loses its normative significance, then this is 
a loss for the ‘hawks’ and a boon for the ‘doves’.
Other critics argue that an all encompassing notion o f ecological security
strips the concept o f its value as a conceptual device for informing policy (Graeger
1996, Keller 1997). Brock suggests that “if everything is a security matter then
nothing is” (1996: 7), and Gleditsch suggests that:
[V]ery wide definitions .. run the risk of including virtually every form of 
environmental degradation under the heading o f a security threat. If  the 
concept is to be analytically useful, its should probably be limited to those 
forms of environmental degradation which have effects comparable to war 
(Gleditsch 1994: 135).
Such arguments are not particularly sensitive to the enormity of the ecological 
security problematique. What is being referred to (at least by Mische and Rogers) 
is the destruction o f habitat - the global environs - so of course the ambit of 
ecological security will be broad. In this sense ecological security is another 
discourse that says, fundamentally, that we shouldn’t ruin the environment. 
Therefore, the criticism that ecological security is too ill-defined stems from an 
ignorance (be it active or passive) o f the magnitude o f environmental problems.19 
Further, it might also be said that rather than being imprecise, the concept of 
ecological security is indeed more precise than that o f environmental security. As 
suggested in chapter 1, the notion o f environment refers to everything there is, the
19 On different forms of ignorance see Smithson (1989).
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notion of ecological security, in contrast, refers more specifically to threats to the 
integrity of ecosystems.20
Nevertheless the question - “when are environmental issues security 
issues?” - has some validity, at least because there is a need to prioritise policy 
responses (Shaw 1996: 39).21 Put another way, some issues may be important 
enough to warrant ‘securitising’ as a means to prompt an extraordinary policy 
response. Certain criteria can be used to argue that particular ecological issues 
warrant consideration as matters of security, these will now be discussed.
Before preceding though, it should be made clear that an ecological security 
issue is not necessarily a national security issue (as Shaw 1996 would have it), nor 
does an ecological security issue have to have any parallel with war (as Gleditsch 
1994 would have it). The focus of this discussion is on issues of ecological 
security and secondarily on human security, and not, as most would prefer, on 
national security; although there are some implications for the nation-state. " So, 
ecological security is not the same as environmental insecurity as discussed in 
chapter 1 of this thesis. Environmental insecurity is seen by this thesis to be first 
and foremost a human security issue; this will be made more apparent in the 
following chapter. What is being considered here, then, are issues which affect the 
security of ecosystems first and foremost. Of course the distinction between 
human and ecological security is not as clear as this discussion might imply, but 
what is being emphasised here is the security of ecosystems or the biosphere, 
irrespective of the effects this may have on humans.
There are three obvious parameters which help to frame identification of 
important ecological, hence security problems; these are time, space and impact 
(see Dovers 1995, Dovers et al 1996, Handmer 1996a).2j Dovers et al (1996) 
provide a broad three-tiered framework that serves as a filter for prioritising policy 
problems. They identify micro-, meso-, and macro- problems. Mcro-problems are 
spatially and temporally discrete, they are generally local or sectoral; they are not
20 For a discussion of the notion of ecosystem integrity see Westra and Lemons (1995) and 
the papers therein.
21 Levy (1995a), Lipschutz (1992b), and Maddock (1995) pose similar questions.
22 Any framework for prioritising issues, it should also be noted, will have shortcomings, 
not least because of the indivisibility of causes in the sense that the causes are 
fundamentally rooted in modernity. The task of ‘unpackaging the environment’ then, is not 
trivial (Keller 1997: 9)
2j Shaw (1996) identifies time and impact, but misses the scale parameter, adding instead 
that the impact on U.S. security interests must be assessed.
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particularly complex, nor is there much uncertainty; and their resolution is not 
necessarily expensive and can generally be achieved through existing policy 
mechanisms. An example of a micro-problem would be the need to manage or 
provide for the recovery of a single species or vegetation reserve. Micro-problems 
then, clearly do not warrant extraordinary responses or a new conceptual or policy 
paradigm. Meso-problems are for the most part major issues but they are often 
contained within a country, and can be fully addressed by that country. An 
example of a meso-problem would be the conservation of a species across a broad 
geographical range. Meso-problems are thus significant, but do not pose systemic 
threats to patterns of consumption or production, nor do they require a 
fundamental reform of existing policy procedures. Meso-problems may be seen to 
be of relevance to national security, but in most instances do not warrant 
extraordinary responses nor new ways of conceiving of them. Macro-problems are 
“multi-faceted, complex, fraught with uncertainties, spatially and temporally 
diffuse, highly connected to other issues, and threaten major disruption of human 
and natural systems” (Dovers et al 1996: 1146). Examples of macro-problems 
include biodiversity loss and climate change. These are, in Dunn’s (1981) terms, 
poorly structured policy problems, and they require a form of ‘post-normal 
science’ to take account of their complexity (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991). 
Following Dovers at al’s framework, ecological security issues are at a minimum 
these macro-problems.
Another rough filter comes from Handmer (1996a). From a risk perspective, 
Handmer proposes that the problems which warrant most attention (hence 
ecological security problems) are those which are largely invisible; unbounded; 
generally feared and create anxiety; tend to contaminate rather than directly 
damage; are generally irreversible and not self-recovering; and which are 
characterised by profound ignorance. This type of framework points to subtle and 
complex ecological damages. Toxic wastes and radiation contamination are the 
most obvious examples of these ‘new species of problem’ (Erikson 1995,
Handmer 1996a). Such a framework implies that in addition to natural hazards, 
there may be “ecological emergencies” (Timoshenko 1989: 245) or “ecological 
accidents” (Evteev et al 1989: 169). The concept of ecological security would 
appear to have potential in this respect.
Perhaps the most comprehensive framework for ‘scaling and framing policy 
problems’ comes from Dovers (1995). Dovers identifies six problem framing
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attributes: the spatial scale o f causes and effects, the magnitude of possible 
impacts, the temporal scale of possible impacts, the reversibility of impacts, the 
mensurability (measurability) o f factors and processes, and the degree of 
complexity and connectivity. Two issues neatly fall into Dovers' framework: 
biodiversity loss and climate change.
Biodiversity entails species diversity and genetic endowment; it is the very 
essence of evolution and species survival (Murray 1993, Wilson 1992). Its loss is a 
loss which affects the survival chances o f all species, including humans. The 
causes o f biodiversity loss are well known, logging, clearing for agriculture, urban 
sprawl, exotic species, and extension o f monocultures all reduce the area of 
‘wilderness’ in which genetic diversity flourishes. These same activities also cause 
habitat fragmentation which reduces the resilience of these ares to climatic 
variation. Pollution and the extension o f infrastructure also serve to lessen the 
integrity of biodiversity-rich areas.24 Following Dovers’ framework, biodiversity 
loss qualifies as an ecological security issue because it is global in scope, its 
impacts concern survival in fundamental ways, the problem has evolved over a 
long period of time and is not easily - if at all - reversed, it is complex in scope, 
and is difficult for contemporary political and economic systems to 
accommodate.25
Climate change is similarly of such a scope that it warrants urgent attention 
and securitisation. Climate change is global in scope; its impacts are by most 
estimates likely to be very severe; it is a long-term, potentially ‘runaway’ issue 
which is not reversible except in the very long-term (and such a reversal, if at all 
possible, will be by natural more than by human intervention); and the degree of 
connectivity is probably higher than any contemporary issue, making it complex 
and difficult for political and economic systems to deal with (Dovers 1995). 
Therefore, climate change also qualifies as an ecological security issue.
Dovers’ framework is a valid basis upon which to determine ecological 
security issues. A further issue, that of accidental releases from nuclear reactors,
24 Therefore Butts’ suggestion that U.S. military assistance in road building in ‘game 
reserves’ in Africa helps preserve natural environments is misleading (Butts 1994).
25 Biodiversity is an issue that continues to defy adequate coverage by the notion of 
‘environmental security’ not least because it is complex, resists simplistic linkages with 
conflict, and involves a degree of ecological sensitivity to which contemporary political 
logic is immune.
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will now be discussed in the context of this framework as it also arguably qualifies
26as an ecological security.
9.3.1 Nuclear power: a case study of ecological insecurity
Nuclear power has long been a contentious issue in environmental politics. The 
debates are complex and pertain to the vexing problem of energy and its 
multifarious environmental and social impacts. Despite this complexity, debates 
about nuclear power have stagnated for lack of fresh perspectives. This discussion 
seeks to offer a new perspective through the use o f ecological security.
The proposed development of a nuclear power program in Indonesia and the 
Chernobyl reactor accident are the primary examples that inform this discussion. 
Indonesia currently generates 350 kwh of electricity per person, compared with the 
world average o f 2,200 kwh per person (Economic and Business Review Indonesia 
1996: 6). Energy demand is therefore particularly acute, and in response Indonesia 
plans to develop twelve nuclear reactors in the Mount Muria region in Java, a 
region noted for its considerable seismic activity (Ahimsa 1995, Barnett 1997d, 
Schlapfer and Marinova 1995).27
The possibility (risk) that these Indonesian reactors might accidentally 
release radioactive material, not unlike the Chernobyl accident, is cause for 
concern. Eisenbud (1990) notes that there were 14 reactor accidents involving core 
damage between 1952 and 1986. Even proponents of nuclear power acknowledge 
that safety is a problem: “the nuclear community has to ask itself whether it is 
ethical to insist on present technology which is likely to be less safe than it could 
be, and above all which cannot eliminate the universally feared threat o f disaster” 
(Stadie 1996: 24). Probabilistic assessments of the risk o f an accidental release are 
less than helpful: “the frequency of such occurrences is well nigh impossible to 
estimate probabilistically” (WCED 1987: 233). Indonesia’s capacity to safely 
operate nuclear reactors is affected by latent conflict in the political system, and by 
a low degree of bureaucratic accountability and transparency. There are also 
questions about technological competence (Williams 1996). The problems of safe 
construction and operation are compounded by Java’s high level o f seismic 
activity - it is the second most active of nine international seismic zones (Schlapfer
26 This discussion is based on Barnett (1998b).
27 Recent political upheaval in Indonesia is not likely to alter these plans because the most 
ardent proponent - B.J. Habibie - is now President of Indonesia.
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and Marinova 1995).28 Given these human and natural factors, there is real risk of 
a reactor accident in Indonesia.
The most difficult ecological policy problems are those with the most 
widespread impact (.spatial scale), particularly if the impacts are spread across 
political boundaries (Dovers 1995: 96). Taylor and Whitehouse (1996) have run an 
atmospheric chemical tracer transport model which shows that an accidental 
release of airborne radioactive material in Indonesia would effect Australia,
Brunei, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, and of course 
Indonesia itself. Java, where Indonesia plans to build its first reactors, has a 
population of 115 million people. To compare, the Chernobyl accident spread the 
long lived radioisotopes Cesium-137 and Strontium-90 over an area of some 
100,000 square kilometres (Marples 1993: 39). However, in the tropical climate of 
Southeast Asia there is more rainfall than in Eastern Europe (particularly during 
summer). This is significant as rainfall seems to deliver higher concentrations of 
radioactivity (Barnett and Taylor 1997). So, even if an accident in Indonesia 
released a smaller volume of contaminants than Chernobyl, it might nevertheless 
result in more intense damage.
Within each nation-state at risk from exposure to fallout from a reactor 
accident in Indonesia, there are places and people who are disproportionately more 
at risk. This is particularly true in Australia. Taylor and Whitehouse (1996) show 
that much of Northern Australia will receive fallout. The ratio of Aboriginal 
people to non-Aboriginal people in this zone is many times greater than the 
national mean; 25% of the Northern Territory’s population is Aboriginal for 
example, and the whole of the area at risk would contain a very significant 
proportion of Australia’s total Aboriginal population (NLC 1995). Australia’s 
Aboriginal population therefore bears a much greater risk burden that the non-
29Aboriginal population.
Continuing to apply Dovers’ (1995) framework, the magnitude of possible 
impacts is the degree of damage to natural and human systems. Greenhalgh (1996)
28 An ‘earthquake proof reactor in Java would have to be able to resist quakes in the order 
o f nine on the Richter scale - this would seem to be an unprecedented standard in nuclear 
engineering (see for example Nedderman 1995). This of course assumes that an 
‘earthquake proof reactor is indeed possible - something Australia’s Fox Inquiry doubted 
(Commonwealth o f Australia 1976).
29 In terms of places, a quick examination reveals that Northern Australia contains a 
substantial component of Australia’s least disturbed natural heritage, both in area and 
ecological value (see chapter 8).
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notes that 20-25% of the annual budgets of the Ukraine and Belarus are now spent 
on coping with the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, although Savchenko 
(1995) considers the economic costs to be unbounded. In health terms, some of the 
populations exposed to fallout from the Chernobyl accident have experienced a 
hundred-fold increase in childhood thyroid cancers (WHO 1996). Tellingly in 
terms of security, the magnitude of the clean up after Chernobyl has been likened 
to the task of rebuilding after the German-Soviet war (Marples 1993).
The third of Dovers’ problem framing attributes is that of the temporal scale 
of possible impacts. The release of twenty radionuclides from the damaged 
Chernobyl reactor resulted in short-term (but intensely damaging) and long-term 
effects (NEI 1996). It is estimated that between 50 and 60% of the reactor core’s 
inventory of Iodine-131 was released, causing the aforementioned massive 
increases in thyroid cancer (NEI 1996). Iodine-131, however, remains active for 
only about 80 days. Other longer lasting radioisotopes were also released at 
Chernobyl, including Cesium-137 (20-40% of the reactor core’s inventory), and 
Strontium-90 (4-6% of reactor core’s inventory); both of which will remain active 
and harmful to human health for up to 300 years (Clayton et al 1986). Smaller 
amounts of very long lived plutonium were also released (NEI 1996). In terms of 
Dovers’ fourth attribute - reversibility - the widespread permeation of these long 
lived radioisotopes into soil, water, plants and animals makes contamination 
pervasive and irredeemable. The fifth attribute - mensurability - is the degree to 
which we understand and can describe the causes, impacts, factors, and processes 
pertinent to the problem (Dovers 1995: 97). Given the pervasive and largely 
invisible accumulation of radionuclides in the environment, the degree to which 
science can predict outcomes from a reactor accident is limited; the problem is 
thus highly immensurable.
The last of Dovers’ (1995) framing and scaling attributes is the degree of 
complexity and connectivity (the essence of the mensurability problem). In effect, 
to appreciate the scale and nature of the impacts of a reactor accident, we need to 
be able to identify all those ecosystems at risk and then understand the ways in 
which each works and interacts with each other; a task possibly forever beyond the 
capacity of human understanding. The issue becomes more complex when we 
factor in the whole array of political, economic and social factors and the ways in 
which these interact (both in cause and effect). There are few policy issues that can 
rival the nuclear power problem in terms of the complex and interdependent
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interaction among and between ecological and human systems on a variety of 
scales.
Proponents o f nuclear power argue that because it produces negligible
amounts o f greenhouse gases it is a viable solution to the problem of other fossil
fuel based energy sources. Keepin puts this argument into perspective:
To displace coal alone would require the construction of a new nuclear plant 
every two or three days for nearly four decades, and even then, future 
growth in oil and natural gas consumption would still be sufficient to keep 
carbon dioxide emissions at or above today’s levels until supplies are 
exhausted (Keepin 1990: 4).
In ecological security terms we are thus presented with a trade off between the 
meta-environmental insecurity associated with climate change and the meta­
insecurities associated with nuclear power. However, this is not an either/or 
proposition - there are viable renewable energy alternatives available. These ‘soft’ 
energy options have greater long-term potential than fossil fuel and nuclear based 
energy sources (World Bank 1992). Their realisation is hampered by the 
displacement o f energy research and development funds into resolving the 
(seemingly unsolvable) problems of nuclear power; the biggest barrier to the 
implementation o f a sustainable energy system is not technical, but political 
(Dovers 1994). In terms of global energy inequities, the issue is neither the 
industrialising world’s right, nor need, to increase electricity supply, but the ways 
in which they do so; renewable energy sources are a viable, cheap, clean and more 
precautionary alternative to nuclear power. Transfer o f renewable energy 
technologies to the industrialising world must be a policy priority.
Accidental releases from nuclear reactors have widespread, long-lived, 
irreversible, complex, and unpredictable negative ecological and social impacts.
j0 For a discussion of the national and regional security implications of Indonesia’s nuclear 
power program see Barnett (1997d, 1998b, 1998c), and Barnett and Taylor (1997). For a 
discussion of the policy implications for Australia, see Barnett (1998c), where I argue that 
for Australia to be consistent in its objection to Indonesia’s nuclear power program it must 
be consistent with regard to its own part in the nuclear fuel cycle; it would be overly 
hypocritical to object to nuclear power in Indonesia yet continue to sell uranium. So, a 
consistent policy that adds credibility to Australia’s conviction is to prohibit all uranium 
exports to all markets, except for the small amounts needed for medical purposes. This 
would provide a much needed reaffirmation of Australia’s commitment to the peace, 
stability and security of the Asia-Pacific Region. It would also be a long overdue political 
statement about the hazards of nuclear power. Banning uranium exports will give Australia 
a clear and uncompromised position on the issue of nuclear weapons non-proliferation, and 
will create opportunities for subsequent diplomatic initiatives to overcome the problems of 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Finally, this would resolve the intense debate at 
present about the expansion of uranium mining in Kakadu National Park.
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Therefore nuclear power plants are a serious (albeit latent) risk to ecological 
security. In terms of the need to determine which ecological issues deserve 
security status, then, nuclear power rivals other meta-problems such as climate 
change and biodiversity loss. Securitising nuclear power in this way is useful as it 
presents the problem as one which jeopardises the national interest and so requires 
an extraordinary policy response.
9.4 Conclusions: Concept and Contest
This chapter has reviewed and extended the concept of ecological security by 
applying ecological theory to the concept of security. Ecological security is a 
valuable way of thinking about security, especially when it incorporates the 
ecological notion of resilience. Applied to security, resilience means embracing 
diversity and complexity which stands in contrast to Realism which denies and 
oppresses diversity and complex realities. This chapter has considered the 
implications of ecology for the theory and practice of sovereignty. It has 
tentatively suggested that a focus on sovereignty is misplaced, and that what is 
required instead is a broader project that seeks to rethink politics and governance. 
This chapter has also discussed one way to prioritise ecological problems for 
policy attention. It has argued that climate change, biodiversity loss and nuclear 
power are substantial issues that can rightly be considered as ecological security 
issues. The notion of ecological security has great potential and could be 
developed further, although, as argued below, the concept is perhaps more useful 
to ecologists than to the Green and peace movements.
In some respects the concept of ecological security shares the same 
difficulties that plague environmental security; it risks a militarisation of Green 
issues, it entrenches rather than undermines national power, and it invokes 
inappropriate responses (Deudney 1992, Brock 1991, Lipschutz 1992b). Conca 
argues that ecological security reinforces notions of stasis, bolsters sovereignty, 
mixes metaphors such that it becomes harder to imagine a peaceful and 
ecologically sustainable world, and militarises the environmental agenda (Conca 
1994a: 18). The principal dilemma, he argues, is that “the cost of elevating 
ecology to the level of a national-security concern may be its militarisation” 
(1994a: 19). Hence the ‘securitisation’ issue re-emerges. If ecological security is a 
‘Trojan horse’ that seeks to reform the meaning of security by working from
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within, according to Conca, it has been captured and redeployed in conceptual 
counterattacks.
Conca’s concerns about ecological security are important but need to be 
qualified in at least two key ways. First, Conca is one of those who conflates 
environment and ecology; so he does not appreciate the difference between the 
two concepts, and as a result his critique refers more to environmental than 
ecological security. Second, were Conca to think through the implications of 
ecology for security, as Dalby, Mische and Rogers do (and as this chapter has 
sought to do), he might consider that ecological security entails a more specific 
ecocentric sentiment and offers new metaphors for security. To be fair, however, 
there have been too few serious efforts to draw out the implications of ecological 
as opposed to environmental security; both Dalby and Mische do this to some 
degree, but such accounts are not comprehensive enough (nor is this chapter). Part 
of the future agenda of ecological security must therefore be to ‘ecologise’ 
security more fully. This might proceed in the first instance by further exploration 
of resilience as a key concept.
Despite seeking to undermine the Realist approach to security and 
sovereignty, proponents of ecological security have not had the same impact on 
the dominant discourse as counter-hegemonic proponents of environmental 
security such as (for example) Brown (1977) and Mathews (1989). One need look 
no further for proof of this than that ‘ecological security’ is never used by the U.S. 
security establishment, nor by the vast majority of authors who write about 
environment-security linkages. This is a problem of the politics of discourse. To 
continue the analogy, this thesis contends that the Trojan horse of ecological 
security has been left outside the gates of the Realist security compound, whereas 
environmental security has been wheeled inside. So, although ecological security 
speaks to the whole issue of environment and security in important and innovative 
ways, it is, in effect, not heard by the mainstream. Ecological security does not do 
that which ‘environmental security’ does so well - that is contest the terminology 
and the discursive terrain of national security. It is this contestation that makes 
environmental security valuable. In deploying alternative language ecological 
security is marginal to this discursive contest.
To be sure, there is something to be said for using new words to address old 
problems. As has been shown, environmental security is a risky venture for
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proponents of a Green and peaceful future. In this sense environmental security is 
a form of conceptual speculation where the concept is ventured in order to 
potentially gain a renegotiation of the conceptual bases of security. The danger is 
the colonisation of the concept such as has occurred in the U.S. (chapter 7). Using 
new words like ecological security may temporarily avert this danger. However, 
the potential gain of this speculative exercise is the destabilisation o f Realist 
security discourse and practice by highlighting its contradictions and 
discontinuities, ultimately leading to its possible collapse, or at least a more 
benign synthesis.31 So although the negative outcome of securitising 
environmental issues is real, the positive outcome is worth striving for. This 
contest is one in which ecological security has not (and probably will not) played a 
key role because o f its alternative vocabulary. It may seem pedantic to deny the 
efficacy o f ecological security because of the word ‘ecological’ as opposed to 
‘environmental’, but in the realm of discourse key words matter.
This issue o f contest and cooptation is not new. The history o f political 
discourse is a history o f deploying words as signs, symbols and metaphors to 
legitimate a particular goal, be it the status quo or some other preordained 
outcome. This is the essence o f counterrevolution; the continuous capture, 
emptying and subsequent redeployment of words and ideas that initially threaten. 
This is the fate of peace when paired to war; of socialism when used by apologists 
of cronyism; of defence when used to justify attack; offree speech, democracy, 
freedom, liberty and rights as justifications for verbal abuse, the politics o f hatred, 
the freedom to associate as the freedom to do violence en masse, the liberty to 
engage in wilful exploitative capitalist enterprise, and the right to bear arms and 
shoot first; it is also the fate o f sustainable development. The answer is not to 
abandon the language of peace and hope, but to defend it. Abandoning a term 
because it is corrupted is to retreat from the struggle for a better future. Throwing 
up new terms to be appropriated does not stop the problem. This is the unwitting 
deeper failing of ecological security, it is a sympathetic bystander on the sidelines 
of the substantive contest.
To conclude, although ecological security has many strengths, it fails to 
effectively engage in a fundamental function o f environmental security - the 
contestation and delegitimisation of security itself. For this reason this thesis 
prefers to maintain the label ‘environmental security’, but to empty it o f its
31 Or the abandonment of the term by the security elite.
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malignant content and refill it with notions of human security and positive-peace 
(the function of the following chapter). Putting people first in this way does not 
mean ignoring the lessons of ecology. The principal difference is that putting 
people first and retaining the label maintains the ability to contest the substantive 
issue of what security is and for whom it applies. So, many of the themes and 
ideas discussed in this chapter are of relevance to the next chapter’s reformulation 
of environmental security, and these should be borne in mind throughout the 
remainder of this thesis. In this respect this chapter has served a valuable function 
by acting as a transition between the dominant approach to environmental security 
and the following alternative and peace promoting approach.
Part III
Towards Environmental Security for People
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Introduction to Part III 
Towards Environmental Security for People
Having explicitly revealed the critical and normative disposition of this thesis in 
chapter 2, subsequent chapters have advanced a number of claims upon which Part 
III of this thesis is based. First, environmental degradation is now more severe and 
widespread than at any other time in history, some problems are now global in 
reach, and environmental degradation is inextricably a product of modernisation 
(chapter 3). The environmental degradation generated by processes of 
modernisation has further exacerbated insecurity (chapter 1). However, given that 
human history is a history of adaptation and change, environmental degradation 
and insecurity are not insurmountable; the question then becomes - how might we 
overcome environmental insecurity? - a question which Part III begins to address.
The second claim of this thesis is that the political Realist approach to 
security is violent because it propagates the war-system, it excludes consideration 
of the needs of people, and it impedes peaceful and ethical political action (chapter 
4). There is a pressing need to move beyond the Realist approach. The notion of 
environmental security was originally intended to do this by broadening the ambit 
of Realism (chapter 5). However, this did not modify the central tenets of the 
Realist approach, although it did reinforce the need for common and cooperative 
approaches to security. The third claim, then, is that it is not enough to tinker with 
the Realist security agenda; if environmental security is to serve the interests of 
peace, the environment, and people, it needs to be far more theoretically 
comprehensive to help prevent its appropriation by Realism (the purpose of 
chapter 10). It also needs to be able to offer some specific recommendations for 
action in order to be able to better contest the meaning and practice of 
environmental security (the purpose of chapter 11).
The fourth claim of this thesis is that it is unproductive and misleading to 
reduce the concept environmental security to consideration of the linkages 
between environmental degradation and violent conflict (chapter 6). This has 
redirected environmental security into the same epistemological and theoretical 
niche in which Realism is most comfortable; if environmental security is to serve
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the interests of people, peace, and the environment, then the preoccupation with 
violent conflict needs to be avoided. The fifth claim is that understanding 
environmental security in terms of national security does not serve the interests of 
most people, peace, or the environment so long as security is seen in Realist terms. 
Chapter 7 has shown that when interpreted by the nation-state (at least the U.S.), 
environmental security is used to legitimate the state and the military, both of 
which, without fundamental reform, are complicit in the problem of environmental 
insecurity and the broader problems of modernity. This thesis is in principle not 
opposed to understanding environmental degradation as a national security issue, it 
is opposed to the particular Realist interpretation of national security that 
appropriates environmental concerns to serve its own interests. The further claim 
here is that although the nation-state is a problematic referent for environmental 
security, there is still a need to engage with it and its institutions.
The sixth claim of this thesis is that the military is a significant cause of 
environmental degradation both in times of war and times of not-war (chapter 8). 
However, simply ignoring the military is not a sufficient response because it must 
be reformed to overcome environmental insecurity. It was argued that involving 
the military in environmental protection and restoration is one way to overcome its 
reluctance to change; this may make a significant contribution towards the 
conversion of this most important of institutions. Finally, this thesis has claimed 
that ecological security is a concept with considerable merit, but that it is marginal 
to the substantive contest over the meaning of security (chapter 9). The best 
strategy, then, is to incorporate the content of ecological security into a 
reformulated notion of environmental security which can advance the interests of 
peace, people, and the environment while retaining its ability to contest the 
meaning and practice of security. This is the purpose of the following chapter.
Thus far this thesis has talked about what environmental security should not 
be rather than what it should be. Although polemical, the critical approach is safe 
in as much as one’s own perspective and recommendations are not exposed to 
scrutiny. So, it is tempting to do no more than critique environmental security, but 
this thesis feels obliged to outline an alternative approach. This is the function of 
Part III, which begins by reformulating environmental security in light of the 
failings of existing approaches. This reformulated environmental security concept 
serves the interests of people rather than states, it focuses on peace rather than war, 
and it advocates change rather than stasis. It also retains the ability to contest the
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meaning and practice of security. Taking the concept of security away from the 
state and towards people in this way “points to a serious political project” (Walker 
1987b: 25). Such a project involves rethinking political practice, and this is the 
function of chapter 11, which discusses the implications of the human-centred 
reformulation for politics, policy, and governance.
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Chapter 10. Environmental (Human) Security
10.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to reformulate the concept of environmental security such that 
it overcomes the limitations of existing approaches. With the exception of 
ecological security, in as much as they are concerned with violent conflict and 
they refer most frequently to the security of the nation-state, existing approaches 
are Realist in orientation. The principal failings of these approaches can be 
summarised as follows: they propagate the security establishment and the state; 
they prepare for war rather than peace; they defend rather than seek reform of the 
environmentally destructive modem way of life; and they ignore the needs and 
desires of most of the world’s population. In short, as presently conceived, 
environmental security secures the processes that destroy the environment and 
create insecurity for the many for the benefit of the few. Ecological security has 
few such limitations, but fails to contest the meaning and practice of security and 
environmental security because of the uncommon label ‘ecological’. So, what is 
required is a reformulation of environmental security which draws on the strengths 
of ecological security, and which does not prioritise the nation-state and issues 
conflict above the needs of those who are most environmentally insecure. This 
therefore entails reformulating environmental security in terms of human security 
and peace.
This chapter begins by discussing the human security literature to establish 
themes which inform the subsequent conceptualisation of environmental security. 
It then defines and elaborates on the idea of environmental security for people. 
Next it discusses the potential of the concept and how it relates to sustainability. It 
then considers the question of whether it is valid to ‘securitise’ environmental 
problems, and following this it discusses risk and resilience in terms of 
environmental insecurity. The validity of this conceptualisation of environmental 
security is then ‘tested’ by answering some questions posed in the literature.
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10.2 Reclaiming Security for People
In the last 10 years there has been a considerable amount o f literature which 
advances the concept o f security beyond national security. This literature puts the 
needs o f people above the needs o f the nation-state, and it commonly talks of 
‘human security’. It is therefore highly relevant to this thesis.1
Human-centred conceptions of security begin by asking the question - 
whose security? Asking - whose security? - is subversive; it questions the state’s 
monopolisation o f political legitimacy and violence (Walker 1987b). Asking - 
whose security? - opens up space to consider alternative meanings and referents of 
security, as well as alternative strategies. Asking - whose security? - “threatens to 
undermine the most basic presumptions about the possibility of security and the 
possibility of political community” (Walker 1987b: 12).
The end o f the cold war, together with advances in communication 
technologies, the continued expansion o f capitalism, the destruction o f nature, and 
the declining purposefulness o f force in world politics has lead Rosenau to 
describe the 1990s as ‘post-international politics’ (Rosenau 1990). For Rosenau 
‘security’ is becoming increasingly elusive due to the interaction between 
globalising and localising dynamics. The political space opened by this global- 
local interaction creates a need for new forms o f identity and community in 
response to shared insecurities (Rosenau 1994). Walker explores the potential in 
this new world: “the fact that insecurity is now felt both locally and globally .. 
provides an opportunity to redefine security in ways that stress both its local 
immediacy and global reach” (Walker 1987a: 187). For Walker there is no reason 
why forms of political community which give priority to difference, pluralism, 
‘conversation’, and openness cannot emerge in the post-cold war world. His 
suggestion is that prevailing concepts o f security can only be overturned by 
“refusing the equation o f security with identity, and thus with the obliteration of 
difference; a refusal that necessarily constitutes a struggle for new forms for 
political community” (Walker 1987b: 23).
For many feminists it is not only war but also unjust relations of domination 
and subordination which must be overcome for there to be peace and human
1 This discussion is based on Barnett (1997b).
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security.2 Tickner’s feminist reformulation begins from the premise that the desire 
for close relationships and belonging are undervalued aspects of human nature, 
and so these form the basis of her approach to security. Emphasising life-giving as 
opposed to life-destroying processes is important: “the preservation of life, not its 
destruction, must be valued” (Tickner 1992: 138). A deepening of referents and 
scales o f actions is also a key part o f the feminist approach; the micro is seen to be 
reified in the macro, the personal is seen to be political, and so “issues o f global 
security are interconnected with, and partly constituted by, local issues; therefore 
the achievement o f comprehensive security depends on action by women and men 
at all levels o f society” (Tickner 1992: 142). This question of individual action 
will be taken up in chapter 11.
The Secure Australia Project (SAP) puts forward a comprehensive set of 
alternatives to thinking about Australia’s security (Cheeseman and Kettle 1990, 
Smith and Kettle 1992).3 The SAP begins with the simple statement: “the concept 
of security has been hijacked” (Smith 1992: 25). It gives consideration to the 
identity aspects o f Australian security discourse (Pettman 1992); to human rights 
as a security issue (Jones 1992); to Australia’s indigenous people as a security 
referent (Pettman 1992, Smith 1992); to the environmental dimensions of 
Australian security (Bolt 1992); to security at the community level (Bretherton 
1992); and to Australian security policy (Camilleri 1992, Hunt 1992, King 1992, 
Smith 1992). These alternative referents and alternative ways o f thinking have 
deepened the level of analysis and have posited different forms o f insecurity. The 
SAP has a geographical frame of reference that looks both within and beyond the 
state with equal measure (Dalby 1996a). The alternative geopolitical reasoning 
that underlies the SAP does “not operate on either the premise o f enmity or the 
premise o f substantially impermeable state boundaries” (Dalby 1996a: 74). This 
alternative security position is premised on a careful manipulation o f existing 
Australian security discourse, particularly evident in Cheeseman’s proposals to 
reformulate Australia’s military force structure to render it non-offensive 
(Cheeseman 1989, 1990, 1992).
2 This discussion is informed largely by Tickner’s (1992) particular feminist approach to 
security. Other feminist approaches may differ (see chapter 2 and appendix I), however 
Tickner’s account is widely recognised and it talks directly to ‘security’.
3 Jennings (1994) offers a critique of the SAP which is valuable not so much as a critique 
of the SAP, but as an insight into the way in which a Realist ontology tightly constrains 
identification with alternative possibilities.
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In One World Many Worlds Walker speaks of security from the perspective 
of critical social movements (1988). The lesson learned from these movements is 
that insecurity takes many forms, and so approaches to security must be diverse, 
multidimensional, and located at many levels of society. A single dominant 
security concept (such as national security) therefore does not satisfy the full range 
of security needs of people. Walker has consistently argued that rethinking 
security involves a rethinking of the relationship between security and political 
practice. A necessary first step is the democratisation of security issues, a call also 
made by the SAP and by feminists. Thus “security is not something that can be left 
to someone else. In a modem world, effective security must mean democratic 
security” (a subject addressed in chapter 11) (Walker 1988: 126).
The potential impact that social movements might have on world politics
has also been considered by Stephenson:
A series of popular movements have arisen since the 1960’s, based on a 
non-violent approach to social and political change and on a view of peace 
which incorporates human rights and social justice as well as the absence of 
war .... they have exemplified a way of thinking that reinforces the notion .. 
that force is no longer the primary determinant in international relations, and 
carries this notion through to the sub-national level as well. A new concept 
of power is involved. (Stephenson 1988: 67-8).
Stephenson suggests that important factors in the development of alternative
security systems include the work of peace researchers in imagining alternative
futures, the development of non-offensive and non-violent methods of defence
(and resistance), the widespread application of peace education, and growth in the
field of conflict resolution (Stephenson 1988).
In a similar mode of analysis, Boulding (1988) has discussed the role of 
International Non-Govemmental Organisations (INGO) in generating a global 
civic culture. INGO’s operate within a multidimensional security paradigm which 
complements positive peace. They are active in resisting and promoting 
alternatives to existing policies on a wide range of issues that affect the well-being 
of people, including trade, human rights, arms control and the environment. Like 
Stephenson, Boulding sees merit in peace education and alternative futures 
workshops as a means to assist people and counterculture movements to wrest 
authority over security matters from states.
The recognition that the home state (rather than the ‘enemy’ state) is most 
often the biggest threat to a person’s security is the starting point for an important 
line of security reasoning made by Booth (1991). For Booth, security defined as
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‘power over’ occurs at the expense of others; hence “true (stable) security can only
be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it” (1991: 319).
Booth argues that ‘emancipation’ should be given precedence as a way of thinking
about security: “emancipation, not power or order, produces true security.
Emancipation, theoretically, is security” (1991: 319). The question ‘whose
security’ is answered resolutely here: “humans are the ultimate referent” (Booth
1991: 319). Integral to Booth’s approach is the ethical premise that one person’s
freedom is conditional on the freedom of all people. The policy implication is a
breaking down of the distinction between the domestic and the foreign. In
suggesting that true security depends on the security and freedom of all, Booth
draws on Weber’s notion of methodological individualism; ie that individual
action can recreate society (see chapter 11). Shaw (1993) also considers this idea
of individual action as a means to security. He draws heavily on Gidden’s
discussion of the effects of modernity on the individual. Shaw concludes his
attempt to integrate sociological theory with security by saying:
Individual and collective human security do not depend irredeemably on the 
state context... Security issues are faced at all levels of social life. The 
concept of security is a general concept of social science (Shaw 1993: 174).
The United Nations Development Program uses the concept of human
security to assist in the framing of development and justice issues (1994, 1995).
The UNDP adopts a comprehensive approach to human security, identifying seven
components: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and
political (1994) 4 The 1994 Human Development Report says that:
Human security is people-centred. It is concerned with how people live and 
breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much 
access they have to market and social opportunities - and whether they live 
in conflict or peace (1995: 229);
In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that 
did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode 
in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a 
concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity (UNDP 
1994: 22).
So the UNDP has sought to deploy the word ‘security’ in its more intuitive and 
positive sense to serve the interrelated interests of peace, justice, development and
4 The United States’ Under Secretary of State, Tim Wirth, also recognises the importance 
of human security, and conceives of it in a way similar to the UNDP. For Wirth, “human 
security is built on a foundation of peace and political stability, physical health, and 
economic well-being”, and “there are close connections between poverty, the environment, 
the economy and security”. He suggests that “we now need to liberate ourselves - from 
outworn policies, from old assumptions, from fixed views..” (cited in Simmons 1995: 55). 
This is radical given the context from which Wirth writes.
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human rights. This represents a significant contribution from a leading and 
respected international body.
The idea of common security has been popular since the publication of
Common Security in 1982 (ICDSI 1982). Common security, however, has
traditionally been equated with the security concerns seen to be common to states',
such concerns do not encompass many of the security issues common to people.
Not unlike the UNDP, however, Dalby understands common security in human
rather than international terms, saying that:
Security is truly common when the weakest are offered the possibility of a 
future free from famine, violence, rape, and the role of nuclear hostage to 
the rivalry of states. Security is common when it ensures that the poor have 
access to resources, freedom from environmental degradation and the 
pollution of others’ economic activities, and from the assurances of these 
things into the foreseeable future. As such, common security should have a 
clear commitment to social justice, but not just to intra-generational equity. 
Future generations require a commitment also to inter-generational equity, 
ensuring that actions of today don’t leave security problems for future 
generations (Dalby 1991: 30).
Security productively intersects with sociology on the subject of modernity. 
Walker observes that “contemporary strategic debate is particularly arcane. 
Decisions are made - or at least justified - on the basis of esoteric forms of 
information which only a small elite can successfully claim to know” (Walker 
1987a: 177). An implication of this is that security, as an ‘expert system’, is 
another disembedding process. Giddens (1991) is concerned with the way such 
expert systems induce ‘existential anxiety’ and erode ‘ontological security’ (see 
chapter 3). One response to the ontological insecurity individuals now face is to 
reinvigorate modes of being that have been lost in modernity. In addition to 
material requirements (nutritious food, clean air and water, shelter), Boyden 
identifies many basic social needs that together can be considered as fundamental 
to the existential well-being and security of people, these include: an emotional 
support network for giving and receiving care, strong family ties, opportunities for 
extended community interaction, a diverse and stimulating environment, 
opportunities for creative expression and learning, opportunities for spontaneous 
behaviour, and a personal sense of involvement, purpose, belonging, excitement, 
challenge, satisfaction, love, enjoyment and confidence (Boyden 1987: 79).
It was argued in chapter 3 that non-violence has historically been the normal 
state of affairs between humans. So, it makes sense that “to erect national security 
regimes on the reverse assumption is to do injustice to the processes which really
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guarantee survival through time” (Clements 1990: 2). Security, in this view, rests 
on more than avoiding danger, it rests on a willingness to act in good faith and 
with trust in others. Because (most) people learn basic lessons about trust and 
security in close personal relationships, the principles that underlie these should be 
used to inform relationships between social groups, including states. Clements 
defines security as:
[A] fundamental social process (with some instinctive spontaneous 
properties) aimed at achieving relatively safe social, political and economic 
(spaces) communities. Such communities enable people to live, move and 
be true to their own cultures, languages and identities without fear of direct 
or indirect violent threat. Integrative relations are both a cause and a 
consequence of such safe spaces and they will dominate destructive and 
threatening relations. Safe communities are characterised by institutions 
which facilitate cooperation, the non-violent resolution of conflict and 
peaceful social transformation. (Clements 1990: 7).
Like peace, security is viewed here as a process, as a struggle to maintain a
reasonable standard of well-being for all people. Clements asks if there can be
“any real security for anyone in a world that is so radically divided into rich and
poor?”, the answer to which is no, hence “security, democracy and equality are
closely interlinked concepts” (Clements 1990: 19 and 14). Not unlike Booth and
Shaw, Clements suggests that security ultimately rests with the power of
individuals to make society as they wish it to be (Clements 1990: 7). This returns
us to the question of the role of individuals (discussed in chapter 11).
A useful list of alternative norms that undergird these peace-infused notions 
of security comes from a conjunction of lists developed by Clements (1990) and 
Gurtov (1991). This serves as a useful juxtaposition to the norms of Realism listed 
in chapter 4, they are:
An optimistic view of human nature;









These norms are consistent with the normative position this thesis adopts (chapter 
2). To this list it should be added that peace means more than war, humans are not
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necessarily violent, and risks are not necessarily deliberately imposed dangers. 
Altogether, these norms undergird the human-centred approach to environmental 
security outlined below.
All of these approaches to security are ‘dissident discourses’ (Dalby 1996a). 
They are engaged in a conception of politics that transcends the state. They 
understand security not so much in the negative sense o f protecting the status quo, 
but as the positive task o f establishing and then maintaining basic human rights, 
justice and freedom. They conceptualise security in ways that are proactive, 
positive and non-violent. These dissident discourses are engaged in a reclamation 
of the concept of security to serve people and positive peace. These radical 
approaches are attuned to what Walker calls the “dialectical interplay between 
security and insecurity” in human affairs (1988: 126). Walker reminds us that 
vulnerability is not necessarily a negative phenomenon: “to be vulnerable is to be 
open. To be open is to create the opportunity for communication and exchange, for 
learning and commitment” (1988: 127). Security entails balancing risk and fear 
with trust and dialogue (after Giddens 1990); it is best attained through caring 
relationships and ethical life-political action.5
At the recent people’s Conference on Alternative Security Systems in the
Asia-Pacific a declaration was passed which encapsulates many of the themes of
this discussion, and which points to the future of a critically aware theory and
practice o f security. The Declaration was produced by concerned people in the
industrialising world, which reinforces the important point that “there is a genuine
propensity” in these places “to link environmental security to personal and
economic security” (O’Riordan 1995: 25). Hence it is hoped that this thesis and
the following construction o f environmental security is true to the concerns and
needs of the most vulnerable of people. The Declaration o f the Conference on
Alternative Security Systems in the Asia Pacific said that:
Security must be fundamentally redefined, democratised and reclaimed by 
people. It must replace narrow state, military or market interests with 
comprehensive human security which includes the social, cultural, gender, 
economic and environmental aspects o f security. It must also recognise the 
need for peace-building and the prevention of violent conflict. This requires 
both a transformation of existing structures and relationships and the 
creation o f new structures and relationships which include groups 
previously marginalised.
5 What is required, according to Ashley, is “the courage to admit that we simply do not 
know with certainty what we fear and to insist that this uncertainty should not in itself be a 
cause of generalised fear, for social mobilisation, for the amassing of resources in order to 
bring all time and space under control” (Ashley 1989: 311).
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Real security is based on establishing democratic relations among men and 
women, within societies, between people and the state and between states 
themselves, and within international institutions. Establishing substantive 
democracy is fundamental.
To achieve real security we need to develop processes and institutions based 
on solidarity, participation, equity and respect to ensure that the individual 
and collective concerns of people - protection of life, livelihoods, 
communities, cultures and the environment - are central
(Democratising Security: Declaration of the Conference on Alternative 
Security Systems in the Asia Pacific, 1997, available at Nautilus Institute 
website http://www.nautilus.org).
The remainder of this chapter advances a concept of environmental security that is 
consistent with this declaration, and with human security and peace.
10.3 Environmental Security for People
Human security is based on the following premises:
The dynamics of globalisation and the end of the cold war present new 
opportunities for reclaiming security;
Many people have legitimate day-to-day needs beyond that of freedom from 
warfare (for the most part a product o f ‘national security’ anyway), and 
these needs are often not provided for by nation-states;
Insecurity takes many forms and originated from many different sources, so 
approaches to human security must be diverse;
Security as the discursive practice of fixing personal identity to the nation 
conditions individuals to support violent practices in the name of national 
security;
Rich interpersonal relationships; a sense of belonging; a diversity of 
experiences; genuine participatory processes; emancipation; trust; a politics 
of inclusion rather than exclusion; responsibility to the Other; individual and 
group action; peace; justice; and non-violent negotiation and conversation 
are all important means to enhance human security;
To achieve human security fundamental, proactive reform of modem beliefs 
and institutions is needed; reactive strategies are insufficient;
Rethinking security means, most of all, rethinking politics.
These premises underlie this thesis’ human-centred approach to environmental 
security.
This thesis’ approach to environmental security seeks to overcome the 
problem of environmental insecurity as established in chapter 1. In this sense the 
ecological security issues identified in chapter 9 are symptoms and not causes of 
insecurity; they are not the fundamental problem, they are merely new
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mechanisms that exacerbate the basic problem of human insecurity. So, this thesis 
understands environmental security to be the process o f enhancing the resilience of 
those people who are most vulnerable to the effects of environmental degradation. 
This process must entail lessening the vulnerability of people to the full gamut of 
risks experienced in late modernity, including unemployment, direct violence (at 
all scales), poverty, and famine. Lessening vulnerability in this sense must entail 
radical reform of modem institutions which directly and indirectly generate risks, 
including the military, the nation-state, processes o f production, excessive 
consumption, legal systems, political systems, and belief systems.
This human-centred environmental security concept places the welfare of 
people first, and prioritises the welfare of the most disadvantaged above all else. 
This is justified on moral grounds, and in a more pragmatic way because 
addressing the welfare o f the most disadvantaged means addressing many o f the 
future sources o f environmental degradation; in Sachs’ words: “protecting the 
rights o f the most vulnerable members o f our society ... is perhaps the best way we 
have of protecting the right o f future generations to inherit a planet that is still 
worth inhabiting” (Sachs 1996: 151). However, let it not be forgotten that the 
responsibility for poverty and environmental degradation rests primarily with the 
well-off in industrialised countries.
This human-centred environmental security concept sees the enhancement 
of welfare, peace, and justice as the fundamental purpose o f politics.6 Peace and 
justice are the firmest pillars on which to build exactly the sort of authoritative yet 
genuinely legitimate institutions required for human and environmental security 
(Conca 1994b). Infusing environmental security with the notion of peace helps to 
see the entirety o f insecurity-producing processes (Conca 1994b). Linking 
environmental security to peace in this way is supported by the recent linkage of 
environmental problems with human rights; for example, in 1990 the UN General 
Assembly agreed that “all individuals are entitled to live in an environment 
adequate for their health and well-being”; and in 1995 the UN Commission of 
Human Rights passed a resolution that “environmental damage has potentially 
negative effects on human rights and the enjoyment of life, health, and a
6 Conversely, lessening environmental insecurity should be a primary aim of peace research 
(Pirages 1991b).
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satisfactory standard of living” (both cited in Cherry 1996: 3).7 This thesis’ 
human-centred conceptualisation of environmental security is very much about the 
rights of all people to a healthy environment. Further, in so far as rights are 
meaningless without responsibilities, environmental security means all people 
have a responsibility to behave in such a way so as to not impinge on the rights of 
others to a healthy environment (hence the discussion of life politics in chapter 
11) .
This welfare, peace and justice approach has implications for the nation­
state as the dominant site of politics. In this approach, the primary purpose of the 
nation-state is to meet the basic needs of all people. This means that the interests 
of the nation-state should be subordinate to the interests of people. Indeed, the 
state is not apart from, but is o/the people (see chapter 11). Thus environmental 
insecurity is seen here not as a problem for the legitimacy and survival of modem 
institutions, but as a problem for which modem institutions are responsible. Those 
institutions that are most problematic, such as the military, are those that must be 
reformed first. This does not mean a naive hope that these will see the error of 
their ways and atone, it means thinking seriously and acting carefully to achieve 
gradual and progressive reform.
This human-centred conceptualisation of environmental security does not 
concern itself with the possibility that environmental degradation may induce 
violent conflict. This is not the most pressing problem, and in any event it pertains 
more the sources aspect of environmental degradation rather than to the more 
complex sinks aspect. This avoidance of environment-conflict linkages is 
supported by Gleditsch, who suggests that: “those who on the basis of the broad 
definition of environmental security deliberately disregard the question of armed 
conflict are in a sense on fairly safe ground” (Gleditsch 1998: 388). Removing the 
warfare aspect from environmental security removes the basis upon which 
Realism gains entry into the concept. Because rethinking security means 
rethinking politics, the continued saturation of contemporary politics with issues 
and metaphors of violence needs to be avoided.
In contrast to thinking about violent conflict, a human-centred 
conceptualisation of environmental security asserts the need for cooperation and
7 UN General Assembly resolution no. 45/94, 14 Dec 1990 Commission on Human Rights, 
1996; and Human Rights and the Environment: Report by the Secretary-General Prepared 
in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1995/14 (both in Cherry 1996).
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inclusion to manage the environment for the equal benefit of all people and future 
generations. The sharing and negotiation o f resources was integral to the 
sustainability o f most successful pre-modem cultures (Bennett and Dahlberg 
1990). The need for cooperative and inclusive approaches to environmental 
management is a key message of the 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED 1993). In 
Australia, cooperation, inclusion and conflict resolution are central to successful 
resource management institutions. This is demonstrated by high rates of 
community participation in Landcare and Total Catchment Management 
(Campbell 1994); it is proven in the effectiveness of intergovernmental 
institutional arrangements such as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
and the Murray Darling Basin Commission; and it underlies the success of 
informal non-govemment agreements such as the Cape York cooperative 
management agreement between Aboriginal, industry and green groups. Inclusion, 
mediation and cooperation are therefore key themes for environmental security.
This human-centred conceptualisation of environmental security is informed 
by ecological theory and biophysical science. These provide information about the 
mechanisms by which environmental injustices transpire, and, as suggested in the 
previous chapter, they offer a new basis for thinking about security and politics.
10.3.1 Defining environmental security
It is always difficult to reduce an holistic concept to a concise definition. Like all
definitions, definitions o f environmental security are problematic (Tennberg
1995). Nevertheless, it would be intellectually amiss to leave this thesis’ definition
open-ended. So environmental security is defined here as:
The process o f peacefully reducing human vulnerability to the effects (and 
risks) o f human induced environmental degradation by addressing the root 
causes o f environmental degradation.
Put another, more axiomatic way, environmental security is the process of
8minimising environmental insecurity (as understood in chapter 1).
There is a danger that this definition dichotomises humans and nature, a 
problem that also vexes environmental security as ‘securing the environment’ (or 
ecological security). It is important to be clear, then, about the deeper inference of
g
In so far as insecurity is a product of interconnected processes, and a healthy environment 
prefigures all other forms of security, it is possible to understand environmental security as 
the universal and all-encompassing security concept of the future, as Dyer (1996) seeks to 
do. However credible, this thesis is reluctant to claim so much for a human-centred 
environmental security concept; a more humble approach is called for.
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this definition. Humans are seen as nature rendered self conscious (Bookchin 
1982, also see appendix I). This means, in Saurin’s words, that humans are not 
counterposed to nature, they are “constitutive of nature” (1996: 83). Therefore “the 
wellbeing of humans must only be possible in a world where nature has its rightful 
place as a democratic partner in evolution” (O’Riordan 1989b: 79). Accordingly, 
the definition’s reference to ‘human induced environmental degradation’ means 
not the degradation of an external or Other habitat, but of the habitat of humans 
themselves. So, environmental degradation can be read as human degradation. In 
this way this thesis is not opposed to definitions of environmental (or ecological) 
security which seek to make the biosphere the referent of security because 
securing the biosphere means securing the physical bases of human health and 
well-being. Nevertheless, the principal referent here is humans as this is arguably 
more politically instigative, which is to say that a concern for the environment per 
se is less likely to mobilise people to act.
This definition seeks to treat the underlying causes that create 
environmental degradation. It suggests that we can never absolutely achieve 
environmental security, and that like all forms of security, and indeed like peace 
and sustainability, environmental security is a target rather than a final condition. 
Defining environmental security as a process in this way overcomes the (Realist) 
strong equation of security with stasis. Security as a process means ongoing 
monitoring and adaptation of programmes and policies. In this way security is a 
proactive and adaptive process which is sensitive to change and seeks to 
peacefully manage change (rather than defend against it).
It was argued earlier (chapter 4) that to be useful any approach to security 
must be able to answer a number of basic questions. In response to the question - 
whose security? - the answer here is the security of the individual, and more 
immediately the security of those people who are most vulnerable to the effects of 
environmental degradation. In response to the question - security from what? - the 
answer is the impacts of environmental degradation on humans, including lack of 
clean water, malnutrition, inadequate access to energy for cooking and heating 
(most acute in the problem of fuelwood shortages); high infant mortality rates and 
maternal death rates; exposure to preventable debilitating or fatal illnesses; and 
greater exposure to risks such as floods, fires, earthquakes, tsunamis, and famines. 
This then leads to the question - insecurity how? - the answer to which is the 
exploitation and impoverishment of people by forces of capital (it is more complex
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than this, see chapters 1 and 3). So, the problem is not humankind’s struggle with 
nature, but humankind’s struggle with the dynamics of its own cultures (de Wilde 
1996).
10.3.2 Environmental security and sustainability
The concepts presently being used to address environmental problems are 
sustainable development and sustainability.9 Sustainable development has a 
humanitarian element not unlike this thesis’ approach to environmental security. It 
recognises that the problem lies in the disparities among people as well as the 
degradation of ecosystems (WCED 1987, UNCED 1993). The principle dilemma 
with sustainable development is the word development,; it implies that 
development per se is not the problem, rather that it is the particular environmental 
effects of existing development practices that need to be addressed (see Redclift 
1987, Sachs 1993).10 Of course this depends on what one means by 
‘development’.11 This difficulty is remarkably similar to the difficult use of the 
word ‘security’ in environmental security.
The concept of sustainability has evolved from sustainable development, 
and is now the preferred term of many because it (at least semantically) avoids the 
difficulty with the word development. Sustainability is defined by Pezzey as the 
“non-declining utility of a representative member of society for millennia into the 
future’ (1992: 323). Sustainability is concerned with a number of issues, including 
the structure of the economy, discounting (of the future), depletion of natural 
resources and environmental degradation, population growth, and sectoral 
sustainability (Pezzey 1992). Exploitation an equity are, by Pezzey’s reckoning at 
least, secondary concerns. Sustainability is still therefore largely an economic 
paradigm, albeit one which is highly critical of conventional neo-classical 
economics (Common 1995). Sustainability, too, has an “uncritical accumulation of
9 The concept o f ecological modernisation could also be considered here, but it is more 
embryonic than that of environmental security, and it is far less popular than that of 
sustainable development or sustainability, or indeed environmental security (see Christoff 
1996 and Mol 1996 for overviews).
10 Nevertheless, the notion o f sustainable development and the WCED and UNCED 
processes established a number of important points about the problem o f environmental 
degradation, and also made a number o f recommendations for action which the majority of 
states have agreed to implement (in principle). These concepts have been highly influential 
in the theory and practice of environmental issues ever since. For this reason some still 
continue to use the term (see note 11 below).
11 Contrast, for example, the original statement on sustainable development - Our Common 
Future (WCED 1987) - with more progressive and Green interpretations such as those in a 
recent edited edition of Environmental Politics (O’Riordan and Voisey 1997a).
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meanings” that renders it less prescriptive, yet paradoxically more popular (its 
ambiguity makes it safe to use) (O’Riordan and Jordan 1995: 192). So, sustainable 
development, sustainability, and environmental security are all plagued by an 
ambiguity which makes them amenable to appropriation by vested interests. This 
is nature of concepts - they are contested. The contestation of concepts is one of 
the ways in which society negotiates its values and goals. This is one of the 
valuable contributions of these three concepts.
This thesis’ reformulated concept of environmental security differs from, 
but complements sustainability for a number of reasons. First, issues of 
exploitation and equity are primary rather than secondary concerns. In this sense 
environmental security is compatible with the concept of environmental justice
13which argues that people are exposed to environmental hazards differentially. 
Second, environmental security explores the juncture of security/foreign policy 
and the environment. This is an area less explicitly covered in sustainability, and it 
is this (original) explicit international focus that is one of environmental security’s 
distinguishing characteristics. In this respect environmental security serves a 
useful function in that it facilitates communication between a diverse range of 
interests (Brock 1996). Third, environmental security is concerned with the 
environmental impacts of military activities and explores the possibility of 
greening the military. Fourth, environmental security adds to the Rio Declaration’s 
assertion that peace and environmental protection are interdependent and 
indivisible (UNCED 1993). It does this by understanding environmental 
degradation to be the product of violence both direct and structural.
Perhaps the most important contribution of environmental security is its 
political dimension. Whereas sustainable development and sustainability are still 
largely concerned with economics (of development and ecological economics 
respectively), environmental security is fundamentally concerned with politics. 
The issue is not just one of the politics of security as addressed in most of this 
thesis, but also one of what a reformulated notion of security holds for politics 
itself. These political and policy aspects are discussed in chapter 11.
12‘ Although these are central in Our Common Future ’s account of sustainable development 
(WCED 1987).




A final and notable distinction of environmental security as opposed to 
sustainability is that environmental security seeks to securitise environmental 
problems, thereby making them more important than other politicised issues. 
Environmental security as presented here agrees that environmental degradation is 
a security issue, but security is seen as human security. So, if there is any truth in 
the popular understanding that the state’s most elemental function is to provide for 
the security of its citizens, then the state must respond to environmental insecurity 
with the same unrestrained vigour that it adopts to ensure military security. 
Environmental (human) security takes this security justification of the state 
seriously. It assumes that the most basic purpose of government is to ensure that 
the basic needs of its constituency are satisfied. This is the political intent of 
environmental security; it stems from the intuitive resonance and appeal of 
security, and it contests the meaning and practice of security because it is the 
favoured term of political discourse in this late modem era.
The question of whether it is valid to understand environmental problems as 
security problems recurs throughout any thoughtful discussion of environmental 
security. The dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental 
issues runs the risk that the Realist security approach will co-opt and colonise the 
environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems 
(as has been demonstrated in chapter 7). For this reason critics of environmental 
security, such as Deudney (1992) and Brock (1991), suggest that it is dangerous to 
understand environmental problems as security issues. This thesis’ position on this 
matter has been progressively uncovered in previous chapters. The contention of 
this thesis is that the problem is not the presentation of environmental problems as 
security issues, the problem is the meaning and practice of security in present 
times. Environmental security, wittingly or not, contests the legitimacy of the 
Realist conception of security; it points to the contradictions of security as the 
defence of territory and resistance to change. It seeks to work from within the 
prevailing Realist conception, in a way not unlike that suggested by Waever 
(1995), but to be successful it must do so with a strong sense of purpose and a 
solid theoretical base.
So, understanding environmental problems as security problems, it was 
argued in chapter 9, is a form of conceptual speculation, but one in which
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environmentalists and peace activists stand to lose little given that political 
Realism dominates and appropriates all challenges to it anyway. Put another way, 
what legitimacy crises suggest is that the situation cannot deteriorate without there 
being fundamental change or collapse, which implies that the practice of political 
Realism (and capitalism) is on the brink and cannot, at least in the domestic 
context, extend its power further if it means further exacerbation of insecurity. Put 
yet another way, Realism’s resistance to change cuts both ways; it may resist what 
this thesis would call a change for the better, but it may also resist a change for the 
worse. Realists like things as they are, too much peace means they have no cause 
for defending society, alternatively, too much chaos suggests a failure of the 
paradigm; in both instances Realism stands to lose legitimacy.
Therefore, in terms of the conceptual venture, having the concept of 
environmental security appropriated by Realism will not result in more insecurity 
(it simply means more strident contestation of the meaning of the concept is 
required). On the other hand, succeeding in the conceptual venture may mean a 
positive modification of the theory and practice of national security. It may also 
mean that national governments do take environmental problems more seriously, 
reduce defence budgets, and generally implement policies for a more peaceful and 
environmentally secure world. Brock thinks this dual goal of demilitarisation and 
upgrading policy is a case of “having one’s cake and eating it”, but if the analogy 
is appropriate, either the having or the eating is sufficient justification for the 
concept, but both is desirable (Brock 1996: 6). Alternatively, Realism may cease 
to use environmental security. This would be a less favourable outcome as it 
means the end of the discursive contest, and the interests of peace and the 
environment will need to be advocated through alternative discourses. This is 
perhaps the only real failure that may come from the project of environmental 
security.
The whole question of securitisation hinges, of course, on the meaning of 
‘security’. The security component of environmental security as understood here is 
human-centred as opposed to nation-centred. Indeed, it directly contests the 
legitimacy of national security by challenging notions of threats, risks and 
questioning who is at risk. In this sense environmental security is as much about 
contesting a defining feature of modernity (national security) as it is about posing 
a new concept for dealing with environmental problems. However, although this 
contest is a crucial function of environmental security, this thesis’s reformulation
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of the concept also seeks to serve as a genuine alternative to understanding and 
addressing environmental problems. It does this in part by using the notions o f risk 
and resilience.14 These are therefore worth revisiting in light of this human-centred 
approach, and as a precursor to considering questions of policy (chapter 11).
10.3.4 Risk
This thesis contends that security is a discourse o f risk, and so a cursory 
understanding of risk (and vulnerability) is necessary to inform the substantive 
goal o f reformulating environmental security. Risk is a subjectively interpreted 
and therefore highly political phenomenon (Handmer 1996a). It is clear that in the 
Realist approach to security, and therefore also to environmental security, those 
who identify the risks identify only those possibilities which may jeopardise their 
particular vested interests. Hence environmental security in U.S. security policy- 
discourse is concerned with those particular risks to the interests of the U.S. policy 
community, and not the risks that others in distant places experience. Similarly in 
hazards management, particular risks are identified, and others ignored, according 
to the priorities of those who set the agenda (Hewitt 1983, O’Riordan 1990,
Rayner 1992). Rayner, for example, analyses risk from a cultural theory 
perspective and finds that - like the response of the U.S. to environmental security 
- “of all the things people can be worried about, they will be inclined to select for 
particular attention those risks that help to reinforce the social solidarity of their 
institutions” (Rayner 1992: 91). Hewitt also talks of the prevailing approach to risk 
and hazards in a way that might well refer to the dominant approach to 
environmental security: “its strength depends less upon its logic and internal 
sophistications than on its being a convenient productive ‘world view’ for certain 
dominant institutions and academic spokesmen. In other words it is, above all, a . 
construct reflecting the shaping hand of a contemporary social order” (Hewitt 
1983: 4). There is therefore more than one discourse of risk, and it seems that 
common to all are exclusions and inclusions, emphasises and biases which serve 
the interests o f the already powerful. Talking about risks therefore requires
14 Stem identifies with the view that security policy should focus on risk prevention and 
resilience enhancement: “security policy may thus be conceptualized as being proactively 
aimed at facilitating crisis prevention and coping capacity.. Coping capability includes 
designing flexible and robust decision-making and response systems that can be brought to 
bear to exploit opportunities for crisis mitigation through intervention measures” (Stem 
1995: 225-226).
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democratically ‘negotiating’ risk, and this is as true for environmental security as 
it is for hazards management (Handmer 1996a).
Needs at risk
This raises the need for some reflection on the reasons why this thesis finds 
particular risks and effects of environmental degradation to be problematic. In a 
general sense what this thesis seeks to do is reassert the moral imperative of 
meeting the needs of those people who have not benefited from modernity. It is 
possible to construct a rough typology of needs: there are basic health needs, basic 
social needs, equal opportunity needs, and relative consumption needs. Basic 
health needs are those things such as clean water, sufficient nutritious food, and 
access to a level of health and hygiene. These enable people to be free from 
unnecessary debilitating sickness. They also make death less a less likely prospect 
at any stage of a person’s life (and more a factor of old age or remote chance) as is 
the case for most people in the industrialised world. That one fifth of the world’s 
population do not have their basic health needs satisfied is the fundamental 
injustice and effect of environmental degradation with which this thesis is 
concerned. That these people are also extremely vulnerable to perturbations in 
weather or economics is also of great concern - these are risks proper. It would 
seem excessively crude for moral relativists to argue that these needs are not real, 
pressing, and their absence wholly unjust.
Basic social needs are those requirements for a meaningful existence. They 
include diversity of experience, close family and personal relationships, and a 
sense of responsibility (Boyden 1987). Many of these have been denied by modem 
ways of living. Equal opportunity needs are those requirements necessary for an 
individual to participate as an equal member in her particular society. These are 
related to Boyden’s (1987 and see chapter 3) notion of technoaddiction; for 
example, in many industrialised societies having access to an automobile is 
necessary for an individual to gain employment and meet the demands of urban 
life. Relative consumption needs, then, are needs that in their absence will not 
result in unnecessary illness or death, nor unequal opportunity. This relates to 
consumption of luxury items, and will be discussed again in chapter 11.
The risks and effects that concern this thesis’ definition of environmental 
security are those which are immediate and necessary to health and well-being 
(basic health needs). There are exclusions in this approach, namely that the needs
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of the wealthy come last. However, inverting the priorities o f the industrialised 
world and countering the culture o f consumption in this way is morally defensible, 
and is a useful strategy to reveal the contradictions of modernity and to begin to 
address a better future for all people.
Effective risk management requires an holistic approach which connects 
technical and political strategies, and which involves all people in ways that are 
cumulatively preventative and proactive: “risk management decisions cannot be 
justified according to purely technical criteria, or even clinical judgement. Moral 
preferences, public consensus, and trust in participatory decision procedures also 
have important roles to play” (O’Riordan and Rayner 1991: 98).15 This therefore 
points to social processes and democracy as means to lessen vulnerability (Blakie 
et al 1994). Similarly then, environmental security should seek to transcend the 
technocratic, typically modem, and reactive approach to risk. Instead, 
environmental security requires holistic strategies to prevent risk-generating 
activity (eg solar power to avoid burning fossil fuels which contribute to climatic 
instability) and to enhance resilience (eg strengthen social bonds, design slackness 
and flexibility in human systems to allow extra resources to be readily available 
when needed - see below). Environmental security is about risk, and risk needs to 
be democratically negotiated to determine the most urgent risks and the best ways 
o f dealing with them. This argument is revisited in the following chapter.
10.3.5 Resilience
Resilience is the inverse o f vulnerability, and vulnerability is a defining 
characteristic o f insecurity. Resilience not only means being better able to cope 
with the risks o f hazards, it also means being less vulnerable to the day-to-day 
effects of environmental degradation. This suggests a range of strategies. It also 
suggests that there are lessons that can be learned from hazards research, not least 
because hazards and disasters are events that happen to already vulnerable people 
(Blakie et al 1994).16
Vulnerability is a product of poverty, exclusion, marginalisation and 
inequities in material consumption; it is a function of the interface between 
political systems and economic systems (Blakie et al 1994, Pelling 1998). There 
are at least six global processes which contribute to vulnerability to hazards:
15 ‘Trust’ is a key component of strategies to deal with risk, see Giddens (1990).
16 Indeed, “the hazard lies in social institutions, not acts of nature” (O’Riordan 1989b: 95).
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population growth, rapid urban growth, land degradation and environmental losses 
(for example lost tree cover and coastal mangrove clearances), environmental 
change, war, and global economic processes (for example structural adjustment 
programs, liberalisation and foreign currency speculation) (Blakie et al 1994). 
People’s vulnerability, then, is generated by social, economic and political 
processes; these are all central issues for environmental security.
The cyclone that struck the coastal region of Bangladesh in April 1991 
demonstrated clearly the interdependence between environmental degradation, 
insecurity and vulnerability to hazards. Bangladesh is a low lying country and has 
in excess of 100 million people with a high population density. Given that the 
country is one of the world’s poorest, this population density creates pressures 
which force the poorest people to live and work in the marginal and shifting 
coastal zone. This in turn places pressure on coastal ecosystems which are 
denuded of stabilising vegetation, and this magnifies the vulnerability of these 
people to environmental perturbations. The April 1991 cyclone battered the coastal 
zone for nine hours and with it came a storm surge that raised water levels along 
the coast by up to seven meters; 139,000 people were killed and up to 3 million 
were exposed to severe health risks; 118,000 acres of crops were damaged;
190,000 homes and 9,300 schools were destroyed; and over 3,000 freshwater wells 
were destroyed (AODRO 1991). A lack of physical and service infrastructure 
meant that many died from diseases and malnutrition after the event. The victims 
of this cyclone were already extremely insecure by any standard. Their 
vulnerability was fundamentally a function of poverty. The painful lesson (learned 
repeatedly elsewhere), is that enhancing security means eliminating poverty, and 
vice versa.
Vulnerability implies powerlessness, and so providing resilience means 
empowering people. As ecological theory informs security, vulnerability also 
means enhancing diversity (as discussed in chapter 9). There are various strategies 
required to promote diversity and empower people, including preservation of 
traditional communities and societies which tend to be more flexible and adaptable 
to environmental perturbations (Handmer and Dovers 1996: 486). Indeed, the 
notion of flexibility is integral to understanding how people manage their 
livelihoods in the face of pressure (a notion not adequately considered in the 
simplistic assumption that pressure leads to conflict) (Redclift 1997a). In research 
conducted in the Nigerian Sahel, for example, Adams and Mortimore (1997) have 
found that the main indigenous means to enhance resilience lie in flexible
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livelihood strategies, including flexible use of labour, flexibility with respect to 
crop location in space and time, flexibility in terms of what crops are grown, and 
flexibility in the means of earning income. So, resilience (to hazards) is about the 
ability of community to draw on material and intangible resources for recovery to 
shocks; traditional coping strategies are thus just as relevant as institutional and 
technological strategies (Handmer 1996b). Flexibility is also achieved through 
designing some ‘slackness’ into human systems (Handmer and Dovers 1996). As a 
strategy to enhance resilience to natural hazards, fiscal and material resources left 
spare in the system can be easily directed to the affected areas, and people can be 
easily evacuated for the period of danger. This implies strategic vision in policy, 
and restraining from the dictum of optimum and maximal use of resources.
Other resilience bolstering strategies include: “a high standard of 
infrastructure, construction, housing, education, and health care; safe working 
conditions; tort law; consumer protection; independent media; fostering scientific 
and advocacy groups; a universal welfare system and access to affordable 
insurance; and low levels of poverty” (Handmer 1996b: 52). Resilience is also 
enhanced through access to land, water, trees, wild genes and other forms of 
biomass; basic standards of nutrition; rotating loan funds; common property 
resource systems; livestock restocking schemes; and grain and seed banks (Blakie 
et al 1994: 228-9). Reduction of vulnerability fundamentally involves making full 
use of social resources such as co-operatives, churches and self-help groups; it 
therefore requires social diversity and “full, day-to-day participation of ordinary 
people and their own popular organisations in the struggle to enlarge choice ... this 
participation must be asserted and protected as a right” (Blakie et al 1994: 238).
Resilience requires an inclusive and proactive approach to vulnerability 
reduction which emphasises partnerships and is multidisciplinary (Salter 1997, 
Handmer 1996b). Pervasive themes are networking, an open transparent planning 
process, cooperation, flexibility, and adaptability (Handmer 1996b). This inclusive 
and proactive resilience paradigm applies to environmental security because 
vulnerability “is deeply rooted, and any fundamental solutions involve political 
change, radical reform of the international economic system, and the development 
of public policy to protect rather than exploit nature and people”; upholding 
human rights is also integral (Blakie et al 1994: 233). So, short term strategies 
such as those discussed above are all important to enhance the resilience of people 
to the day-to-day effects of environmental degradation as well as to disasters, but
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in the long-term reducing risk, vulnerability and insecurity requires fundamental 
changes in the institutions and beliefs of modernity. There will be no lasting 
environmental security unless these changes take place. At a minimum there needs 
to be changes in power relations, this can be achieved by improving democracy, 
enhancing political participation, and improving governance. These issues are 
explored in the following chapter.
10.4 Answering questions
Critics of human security (like ecological security) argue that if security is applied 
to every risk that humans face, then the notion of security become imprecise and 
inoperable. According to the proponents of a narrow security agenda, broadening 
the domain of security “would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more 
difficult to devise solutions” (Walt 1991: 213). This criticism warrants serious 
attention. First, it is important to note, as Walker does, that traditional Realist 
accounts of security are also rife with “vague generalities about everything and 
nothing” (Walker 1997: 63). Thus, imprecision and generalisation are 
characteristics of the dominant approach no less than they are of alternative 
approaches. Second, as argued in the previous chapter, a concept such as 
ecological, or in this case environmental (human) security is neither imprecise nor 
inoperable as the referent of security; the risks and vulnerabilities, and the 
processes by which these transpire are clearly identifiable, and they have been for 
some time in the fields of development research, hazards research, peace research, 
and indeed more generally in post-Marxist and feminist types of analysis. Equally, 
responses to many of these issues are by now well known (see chapter 11). 
Nevertheless, there is still some validity in proving the coherence of the human- 
centred environmental security concept presented here. This can be done by 
answering some specific questions posed by two scholars - Mandel (1993) and 
Brock (1996). The perspectives of both differ; Mandel’s approach is essentially 
consistent with neo-Realism, whereas Brock’s is more critical. Thus their 
questions neatly frame the range of concerns about environmental security.
Mandel suggests that there are “a seemingly unending series of complex 
theoretical questions” concerning environmental security (although he does not 
answer these questions himself) (1993: 346). Despite predominantly reflecting 
what Mandel thinks environmental security to be (somewhere in the
260
conflict/national security nexus), these questions (all on p.346 of Mandel 1993) are 
worth answering in turn.
Q. Does protection o f the territorial integrity o f states mean protection o f the 
natural environment and resources within that territory?
A. This is for the most part a misleading question. A government’s responsibility 
is to the people it governs for. This entails conserving and maintaining ecological 
integrity within the state, and because this cannot be separated from the whole 
biosphere, it also demands a globally-oriented outlook. So, talking in terms of 
state boundaries is useful only in as much as it identifies a zone immediate of 
responsibility, but with environmental security the responsibility is global as much 
as it is national. Therefore environmental security means acting locally but within 
the context of global responsibility.
Q. Do force and violence in the national security context encompass force and 
violence toward nature rather than toward humans?
A. No. First, national security is not the primary referent of environmental
security. Second, demilitarising security as this thesis seeks to do means moving
beyond force and violence altogether. Third, whether Mandel means the state may
respond to force and violence towards nature, or respond by considering the option
of force and violence towards nature is unclear; however, in most cases
environmental degradation is a by-product of economic activity and war rather
than a deliberate outcome. So, ‘force’ is a misleading term for discussing
environmental security.
Q. Is the preservation o f human life - or the quality o f human life - as important to 
national security as the preservation o f state sovereignty?
A. The preservation of life and enhancing the quality of life is the goal of
environmental security, and is the primary function and the ultimate justification
of government. When government fails to do this it fails to be legitimate. The
theory and practice of sovereignty is a part of the problem of environmental
insecurity, and it must be de-sanctified in order for there to be environmental
security (see chapter 9).
Q. Should external threats to national security include unintended consequences o f 
resource exploitation or o f environmental degradation by other states?
A. Again, the issue is not one of national security but of human security.
Unintended consequences of resource use and other environmental problems are
rarely generated in order to ‘threaten’ another group. However, they may well be
the product of wilful behaviour, as in the case of Shell’s destruction of the
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homelands of the Ogoni people in Nigeria or BHP’s pollution of the Ok Tedi River 
in Papua New Guinea. These are issues that environmental security should 
address, but not as national security threats.
Q. Are the prime adversaries in the context o f environmental security defined as 
those nations engaged in the greatest amount o f resource exploitation or 
environmental degradation with transnational spillover effects?
A. ‘Adversaries’ seems an inappropriate word. In an age of globalisation and
transnational corporations thbse most responsible for environmental degradation,
and hence environmental insecurity, are as much private corporations as they are
nation-states. To the extent that consumers fuel demand for the products of this
exploitation and degradation, consumption patterns are also to blame; this is to say
that the enemy is Us as much as the Other. Indeed, in the industrialised world the
enemy is far more Us and our corporations than it is Others and their governments.
The Others, if not their always their governments, are not the threat but the victim.
Thus there are clear limitations of thinking in simple ‘national’ and ‘international’
terms. Further, while issues with transnational spillover effects are meta-problems,
some of which were understood as ecological security issues in the previous
chapter, there are many small and large, local and global issues that might be
identified as environmental security issues.
Q. Does the link within several nations between management o f nuclear energy 
and management o f nuclear arms necessarily entail national security 
consequences from reliance on nuclear power?
A. Yes, but it entails more than national security consequences, it also is 
fundamentally a human security problem (see chapter 9).
Q. How does the current mix o f public and private control involved in oil 
exploitation and transfer affect national security?
A. Again, national security is not the primary issue. Further, there is some need to 
be wary of understanding oil as an environmental security issue regardless of 
context. According to the framework presented in chapter 6, oil is primarily a 
source or resource issue, it is only an environmental issue when considering the 
consequences of burning or spilling the oil. Nevertheless, Mandel’s identification 
of the mix of public and private ownership of the oil supply chain seems valid.
The proper solution to the environmental problems associated with oil lies in the 
shift to alternative renewable energy sources. The solution therefore lies in state 
sponsored renewable energy research and development, and in state-imposed price
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disincentives to oil consumption (the most effective of which would be a carbon 
tax). This requires a strong degree of public involvement in the market.
The most telling point to emerge from Mandel’s questions is that 
environmental security as conceived of here is not primarily a national security 
issue but a human security issue. In so far as national governments should above 
all else be concerned with maintaining the welfare of their constituents, the nation­
state has grounds to deal with environmental insecurity, but not as an issue which 
involves conflict, threats and (scripted) malignant Others. Environmental security 
demands state responses to environmental degradation at home and abroad, 
including stronger regulation of the actions of nationally flagged transnational 
corporations. This necessitates stronger government on some issues, and 
conceding authority in others, which problematises the theory and practice of 
sovereignty. Because of the local-global dynamic, acting solely for the benefit of 
the domestic populace is insufficient to comprehensively address environmental 
insecurity within any given nation, and in any event, this will do little to assist the 
people whom are most insecure throughout the world.
A more interesting and perhaps challenging set of questions comes from 
Brock (all on page 3 of Brock 1996).
Q. What is the referent object of environmental security, the environment or 
security, environmental scarcity or violent conflict arising from environmental 
scarcity?
A. People and the environment in which they live. Issues of violent conflict are not 
the object of analysis. However, the processes that strive for environmental 
(human) security will eliminate many sources of violent conflict.
Q. What should be considered as a threat to environmental security? Restricted 
access to natural resources or pollution and degradation? I f  the latter, are 
pollution and degradation as such the problem or do they become a security 
concern only when they are crossing certain thresholds?
A. Any process which directly or indirectly restricts the satisfaction of an
individual’s basic needs. This therefore entails restricted access to water, land and
food, as well as various forms - indeed most forms - of pollution and
environmental degradation. These are security concerns when they affect the basic
welfare and well-being of people. Nevertheless, there is a more subtle point here
about ‘thresholds’, which is that any human activity consumes resources and
contaminates sinks, so the issue is one of degree, or of the sustainability of
collective human activity. One should not be overly distracted but this issue of
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thresholds, it obscures the need to act now on unacceptable standards of insecurity. 
Thus environmental security is understood here as a process continually subject to 
refinement and adjustment rather than as an attempt to get under an ill-defined 
threshold. In this sense the problem of quantification is subordinate to the problem 
of inequality.
Q. Who would determine such thresholds, environmentalists or national security 
experts in unison with family planners?
A. Recognising that conceiving of the problem in terms of thresholds is less useful 
than conceiving of it as a process, determining the agenda is nevertheless a 
question worth considering. As they presently operate, there is little if any scope 
for national security experts in addressing the problem of environmental 
insecurity. The policy community should be diverse, comprising at a minimum 
those who are most vulnerable within and beyond the nation; those who are 
traditionally marginalised in policy discourse (including women, ethnic minorities 
and children); and those who have expertise in the fields of political economy, 
development, ecology and other biophysical sciences, emergency management, 
and economics. What is equally important is that politicians are made to hear and 
act on the advice it gets from this more diverse policy community, and that 
political actions are justified on humanitarian grounds rather than on the basis of 
rational economics or short-term political expediency. This of course also raises 
questions about accountability, public expectations, and institutional and 
individual responsibility. These issues are discussed in the following chapter.
Q Who are the objects o f environmental security? states? societies? people?
A. People first and foremost. However, these referent groups are not mutually 
exclusive. People are part of societies, cultures and communities, and may in some 
instances be considered to be members of a political grouping, be it a local 
political unit, a state, a bioregion, or the whole planet.
Q. Finally: Can there be environmental security at all, i f  we take into 
consideration that the environment has been changing throughout earth history?
A. While the history of insecurity presented in this thesis (chapter 3) makes clear
that there has always been environmental insecurity in so far as people have
always been at the whim of natural perturbations, the argument is that in adapting
to these insecurities, at least in modem times, people have minimised insecurity in
certain places at the expense of heightened vulnerability of other people in distant
places. Hence Brock’s question is somewhat misleading if we consider the spatial
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as well as the temporal dimension to environmental insecurity. Further, conceived 
of as a process with no fixed end point, environmental security is less about being 
absolutely secure and rather about being relatively more secure. So the issue is one 
of decreasing the vulnerability of all people.
Brock’s questions point to the difficulty of the politics and policies required 
for environmental security. However, these issues are no more vexing for 
sustainability, natural hazards management, or indeed many political and 
economic problems. Working through some of these difficulties is the subject of 
the following chapter.
10.5 Conclusions
This chapter has developed a human-centred (as opposed to a state-centred) 
concept of environmental security that is consistent with a range of critical 
approaches to security. The consistency arises from the shared understanding that 
security is intuitively about the stable provision of basic needs - needs which states 
and the system of states have hitherto failed to provide. A strong, human-centred 
concept of environmental security can better contest the meaning of security in a 
way which, despite the concerns of critics, stands to gain much by highlighting the 
inherent contradictions of national security, yet stands to lose little from a failure 
to succeed in this venture. It may also serve as a valuable alternative concept to 
sustainable development and sustainability by highlighting the political aspects of 
environmental problems, and by re-emphasising that environmental problems are 
valuably framed as problems of human vulnerability.
The key themes of this human-centred environmental concept are risk, 
resilience, peace, and basic needs. These are seen by the critical security literature, 
ecological theory, and the hazards literature to be issues that are best handled 
through democracy, diversity, inclusion and conversation. This human-centred 
environmental security concept brings the issues of peace and the environment 
together to realise anew that the a key challenge of our time is to develop “a set of 
social institutions in which responsibility and authority are distributed widely 
among the citizenry and in which all individuals are encouraged to develop their 
critical faculties” (Leiss 1972: 197). The following chapter seeks to explore the 
politics, policies, and forms of governance required to meet this challenge.
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Chapter 11. Environmental Security for People: Implications 
for Politics, Policy, and Governance
11.1 Introduction
The previous chapter established the broad parameters of this thesis’ human- 
centred conceptualisation of environmental security. This chapter explores the 
implications of this reformulated environmental security concept for politics, 
policy, and governance.
This chapter talks of policy in a very broad sense as “a purposive course of 
action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of 
concern” (Anderson 1984: 3). It talks of institutions, broadly understood as 
“established orders comprising rule-bound and standardised behaviour patterns” 
(Jary and Jary 1995: 324), including organisations and regimes which “constrain 
activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989: 163). This chapter also talks of 
governance, defined as “the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their 
differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations” (UNDP 1997: 1). 
Finally, this thesis’ understanding of politics was revealed in chapter 2 to be the 
business of deliberation and negotiation of the Good, or, in Rees’ terms, the 
process of “mutual education, as the means of influencing choices through the 
constant process of communication ... with a view to defining the public good” 
(Rees 1991: 41).
This chapter seeks to explore possibilities for enhancing environmental 
security (ergo human security and peace) through a “revitalized” politics and 
better governance (Rees 1994: 171). It tackles “the hard structures of institutional 
power” which “exercise control over what people do” (Walker 1988: 137). This is 
necessary to make prescriptive policies work. Recent United Nations conferences 
on the environment have proposed a range of policies which, if implemented, 
would lessen environmental degradation and enhance environmental security. If, 
for example, the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED 1993) were implemented in conjunction 
with those of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD 
1994) and the Habitat II conference (UNCHS 1996), there would be more
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environmental security (and thus more peace) for more people than at any time 
since the appearance of the first cities 5,000 years ago.1 2These documents contain 
most, if not all the necessary policy measures, and there is little point in this thesis 
restating or reworking these. Rather, this thesis seeks to address the impediments 
to implementing these policies which lie in the nature of contemporary politics, 
institutions, and structures o f governance. The problem also lies in a lack of intent. 
Elliott summarises this argument, saying that the problem is “not in the strategies 
themselves but in the fact that those strategies have not yet been effectively 
operationalised because of the intervention o f political and economic interests” 
(Elliott 1998: 244).
The most comprehensive support for this view that the problem is not the 
policies but the politics comes from the Earth Summit +5 special session o f the 
United Nations. In reviewing the implementation of Agenda 21, the Earth Summit 
+5 special session noted the failure o f the international system to act in the 
interests of sustainability (United Nations 1997). Addressing the Earth Summit + 5 
conference, the Executive Director of Greenpeace was blunt on this matter on 
political failure:
[Y]ou [national governments] have failed as yet to act. You have given in to 
commercial interests; you have put national interests above the welfare of 
future generations ... it has become fashionable to say that governments can 
do very little, and that all power now lies with unaccountable multinational 
companies and institutions in a newly globalised market. But let that not 
disguise the power and accountability which you, together, hold to impose 
environmental and social limits, controls and standards (Bode 1997: 1-3).
So, environmental problems need political solutions (Kakonen 1992b). The failure
to act is therefore fundamentally failure o f politics and governance, and it is these
2
failures that this chapter begins to address.
Describing the new politics and forms o f governance that a human-centred 
concept of environmental security requires is extremely difficult, not least because 
“there is little agreement as to what a sustainable society would look like” 
(O’Riordan 1995: 28). However, some themes are well known. We should not 
create new and more powerful institutions that facilitate and exacerbate injustice 
(Conca 1994b). In this respect new free trade and investment agreements are
1 The various treaties and conventions arising from these conferences have been almost 
unanimously endorsed by all nation-states, this attests to the validity of their
recommendations.
2
Political failure is also the biggest obstacle to reducing vulnerability to hazards (see 
chapter 10).
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undesirable given that these tend to enhance the economic power of the already 
powerful. Lasting and peaceful solutions will arise from a transformed discourse
3
on social justice and Goodness instead of neo-liberal rationality (Rees 1994: 183). 
This thesis contends that solutions lie in political forms that are inclusive and 
which discursively negotiate the Good.* 4 Policy then becomes the implementation 
of this democratically and discursively negotiated Good.
Environmental security requires adaptive and responsive processes of 
governance rather than monolithic and all-encompassing institutions such as the 
nation-state. This entails “polycentric” institutional configurations (Pelling 1998:
1). A polycentric structure of governance implies, at a minimum, strengthening the 
coordinating and initiating capacity of intergovernmental organisations such as the 
United Nations; enhancing the roles of critical social movements and non­
governmental organisations; and reforming - with a view to dissolving - nation­
states and their shallow (if at all) democratic processes, their inflexible approach 
to sovereignty, and their narrow definition of security. This chapter addresses 
these concerns, and adds in a significant new element which has scarcely been 
considered in the context of environmental security - the role of the individual.5
Chapter 3 established many of the problems associated with modernity. 
Overcoming these is a huge theoretical and practical challenge. Thus far, two 
solutions have been proposed by critical scholars. First, it is widely recognised that 
individual action can alter the structures of power and the socially and 
environmentally damaging institutions of modernity. This is based on the premise 
that while structures influence agency, agency can influence structures (Giddens 
1984). This view is advanced by scholars such as Murray Bookchin (1982), Robin 
Collingwood (1992), Mahatma Gandhi (1951), Anthony Giddens (1991), John 
Stuart Mill (1992), Ernst Schumacher (1974), and Arnold Toynbee (1966).
Second, and not unrelated, in response to the emptying of political practice of 
moral and ethical concerns, and the hollowing out of the principle and practice of
Rees juxtaposes neo-liberal/economic rationalist concepts with those o f social justice.
The juxtaposition is a reminder of the unpacked assumptions in contemporary economistic 
political discourse, they also provide a framework for a consistent humanistic discourse.
Examples include: efficiency to sufficiency; deregulation to social responsibility; free 
market to egalitarianism; investment to justice; profits to choices; interest to altruism; 
consumers to citizens; productivity to preservation; competition to cooperation; and assets 
to potential (Rees 1993: 297).
4 As Dryzek (1990b), Giddens (1994) and Habermas (1990) have variously argued.
5 Falk (1971) gives this some consideration, and Buckley (1996), Carroll (1989), Finger 
(1992) and Hay (1994) express the need for individual action.
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democracy in modem times, it is considered that politics and democracy can be 
revitalised through enhanced communication, dialogue, or conversation between 
parties. This is the essence of Rees’ politics as ‘mutual education’ (see above).
This a view most commonly associated with Jurgen Habermas (1990), and it is 
generally shared by John Dryzek (1990b), Anthony Giddens (1994) and Moira 
Rayner (1997). The notion, however, can be traced back to the philosophy of the 
Ancient Greeks. This chapter discusses both of these approaches as means to 
overcome the problems of modernity, and therefore the problem of environmental 
insecurity. Both approaches are not unproblematic, and both draw on past ideas 
and contested theories and concepts; this, however, does not mean that they should 
be abandoned. These are the best and most persuasive approaches to date, and this 
thesis does not presume that it can do better.
This chapter therefore begins by exploring the role of individuals as agents 
for security. It then considers an array of options for domestic-oriented reforms 
within the nation-state. Next it explores what the nation-state can do to enhance 
dialogue and better governance between states, and it ends by considering a range 
of options for global governance. This chapter is imaginative and has an element 
of utopianism, it was argued in chapter 2 that this is a valid and necessary 
approach.
11.2 People, Politics, and Agency
A human-centred environmental security concept runs the risk of depicting people 
as passive recipients of strategies to promote environmental security. However, 
because shifting the referent object of security means rethinking politics, part of 
the task must be to rethink the role of people as actors deliberately seeking to 
shape social and political life; that is, as agents of security. Agency is defined as 
“the power of actors to operate independently of the determining constraints of 
social structure. The term is intended to convey the volitional, purposive nature of 
human activity as opposed to its constrained, determined aspects” (Jary and Jary 
1995: 10). The difficulty with agency lies in the structure-agency dialectic; it is 
questionable that anyone is wholly ‘independent’, and the influence of institutions 
and ideologies on individual action should not be discounted because these do 
have real power. However, to advocate agency is to see power in a positive way as 
the ability of people, individually and collectively, to resist or reshape restrictive
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and oppressive institutions and ideologies. Absent agency and it is difficult to 
identify another engine for the transformation of modernity.
This section begins by discussing relative consumption needs as these are 
the basis o f much unnecessary consumption and associated environmental 
degradation. It then discusses the notion o f ‘life politics’ which directly addresses 
the individual as a political agent.
11.2.1 Relative consumption needs
It is important to revisit the question of needs. It has been argued that 
environmental security entails securing every individual’s basic health needs, 
which entails overcoming environmental degradation and insecurity. For this to 
occur, the relative consumption needs of wealthy people need to be addressed, as it 
is the satisfaction o f these which - through economic and ecological processes - 
exploits poorer peoples in remote places as well as the degrades their environs6
It was posited by the Frankfurt School that the gratification o f consumptive 
needs elicits a more elaborate set o f needs, thereby perpetuating a wasteful 
consumption/satisfaction cycle (Leiss 1972, Adorno and Horkheimer 1979). 
Marcuse understood that consumption suppresses people’s real needs and creates a 
‘false consciousness’:
False needs are those which are superimposed upon the individual by 
particular social interests in his[her] repression: the needs which perpetuate 
toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice.... this happiness is not a condition 
which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the 
development o f the ability (his own and others) to recognise the disease of 
the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is 
euphoria in unhappiness.
The prevalence o f repressive needs is a fact that must be undone in the 
interests o f the happy individual as well as all those whose misery is the 
price of his satisfaction (Marcuse 1964: 5).
6 It was argued in chapter 3 that the consumption of luxury items began with the production 
of an agricultural surplus and the emergence of the first cities, after which time 
consumption slowly displaced social needs as the basis of individual satisfaction and set in 
train a cycle a cycle of consumption and status that contributed to more excessive forms of 
environmental degradation. Over time this was exacerbated by technological advances and 
the expansion of the bourgeoisie. With the advent of colonisation and later industrialisation 
more luxury goods could be produced and the ecological and social costs of these were 
both extended across space and magnified in their impact.
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It follows, then, that people can only satisfy their real interests by changing their 
way of life and “refusing” the delivery of material goods (Marcuse 1964: xviii).7
More recently, empirical studies have supported the understanding that 
consumption of luxury or non-basic goods and services is fuelled by the relativity 
of status that this confers. In 1990 The Economist magazine noted that while per 
capita income in the United States had steadily increased since 1973, middle-class 
Americans nevertheless perceived that living standards had stagnated or fallen 
(The Economist 1990). The implicit message was that the pleasure obtained from 
consumption had decreased, suggesting that consumer satisfaction is a relative 
phenomena; so people consume because others around them do (Lichtenberg 
1996). Thus “it cannot be demonstrated that consuming more makes the 
representative individual happier” (Common 1996: 15).8 There is thus a falsity in 
conventional economic, political and cultural wisdom which (erroneously) holds 
that more goods and services means more Good.
This point about wealth and welfare is demonstrated in a slightly different 
way by the UNDP’s Human Development Report which compiles a Human 
Development Index (HDI) that measures welfare in terms of education, adjusted 
income and life expectancy. Comparing the HDI for numerous countries is 
instructive, for example: Switzerland has an HDI value of .926 (out of 1) with a 
GNP per capita of US$36,000, whereas New Zealand has an value HDI of .927 
with a GNP per capita of US$13,000; South Africa has an HDI value of .649 with 
a GNP per capita of US$3,000, whereas Indonesia has an HDI value of .641 with a 
GNP per capita of US$700; and Senegal has an HDI value of .331 with a GNP per 
capita of US$750, whereas Nepal has an HDI value of .332 with a GNP per capita 
of US$190 (UNDP 1996). So, economic wealth is not synonymous with life 
richness.
Making the environmental dimension of this wealth/well-being paradox 
more explicit, Dovers (1994: 23) plots the HDI against extrasomatic energy use 
(remembering that the use of extrasomatic energy is the single best indicator of the 
stress humans place on the environment - see chapter 3). Dovers finds that gains in
7 This refusal is what Marcuse called ‘the great denial’ which resonates with life politics 
(following section). The is the protest against unnecessary repression through consumption, 
the struggle for the ultimate form of freedom, and practices that if ever universally upheld 
would be the death o f capitalism (Marcuse 1956, 1964). The great denial was also a 
popular catch-cry associated with the 60s, embodied in the phrase ‘tune in, turn on, and 
drop out’.
8 A classic early text on this subject is Scitovsky (1976).
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human development diminish above a certain level of energy use (the law of 
diminishing returns). Some countries are therefore able to deliver high levels of 
human well-being with relatively low levels of energy consumption. This is done 
through a diversification of economic, social and political systems which allow for 
welfare and well-being to be delivered by means other than increased consumption 
(Dovers 1994).
There are three key implications of this consumption/well-being paradox. 
First, the present consumer culture in the industrialised world is not merely 
ecologically destructive, but it is counterproductive to the genuine well-being of 
consumers. Second, welfare and well-being are better met (both ecologically and 
experientially) through the satisfaction of basic social needs such as an emotional 
support network for giving and receiving care; strong family ties; opportunities for 
extended community interaction; a diverse and stimulating environment; 
opportunities for creative expression and learning; opportunities for spontaneous 
behaviour; and a personal sense of involvement, purpose, 'belonging, and 
excitement (Boyden 1987: 79). Historically, these were the means to 
psychological health and satisfaction - consumption is a hollow substitute for these 
more fundamental and ecologically sustainable needs. Third, the claim that 
economic growth is the means to deliver greater satisfaction is unmasked, and “if 
growth does not deliver, then compromising it in order to protect the environment 
.. is much less of a problem” (Common 1996: 15). In essence then, that 
consumption and growth do not enhance the Good means that the core economic 
tenets of modernity are flawed.
This consumption/well-being paradox has profound implications for the 
behaviour of individuals in industrialised societies. First, it suggests that working 
more to earn more is counterproductive to happiness as it entails sacrificing the 
time required to meet basic social needs in return for more (less satisfying) 
consumer power. This is commonly expressed in the recognition of professionals 
that they do not get as much ‘quality time’ with their friends and families as they 
would like. Second, of course, seeking to meet basic social needs in lieu of greater 
consumption means consuming less resources and demanding less products whose 
manufacture pollutes the environment and exploits labour; hence Gandhi’s 
observation that:
If each retained possession only of what he needed, no one would be in
want, and all would live in contentment.... The rich should take the
initiative in dispossession with a view to a universal diffusion of the spirit of
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contentment.... Civilisation, in the real sense of the term, consists not in the 
multiplication, but in the deliberate and voluntary reduction of wants 
(Gandhi 1951:46).
Third, in terms of unemployment, the present trend of fewer people doing more 
work does not serve the interests of the workers, and it deprives the unemployed of 
potential employment opportunities (see Rees and Rodley 1993, and Cox 1996 for 
more on this subject). The policy implication is to reduce working hours to create 
more jobs and enhance lifestyle. So the motivation for individuals as agents of 
security (to be political beings) stems from both a responsibility to the Other, and 
from an awareness that more goods does not mean more Good.
11.2.2 Life politics
‘Life politics’ is the particular label Giddens (1991) uses to describe the notion of
the individual as a political agent. The broader rationale for life politics as a means
to emancipation and to overcome insecurity is worth establishing:
No one can doubt that reducing global inequalities is essential if long-term 
global security is to be won. An emancipatory process must be set in 
motion, although at the moment the mechanisms whereby this might be 
achieved are not very apparent.... a process of emancipation on the part of 
the world’s poor could probably only be achieved if radical lifestyle changes 
were introduced in the developed countries. Emancipation presumes life- 
political transformation (Giddens 1991: 230).
Life politics begins from the recognition that political life is not just party 
politics; it includes community organising, media events, court actions, 
conversations in bars and restaurants, education initiatives, demonstrations, 
boycotts, working with the disadvantaged, strikes, and self-help groups (Dryzek 
1997: 189, Walker 1988: 155). Life politics involves being an active participant in 
events that affect one’s own and others’ lives; it involves moving beyond passive 
consumption to deliberate action (it is thus the opposite of consumerism); it entails 
the deliberate acquisition of a political identity (Rees 1991: 43).
For Giddens, life politics is a means to redress the ontological insecurity and 
existential anxieties of individuals in late modernity (see chapter 3). He suggests 
that life politics entails renewed control of the lives and identities of the middle 
classes in the industrialised world, what Bookchin calls “the achievement of an 
autonomous personality and selfhood” (Bookchin 1982: 70). Life politics is 
therefore about individuals regaining a degree of control, because while structure 
makes agency, agency also makes structure; so “in forging their self-identities, no 
matter how local their specific contexts of action, individuals contribute to and
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directly promote social influences that are global in their consequences and 
implications” (Giddens 1991: 2). This underlies the possibility that “the reflexive 
project of the self (can) be the very hinge of a transition to a global order beyond 
the current one” (Giddens, 1991: 223). In short, life politics is about agency 
influencing structure in personal and detailed ways to enhance the lives o f the 
agents themselves at the same time as enhancing the lives of others; it is about 
individuals taking seriously the freedoms already available to them; it is about 
self-enhancing emancipation.9
Materially affluent people, particularly the middle classes o f the
industrialised states, have real economic and political power that derives from
lifestyle; they have the luxury to choose how they wish to liv e .10 It is therefore
with these more privileged people that the most responsibility lies; not merely
because they have more freedom, but also because it is their consumption and
lifestyle habits that fuel the demand for products whose manufacture contributes to
environmental degradation (and therefore environmental insecurity). Further, in as
much as the production o f these goods also frequently entails labour exploitation
and the accumulation o f power to corporations, those who most demand them are
responsible for much oppression. As Massey describes it:
The time-space-compression which is involved in producing and 
reproducing the daily lives of the comfortably-off in the first world societies 
.... the resources they draw on from all over the world to feed their lives .... 
may entail environmental consequences, or hit constraints, which will limit 
the lives of others before their own (Massey 1991: 26)
So, affluent people perpetuate the industrial-capitalist system and its ecological
destruction through their consumer behaviour; they are thus complicit in structural
violence: “in this sense to acknowledge (common) responsibility for its [the
system’s] power over us would be the key to breaking its spell” (Vogel 1996:
172).
9 Life politics is also a means and an ends to empowerment. Empowerment entails 
struggling to make sense of one’s circumstances, appreciating that to influence and 
comprehend the world is a continuous (and difficult) process, and developing the freedom 
and ability to express oneself in spontaneous and creative ways (this latter point reinforces 
Boyden’s basic social needs - see section 11.2.1) (Rees 1991: 11-12).
10 It is important to note that ‘choose’ and ‘choice’ have been captured and interpreted in 
particular ways by neo-liberal economic discourse, where choice becomes the freedom to 
choose among goods and services, but does not entail the freedom to choose not to 
consume. Enhancing the diversity of goods and services to choose from is scripted as a 
principal benefit of neo-liberal economic policies. However, this is not real choice, nor real 
freedom, but, in fact, a form of enslavement.
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It is also important to recognise that it will be easier for people to consume 
less if others around them are consuming less (Lichtenberg 1996). So, in terms of 
the relative deprivation of people in industrialising countries, the standard of 
consumption to which they aspire will be lower if the evident standard of 
consumption in the industrialised countries is lower.11
Life politics is founded on the Weberian notion of methodological 
individualism. It interprets this as the basis o f emancipation and ethical life, rather 
than crudely reducing it to the principle of consumer sovereignty (neo-liberal 
economics), or rational autonomous ‘man’ (political Realism). Life politics is the 
enactment o f an ethical life in which we identify ourselves with larger goals and 
moral causes as way to give purpose and meaning to our lives. According to 
Giddens, life politics is a politics of choice in which power is generative rather 
than hierarchical:
Life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self- 
actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where globalising influences 
intrude deeply into the reflexive project of self, and conversely where 
processes o f self-realisation influence global strategies (Giddens 1991: 214).
So, life politics is exercising choice in action to consciously affect the social order.
Choice is integral to changing destructive habits and renouncing familiar, if
destructive institutions (Toynbee 1966). The freedom of choice is a hallmark of
freedom itself; to be free is to rationally exercise one’s choices, and to be truly free
means choosing to break the “fetishization o f needs” (Bookchin 1982: 69).
The sort o f problems that life politics is capable of addressing are those
which do not easily fit within existing political frameworks, as Prins puts it:
The ordinary waste in every kitchen and pumped from every car exhaust 
contributes to environmental stress in ways which make criteria of public or 
private origin irrelevant. In this sense environmental questions cut across all 
categories of political choice, including some which most people don’t see 
as political at all - such as choosing to drive down to the shops” (Prins 1990: 
715).
Life politics, then, is about wresting authority and control from experts 
(Collingwood 1992), and taking charge o f political issues that defy the limitations 
o f contemporary political processes. As Booth notes: “even in small and private 
decisions it is possible to make choices which help rather than hinder the building 
o f a world community” (Booth 1991: 326). Life politics also involves
11 Thus U.S. President Clinton’s reported comment to the Chinese President (see chapter 6) 
about the environmental dangers of increased consumption in China (to equal U.S. levels) 
implies not a suppression of the ability of the Chinese to consume, but a lowering of the 
standard of consumption, the highest of which is arguably in the U.S.
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revolutionising political institutions; it involves generating new, or reforming 
existing structures of authority and governance. Exactly what these will look like 
depends on exactly how people participate in political life (Walker 1988). By 
acquiescing to democracy as the practice of voting every two or three years, 
people are acquiescing to their own disempowerment and consenting to the 
artificial distinction between politics and ordinary life (Bookchin 1982, Walker 
1988). Politics and democracy must entail more than this, and life politics can 
force the shift towards a greater “personification” of politics (Bookchin 1982:
335). On this point Falk says: “it will be the cumulative impact of separate 
assertions of concern that form the basis of the one solid strategy for change that 
does not rest on the tactics of desperation” (Falk 1971: 444).
As well as having the potential to resist or reform economic and political 
institutions, life politics is integral to effecting a change in the culture which has 
exacerbated environmental insecurity. The need for cultural change is expressed 
by Boy den:
It is only through our capacity for culture that we can hope to achieve the 
kind of reorganisation that will be necessary to ensure the protection of 
ecosystems, local and global, and the well-being of humans the world over. 
It follows that the most immediate and urgent task facing humanity today is 
to apply our aptitude for culture in a new way - using it, in fact, to control 
culture itself (Boyden 1992: 251).
Culture is a dialectical phenomenon, “a malleable entity in which there is 
continuous feedback” (Wilkening 1998: 4). A key driver of modem culture is 
advertising, which actively fosters the recognition of an individual’s relative 
deprivation. However, advertising is effective only for as long as consumers 
respond positively. By not responding by not consuming, individuals acting as 
political agents can change the culture industry and can assert a new set of cultural 
norms such as frugality and self-sufficiency.
Life politics is a new label for an old idea. Greek philosophy, for example, 
understood that an ethical life is a Good life, and, as suggested in the introduction 
to this chapter, various scholars have implored us to live simply. Feminists have 
also long recognised that the personal is political (see chapter 2). Gandhi, too, was 
aware that the individual is able to “defy the whole might of an unjust empire to
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save his honour, his religion, his soul, and lay the foundation for the empire’s fall
12
or its regeneration” (cited in Paggi and Pinzauti 1985: 40).
There are numerous obstacles to ‘life politics’. The first is that alternative
paths and lifestyles are hard to see, and the more radical the choice the more
difficult the implementation.13 It is difficult to picture alternatives to our world
because even our imagination is to a large degree conditioned by experience.
Thinking seriously about escaping the modem capitalist system therefore involves
engaging in intensely difficult questions about possible futures:
To rethink the meaning of security, or development, or democracy is to 
enter upon very difficult conceptual terrain. It is to move from what is to 
what might be. It is to strain the limits of prevailing categories and to 
wrench enormously influential concepts out of their present contexts 
(Walker 1988: 142).
A collective and sustained effort at imagination and “utopian dialogue” is 
therefore necessary (Bookchin 1982: 334).
A second obstacle is technological entrapment, or in Boyden’s terms, 
technoaddiction - which determines equal opportunity needs (see chapter 3). The 
concept is not hard to grasp but has profound importance. Put as a question, it asks 
- what can we do without? Achieving environmental security involves finding 
substitutes for the ecologically and socially damaging technologies to which 
modem societies are addicted. This is a question for policy and technology, but the 
impetus for reform must come from the general public through the generation o f 
demand for alternatives to be supplied through the market and by the state; this is 
why life politics is generative.
12 Collingwood (1992) would endorse life politics, understanding it to be the politics of 
civilisation. He identifies a need for people to act on the will for the Good, for not acting is 
the will to barbarism (Collingwood 1992: 307). In these terms being civilised means living 
dialectically, that is “the constant endeavour to convert every occasion of non-agreement 
into an occasion of agreement” (Collingwood 1992: 326). This is supported by 
O’Riordan’s claim that “the challenge of modem environmentalism is essentially the search 
for mediation - an outcome that for many can only be found by consciously applying one’s 
whole being to the ultimate meaning of existence (O’Riordan 1976: vi - vii). This 
foreshadows the theme of communicative action discussed later in this chapter. 
lj In modem society difference is tolerable so long as it is socially sanctioned and confluent 
with the capitalist order. Those who are socially shunned - for example gypsies, vagrants, 
and some of Australia’s indigenous people - do not live by the creeds of ownership, labour, 
high consumption, planning, status and acceptance. These people radically challenge the 
modem experience of the life world, they threaten the very order of modernity; how could 
anyone not sacrifice their lives for convertible sports cars, brick veneers and white goods?
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A third obstacle is the insufficient demonstration of the links between
individuals, social structures, ecological damage and structural violence
(interdependence). As Agenda 21 noted:
There is still a considerable lack of awareness of the interrelated nature of 
all human activities and the environment due to inaccurate or insufficient 
information.... There is a need to increase public sensitivity to environment 
and development problems and involvement in their solutions to foster a 
sense of personal environmental responsibility and greater motivation and 
commitment towards sustainable development. (Agenda 21, 36.8, UNCED 
1993)
This suggests that for life politics to have a cumulative impact there needs to be 
growth in the provision of enabling information, and the demonstration of 
alternative lifestyles. That education and information provision is important is 
underscored by Agenda 21:
Education is critical for promoting sustainable development and improving 
the capacity of the people to address environment and development issues 
.... it is also critical for achieving environmental and ethical awareness, 
values and attitudes, skills and behaviours consistent with sustainable 
development (Agenda 21, 36.3, UNCED 1993)
Therefore, one important prerequisite for life politics is to get information fully
active and to use modern communications “to force changes in the public
imagination” (Prins 1990: 729).
11.2.3 Doing life politics
The general goal of life political action should be to consume less, to consume
smarter, and to be more involved in political processes from the local to the global
level. It is also important for individuals to set examples and disseminate
information - this does not mean preach, it means demonstration in everyday acts,
and facilitating awareness. The ultimate aim of such action is to shift culture from
one of consumption to one of frugality, self-sufficiency, and caring. Falk suggests
that the secret is to begin somewhere: “with a concrete and personal act, perhaps
located in the mind, in one’s daily routine, or in one’s neighbourhood. The early
acts should be close at hand, and gradually the circles of effect should be
expanded” (Falk 1971: 19). Specific actions might include:
Negotiating to work only as much as is necessary to provide for basic needs. 
This makes more time available to spend with friends and family and to 
engage in community and environmental activities. It also makes work 
available for others;
Trying to be as self-sufficient as possible by growing vegetables, rearing 
poultry, using home-based renewable energy sources, better housing design, 
recycling wastes and other permaculture activities;
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Investing in green energy and ethical investment portfolios, as well as 
seeking to exert greater control over pension schemes (a large source of 
floating capital - see Rifkin 1991);
Taking public transport, cycling or walking as modes o f transport;
Spending more time with one’s family and children;
Eating less energy and resource intensive foodstuffs. This entails consuming 
more fresh fruit, vegetables and grains, and less meat and frozen goods. It 
also involves selecting products with minimal packaging;
Boycotting certain products and companies whose practices are known to 
environmentally destructive and socially dam aging as well as favouring 
those which are cleaner, greener and more ethical;
Supporting local employment-intensive businesses;
Becoming involved in local politics and community support programs 
(schooling, health care and housing for the homeless for example), and 
engaging with local and global advocacy groups;
Donating to charities;
Lobbying governments on a range of issues, for example: for land reform 
programs; for greater contributions to foreign aid; for better public 
transport; for renewable energy schemes; for reductions in the defence 
budget; for better education; for a carbon tax; for schemes to discourage 
excessive consumption; for international exchanges of people; for more 
stringent environmental laws; for the protection of workers rights; for 
financial and legislative support o f local and transnational political 
organisations; and to ratify and implement existing international treaties on 
the environment.
11.2.4 Conclusions
Individuals in the industrialised world have a moral responsibility to be frugal.
Less consumption o f status goods and more time invested in social needs enhances 
personal welfare and well-being, it also helps people to regain control o f their own 
lives and to bolster individual identity and ontological security. Conscious reform 
of lifestyle in this way helps reshape modem institutions. Action of this kind is 
political action that will enhance environmental security. It is important to 
recognise, though, that institutional power can be inimical to individual action, and 
so the following section seeks to begin to address the difficult task of institutional 
reform (particularly of institutions o f governance). Further, social movements 
(discussed below) can enhance the ability of people to act by providing 
information that helps motivate and implement action, and they provide a 
commonality of purpose that runs counter to the social atomisation affected by 
capitalism.
14 There is thus an element of green consumerism in life politics, but life politics is more 
encompassing than this (Elkington and Hailes 1988).
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The individual is an important, overlooked and under-theorised site of 
politics. Exploring the issue of the individual as a political actor is integral to the 
challenge of rethinking the political implications of any human-centred security 
concept. The following section seeks to consider what policies existing political 
institutions might need to pursue to bring about a more environmentally secure 
world; this entails new policies and reform of existing policies. Politically aware 
individuals must demand these changes, and in this respect this discussion about 
individuals as agents of security satisfies the often overlooked issue of the politics 
of policy.
11.3 Policies and Governance for Environmental Security7
Describing the characteristics of a human-centred environmental security concept
is perhaps easier than determining what this means policy and governance in the
future. Dryzek provides a timely warning here:
If the twentieth century holds one political lesson, it is that we should 
beware of anyone peddling .. blueprints, be they socialist paradises, fascist 
Reichs to last a thousand years, or free market utopias popularized in the 
Anglo-American world in the 1980’s (Dryzek 1997: 192).
Further, there is much danger in speaking for other people as this thesis does.
Ultimately the only policy recommendation this thesis confidently makes is that
those people who are most vulnerable should be heard, and their interests acted
upon by those who have the power to act. So, although conscious of the need to
make recommendations, what follows should be seen as tentative suggestions that
can serve as a basis for future dialogue.
It is clear from previous chapters that the nation-state cannot be allowed to 
continue to appropriate environmental security to perpetuate its own power and to 
avert legitimacy crises. Preventing this appropriation is the most valuable function 
of critical environmental security analyses such as this thesis. Nevertheless, the 
nation-state is still the most powerful of all formal political institutions. So, efforts 
to enhance environmental security will be more effective and more rapid if the 
nation-state is positively involved, however unpalatable this may be.15 Indeed, it is
15 On this key point this discussion departs from the critical and obstinate perspective 
entailed in the works of, say, Marcuse and Bookchin . There is a need for pragmatic 
engagement with the state, although we might wish otherwise. The distinction is essentially 
one of positioning, Bookchin and Marcuse stand outside the system and seek its reform 
from the exterior, whereas others seek reform from within. Neither approach is likely to be
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possible that life politics will fail so long as elites in the nation-state refuse to 
relinquish their monopolisation o f power (Falk 1982b). When talking o f policy, 
then, this section is primarily speaking about national policy, and more properly it 
is concerned with policies designed to bring about more effective governance 
throughout the world. Although this is a long-term agenda, this thesis contends 
that in the interim national governments should foster and facilitate a form of 
politics and governance that is driven from the bottom-up, is consistent with needs 
of people, and which is consistent across institutions and scales. The ultimate goal 
(like the purpose o f engaging with the military - chapter 8), is to progressively 
transform the state with a view to its dissolution, or to a radical change in its 
current nature such that it becomes but one o f many equally weighted institutions 
o f governance.
The intent o f this discussion is to see political power distributed to those 
institutions and groups which are most capable of acting to enhance environmental 
security. The premise here is that “governance is too important to leave to 
governments alone” (Renner 1997: 153). What is required, then, are institutions 
that encourage reflection, dialogue, and learning, and which enhance social and 
political awareness (Rees 1995: 287). This involves more than subsidiarity as the 
process of shifting authority downward, it also involves enhancing the authority of 
global institutions (such as the United Nations), transnational non-governmental 
organisations, and critical social movements.16
This power shifting strategy involves moving beyond the jigsaw-like 
political geography o f the modem world where virtually all space is sovereign and 
boundaries are fixed, and where the state is removed from the people and its 
responsibility for one space means responsibility for all issues within but not 
beyond that space. A new politics for a new conception of security means 
imagining an issue-sensitive, adaptive, deterritorialised and multi-layered system 
of governance by people and for people, rather than by distanced, territorial 
institutions motivated by power for power’s sake. The ecological vision o f politics 
as discussed in chapter 9 has relevance here. Ultimately what is necessary is a 
dissolution o f national power through a progressive relinquishment o f national
successful, critiques and alternatives posed from without are as necessary, and complement, 
cajoling from within. But the critical point, to return the opening sentence, is that the state 
cannot be ignored and must be engaged.
16 Subsidiarity does not necessarily means shifting authority to the lowest possible political 
level (ie to local government), it more generally refers to governance at the appropriate 
level (Graeger 1996).
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power. In this approach the nation-state is a broker, facilitator and conduit for the 
new politics of environmental security. The state as a conduit in this sense means 
facilitating governance from below, that is fostering bottom- up representation of 
people from the local through to the global level. This is the inverse o f the present 
trend, noted by O’Tuathail et al (1998), whereby the state increasingly acts as a 
conduit for top-down implementation of the rules and requirements o f the global 
economy.
An alternative and complementary intent o f the following discussion, and 
the discussion of life politics, is to foster a political climate, and institutions, 
which are conducive to communicative action (Habermas 1990), or discursive 
democracy (Dryzek 1990b).17 A crude summary o f communicative action is that it 
is the process whereby through communication conceptions o f the Good are (in 
effect discursively/democratically) determined. Communicative action means 
reinstating politics as the process o f consensually agreeing to the Good, and policy 
as the means to make the Good happen. Communicative action means authority 
is accorded solely on the basis of a reasoned and persuasive argument, and policies 
have to be continually justified in and of themselves rather than on the basis of the 
power o f the proponent. Communicative action arises through life politics and the 
explicit justification of our actions; however, it also requires enabling institutions 
and practices (Vogel 1996: 173). Institutions which are non-hierarchical and non- 
discriminatory are essentially conducive to communicative action. So, the 
polycentric institutional and political forms that this discussion seeks to foster are 
consistent with the needs of communicative action. This should not be surprising 
given that communicative action and a human-centred environmental security 
concept both fundamentally see inclusion and dialogue as the paths to peace (see 
the comments on democracy below). To argue for greater inclusion of diverse 
interests in governance processes may well be consistent with a ‘liberal’ ideal of 
politics (note, though, that like ‘democracy’, ‘liberal’ is a contestable category), 
however, to argue against greater inclusion is to argue for a form of 
totalitarianism. Finally, communicative action is unlikely to ever be perfect, and 
the prescriptions made below are unlikely to do justice to this imperfect idea.
17 Note that these are not necessarily the same, but the principles of communication and 
negotiation are common.
18 Thus communicative power differs from administrative power, the latter being the more 
dominant feature of politics in modernity, and communicative rationality differs from the 
efficient implementation (of blind criteria) of instrumental rationality (Habermas 1990).
282
However, if these would serve to enable a more communicatively rational political 
process, then they are worth proposing.
The philosophy of greater inclusion implicitly informs the trend toward 
greater stakeholder involvement in environmental (and cultural heritage) 
management in Australia. The success of Australia’s Landcare movement, which 
has some 4,000 district scale groups engaged in education, investigation and 
demonstration, is contingent upon the active involvement of a diverse range of 
people who have a stake in land degradation (Campbell 1994, Martin and 
Woodhill 1995, Dovers 1998). In Australia, a philosophy of inclusion underlies 
other environmental management processes such as Total Catchment 
Management, environmental policy formulation processes such as the National 
Rangelands Strategy, and environmental management institutions such as the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (Dovers 1998). These processes mirror 
the intent and illustrate the difficulties of involving a diverse range of interests in 
governance processes. One of the principal difficulties, which supports the need 
for communicative action, is the absence of a sophisticated dialogue on goals and 
values. Recent research suggests that if there is to be a more diverse range of 
inputs into environmental governance, there needs to be enhanced dialogue about 
what is to be governed and for whom (Ellemor 1998). Although the principle of 
inclusion underlies these innovative processes, the theoretical justification is 
generally absent, and the coordination of efforts is generally very poor. It is 
interesting that practice is leading theory here, nevertheless, more theoretical 
awareness can enhance practice.
Environmental security demands policies to promote good governance from 
the local to the global scale. Good governance, it is increasingly recognised, is 
vital for the eradication of poverty, reducing environmental degradation, and 
increasing the welfare of people. Good governance is characterised by: effective 
participation and inclusion; transparency; responsiveness; strategic vision; respect 
for human rights; a capacity to learn and to adapt; receptiveness to global and local 
requirements; reliance on education, conversation and persuasion; meeting the 
needs of the most deprived; and accountability (after COGG 1995, Falk 1987,
Haas and Haas 1995, UNDP 1997). These are all mutually reinforcing and 
interdependent. Good governance requires leadership and the courage to 
implement necessary reforms (COGG 1995, O’Riordan and Voisey 1997b). Good 
governance should seek to empower people; to foster cooperation and consensus;
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to foster ownership of the political process; to advance equity; to respect life and 
liberty; to meet present needs without compromising the satisfaction of future 
generations’ needs; to promote the rule of law; to enhance people’s capabilities; to 
protect rights and promote responsibilities; and to provide stability and certainty 
(after COGG 1995 and UNDP 1997).19 These are all necessary for environmental 
security. Consistent with the argument made in chapter 9 (that diversity is a key to 
resilience), a more diverse array of institutions is also necessary for good and 
stable governance for environmental security."
A simple framework for thinking about the focus of national policies for 
environmental security identifies political action above, below and between 
nation-states. The distinction should not be read as a demarcation of rigid 
boundaries, zones or scales of politics. It should by now be apparent that this 
thesis sees politics in holistic and dialectical terms where institutions are 
temporary manifestations - reflections and refractions - of the ongoing and ever 
changing milieu of human behaviour. So the categories that will now be deployed 
are an extremely loose and imperfect means to provide some nominal order for the 
purposes of discussion. Again, this discussion is tentative and exploratory and 
makes no pretences to being a comprehensive blueprint. Again, the focus of 
discussion here is not on specific policies, but on what the nation-state can do to 
assist the transition to a political order capable of enhancing environmental 
security. Finally, it is important to note that the author’s experience with the 
Australian political system inevitably conditions these observations. Nevertheless, 
the recommendations being made here are intended to be generically applicable to 
all states, although different places and contexts mean flexibility in 
implementation will be necessary.
An important caveat is that the following discussion assumes the need for 
democratic political systems. There are two dimensions to democracy (itself a 
contestable concept); first, it is a vehicle for the representation of diverse interests; 
second, and consistent with communicative action (see above), it is a way of 
creating a public arena in which controversial issues are handled through dialogue 
and negotiation rather than through the use of power and/or force (Giddens 1994: 
16). Both are necessary for democracy to be peaceful. This does not mean that 
there is any ideal system of governance, and certainly most present democratic
19 ‘For peace and plenty may be had to some extent without law and order; but with law 
and order they are ensured, and abundantly” (Collingwood 1992: 333).
20 As well more social and cultural diversity.
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systems are less than ideal (largely because the principles of inclusion and 
dialogue are often not fully upheld). Nevertheless, the aim of revitalising politics 
and the crucial need to alleviate poverty will be near impossible in an autocratic 
political system: “democracy provides the environment within which the 
fundamental rights of citizens are best safeguarded and offers the most favourable 
foundation for peace and stability” (COGG 1995: 337). As Giddens notes, despite 
its flaws, democracy is the best system there is at present, so “are there any 
political thinkers today .. who are not, in one sense or another, democrats?” 
(Giddens 1994: 104). The following discussion therefore requires a degree of 
democracy to be present, but once present, the recommendations seek to 
significantly enlarge the scope for genuine input from people. The (optimistic) 
assumption here is that more participatory forms of politics means more 
environmental security.
11.3.1 Below
National policy has a crucial role to play if the full potential of life politics is to be 
realised, for while life politics is important for better policy, policy is also 
important to encourage life politics. Crucial here is the reform of domestic 
political systems to enhance participation. This is a complex area, but the general 
direction should be towards allowing (not deregulating) trade unions and acting in 
the interests of the protection of labour; more forums and opportunities for people 
to participate and have their voices heard; more accountability of political leaders 
to justify their policies in terms of the negotiated values of the state; greater 
integration of political values into economic policies (including access to credit on 
fair terms for poor and disadvantaged groups, and approaching technology 
transfers as unencumbered aid rather than as exploitation of comparative
advantage); and a model of politics based on honest conversation rather than on
21crude argumentation and sophistry (see Rayner 1997).
To enhance the politicisation of society it is vital that women occupy 50% 
of seats in a country’s governing body, and hold 50% of public service positions.
21 Policies that put disincentives on high levels o f consumption of resources and energy 
through taxation are needed to complement the promotion of environmentally benign 
activities (see O’Riordan 1996). Perhaps the most comprehensive single policy option here 
would be to introduce a carbon tax as the principal means of revenue raising (see Common 
1995). As well as taxing environmentally damaging activities it might also be necessary to 
tax the promotion o f environmentally damaging activities (Pezzey 1992). There are also 
good grounds for considering that more taxation is necessary for peace, justice and security 
(Rees 1993). On aid and environmental security see Goldstone (1996b).
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22 Policies should advance an equal gender balance in private enterprises as well. It 
is also vital that indigenous people have a greater and more formal say in 
governance. At a minimum, indigenous people should be given a percentage of 
seats in a state’s legislature; even 5% of seats would facilitate more lobbying 
power and make indigenous concerns heard. O f course, indigenous people should 
be represented proportionally, but in states where indigenous people are a minority 
and do not have a voice, the above recommendation would ensure a minimum 
standard o f access. This might be extended to other marginalised groups as well.
More autonomous local-level governance is necessary if people are to 
participate directly on issues which affect them intimately. Local governments are 
key players in empowering people and in facilitating the social and infrastructural 
requirements to enhance community resilience. Local governments are frequently 
(although not always) effective environmental stewards, and are well positioned to 
observe the social and environmental effects o f private enterprise. They are also 
integral to ensure that developments within their jurisdictions have the approval 
and meet the needs of local people. However, local governments must ensure that 
developments within their jurisdiction do not to harm others in more distant 
places; hence O ’Riordan and Rayner’s suggestion to invert the catch-phrase ‘think 
globally: act locally’ to ‘think locally: act globally’ (O ’Riordan and Rayner 1991: 
97). In short, because most things happen in specific locales, good governance is 
needed at the local level.
There is also a need for greater input from young people into governance 
processes. States should sponsor a system that encourages youth involvement and 
allows young people to have input into decision making. As an example, there 
could be a youth parliament comprised of delegates from secondary schools which 
sits three or four times a year, ‘adult’ members o f the legislature could attend, and 
it might be desirable for the youth parliament to hold seat(s) in the national 
legislature. Lowering the voting age would also be a useful initiative. Similarly, 
local governments could have a more regular forum, and could be represented in 
the national legislature. There is also scope for input into the legislative and policy 
making process by trade unions. Further, there is merit in the idea o f an
22 This should not obscure the need to include consideration of issues of gender. Focusing 
on the need to include women tends to marginalise consideration of the responsibilities of 
men, and the whole issue of constructions and reproductions of gender relations 
(Bretherton 1998).
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international body such as the United Nations having a seat in the national 
legislature.
A more radical suggestion is that international and domestic non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) have a formal place in the political process. 
This might take the form of, say, government sponsored ‘embassies’ for NGOs 
which have a certain (paying) constituency. So, for example, if Greenpeace has 
more than 3% of a population who pay membership fees, it would be entitled to 
government support and opportunities to participate in the diplomatic process. 
Taken further, the NGOs who qualify under such a scheme could have a similar 
forum to that of local governments and young people, and might also be similarly 
entitled to seat(s) in the legislature. The role of NGOs and other social groups is 
discussed further in the following sub-section.
All of these proposals seek to enhance security by improving the 
opportunities for people to be represented, and by creating multiple channels and 
multiple inputs into the making of policy. More diverse voices hopefully means 
less exclusion. Further, involvement of NGO, student, trade union, local 
government and indigenous groups (for example) in the political process would 
stimulate these groups to actively elicit responses from people on a wide range of 
issues. Political cynics might groan, what is needed, it could be argued, is less 
rather than more politics, but this depends on the spirit of politics. The difficulty in 
most liberal-democracies is that politics is about promoting economic policy over 
social policy; promoting the ideology of crass neo-liberalism, described by Rees as 
“an economic aspirin, a sort of pill for all seasons to be prescribed by politicians of 
any persuasion” (Rees 1994: 174); and protecting the interests of big business and 
the power of money ahead of the interests of marginalised people. The problems 
of contemporary liberal-democratic politics are compounded by parties seeking re- 
election in short-term electoral cycles, and the dominance of big parties such that 
“soundbites and inter-party squabbling reduce the chance of getting serious long­
term strategic issues into any meaningful political programme” (O’Riordan and 
Voisey 1997b: 176). In effect, the problem is that national politics is currently
2j Of course this call for greater inclusion of alternative perspectives need not imply that 
all included groups hold to the values and interests o f peace and environmental security in 
the way that this thesis does. However, it is assumed that the majority of interest will be for 
the Good, an assumption that seems supported by the general progressive and positive 
interests advanced by most NGOs and civil society groups. This assumption arguably 
underlies most theories which advocate greater inclusion and conversation in political 
processes, including Habermas’ communicative action (1990), Dryzek’s discursive 
democracy (1990b), and Giddens’ dialogic democracy (1994).
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about the pursuit of power for the sake of power, and that powerful parties have 
become progressively more powerful, which is arguably a regression of politics. It 
is important to imagine then, a political context which is more diverse, and more 
populated by people with political concerns rather than by politicians with token 
concerns. In this sense life politics is a very important component of this new 
politics.
11.3.2 In between
One of the positive aspects of globalisation is the ‘bottom-up’ proliferation of 
‘contemporary social movements’ (Walker and Mendlovitz 1987), also known as 
‘critical social movements’ (Walker 1988). These are “an assemblage of 
individuals linked intersubjectively to one another, based on shared identity and a 
common fabric of relations and practices” with “some degree of collective 
consciousness” (Latham 1996: 101).24 The upsurge of citizen action through these 
groups has been “a salient phenomenon” of political life and environmental 
restoration initiatives in recent times (Gordenker and Weiss 1995: 364). The 
phenomenon of social movements has caught the attention of critical theorists, 
including Habermas, who identifies these as carriers of a communicative ethic, not 
least because they tend to debate their identity, negotiate their actions, hold to the 
principles of free discourse, and are not interested in reaching power but in 
redistributing it (Habermas 1981a, 1990). Giddens says the value of social 
movements lies in their “remoralization of a sphere of life denuded of moral 
meaning” (1985a: 320), and Beck identifies these as “the new constellation of a 
global subpolitics” (1996: 17).25
It is tempting to identify these as the basis of ‘global civil society’ and the 
foundation of a new form of governance (Lipschutz and Mayer 1996). However, 
the value of these groups needs to be put into some perspective. First, it seems 
overly optimistic to talk of a global civil society when the world system is still
24 Recent literature which talks o f civil society can over simplify the position o f these 
groups, they are neither necessarily in opposition to states not are they necessarily NGOs. 
Such simplifications confuse the analysis o f society and undervalue the contribution of 
certain cultural groups (Pelling 1998). The UNDP identifies as examples of these groups: 
trade unions; non-govemmental organisations; gender, language, cultural and religious 
groups; charities; business associations; social and sports clubs; community development 
organisations; environmental groups; professional associations; academic and policy 
institutions; media outlets; and political parties not represented in parliament (UNDP 
1997).
25 “Subpolitics refers to politics outside and beyond the representative institutions o f the 
political system of nation-states” (Beck 1996: 18).
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fundamentally barbaric, and when the resources and access to political power of
these groups “pale[s] in comparison to the forces driving environmental
destruction” (Conca 1995b: 454). Second, these transnational groups are not
always ‘civil’, the U.S. National Rifle Association, for example, has strong links to
numerous other countries, and fascism is less than benign. Third, whatever
governance may become, it is a present a long way from being firmly rooted in the
deliberations o f multifarious special interest groups. Thus the UNDP writes that:
Civil society organisations do not always pursue the qualities o f good 
governance. Nor are they always the most effective development agents. 
That is why states, while recognising and protecting the democratic rights of 
civil society organisations, must also ensure that rules of law and values that 
reflect societal norms are adhered to (UNDP 1997: 22)
The real potential o f critical social movements lies in their ability to offer a 
collective and at times complementary grass roots perspective to nation-states - 
one which is consistent with global priorities (Elliott 1998). They add radically 
different streams of advice into the policy making process; Pelling calls this “a 
corrective influence on the polity” (1998: 11), and Haas (1992) calls it an 
‘epistemic’ function. These groups (and NGOs) have monitoring roles as well 
(Elliott 1998). They also foster global awareness, dissolve national membranes, 
and exploit the positive aspects o f communications and transport technology. 
Social movements are for the most ‘placeless’, and in this sense they transcend the 
conflation o f identity with territory, offering the potential for identity to come 
from recognising interdependence and the numerous affiliations available to all 
people. For their part, governments need to create channels to hear these 
alternative global and local perspectives (see above), and need to commit 
themselves to implementing this advice. O f course, this would mean actively 
undermining the authority of the state and breaking the monopoly hold o f state 
bureaucracies on policy advice, but this authority and monopoly contributes to the 
non-resolution o f environmental insecurity.
There are important processes which can enhance bilateral and multilateral 
transactions between states. Beyond suggesting that these are important for 
environmental security, it is not the place o f this thesis to reiterate the need for, or 
to describe, these interstate forums and confidence building processes, this is done 
ably elsewhere (see for example Ball 1991b, Elliott 1998, Haas et al 1993, Payne 
1996, Vogler 1995, Young 1989 and 1994).26 Indeed, this is a key theme of the
26 However, stressing the importance of these should not obscure the need for other 
institutions and strategies for providing environmental security - such as individual action,
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environmental security literature, and was recognised by Agenda 21 (which was 
signed by 178 countries).
There are therefore important precedents for interstate interaction on 
environmental (and peace and development issues). Beyond these formal inter­
governmental exchanges there is scope for governments to foster people-people 
exchanges to strengthen awareness of other cultures and issues in other places 
(although, to be sure, most cross-cultural interaction occurs without the 
sponsorship of states). This might take the form of, for example, exchanges 
between students at all levels, exchanges of people in similar employment roles, 
exchanges of technical and scientific personnel, exchanges of people from trade 
unions and indigenous groups, and exchanges of families and households between 
communities. Such processes, when transpiring in the renewed political context 
being described here, would enhance the global awareness of people and 
governments which is necessary for environmental security. This would also 
promote cross cultural awareness which would help destabilise identity politics, 
and it would significantly decrease the likelihood of interstate conflict.
11.3.3 Above
It is difficult to talk of what goes on ‘above’ the state without discussing
'll‘globalisation’. Globalisation is facilitated by advances in transport and 
communication technologies, and it can be seen in both positive and negative 
ways. Positive facets are the rise of international non-government organisations 
and critical social movements; greater international involvement (sometimes) in 
settling regional conflicts; and treaties, conventions and charters approved by a 
majority of states prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. On the 
negative side globalisation involves rampant and rapid transfers of venture capital
enhancing participation in local and national politics, fostering transnational groups, and so 
on. The strength o f the regime approach is undermined if it excludes alternative strategies 
(Doran 1995: 194). Saurin warns that an overly narrow focus on regimes and the like can 
elevate “an ignorance of the vast range of social, cultural and economic processes at work 
into an essential methodological precondition” (Saurin 1996: 95). He also suggests that 
“complexity and diversity are marginalised in order to press standard generalised 
procedures into the service o f official state regulation” (Saurin 1996: 95). This, o f course, 
depends in a large part on the nature o f ‘the state’. A reformulated ‘state’, as proposed here, 
is less likely to misappropriate and misconstrue inter-state cooperation on environmental 
problems in this way.
27 Globalisation is more an analytical concept than a descriptive term. It does not suggest 
that common tendencies exist uniformly around the world, but that there are relationships 
between distanciated people often in very diverse circumstances; it thus “entails the 
restructuring of the locality through globalised relations of power” (Saurin 1996: 91).
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which have the power to make and break fortunes and destabilise currencies. It 
also involves deregulation of trade and investment through agreements such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organisation, 
and the impending Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), all of which 
undermine the capacity of states to protect industries and firms which may be 
labour intensive or greener than their foreign competitors. This implies an erosion 
of sovereignty where sovereignty' is arguably most needed. Globalisation also 
means transnational flows of pollutants, drugs, crime, and a widening gap in 
incomes and capabilities (UNDP 1997). Importantly, those who do not have access 
to globalisation’s facilitating transport and communication technologies are 
experiencing a new form of deprivation and becoming part of what the UNDP 
calls a “structural underclass” (UNDP 1997: 25). Thus “globalisation has profound 
implications for governance the final impact of which we cannot yet determine” 
(UNDP 1997: 24).
In this new climate the state must strike balances between global influences 
and global and local responsibilities. The previous discussion has suggested 
reforms which might assist in meeting the nation’s local responsibilities while 
taking account of global issues. The remainder of this section addresses ways in 
which a state’s global responsibilities can be better met.
It is important not to overstate the importance of global institutions for 
environmental security. Talking of the ‘global’, as has repeatedly been suggested, 
tends to obscure causes and effects, and displace responsibilities. Action for 
environmental security begins at home. If a prioritised order of this thesis’ policy 
recommendations were necessary, the rule of thumb would be the closer to the 
ground the more important the implementation. By this token, global level initiates 
come last in importance, and individual action in the context of global issues (act 
local think global) is the most important. Further, talking about global institutions 
runs the risk of proposing to centralise power, which is another reason why power 
should be dispersed downwards wherever appropriate. It should always be borne 
in mind that the most basic function of global institutions is to coordinate, not 
enforce the actions of more localised forms of governance. Indeed, this is true for 
all institutions of governance above the local level.
The notion of global governance is unavoidable here. Global governance is 
understood as “systems of rule at all levels of human activity - from the family to
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the international organisation - in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise 
of control has transnational repercussions” (Rosenau 1995b: 13). This does not 
imply world government, nor does it imply hierarchy as a necessary condition.
The preferred term here is steering, which highlights a purposefulness of 
governance without presuming the need for hierarchies (Rosenau 1995b). Thus, in 
addition to the definition given earlier (section 11.1), governance can be seen as 
“the process whereby .. a society steers itself, and the dynamics of communication 
and control are central to that process” (Rosenau 1995b: 14). This notion of 
steering is consistent with the suggestion, made in the previous paragraph, that the 
function of more aggregated governance institutions is to coordinate the actions o f 
more localised forms o f governance, not least because legitimate governance is 
more likely to be achieved by bottom-up rather than top-down processes.
Recent work on global governance by the UNDP and the Commission on 
Global Governance (COGG) embody the notion o f common security, but elevate it 
to a new moral plane. Common security in these projects is about equity, justice, 
caring, and “a universal moral community” - a significant extension o f its original 
conception as limited cooperation for the purposes of disarmament and war 
prevention (COGG 1995: 49).28 The Commission on Global Governance (COGG) 
suggests that:
The world community should reassert the importance of tolerance and 
respect for ‘the other’: respect for other people, other races, other beliefs, 
other sexual orientations, other cultures. It must be resolute in upholding 
these values and offering protection against the actions of those who would 
trample them. The guiding principle should be that all groups and 
individuals have a right to live as they see fit so long as they do not violate 
the coequal rights and liberties of others (COGG 1995: 53).
Consistent with the inclusive approach of this thesis, the COGG suggests that:
Global governance, once viewed primarily as concerned with 
intergovernmental relationships, now involves not only governments and 
intergovernmental institutions but also non-governmental organisations, 
citizens’ movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass
28 Our Global Neighbourhood is not without its shortcomings. For example, it has a liberal 
institutional bias (Knight 1995), and it does not take seriously enough the power of neo­
liberal ideology, whose interests the COGG ultimately serves (Broadhead 1996). The most 
comprehensive and thoughtful critique comes from Baxi (1996), who argues that the 
COGG talks of values and governance in ways that reinforce the interests of the north at the 
expense of the south. For Baxi, the COGG’s construction of the ‘global neighbourhood’ is 
particularly active in this masking of particular interests under the guise of global values. 
Thus this discussion does not advocate in full the recommendations of the COGG, but 
treats them with caution and in the context of the broader aims of enhancing true 
democracy, participation and negotiation. The COGG is nevertheless worth discussing 
because it is the most prominent of recent semi-official discussions of global governance.
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media... The United nations must play a vital role, but it cannot do all the 
work. (COGG 1995:335).
The COGG is in favour o f unilateral action to protect the security of people. It 
suggests that the U.N. has key role to play, not necessarily through the Security 
Council, but also through agencies such as the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. Other international 
groups such as the International Committee o f the Red Cross can also play a part. 
The international dimension and impartiality o f these institutions make them 
unique. Enhancing the efficacy o f these institutions is invaluable to enhancing 
environmental security. This implies that nation-states should fund and supply 
personnel to these institutions.
Environmental security requires global governance of this kind. Enhancing 
good governance throughout the world requires the involvement of 
intergovernmental international organisations to initiate, advise and assist in the 
implementation of reforms (UNDP 1997). There is also some scope for these 
organisations to engage in quasi-enforcement o f treaties and conventions (Sands 
1993). Intergovernmental international organisations are also valuable for their 
ability to bring together NGOs, national governments, local governments and 
other critical social groups, such as was the case at the UNCED and HABITAT II 
conferences. Global institutions are also necessary for coordinating, developing 
and monitoring international agreements on the environment; According to the 
Administrator o f the UNDP:
The continuing deterioration of the environment, and the expanding need to 
address environmental issues on an international basis, underscore the 
contribution an international entity can make in developing and monitoring 
international environmental agreements and promoting international 
environmental protection and cooperation... We need a strong international 
body to facilitate the work of the national environmental authorities at the 
regional and global levels (Speth 1997: 3).
Enhancing good governance as a means to enhance environmental security 
demands strengthening the United Nations in the short term. However, this is not 
necessarily an absolute or final precondition for environmental security. First and 
foremost, strengthening the United Nations means that nation-states pay their dues 
to the U.N. promptly and in full. Indeed, it suggests that nation-states increase 
their contributions to the U.N., and, consistent with U.N. objectives, this increase 
should come from savings acquired through disarmament. The COGG has made
9 9
Although it is noted that disarming nuclear, chemical and biological weapons probably 
means greater expenditure in the short term.
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a number o f suggestions for U.N. reform which seem valid, including a right for 
non-state actors to petition the Security Council to bring to its attention situations 
where the security o f people is endangered. It proposes revitalising the General 
Assembly as the universal forum o f the world’s states, and strengthening the 
authority o f the International Court of Justice (COGG 1995: 345-7, see also 
Timoshenko 1989). The COGG also recommends the establishment of a 
Demilitarisation Fund to help (it says developing) countries reduce military' 
commitments. More polemically, the COGG suggests that (a reformed) Security 
Council should have a limited but carefully controlled right to intervene in the 
affairs o f a state when it judges that there is a “violation of the security of people 
so gross and extreme that it requires an international response on humanitarian 
grounds” (COGG: 90). It suggests also that there be a standing U.N. Volunteer 
Force o f no more than 10,000 personnel which is capable o f backing up 
preventative diplomacy. This is a difficult issue, but this seems a useful strategy 
for easing the transitional period during which states demilitarise. Further, given 
that the militarily powerful states are able to do ‘peacekeeping’ without U.N. 
sanction (in part because they are integral to effective peacekeeping operations 
under the present system), a more effective and authoritative U.N. peacekeeping 
body may better challenge the rogue actions o f these states.30
The COGG also proposes establishing an Economic Security Council to 
deliberate and regulate matters pertaining to the global economy. Its tasks would 
be to provide a long term strategic framework “to promote stable, balanced, and 
sustainable development”; to ensure that agreed global economic policy goals are 
adhered to equally by all states; and to offer leadership and consensus on 
international economic issues (COGG 1995: 342). The COGG also suggests that 
there be charges on the use of the global commons, including charges for the use 
of sea lanes, flight lanes, fisheries and possibly a tax on foreign currency transfers 
(the ‘Tobin Tax’) (COGG 1995: 343). It is also suggested that a system capable of 
effectively taxing the activities of multinational corporations be developed (a 
carbon tax would go a long way here). These seem to be valid recommendations. 
An Economic Security Council might also implement and steer a unilaterally 
applied carbon-taxation system so that exported and imported products do not 
escape penalties or advantages that accrue according to their environmental cost.
j0 The recent U.S. troop build up in the Persian Gulf, for example, occurred without the 
explicit endorsement of the U.N. Security Council.
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An Economic Security Council might also be an appropriate forum for debt 
reduction and to elicit and administer unencumbered aid from wealthier countries.
The difficulty with proposing specific councils to deal with economic and 
military security is that this legitimates the prevailing military and economic 
concerns that have always dominated the security agenda while ignoring other 
sources of insecurity. Prioritising economic and military concerns in this way 
perpetuates the dominance o f ‘high politics’ and implies that other forms of 
insecurity are of lesser importance. The notion o f comprehensive security was 
proposed to counter this narrow approach. Comprehensive security implies that 
there needs to be more security councils, particularly ones to deal with 
environmental security, social security and political security (if we follow Buzan’s 
sectoral approach - see chapter 5), and food security and personal security might 
also warrant specific councils (if we follow the UNDP’s approach - see chapter 
10).31 Alternatively, rather than having a multitude of security councils there 
might be no security councils, and all matters o f security would be referred to the 
General Assembly. A further option would be to have one, ‘human security’ 
council.
If there is merit in adding more voices to political institutions at the nation­
state level (as discussed above), then there may equally be much to be gained from 
similar reforms at the global level. There is an array of possibilities here. Parallel 
assemblies to the present U.N. General Assembly (of states) could be developed 
for indigenous people, local governments, youth and NGOs (at least). Each 
parallel body might then converge at a supra-assembly where global issues are 
discussed. Alternatively, a reformed General Assembly might allocate a proportion 
of seats to indigenous people, local governments, youth and NGOs. The rationale 
is simple, global governance must involve more voices than those of nation-states. 
This principle should extend into whatever ‘security councils’ are formed (see 
above), as security also should not be left to nation-states alone. Furthermore, a 
more inclusive U.N. would need more diverse input into the operation o f the 
various U.N. agencies (UNEP, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR ect..), and again a 
minimum approach would be to allow indigenous, local government, NGO and
J1 There is also some merit in the idea of global educative authority to formulate a uniform 
syllabus of education for students, bureaucracies and commercial organisations throughout 
the world (Salla et al 1995).
j2 Managing representation here is an obvious difficulty given thousands of possible 
delegates from each category. The problem is not insurmountable if a degree of 
imagination and goodwill is applied.
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young people to be on the advisory boards of these bodies. As an absolute 
minimum, women should be equally represented right across the whole of the 
United Nations organisation.
An important function of global governance is to regulate the 
environmentally and socially damaging activities of multinational corporations 
and transnational capital (Redclift 1997b, O’Tuathail et al 1998). The growth of 
transnational flows of materials and money beyond the immediate purview of 
states is a novel feature of late modernity, and the difficulties of dealing with this 
in terms of environmental security cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the power of 
these processes and corporations should not be overstated such that the options 
available to the state are obscured. There are alternatives that arise from a 
fundamental difference between private multinational corporations and states, 
which is that states control space. This is not often a positive features of states, but 
it forms the basis of any effective strategy to control multinational corporations 
and speculators because their activities still occur somewhere in space. The 
principal difficulty rests not so much in the potential and means of control, but in 
the need for unilateral control across all states. In this sense coordinated and 
consistent global governance is particularly necessary.
11.3.4 Conclusions
This discussion has outlined ways in which a revitalisation of politics which 
respects the principles of inclusion and conversation can be implemented within 
contemporary structures of governance. This is an ambitious task and the 
discussion should be seen as exploratory. The discussion has argued that there is a 
need for: expansion of the range of groupings through which people can express 
their concerns; expansion of the range of forums whereby people can have their 
concerns heard and acted upon; formalising the involvement of traditionally 
informal political groups into institutions of governance at all levels from local to 
global; dissolving the rigid geographic limitations of contemporary political 
processes in ways that promote greater autonomy over some issues and lesser 
autonomy over others; synergising the activities of this new polycentric political 
structures through higher level but subordinate coordinating institutions; and 
enhancing the capacity to curtail the excesses of private enterprise.
It is tempting to conclude this discussion with a sweeping statement of the 
policies and institutions of governance necessary for environmental security.
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However, the best one can do with any confidence is restate the informing 
principles required for successful and more legitimate forms of governance, these 
are: inclusion, conversation, access, equity, and coordinated (not enforced) bottom 
up processes of reform. Beyond this, all that might be said is that the issue of 
governance needs further investigation; this, then, is “an unfinished story” 
(Rosenau 1995b: 39).
11.4 Conclusions
This chapter has made a preliminary exploration of the implications for politics, 
policy and governance of the human-centred environmental security concept 
proposed in chapter 10. Its exploration has been concerned with revitalised politics 
and institutions for better governance, arguing that detailed policy measures likely 
to be successful are already available, and that the more pressing deficiency lies in 
the failure of contemporary politics and institutions to implement these changes. 
The chapter has sought to cover a broad array of approaches, discussed in an 
approximate order of priority from individual action through to global level 
reforms. It has argued that individuals acting as conscious agents can transform 
the system to enhance environmental security, and that there is a triple motivation 
for this agency, namely the responsibility to others, the pursuit of true happiness 
and satisfaction, and the recovery of personal identity and ontological security. 
Within this broader life politics context, it then becomes possible to talk of 
meaningful and pragmatic reform of political institutions. The chapter has 
advocated a range of policies designed to foster a polycentric governance system 
which is determined by people acting in an enhanced democratic environment. It 
has also argued that with this polycentricity and reinvigorated politics comes a 
greater need for coordination, and to this end there needs to be equally democratic 
and inclusive institutions which facilitate this coordination and assist in fostering 
the desired reforms. These proposals advance the implementation of the new 
politics necessary for environmental security. Although the proposals of this 
chapter do not by any means address all the processes of modernity which 
generate insecurity (chapter 3), it is possible to see the meta-intent of this chapter - 
to allow people to take control of their lives - as the necessary first step to 




Conclusions tend to narrow a piece of research into an inadequate but digestible 
set of outcomes. True to form, this concluding chapter summarises the principal 
outcomes and contributions of this thesis, it revisits its aim, and it suggests some 
ways in which further research can advance environmental security. Conclusions 
also imply closure, but the deeper function of this thesis, and one which evades 
proper capture in this chapter, is to open up the study of environmental security by 
thinking critically about existing approaches, and thinking inventively about 
alternative possibilities. Thus it is the (in)conclusions and latent possibilities of 
this entire thesis that the reader may find more stimulating, and these are for the 
reader to discern according to their own predilections. It is hoped that the reader, 
regardless of perspective, has found something of interest herein.
It is important to recognise that writing and reading are acts of 
communication which are never perfect, but can nevertheless be improved by a 
commitment to clarity and transparency on the part of the author, and an attentive 
and open-minded approach by the reader. This thesis has sought to be clear and 
transparent, and this goal is carried through to the end of this chapter. Readers will 
of course interpret and learn from this thesis according to their own perspective, 
and may find interest in aspects of it that the author does not. Nevertheless, it is 
hoped that by the end of this chapter it will be apparent what this thesis claims to 
have done.
12.2 Review
The explicit overarching aim of this thesis was to critically examine the concept of 
environmental security. It is therefore necessary to explain how this has been 
fulfilled as this is presumably the minimum criteria for assessment, although it is 
hoped that the value of this dissertation will not be judged by this criteria alone. 
The proliferation of ad-hoc and divergent approaches to environmental security 
make a comprehensive and critical examination of the concept timely. Such an 
examination is also warranted because environmental security increasingly
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appears in policy-discourse, particularly in the United States. Finally, an 
examination such as this might assist in the development of an environmental 
security concept that offers something new to the broader goal of the peaceful 
resolution of environmental problems. This overarching aim was to be satisfied by 
meeting a number of specific requirements.
The first requirement to meet this thesis’ overarching aim was to establish 
the particular problem that concerns this thesis. This is necessary because in most 
accounts of environmental security the problem is implicit in the answer, rather 
than clearly stated at the outset. Clearly establishing the problem in this particular 
way is therefore an original contribution, and serves as a firm basis for the 
subsequent examination of concept of environmental security.
Axiomatic as it may seem, environmental security should be seen as the 
response to the problem of environmental insecurity. Chapter 1 proposed a 
humanistic understanding of environmental insecurity as the vulnerability of 
people to the effects of environmental degradation. Environmental insecurity was 
understood as a double injustice arising from economic processes that create 
poverty, and the subsequent environmental degradation and exacerbated 
vulnerability that results from these processes. Environmental insecurity, then, is 
when already vulnerable people become more vulnerable due to environmental 
degradation. More broadly, environmental insecurity is the condition of unstable 
and declining trends in human health and welfare.
The second requirement was to outline the particular critical approach this 
thesis adopts to the subject of environmental security. This was necessary to make 
clear the presuppositions and values this thesis holds. It also contributes to this 
thesis’ goal of transparency, and provides a useful starting point to the 
examination of environmental security. Satisfying this second requirement was the 
function of chapter 2, the first chapter in Part I of this thesis.
The particular critical approach developed in chapter 2 draws on the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School, feminist theory, poststructuralist theory, and 
Green theory (further discussion of these can be found in appendix I). Some 
features more or less common to of all these critical perspectives were elicited, 
and these formed the basis of this thesis’ critical green approach. These include: an 
open declaration of the values informing a study and a consistent adherence to 
these values; a dialectical perspective; an appreciation and regard for history; a
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positive view of human nature and an emancipatory intent; an holistic and 
interdisciplinary approach; and a concern for imagination and utopianism. Chapter 
2 also discussed the normative concern of this thesis which is encapsulated in the 
notion of peace.
It is not for this thesis to assess the contribution of chapter 2 to either critical 
environmental politics or critical scholarship more generally. It is hoped, though, 
that it has shed some light on the difficult problem of linking the Green 
perspective with other critical perspectives.
The third requirement to satisfy this thesis’ overarching aim was to 
understand the evolution of environmental insecurity. This is consistent with the 
critical regard for history, and necessary to appreciate the nature and origins of 
contemporary insecurity such that existing responses can be appraised, and 
historically aware solutions proposed. Chapter 3 has sought to fulfil this third 
requirement - remembering that history is a big place!
Chapter 3 offers a broad and sweeping meta-history, and while too brief to 
do justice to the task, it has sought to elicit some key themes which explain 
contemporary environmental insecurity'. The principal lessons from this historical 
analysis are that population, energy use, social disaggregation, structural and 
direct violence, and environmental degradation - all of which contribute to 
environmental insecurity - have grown exponentially over time. The particular 
history presented in chapter 3 can be seen as a progression from a state where 
‘peace’ was unthinkable given the general absence of direct and structural 
violence, to a state where violence of both kinds is rife and peace therefore 
becomes a master metaphor for the Good life.
In the earliest and longest hunter-gatherer phase of human history, humans 
lived close to nature, their activities were environmentally sustainable, social life 
was characterised by close and interdependent relationships with the immediate in­
group, and basic health and social needs were fulfilled. Insecurities took the form 
of the risks associated with the intimate interaction with nature. With the advent of 
agriculture, humans gradually came to live in more settled groups, population 
slowly increased, and there was a more regular and reliable supply of food. 
However, with greater dependence on single crops for food came greater 
vulnerability to natural perturbations. Over time an agricultural surplus was 
produced which, in conjunction with other factors, gave rise to the first cities. The
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survival of the city depended on sophisticated hierarchies of domination and 
exploitation to ensure a sufficient supply of food. With the city came organised 
warfare, and larger scale agriculture meant more intense forms of environmental 
degradation. Late in this early urban phase Europeans began to colonise the world 
and bring diverse peoples and environs under their control. With the advent of the 
industrial revolution fossil fuel use and the human population increased at a 
massive rate. Modem society is characterised by: industrialism; capitalism; a 
heavy dependent on fossil fuels; the legitimate use of increasingly destructive 
force by the state; the increase in consumption of luxury items; the oppression and 
impoverishment of millions - later billions - of people; the rise of instrumental 
reason and the sublimation of tradition; and the widespread and in some 
circumstances global spread of environmental degradation. All of these are, 
directly or indirectly, sources of environmental insecurity.
Over the course of this history the locus of insecurity shifted from being 
rooted in nature to being rooted in humanity itself. In today’s late modem era, the 
risks humans pose to themselves and other humans, and by the damage we have 
wrought upon nature, combine to produce multitudinous forms of insecurity, 
including environmental insecurity. Nevertheless, the positive lesson is that 
throughout history humans have learned to adapt, often peacefully, to changing 
circumstances. This offers hope that in this late modem era we can once again 
adapt and meet the basic needs of all people in all places.
This particular account of the history of insecurity is unique, as an historical 
perspective is almost completely absent in the environmental security literature, 
and because it uses insecurity as the interpretive theme.
Chapters 2 and 3 comprise Part I of this thesis. These chapters established a 
firm theoretical and historical starting point for the more detailed examination of 
environmental security that occurs in Part II. Rather than establishing this 
theoretical and historical beginning in a dry and uncontentious manner, Part I has 
sought instead to delve deep into these issues in an exploratory and polemical 
manner. This serves to make the account more interesting and challenging, and 
hopefully it offers a rich source for future debate and research.
The fourth requirement was to explore the meaning of security. This is 
necessary as security per se is integral to environmental security. Chapter 4, the 
first chapter in Part II of this thesis, sought to satisfy this requirement by
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discussing the concept of security in general terms, and then discussing and 
critiquing the dominant Realist approach to security which has conditioned most 
accounts of environmental security. The claim of this chapter was that security 
understood as the security of the nation-state, and procured through military 
power, undermines the security of the people the state purports to protect. The 
resonances of this Realist approach are evident in many discussions of 
environmental security. Chapter 4 makes no pretence to originality.
The fifth requirement was to understand the origins of the concept of 
environmental security. This is important for any comprehensive and critical 
examination of the concept. Chapter 5 sought to meet this requirement by 
discussing efforts to extend and modify the dominant Realist approach, as it was 
from these efforts that the concept of environmental security emerged. The 
argument of this chapter was that these efforts to expand the meaning of security 
did not modify the dominant Realist approach, but were instead appropriated and 
incorporated into it.
This chapter can not honestly claim to make an original contribution to the 
literature. However, reviewing the historical origins of the concept of 
environmental security in this way offers important lessons for the politics of 
security discourse, and it is necessary if this thesis’ aim to conduct a critical 
examination of environmental security is to be properly satisfied.
The sixth requirement to meet this thesis’ overarching aim was to critically 
appraise the argument(s) that environmental degradation will induce violent 
conflict. This is necessary as these environment-conflict arguments dominate the 
environmental security literature. Meeting this requirement was the function of 
chapter 6.
The literature considers that depletion and contamination of various 
‘resources’, as well as rapid population growth, will induce violent conflict. This 
thesis has argued that this preoccupation with violent conflict reflects the 
particular (not essential) Realist ontology which assumes that people will naturally 
resort to violence rather than cooperate in times of stress. It is also a product of an 
imperfect reading of history, and this literature fails to adequately grasp the 
differences between resource and environmental problems. Further, this research 
leads to the militarisation of environmental issues, and it obscures recognition of 
the day-to-day environmental insecurities experienced by people. Focusing on
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negative peace in this way obscures the broader and more pervasive need for 
positive peace. A more productive research agenda would be to explore instances 
where people have cooperated peacefully in times of scarcity. There are few 
systematic and critical discussions of these environment-conflict arguments, and 
none as comprehensive as that presented in chapter 6.
The seventh requirement was to examine existing policy manifestations of 
environmental security. This is necessary to gain a better appreciation of how the 
concept has been interpreted and deployed by the nation-state which is (in 
modernity) the dominant purveyor of security, and which is integral to efforts to 
overcome environmental insecurity. Fulfilling this requirement was the function of 
chapter 7, which began by discussing environmental security as a national security 
phenomena, and then focused on the policy initiatives of the United States.
The examination of U.S. environmental security policy-discourse found that 
environmental security has been interpreted and deployed in ways that legitimise 
traditional security practices. U.S. environmental security policy-discourse 
understands environmental security to be the military defence of the inside against 
an existentially threatening outside; there is little to suggest that the insecurity of 
people is of genuine concern. The lesson of this examination of U.S. 
environmental security policy is that unless a more competitive account of 
environmental security is developed, and one which has a readily available set of 
policy options, the concept will continue to be used to perpetuate the security 
establishment. This is not to say that a more resolute conceptualisation can totally 
prevent the appropriation of environmental security, but it is to say that it can 
contest the concept more effectively to (hopefully) affect a shift in its meaning and 
practice. This is undoubtedly the most extensive critical discussion of U.S. 
environmental security policy.
The eighth requirement was to examine the connections between the 
military and the environment. This is necessary as the military is the dominant 
agent of security in modem (formal) politics, and because much of the 
environmental security literature makes connections between the military and the 
environment. Chapter 8 sought to meet this requirement.
Chapter 8 discussed the rather obvious point that war causes environmental 
degradation. It then discussed the way in which military preparations for war 
degrade the environment, and agreed with much of the literature that the military
303
is indeed a significant cause of environmental insecurity. More significantly, the 
difficult question of whether militaries may have a positive role to play in 
enhancing environmental security was considered. The response to this question 
was a tentative and qualified ‘yes’; the argument being that the military may have 
a positive contribution by engaging in non-core and non-coercive activities which 
have a direct and observable positive environmental outcome. This finding should 
not be presented without its attending caveats. Tackling the role of the military 
cuts to the core of the positive/negative peace dilemma, and the proposal to 
cautiously involve the military in environmental restoration seeks to affect a shift 
from a negative to a positive peace role for the military. The real benefit to flow 
from this involvement is that it may serve as a transitional step towards conversion 
of the military. This latter discussion is the most extensive and arguably the most 
reasoned of all efforts to consider the role of the military in relation to 
environmental issues.
The ninth requirement to meet this thesis’ overarching aim was to examine 
the notion of ecological - as opposed to environmental - security. This was the 
function of chapter 9. An examination of ecological security is necessary as it 
seems to present a different approach to the connections between security and the 
environment.
Chapter 9 began with a review of the literature which talks in terms of 
ecological security. The difficulty of distinguishing between ‘ecological’ and 
‘environmental’ security in the literature was noted, and making this distinction 
clearer was another function of this chapter. The chapter applied ecological theory 
to security, and it argued that resilience and diversity can be metaphors for a more 
positive approach to security. Chapter 9 discussed the difficult issue of sovereignty 
and ecology, and it tentatively suggested that rather than attempting to rethink 
sovereignty, it is perhaps better to rethink the meaning and practice of politics 
more generally. Chapter 9 also presented and applied a framework for identifying 
ecological security problems. These are widespread and long-lived ecological 
disturbances which contribute to environmental insecurity; they include climate 
change, biodiversity loss, and accidental releases from nuclear power stations.
Chapter 9 argued that despite its many merits, the concept of ecological 
security is less effective than that of environmental security in that environmental 
security has a certain intuitive resonance and it speaks to the prevailing Realist
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approach to security in a way that offers the possibility of dialogue, contestation 
and potential reform. Ecological security does not do this. Therefore, it was 
proposed that the better strategy is to persevere with environmental security, but to 
incorporate the themes of ecological security into a reformulated human-centred 
environmental security concept. This chapter makes a modest contribution to the 
literature.
Chapter 4 to 9 comprise Part II of this thesis. Together they provide a 
detailed critical examination of existing approaches to environmental security. On 
the basis of the limitations of existing approaches identified in these chapters, Part 
III of this thesis reformulated the concept of environmental security and explored 
the implications of this for politics, policy, and governance.
The tenth requirement to meet this thesis’ overarching aim was to propose a 
concept of environmental security that overcomes the limitations of existing 
approaches. This was the function of chapter 10, the first chapter in Part III of this 
thesis. It was argued that environmental security needs to be human-centred, 
peace-oriented, and adaptive to change in order to overcome the limitations (and 
omissions) of existing approaches. A human-centred environmental security 
concept combines the interests of peace and the environment, and it contests and 
contrasts with the dominant nation-centred and conflict-oriented approach. It also 
serves as an alternative paradigm from which new understandings and responses to 
environmental problems may emerge.
Chapter 10 began by reviewing the literature which seeks to reclaim security 
to serve the needs and aspirations of people. This offered important lessons of 
relevance to the human-centred environmental security concept which was then 
proposed. This concept seeks to be true to the norm of positive peace. The highest 
priority of such an approach, it was argued, should be to enhance the security of 
those people most vulnerable to environmental degradation. The human-centred 
approach is based on the notions of risk and resilience. Such an approach makes 
clear that positive peace is integral to achieving environmental security. This 
approach does not concern itself with the possibility that environmental 
degradation may induce violent conflicts, nor does it concern itself with national 
security. In this account people are the first and overriding security referent.
A definition of environmental security was proposed. The features of this 
were human security (expressed as less vulnerability/more resilience);
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environmental security as an adaptive process; and the need to treat the root causes 
of human vulnerability (the processes which induce environmental degradation). 
The definition was justified by answering key questions associated with security 
(whose security? - security from what? - and insecurity how?), and by answering 
some questions posed in the literature. It was argued that this human-centred 
approach to environmental security differs from other environmental discourses as 
it strongly emphasises the need to meet basic needs ahead of any other societal 
need, it explores the linkages between peace and the environment, it addresses the 
juncture of foreign policy and the environment, it addresses the role of the 
military, and it adds a significant political dimension to environmental issues. 
These are perhaps not unique in and of themselves, however the particular 
combination makes environmental security (so conceived) a useful alternative 
concept for understanding and posing solutions to environmental problems.
Chapter 10 also reasserted that environmental security is useful for the way 
it challenges the meaning and practice of security. Implicit in the concept is the 
idea that environmental problems are security issues which warrant extraordinary 
responses from government, because providing security is the highest purpose of 
government. In this account, it is human security that governments should be 
making every effort to address. Chapter 10 has made a significant contribution the 
literature. It has developed a consistent and peace-promoting account of 
environmental security that differs considerably from, and offers a viable 
alternative to, prevailing approaches.
The eleventh requirement was to discuss the implications of the human- 
centred environmental security concept for politics, policy, and governance. This 
is necessary as the value of a new concept in part lies in the suggestions it 
generates. Further, this discussion is justified by the recognition that to be 
effective critical security studies must move beyond critiques of the politics of 
security discourse, and start addressing the political requirements for security. 
Chapter 11 sought to satisfy this last requirement.
Chapter 11 did not seek to propose detailed policy measures, arguing that 
these are available elsewhere. Instead, it argued that the failure to provide 
environmental security stems from failures in contemporary politics and 
governance. The role of individuals as agents of security was given considerable 
attention. It was argued that people, mostly in the industrialised countries, have
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three motivations to act as conscious political agents: for the benefit of others; for 
the satisfaction of genuine needs; and to secure their identity and give meaning to 
their lives. Such action can reform existing institutions that generate 
environmental insecurity. This action can take many forms, including consuming 
less and actively engaging in formal and informal political processes. Consuming 
less and consuming smarter, for example, undermines and reshapes the capitalist 
economy, and participating in a diverse array of political forums enhances the 
processes of governance and strengthens social resilience.
The implications of the human-centred approach to environmental security 
for national policy were then considered. The most important recommendation 
was to listen to, and act on, the interests of the most vulnerable. A range of 
measures were proposed to enhance good governance for environmental security. 
These were informed by the need for greater inclusion of alternative perspectives, 
greater dialogue and conversation about political priorities, and the need for 
institutions that respect processes as much as outcomes. It was suggested that 
these principles could be achieved through a more polycentric and scale varied 
system of governance in which women are equally represented, and which 
includes social movements, indigenous people, local governments, young people, 
and trade unions. Greater accommodation of diverse perspectives into process- 
oriented and consensus-based systems of governance helps protect the social 
diversity necessary for just, flexible, and resilient (therefore secure) societies.
Chapter 11 makes an important contribution to the literature by proposing a 
set of recommendations for political practice which are consistent with the need 
people have for environmental security. These recommendations are consistent 
with theories about good governance and better democracy, and are confirmed by 
practices of environmental governance in Australia. They also offer a different 
approach to the problem of global politics by focusing on governance rather than 
on the difficulties associated with sovereignty. Moving beyond a critical 
perspective means taking risks and proposing changes. There are no easy answers 
to these questions of politics, policy, and governance, and the real value of this 
chapter lies in the future research and dialogue that it might provoke.
307
Conclusions: A critical examination o f environmental security reconsidered
To be thorough and to act as a stimulus to further dialogue, a critical security 
project should have three parts: it should identify its particular critical approach 
and its position as a subject, and ideally it should explain the historical context in 
which it situates itself (Part I); it should provide a critique of the existing meaning 
and practice of security, and in this case environmental security (Part II); and on 
the basis of this it should offer its own reformulation of security and link this to 
political practice (Part III). This thesis has satisfied these requirements.
Ultimately it is up to the reader to determine whether the overarching aim of 
conducting a critical examination of environmental security has been sufficiently 
achieved. It is the contention of the author though, that by defining the problem at 
the outset; by adopting a critical perspective; by proposing a history of 
environmental insecurity; by examining the dominant approach to security; by 
examining the origins of environmental security; by examining the idea of 
environmentally induced conflicts; by examining existing environmental security 
policies; by thoughtfully engaging with the linkages between the military and 
environmental degradation; by discussing the notion of ecological security; and by 
proposing an alternative approach to environmental security and proposing a range 
of actions consistent with this - this thesis can reasonably be said to have satisfied 
this overarching aim.
The meta-outcome of this thesis has been the development of a critically 
informed and positive peace-promoting environmental security concept, including 
suggestions for how this can be put into practice. This differs significantly from 
the political Realist, nation-centred, militaristic and negative peace approaches 
that currently dominate the meaning and practice of environmental security. It is 
hoped that this reformulated and more resolute conceptualisation can better contest 
and therefore change the meaning and practice of environmental security, and 
indeed security more generally.
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12.3 Environmental Security: Now What?
The last task of this dissertation is to suggest areas for further research to advance 
the meaning and practice of environmental (human) security. This discussion is 
not concerned with the ability of particular disciplines to contribute to this 
research agenda. Instead, it outlines the general areas warranting further 
exploration, believing that a problem-oriented approach is the best way to 
overcome disciplinary specialisation and foster integrative and innovative 
research.
This thesis has argued that environmental security securitises environmental 
problems, thereby making them more important than other mainstream political 
issues. This is a double edged sword; securitising environmental issues runs the 
risk that the Realism will co-opt and colonise the environmental agenda rather 
than respond positively to environmental problems; alternatively, environmental 
security can contest the legitimacy of the Realist approach to security and 
highlight its contradictions. It is the contention of this thesis that the latter function 
justifies the risk of co-optation, particularly given that the concept has by-and- 
large been co-opted anyway. If environmental problems can be securitised in a 
way that challenges the Realist paradigm yet has currency with policy discourse, 
national governments may well take environmental problems more seriously, 
reduce defence budgets, and implement policies for a more peaceful and 
environmentally secure world. This thesis has argued that for environmental 
security to contest the Realist approach in this way, and for it to offer useful policy 
advice, it needs to be framed in terms of human security.
This thesis has thought through the politics of security discourse as it relates 
to the environment. It has determined that environmental security is a risky 
venture, but one worth pursuing. The greatest risk, perhaps, is that Realist security 
discourse abandons the use of environmental security altogether, thereby ending 
the discursive contest. Until such time, there a need for ongoing and obstinate 
contestation of the meaning and practice of security and environmental security. 
There are, as in this thesis, three components to this. First, there is a need for 
continued development of theories and historical explanations which can serve as 
solid foundations for a human-centred environmental security concept, and which 
can enhance critique and contestation. Second, and contingent upon the former, 
there is a need for ongoing critique of existing theories and practices of security
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and environmental security. This can be done, for example, through a framework 
of questions (whose security? - security from what? - insecurity how? - why 
security?); and by exposing contradictions between the alleged benefits of the 
theory and practice of environmental security and the reality of environmental 
insecurity. Third, and contingent upon the first two components, there is a need to 
posit alternative theories and concepts, and to link these to practice. In general, the 
critique of security and (after this thesis) environmental security is well developed, 
and so the challenges lie more in developing the foundations and advancing the 
alternatives. The remainder of this discussion provides thoughts on ways to 
enhance the contestation of the meaning and practice of security and 
environmental security according to these three components.
Enhancing the foundations
Integral to the need for further critical research is the refinement and development 
of more explanatory modes of critical thought. It is the contention of this thesis 
that one way in which this might be done is to think freely about what is common 
to various critical approaches, and to more constructively link the insights and 
strategies of these. This calls for an honest and (dare it be said) ‘communicatively 
rational’ dialogue between advocates of critical and emancipatory theories. This, 
however, is no easy task.
There is also a pressing need for alternative histories. The contention of this 
thesis is that history tends to support an atomistic and negative ontology of human 
nature, because history tends to be a ledger of anomalous episodes of conflict - 
which can be read as proof that humans are predisposed to violence. It is thus the 
silences of history - the more proliferate instances of negotiation and cooperation - 
that need to be found and asserted as these offer a basis of hope and lessons for 
strategies to provide peace and security. This calls for extensive projects on both 
‘peace histories’ and ‘environmental histories’.
Enhancing the critique
Security as territorial integrity determines national identity by delineating 
threatening Others. This is an inherently violent form of identity creation which 
justifies militarism and complements exploitative capitalist modes of exchange; it 
entrenches a competitive and hostile view of the world. In such a world there can 
be no unilateral action to protect people and the environment. There is therefore a
310
need to dissolve this state centrism and crude identity politics. The challenge is to 
construct multiple ‘maps’ that show the dimensions and spectrums of other 
political, ecological, social, economic and cultural spaces and processes; these can 
highlight the limitations of Realism’s two-dimensional view of the world. If the 
individual and social groups can appreciate the multiple forms of affiliation that 
are available to them, then this might serve as a positive source of identity creation 
which embraces the global community and breaks down the distinction between 
Us and Other. Expanding awareness of the complexity and connectivity of the 
world will help dissolve the tendency to ascribe threats, risks and dangers to 
Others. We may then appreciate that in life there will always be insecurity and 
risk, but violence rarely - if ever - provides security. In short, there is a need to 
demonstrate interdependence.
Scholarship of a critical nature clearly has a key role to play in enhancing 
environmental security. The basic function of critical scholarship is to open up 
thinking space and to generate alternatives. More specifically for environmental 
security, critical scholarship has to continually unmask discourses which construct 
an ethnocentric and essential account o f ‘reality’ and identity which in turn lead to 
practices which exclude and oppress people who lie outside the frame of reference. 
There is a need to continually challenge simplistic responses to complex problems. 
It is also necessary to continue to challenge the presumption that economic forces 
are beyond political control. Further, it is necessary to continue to contest singular 
representations of words like security, as it is through such discursive 
contestations that malignant discourses can be critiqued and benign alternatives 
proposed in the hope of affecting a shift from malignant to benign practices.
There is a normative element to this thesis’ critique. An'explicitly normative 
style of argumentation is rare in the security literature, but does seem to be a valid 
and constructive technique of critique. In addition, normative argumentation is 
more conducive to the generation of alternative and positive concepts and 
recommendations for change. Part of the reluctance to engage in normative theory, 
one suspects, is its problematisation by relativist forms of postmodern theory, 
where to argue on the basis of a notion of the Good is seen to be an argument in 
favour of singular and therefore exclusionary prescriptions which cannot possibly 
be Good for all people (see Appendix I, section 6). It is ironic, but probably fair to 
say that the postmodern turn has helped protect violent theories and practices such 
as Realism from criticism, because it is now difficult to say that these are Bad in
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the absence of a sense of the Good. It is at this juncture that a key message of this 
thesis applies - that is that politics should be the discursive or dialogical 
negotiation of the Good; to wit, the Good is not singly determined but 
continuously consensually derived (see chapter 11). However, the absence of a 
stable and universal Good does not mean that there is an absence of things that are 
more or less Bad. Indeed, that violent theories such as Realism (and neo­
liberalism) exclude alternative voices, impose their will upon others, and affect 
material oppression, these theories and practices are Bad by virtue of the way they 
suppress the possibility of a democratically and consensually determined Good.
So, normative critique is still possible, but normative critique, like all forms of 
critique, requires a deep level of awareness of the context, the implications and the 
responsibilities that are involved in arguing against, and for, certain theories, 
discourses and practices. As a final thought on the matter, normative critique 
enables a sense of optimism, and a capacity for obstinance. These are both 
required if the meaning and practice of security and environmental security are to 
be changed.
Enhancing the theory and practice o f environmental security for people
In order to enhance the robustness of its human centred concept of environmental 
security, this thesis has drawn on ecological theory, risks and hazards literature, 
and existing approaches to environmental management and policy. Its 
understanding of these is perhaps cursory, however it has shown that there is a 
degree of confluence between these. This points to a substantial research agenda of 
enhancing the theory and practice of environmental security by integrating 
perspectives from ecological theory, risks and hazards, and environmental 
management and policy. More generally, these may offer important lessons for the 
theory and practice of positive peace.
There is a substantial amount of literature which looks at disruptions to local 
environments and the ways these may induce conflict (discussed in chapter 6). 
What is absent is consideration of the day-to-day insecurities that people face, and 
the broader global economic processes that in many direct and indirect ways 
generate environmental insecurity. If we are to better understand the phenomenon 
of environmental insecurity then it is these routine impacts of global processes that 
must be further investigated. Development studies has already provided many 
valuable lessons here, but this is a challenging area and our understanding is not
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fully complete. A useful research strategy would be to conduct a series of case 
studies of environmental insecurity across a diverse range of places and cultures in 
an attempt to explicate both common and particular causes. As an immediate task, 
the lessons of similar types of analysis that are already available could be 
described in the language of security such that the global-local mechanisms which 
generate insecurity could be brought to the fore of security discourse.
A more necessary research task is to demonstrate how people cope with 
vulnerability and scarcity in peaceful ways. This is the inverse of the case studies 
of violent conflict discussed in chapter 6. If we are serious about peace then we 
should learn from instances of peace. A case study approach such as suggested in 
the previous paragraph might help elicit what is common to the many cases where 
people have responded non-violently to externally derived but locally felt 
environmental insecurity. The lessons distilled from these case studies could then 
be applied to cases where communication and cooperative arrangements for peace 
and sustainable development have broken down. A challenge for environmental 
security, then, is to learn from instances of cooperation rather than focusing on 
instances of violent conflict.
This thesis can be read as a sustained exploration of the relationship 
between peace and environmental degradation. It has argued that environmental 
degradation is a function of structural violence, and that the construction of 
environmental problems as requiring defence against Others leads to the 
perpetuation of the same forms of violence responsible for environmental 
degradation. Inverting the discussion, it is the contention of this thesis that positive 
peace is the best means to achieve environmental security. However, the various 
connections between peace and environmental degradation need to be more fully 
explored. One particularly fruitful area for research would be to investigate the 
possibility that common environmental problems can provide a basis for the 
resolution of long-standing social and political conflicts. As an example, water 
scarcity seems to be a particularly valuable basis upon which to build peace - as 
the case of the Okavango River, shared by Angola, Botswana and Namibia seems 
to suggest (chapter 6). Such a research strategy may pave the way for turning 
strategies for negative peace into strategies for positive peace. In short, there is a 
need to prove not just that peace is necessary for environmental security, but that 
resolving environmental problems can forge peace.
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Beyond this applied approach to peace-environment connections, there is 
scope for more theoretical investigation as well. A challenging but likely 
rewarding area of research lies in the linkages between ecological theory and 
peace - linkages which this thesis has barely begun to explore (chapter 9). What 
this thesis has done is to prove that there is sufficient resonance between 
ecological theory and a politics of peace and security to warrant further 
investigation. Further, investigation of this kind may offer extremely valuable 
insights for Green theory, and indeed for all dialectically-oriented theories. The 
difficulties of such a research agenda lie in tentative nature of ecological theory, 
and in the tendency for social and political theorists to simplify, misconstrue and 
misappropriate these tentative theories. The best short-term strategy to advance the 
relation between ecology and a politics of peace is to convene a series of 
exploratory and interdisciplinary workshops, and to publish their findings. One 
important outcome of this would be to increase the population ecologists’ 
awareness of the social sciences and humanities, and conversely, to increase the 
social sciences’ and humanities’ awareness of ecological theory.
A particular limitation of critical scholarship is the difficulty that it has in 
informing policy and posing genuine alternative courses of action. This limitation 
is no doubt evident in this thesis. It is difficult to move quickly from a critical to a 
prescriptive mode, indeed the latter almost seems to be anathema to the former. 
However valuable the contribution of critical perspectives, it is nevertheless 
important to talk about the immediate needs for a better future. In the absence of 
critically informed prescriptions, ad hoc and ideologically laden measures are 
proposed, and these tend perpetuate the status quo. So, critical research must say 
more about positive changes that are needed now in order to achieve a more secure 
future. Bearing this in mind, this thesis has attempted to say what may be 
necessary to achieve environmental security given the limitations of existing 
approaches thus far. It has argued that a peaceful and secure future requires the 
involvement of all people in the determination and implementation of the Good. It 
would be presumptuous to describe the discussion in chapter 11 as anything other 
than exploratory. It is therefore open to debate, and indeed should be debated.
A contention of this thesis is that generally satisfactory policies are 
available in various international agreements and conventions on the environment, 
development, and population. In addition to these, this thesis has added that there 
is a need to creatively and constructively engage with the military, and it was
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suggested that this might be done through careful involvement of the military in 
environmental restoration and (non-coercive) protection. There is clearly 
enormous scope for further research to develop specific programs in which the 
military might be involved.
This thesis has argued that environmental insecurity stems from a failure of 
politics and governance. To this end the most important research agenda of all is to 
find ways to revitalise politics, and to design a polycentric, scale varied, 
coordinated system of governance that is flexible and represents all people. This is 
an extremely difficult and challenging task; it is also most urgent.
In the final analysis, enhancing environmental security involves no less than 
overcoming the negative aspects of modernity. This means thinking seriously 
about the nation-state and ways to reform it. It means resolving difficult issues to 
do with politics, democracy, justice, freedom, responsibility, diversity, reason, 
ethics, communication, and the situating and scaling of legitimate institutions of 
governance. This will not be easy, but if it has done nothing else, hopefully this 
thesis has shown that an environmentally secure future is still a possibility.
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